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This thesis explores the dynamics of conflict by focusing on two aspects of the problem – 
(a), links between illicit drugs and conflict and (b), the mechanism and extent to which 
illicit drug production and trade weaken the state. The research question I have set out for 
this project is: “what is the impact of illicit drugs on conflict and how does access to drugs 
affect the strength and ideology of insurgent groups and hampers state-building?” 
Although Afghanistan is the main case study, in order to understand the phenomenon in a 
wider context, the study also explores the relationship between drugs economy and conflict 
through examples of insurgencies in other parts of the world – mainly the FARC in 
Colombia, PKK in Turkey and LTTE in Sri Lanka.  
 
In addition, the thesis offers a unique empirical contribution. Based on first-hand 
knowledge from the field, this study is unusual in many ways as it critically analyses the 
impact of illicit drugs on conflict and governance and explores how the patron-client 
relations in the drug trade create and cement structural corruption. In order to produce a 
uniquely detailed picture of the conflict in Afghanistan and the overall impact of drugs, 
this study draws on an extensive field work and more than a hundred original interviews 
with several actors including insurgents, drug traders/smugglers, poppy farmers, local 
elders and politicians, government officials as well as experts. It explores, arguably, for the 
first time, the detailed mechanism and extent to which drug production and trafficking 
inhibit state-building and facilitate insurgency in Afghanistan. The study argues that the 
conflict in Afghanistan didn’t start because of drugs; it was the war that created a suitable 
environment for drug production which now plays a significant role in perpetuating and 
prolonging the violence. The study examines the Taliban’s evolving involvement in the 
drugs economy and discusses the insurgent group’s multiple sources of income. It also 
provides a comprehensive picture of the Taliban’s governance and organisational structure. 
 
This research offers a multidisciplinary framework drawing together data from a number of 
areas of knowledge and sources and examines the nexus between drugs, insurgency and 
state-building by offering detailed and fresh information on the current state of overlapping 
fields such as International Relations, Political Economy, Political Anthropology and 
Development and State-Building. While focusing on the decades-long war in Afghanistan, 
the thesis attempts to provide an integrated and comprehensive framework for 
understanding the conflict in general. While discussing the conflicts’ causes and 
motivations, the existing literature is mostly focused on a few factors including greed, 
grievance, ethnic and social deprivation. Although these are all valuable and important 
contributions, the thesis argues that the conflict itself is a complex phenomenon and its 
understanding and analysis needs a comprehensive approach. Therefore, the thesis also 
examines other overlooked and overlapping factors including the role of foreign actors, 
nationalism, criminality and ideology in initiating and perpetuating the conflict. This study 
fills a conceptual lacuna in the field of conflict studies and devotes considerable attention 
to the problems of drugs and conflicts, the challenges of state-building and the 
complexities of insurgency by bringing together various dimensions and factors into one 
whole.  
 
The thesis argues that in an increasingly perplexing and globalising world, conflicts are 
becoming more complicated involving a variety of actors at local, regional and 
international levels as well as a combination of a wide range of causes and motivations. 
While discussing the motivations and causes of conflicts including civil wars, this study 
suggests the “Hybrid Framework” of conflict to understand the nature of intra-state 
conflicts. The “Hybrid Framework” takes into account a variety of overlapping causes and 
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Due to its geographical location and strategic significance, Afghanistan has frequently 
been a battlefield for major powers and a variety of invaders for several millennia. The 
breakup of society resulting from these foreign invasions and wars has, at times, also led to 
internal strife and civil wars. The recent history of Afghanistan shows that the country has 
been at the centre of various encounters and upheavals. In the 19
th
 Century, Afghanistan 
was at the heart of the Great Game between the two super powers -- British Empire and the 
Tsarist Russia. During the Cold War (1945-1991), the country became a main battlefield in 
the strategic competition between the US-led capitalist bloc and the communist USSR. The 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 made the country a main theatre of an international 
conflict which brought numerous regional and international actors together to fight against 
each other in the villages and valleys of this ancient land. Although the conflict in the 
country has taken many shapes and forms over the past few decades, the Soviet invasion 
marked the beginning of a long phase of violence which is still continuing. The conflict in 
Afghanistan transformed from an anti-Soviet resistance to a proxy battle between 
neighbouring countries and other regional players and, with the passage of time, became 
more complex involving dozens of local and international state and non-state actors. Only 
twelve years after the withdrawal of one super power -- USSR, the country was invaded by 
another superpower -- USA. Following the attacks on the US on 11
th
 September 2001, 
Afghanistan was turned overnight into another international battlefield and became the 
main theatre of the US-led “War on Terror”.  
The wars and invasions are associated with many other major problems in the country, 
namely drugs and opium in particular. Opium had been cultivated in the region which later 
became known as Afghanistan for hundreds if not thousands of years. Traditional 
cultivation and use of opium, mainly for medicinal or recreational purposes, had been 
engrained in parts of the country for at least one thousand years. Nevertheless, drug 
production (primarily opium and cannabis) increased considerably in the period succeeding 
the onset of the ongoing conflict. The destruction of critical infrastructure and the collapse 
of state institutions as a result of these invasions and wars created a suitable environment 
for a flourishing drugs economy and made the country one of the biggest opium producers 
in the world. Following the Soviet invasion, a number of Afghan farmers switched to 
2 
 
opium poppies, as most of the agricultural infrastructure was destroyed in the fighting 
between the Soviet military and the Mujahideen
1
 resistance fighters. A number of farmers, 
especially those whole lived in areas where the government control was weak or absent, 
started cultivating opium poppies as it brought them more money than other traditional 
crops such as wheat, cotton and fruits. The Mujahideen, most of whom were local Afghan 
villagers, also found opium useful in order to get the much needed cash to survive and to 
buy weapons for their war against the Soviet occupation. In 1979, the year when the Soviet 
troops invaded Afghanistan, less than 200 tons of opium was produced in the country. 
However, opium production continued to expand rapidly and reached 1,000 metric tons in 
1988; while in 2007, Afghanistan produced 9,000 metric tons; record high and around 90% 
of world’s opium at the time. Thus, within in less than two decades, Afghanistan went 
from a very minor producer of opium to become the biggest opium producer of the world.
2
   
Although opium production brought more money to farmers and traders than other licit 
crops, it contributed to the complexity of the Afghan conflict by creating new actors such 
as drug traders and other criminal groups involved in drugs processing and trafficking. 
Drugs also played an important role in changing the internal power dynamics within the 
Afghan society. Following the defeat and withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1989 and the fall 
of the Soviet backed Kabul regime in 1992, drugs served as a major source of funding for 
those groups and individuals who fought against each other to preserve and expand their 
local power base. Many commanders associated with various factions that were involved 
in a violent power struggle in early 1990s relied heavily on drugs money. On the other 
hand, the new local powerful elites, who were in most cases the product of war, continued 
profiting from drugs to sustain their newly acquired power and prestige in the society.
3
  
                                                          
1
 Mujahideen means religious fighters or holy warriors (plural of Mujahid). This was the name commonly 
used for the Afghan resistance fighters who fought against the occupying Soviet forces in the 1980s. As they 
were supported by the West, the term became very popular especially in the US where it was sometimes used 
as “Muj”.  
2
 UNODC, (2003). The Opium Economy in Afghanistan: An International Problem. Vienna/New York. 
Available online at: 
<http://www.unodc.org/documents/afghanistan/Counter_Narcotics/The_Opium_Economy_in_Afghanistan_-
_2003.pdf> [Accessed 06 Dec 2013]; Azami, Dawood, (2013). Why Afghanistan May Never Eradicate 
Opium. BBC News, 26 February. Available online at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-21548230> 
[Accessed 25 Aug 2013]; UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime) and the Ministry of 
Counter-Narcotics of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, (2014). Afghanistan Opium Survey 2014: 
Cultivation and Production. November. Vienna: UNODC, p.12. Available online at: 
<https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghan-opium-survey-2014.pdf> 
[Accessed 23 Nov 2014]. 
3
 Dorronsoro, Gilles, (2005). Revolution Unending: Afghanistan: 1979 to Present. (Translated from the 
French into English by John King). London: Hurst & Company; Giustozzi, Antonio, (2009). Empires of Mud: 
War and Warlords of Afghanistan. New York: Columbia University Press; Hodes, Cyrus and Sedra, Mark, 




The Taliban movement, which emerged in southern Afghanistan in 1994, also exploited 
the drugs economy in their violent campaign against those powerful warlords who were 
incharge of different parts of the country. In addition to donations from drug traders, it 
received millions of dollars annually by taxing opium just like other agricultural products. 
However, the Taliban, which captured Kabul in 1996 and most of the Afghan territory by 
the end of the decade, unexpectedly banned the cultivation of opium poppies in the 
summer of 2000. Although the Taliban’s motivation behind the poppy ban is still debated 
and several possible reasons have been described by different scholars and experts, the ban 
itself was very effective and is termed as the one of the most successful drugs bans in 
history. However, since the removal of the Taliban regime as a result of the US-led 
invasion in late 2001, the group has reversed its poppy ban and, in some cases, even 
encourages drug production in areas of Afghanistan it controls. The Taliban receive tens of 
millions of dollars annually from taxing drug cultivation and trade. As part of an effort to 
win hearts and minds of the population, the Taliban also earn a political capital by defying 
the Afghan government and its international allies and protecting the livelihoods of poppy 
farmers. According to estimates, the Taliban get US$100-400
4
 million per year from taxing 
poppy farmers and drugs producers and traffickers in areas under their control.
5
 The group 
has become a formidable challenge to the Afghan government and its foreign backers since 
it launched a well organised insurgency in 2003-04.  
Generally, opium economy and insurgency have been mutually reinforcing. Narcotics 
finance insurgent groups; while their violence weakens the state institutions and 
government control and encourages more poppy cultivation and drug production and trade. 
Both of these problems have grown more severe in post-Taliban Afghanistan (2001 
onwards) and pose a serious threat to the stability of Afghanistan and the wider region. 
However, it is not only the Taliban who are benefiting from the drug economy; the drug 
trade has become an important part of the overall war machine in the country. In particular, 
a number of local actors, who acquired an elite status during the war years, have been 
increasingly benefitting from the drug economy and use the drug money to maintain their 
power and authority in the society and polity of Afghanistan.   
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The discipline of Political Anthropology suggests that wars and the subsequent social and 
political upheavals generally result in the creation of a new socio-economic and political 
order with political agents, usually leaders, engaging in strategies to attain power and 
influence and control resources. Self-service is an important part of politics where political 
agents use skills and power to ensure political survival and social and economic well-
being.
6
 Moreover, leaders need financial resources to maintain and, if possible, increase 
their power. As Earle says, leaders who control financial means and provide rewards are 
accepted, but those who fail to do so lose authority. The desire to control the economy is a 
tendency common among leaders in all human societies as it gives “a direct and material 
power over the lives of people.”7 Similarly, the discipline of Political Economy suggests 
that social and political power largely depends on the production, acquisition and 
distribution of economic resources.
8
 Therefore, the surge in drug production is, on one 
hand, a matter of survival for many farmers; on the other hand it is linked in many ways to 
power struggle as well as control over economic resources.  
In Afghanistan, drugs are also creating an infrastructure of crime and corruption that 
thwarts the process of state-building and the growth of viable institutions. Many 
“warlords”9 -- a product of the anti-Soviet resistance and the subsequent factional wars 
(1992-2001) -- also function as political leaders while exploiting criminal economy 
including the drug trade. They pose one of the biggest challenges to the Afghan state-
building.
10
 In most cases, these “warlords” acquired monopoly on what political 
anthropologists describe as the three main components of power -- control over the 
economy, war, and ideology.
11
 Both the drug traders and “warlords” have infiltrated the 
government apparatus at the centre as well as regions and hamper the establishment of an 
accountable, transparent and efficient Afghan state.
12
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The drug economy is conventionally viewed as an index of state power, so that low 
capacity regimes are more likely to have a “drug problem” than high capacity regimes.13 
The post-Taliban Afghanistan is struggling to build a functioning state able to monopolise 
the use of legitimate means of coercion and develop the capacity to respond to the people’s 
political, security and economic needs. However, the drug trade has evolved into a serious 
threat to both the stability of the state and the social wellbeing of the population. The drug 
economy corrupts and infiltrates state institutions and a weak governance infrastructure 
usually results in increased drug production which in turn not only paves the way for more 
drugs but also strengthens the insurgency at the cost of a fragile weak state.  
This study looks at the problem of conflict and the challenges of drugs and state-building 
with a special focus on Afghanistan. In doing so, it analyses the evolution and implications 
of drug production in a historical and comparative context and discusses the relationship 
between drugs economy and insurgency. Although Afghanistan is the main case study, it 
explores the issue through examples of other countries. Three insurgent groups -- FARC in 
Colombia, PKK in Turkey and LTTE in Sri Lanka – have been selected for this purpose 
and, in order to understand the phenomenon in a wider context, their links to drugs 
economy have been discussed in detail. The study also looks at the impact of drugs 
economy on institution building and explores the mechanism of how illicit drugs 
encourage “warlordism” and result in an informal alliance between drug traders, organised 
crime and corrupt officials.  
Although this study covers the history of drugs production in Afghanistan and the wider 
region in general, its main reference period is from 1979 (the year the Soviet Union 
invaded Afghanistan) to the end of 2014 (they year when the US-led ISAF (International 
Security Assistance Force) ended its combat mission in Afghanistan). The violence that 
erupted with the Soviet intervention paved the way for a large scale drug production and an 
entrenched drugs economy in the impoverished country.  
This thesis attempts to answer a number of important questions related to conflict and 
drugs economy. For example, what is the relationship between illicit drugs and conflict? 
What is the nature and mechanism of different insurgent groups’ involvement in the drugs 
economy and how does this impact their insurgency? What are the dynamics of the 
Afghans conflict and what role does the drugs economy play in it? How does the conflict 
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in Afghanistan differ from or resemble to conflicts in other parts of the world?  How much 
do the Taliban insurgents depend on and benefit from the drugs economy? What is the 
overall impact of illicit drugs economy on state intuitions and society in general? How 
does the drug production and trafficking facilitate insurgency and inhibit state-building? 
These are all complex and inter-related questions and in order to explore them properly, I 
have adopted what I call the “Hybrid Framework” – a multi-dimensional and hybrid 
approach which combines different causes and factors and analyses the conflict as a 
complex web of multiple actors and overlapping motivations and interests. The thesis 
explores how the ‘Hybrid Framework’ helps us understand the intra-state conflict and the 
drugs-insurgency-weak state linkages. 
 
Significance of the Study  
This study is about conflict, illicit drugs and state-building and I have chosen Afghanistan 
as the main case study. The research question which I have set out for this project is: “what 
is the impact of illicit drugs on conflict and how does access to drugs affect the strength 
and ideology of insurgent groups and hampers state-building?” The key objectives of this 
research are: 1) To explore the conflict and its relationship with illicit drugs in general and 
in Afghanistan in particular and to explain how does access to drugs affects the strength 
and ideology of insurgent groups?; 2) To demonstrate the true nature of the Afghan 
conflict and to examine its various dimensions, causes, motivations and actors; and 3) To 
critically analyse the impact of illicit drugs on state institutions and explore the mechanism 
and extent to which the Taliban insurgents exploit the drug trade.  
Afghanistan, described as NATO’s most important mission since the establishment of the 
alliance in 1949, is still one of the top military priorities for the US and its allies. The 
Afghan conflict has already become the longest war in American history and the longest 
war in the British living memory. Fixing Afghanistan has been a major challenge for the 
international community whose members have been engaged in the country since the US-
led intervention of October 2001. The continued violence and chaos in the troubled country 
is having a spill-over effect and the drugs produced there are threatening the social fabric 
and political stability of many communities in the surrounding region and beyond. In fact, 
drug production and conflict are the two most serious problems the country has been facing 
for the past several decades. 
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Much has been written in recent years about the conflict in Afghanistan; particularly after 
the 2001 US-led invasion of the country. Dozens of books and thousands of research 
papers and media articles have been published as part of an effort to understand and 
explain different aspects of life in the country. Different authors have focused on different 
dimensions of the conflict applying various approaches and methodologies. Some writers 
have analysed the Afghan conflict from the US’s national security perspective and its 
global “War on Terror.”14 A number of them have associated the conflict with militant 
Islam and Islamic fundamentalism
15
 while others including Ahmed saw it as a conflict 
between the centre and the rural and tribal periphery.
16
 Several writers attribute the 
continuation of the Afghan conflict and the Taliban’s resurgence to the West’s “wrong” 
approach and policies especially military decision making as well as a reaction towards the 
corruption and incompetence of the Afghan government.
17
 Some have analysed the 
violence and insurgency in Afghanistan from a structural point of view, showing how a 
rising drug trade and poor performance undermined the Afghan government, and blaming 
the Americans for failing to provide the necessary support to the Afghan government, and 
neglecting insurgent sanctuaries across the border in Pakistan.
18
 On the other hand, some 
writers see the Afghan conflict mainly as a proxy war with a view that the insurgents have 
been sheltered and supported by the Pakistan’s security establishment.19 Some scholars 
such as Barfield see the conflict as the manifestation of the tension between two different 
cultural outlooks and as a conflict between the old and new, local tradition and global 
norms, and conservatism and modernism.
20
 While analysing the role political Islam, Roy 
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focuses on the theme of ethnicity as the chief determinant of identity.
21
 Several other 







, among others, assess the impact of ethnic 
diversity and the role ethnicity plays in the Afghan conflict and analyse it from the 
perspective of ethnically-motivated aggression. Rubin has examined the situation in 
Afghanistan by applying the political economy approach and focused more on the internal 
dynamics of the conflict by analysing the acquisition and distribution of resources by the 
state.
25






 and Mercille 
29
 
have explored the conflict in Afghanistan from a “narco-terrorism” perspective and 
discussed the links between insurgency and drug economy.   
Although the literature on the Afghan conflict in general has an important role in exploring 
its causes and motivation and promoting the understanding of the problem, it mostly 
focuses on individual elements and specific dimensions of the conflict while ignoring to 
analyse it as a whole. Much of the recent scholarship focusing on current conflict either 
fails to identify the main factors or undermines some while exaggerates others. Similarly, it 
either downplays or overplays the role of certain actors and factors in initiating and 
prolonging the conflict. Therefore, it falls short to draw a comprehensive picture of the 
situation. The other common shortcoming of most of the recent studies of Afghanistan is 
the fact that they generally overlook the role of outside actors as well as the importance of 
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geo-economic and geopolitical position of Afghanistan. In order to understand the conflict 
in Afghanistan, attention needs to be paid to all dynamics including local/national, regional 
and international as well as all the relevant actors and factors responsible for causing and 
perpetuating violence in the country.  
The conflict in Afghanistan is one of the oldest and most complex in the world today. It is 
a mixture of several important issues including geo-politics, proxy, ideology, nationalism, 
ethnicity, tribalism, and criminal. In order to understand the conflict in general and 
specifically in Afghanistan, there is a need for an integrated and comprehensive approach 
and to bring together all the major themes and approaches in the scholarly literature. 
Applying only one or two or three approaches don’t seem to be sufficient to understand 
and explain the country’s decades old conflict.  
In this thesis, first of all, I attempt to provide an integrated framework for understanding 
the conflict in general. The existing literature on conflict seems to be ignoring, 
exaggerating or undermining certain potential drivers of violent behaviour such as greed, 
grievance, creed, ethnic hatred and social deprivation. Greed has been particularly a 
dominant theme in the field of intra-state conflict for the past several years.
30
 Although all 
these approaches are important contributions to understand and analyse internal conflicts, 
increasingly new schools of thought are emerging that emphasise the role of other factors 
such as foreign actors, ideology and political economy. This study fills a conceptual lacuna 
in the field of conflict studies and represents probably the first study that devotes 
considerable attention to the problems of drugs and conflict, the challenges of state-
building and the complexities of insurgency by bringing various dimensions and factors 
into one whole. The thesis argues that in an increasingly globalising world, conflicts are 
becoming more and more complex involving a variety of actors at local, regional and 
international levels as well as a combination of different causes and motivations. While 
discussing a number of conflicts, this study suggests the – “Hybrid Framework”- to 
understand the nature, causes and motivations of conflict in general. The “Hybrid 
Framework” takes into account a variety of overlapping causes and motivations as well as 
the complex web of actors and interests at different levels. 
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Secondly, with a special focus on drugs, this study explores the role of natural resources in 
a conflict. Although there are various studies about the nexus between drugs and crime, 
there is a relatively lack of informed and detailed literature on the links between drugs and 
insurgencies and the impact of drugs economy on the nature, ideology and motivations of 
insurgent groups. In addition, there is also a need for a better understanding of how does 
the drug economy affect formal institutions and the state (un)building process? Although 
there is a substantial amount of academic and journalists literature on the problem of illicit 
drugs in Afghanistan, it usually looks at it from an external perspective. This study looks at 
it from the inside too though a wide range of original interviews with more than a hundred 
individuals and field research. In addition, most of the available literature on the problem 
of drugs and conflict in Afghanistan rarely goes beyond the media reports and relies 
heavily on the official information given by US/NATO and Afghan government. Many of 
such writings lack detailed field information and credible corroboration.
31
 There is a lack 
of empirically-based evidence about the links between conflict and drugs in Afghanistan 
and the extent and mechanism of how the insurgents and other non-state actors benefit 
from the drug production and trade. My research examines the links between the Taliban 
and the drug trade and shows that their involvement is much deeper and complicated than 
what is usually known. I have also explored a sophisticated mechanism through which the 
Taliban exploit the drug production and trade to get both public support and financial 
resources. During the course of this study, I found out that the Taliban’s involvement in the 
drugs has gradually grown over the past decade and they are increasingly relying on drugs 
income. In many cases, they have encouraged farmers to cultivate opium poppies in areas 
under their control and provide protection to their poppy fields from being eradicated by 
the government forces. In addition, my investigations have found the nature of infiltration 
of state institutions by the drug mafia and showed that the involvement of government 
officials in the drugs economy goes beyond what is usually described in popular and 
academic literature. In the appendices, I have given the English translation of several drugs 
related decrees issued by the Taliban when the group was ruling over Afghanistan (1996-
2001). The decrees (Farmans) issued by the Taliban leader, Mullah Muhammad Omar, 
show the Taliban’s evolving relationship with the drug trade cultivation. It also 
demonstrates the complex relationship between drugs and insurgents and indicates the 
dilemma many insurgent groups face vis-à-vis illicit drugs. This is perhaps the first time 
that these Taliban decrees have been assembled and translated into English for the benefit 
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of scholars and the general public alike. In addition, the study also provides, a 
comprehensive picture of the organisational structure of the Taliban from its emergence in 
1994 to the fall of their government in 2001 and the formation and structure of the Taliban 
insurgency and their “shadow government” (2001-2015). 
Thirdly, in order to understand the phenomenon in a wider context, this study also explores 
and analyses the relationship between drugs economy and conflict in several other 
countries. Three examples have been selected for this comparative part of the study – 
Colombia’s Marxist rebel group, FARC; Turkey’s Kurdish separatist group, PKK; and the 
Tamil Tigers (LTTE) in Sri Lanka. As part of this comparative section of the study, the 
drugs links of these groups is analysed and the impact of drugs economy on their nature, 
strength and ideologies is examined in detail. This integrated comparative analysis 
facilitates understanding the role of drugs in the conflict in Afghanistan and elsewhere. 
Fourthly, this research, which relies upon insights from various field trips, offers a 
multidisciplinary framework drawing together data and information from a number of 
areas of knowledge and sources. It examines the nexus between drugs, insurgency and 
state-building by offering detailed and fresh information on the current state of overlapping 
fields, such as International Relations, Political Economy, Political Anthropology and 
Development and State-Building. My familiarity with the country and contacts enabled me 
to conduct field work and collect first-hand information about the dynamics of the conflict 
and the role the drugs play in it. In addition, it offers a unique empirical contribution as 
well as insight into the overall context in which the research is conducted. The study draws 
on more than a hundred original, and in many cases rare, interviews with the Taliban 
soldiers, drug smugglers, poppy farmers, local elders and the Afghan government and 
NGO officials to produce a uniquely detailed picture. In addition, it demonstrates the 
overall impact of drugs and explores the detailed mechanism and extent to which drug 
production and trafficking inhibits state-building and facilitates insurgency and criminality 
in Afghanistan. As far as I know, it is the first time that the mechanism of how the Taliban 
benefit from drug production and trade is explored in such details. It describes the 
Taliban’s involvement in different stages from cultivating opium poppies to opium 
production, processing and smuggling and explains the nature of the Taliban’s intervention 
in different stages of the drugs business.  
The study also provides details of how the patronage network operates, how players 
bargain and how is this relationship complicated by the introduction and intervention of 
foreign actors such as international drug mafia and US/NATO. This study explores how 
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the patron-client relations in the drug trade create and cement structural corruption – a 
problem that has got worse in the post-Taliban Afghanistan. Although, most of 
Afghanistan has been covered as art of this study, I have selected Helmand province in 
southern Afghanistan as the main location for field research as it has been producing more 
opium than all the other 33 provinces combined. The province is also one of the main 
battlegrounds between the Taliban and the Afghan forces and their international backers.  
The study will help greatly in a wider understanding of the problems of conflict and illicit 
drugs and the challenges of peace and state-building. The study’s insights will advance the 
understanding of conflict in general and the politics and international relations of 
Afghanistan in particular. In addition, this will provide a meaningful context for recent 
trends and the future scenarios regarding illicit economies, their links with insurgencies 
and rebellions and the challenges of building and/or empowering viable and accountable 
states. Finally, the findings from this study have important implications for the prospects of 




Research methodology is a “science of studying how research is done scientifically”.32 
There are various methods of research used in the realm of social sciences. Generally 
speaking, three main types of research methodologies are widely in use in undertaking a 
research project - qualitative, quantitative and a mixture of the two, called mixed research 
method. Quantitative and qualitative methods refer to the type of data being collected. 
Qualitative research relies mostly on non-numeric data, such as interviews and 
observations. In contrast, quantitative research employs numeric data such as scores and 
metrics.
33
 The differences between the two approaches are mainly ones of style and 
specific technique.
34
 Qualitative research method is non-numerical and more descriptive in 
nature and is concerned with qualitative phenomenon involving quality. As Kvale says, the 
word “quality refers to what kind, to the essential character of something”, while “quantity 
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refers to how much, how large, the amount of something.”35 Quantitative method involves 
numbers and digits in the form of tables, charts and graphs, while the latter is more 
descriptive and explanatory in nature.  
This study has adopted a qualitative research methodology with descriptive, analytical, 
historical, comparative and empirical approaches. There is a strong rationale and 
compelling reasons behind choosing a qualitative approach. In contrast to quantitative 
questions that ask why, a qualitative study research question often starts with a how or a 
what so that initial forays into the topic describe what is going on. Second, the topic needs 
to be explored and there is a need to present a detailed view of the topic. The qualitative 
study research is needed because the existing wide-angle lens or the distant panoramic shot 
does not suffice to present answers to the problem, and the close-up view does not exist. In 
addition, in a qualitative study research, individuals are studied in their natural setting 
which involves field of study and gaining access to the main players.
36
 In qualitative 
inquiry, it is the researcher who is an instrument of data collection. According to Denzin 
and Lincoln: 
[Q]ualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of 
or interpret phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them. Qualitative research 
involves the studied use and collection of a variety of empirical materials - case study, 
personal experience, introspective, life story, interview, artefacts and cultural texts and 
productions, along with observational, historical, interactional, and visual texts - that 
describe routine and problematic moments and meaning in individuals’ lives.37 
As Creswell says, a researcher undertakes qualitative research “in a natural setting” where 
s/he is “an instrument of data collection who gathers words or pictures, analyses them 
inductively, focuses on the meaning of participants, and describes a process that is 
expressive and persuasive in language.” 38   Therefore, bearing in mind the research 
objectives, I have chosen qualitative research methodology with descriptive and analytical 
approaches. There are two more reasons for this choice; (a) it may not be easy to quantify 
or measure the views and opinions of the interviewees regarding the drug production and 
conflict in Afghanistan and the link between the two, and (b) my research project requires 
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a detailed description and analysis of the impact of drugs on the conflict in Afghanistan. 
The project also requires examining various dimensions, motivations and actors of the 
Afghan conflict. Therefore, this research is not about the quantification but rather to 
describe, analyse and explain the views of various respondents. However, statistical data is 
utilised in several places in the thesis, mostly in the form of graphs and tables, for 
furthering the arguments. 
Although this study mainly focuses on Afghanistan, it also involves “case study” research 
as part of the overall qualitative research. Case research “is an in-depth investigation of a 
problem in one or more real-life settings (case sites) over an extended period of time.”39 
However, along with the descriptive and analytical approaches, a comparative approach 
has also been applied vis-à-vis the impact of drugs production and trade on conflicts in 
other parts of the world. As part of this approach, three insurgent groups such as FARC in 
Colombia, LTTE in Sri Lanka and PKK in Turkey have been studied and investigated and 
their involvement in the drug trade is critically examined.  
Data are collected and compiled in every piece of academic inquiry. Qualitative inquiry 
also involves field work to collect extensive data, and gain access, rapport, and an “insider” 
perspective. There are a number of methods of data collection including interviews, 
observations, scores and metrics. For this study, both primary data - those which are 
collected a fresh and for the first time and are original in nature – and secondary data - 
those which have already been collected by someone else and which have already been 
passed through the statistical process - are used. In qualitative research, primary data is 
usually obtained through observation, direct communication with the respondents and/or 
through personal interviews. 
In social sciences, interviews are one of the main primary data collection tools and 
techniques in qualitative research.
40
 Although different types of interviews are usually used 
to conduct a qualitative research, this project carried out mainly four kinds of interviews in 
collecting primary data: 1), face to face interviews; 2), Skype based interviews; 3), 
electronic mail based interviews; and 4), telephone interviews.  
There are several reasons for choosing four types of interviews instead of one. The people I 
planned to interview were/are not based in one city or even one country, therefore, it was 
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not possible for me to visit all those places and conduct face to face interviews due to time 
constrained, limited financial resources and, in some cases, possible danger due fighting 
and insecurity. Thus, reachable participants living in Afghanistan, Pakistan, United Arab 
Emirates, United States and the United Kingdom were approached for face to face 
interviews. In certain parts of Afghanistan, some of the interviewees were not able to meet 
face to face and, sometimes, I was not able to meet those who live in very insecure areas of 
a few southern and eastern provinces. In such cases, I usually relied on telephone 
interviewees. Skype interviews were used as a tool for gathering the primary data when the 
interviewees had access to the internet while electronic mail was used where individuals 
were literate and were connected to the worldwide web. Individuals with no access to the 
internet were also interviewed on the telephone.  
As Wimmer and Dominick say, questioning in qualitative research is flexible and there is 
no strict rule for developing a set of questions or a questionnaire.
41
 Therefore, I used open-
ended questions and the participants were allowed to respond without any restrictions. It 
was useful as such interviews usually provide an opportunity to the interviewer to get 
additional information. As part of this study, conducting interviews and gathering primary 
data were based on an open ended questionnaire consisting of 7 to 10 questions revolving 
around the research. Due to the sensitive nature of the topic, interviews were mostly 
unstructured and were not following a rigid system of pre-determined questions. This 
offered me greater freedom to ask, in case of need, supplementary questions or at times 
omit certain questions when the situation required. In this method, I was able to change the 
order of my questions and include some aspects and exclude others. I found open-ended 
questions quite useful as they usually “generate unexpected insights not otherwise 
available from structured quantitative data alone”.42 In addition, many of my interviewees 
such as poppy farmers, Taliban members and local elders were not willing to give a 
structured interview and follow a standard questionnaire. Therefore, interviews were 
mostly free-flowing. Interviewees were asked different questions depending on their role, 
background and area of interest and expertise.  
It is also important to mention that while collecting primary data through interviews; it was 
difficult to fix the exact number of interviewees as it depended upon the interviewees’ 
responses as well as the time period that had been allocated for the fieldwork/interviews. 
However, I have captured the views and opinions of all the main stakeholders – including 
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members of the insurgency and drug traffickers. Some of the traffickers had been captured 
and others were/are still at large. This makes the dissertation a more balanced and 
objective one. Over a period of several years, I conducted more than a hundred interviews 
with different stake holders and have categorised my research interviewees into the 
following groups as per their profession, background and expertise.
43
 At least three 
individuals have been interviewed from each group. 
1. Opium poppy farmers  
2. Taliban members/commanders/Insurgents 
3. Drug smugglers/traders 
4. Local elders/local politicians 
5. Afghan Government officials (retired and in service) 
6. Foreign diplomats/foreign officials (retired and in service)/NGOs/UN officials 
7. Academics/Journalists/Experts/Businessmen 
During the course of this study, I had interactions and discussions with hundreds of people 
from different walks of life. Several of them were also interviewed informally to enrich the 
study and obtain first-hand information about the topic. Despite my assurances about 
confidentiality, my poppy farmers, villagers and even journalists and some local officials 
asked me not to record the interviews as they feared that this might harm them or their 
livelihoods and careers. In such cases, I simply took notes and later incorporated them in 
various parts of the thesis. I have made sure to protect the confidentiality of some of the 
participants’ names, locations, and other data which might reveal their identity. In certain 
cases the subjects may want to remain anonymous. So, it is the ethical responsibility of the 
researcher to ensure appropriate precautions are taken in order to protect the confidentiality 
of the participants’ names, locations, and other data. Given the sensitivity of the subject, 
and as requested by the University Ethics Sub- Committee, anonymity and confidentiality 
was offered to all participants. Before conducting the interview, every participant was 
assured about the confidentiality and prior approval was also taken from each individual 
for recording and/or note taking. During my fieldwork, several of them asked for 
anonymity or confidentiality.  
Therefore, the interviewees who wanted to remain anonymous have been mentioned with 
their profession such as Farmer, Smuggler/Drug Trader, and Journalist etc. along with the 
names of the province/city of Afghanistan they reside in. As listed in the bibliography 
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section of this thesis, they have been given codes such as “B1, B2 and B3…” for 
businessmen; “D1, D2 and D3…” for Afghan diaspora members/labourers based in Gulf 
countries mainly in UAE and Qatar; “G1, G2, G3…” for government officials; “F1, F2, 
F3…” for farmers; “J1, J2, J3…” for local journalists; “P1, P2, P3...” for politicians; “S1, 
S2, S3…” for smugglers/drug traders; “T1, T2, T3…” for Taliban members/sympathisers 
/supporters; and “V1, V2, V3…” for local villagers including tribal elders.  
Great care has been taken to analyse the responses of the interviewees as objectively as 
possible. For the maintenance of objectivity, different people on different side of the 
spectrum were asked questions about similar issues to corroborate facts and cross check 
the information in order to avoid subjectivity and biasness. All possible efforts have been 
made to enhance the credibility and authenticity of the project. 
All of my interviewees were not able to speak English. Therefore, depending on the 
interviewees’ language capabilities and the circumstances, interviews were conducted in 
four languages i.e. Pashto, Dari/Persian, Urdu and English. Where applicable, before 
leaving for the fieldwork, prior mailing or telephonic contacts were established with the 
interviewees. As I speak all these languages, I conducted the interviews myself without the 
help of any interpreter and translated the relevant parts into English for this thesis. 
As part of the primary data collection, I also applied the Observative Method, which 
involves the “investigator’s own direct observation.” I found this very useful as “the main 
advantage of this method is that subjective bias is eliminated” and “the information 
obtained under this method relates to what is currently happening.”44 
The secondary data refers to the data which are already available and have already been 
collected and analysed by someone else. Secondary data may either be published data or 
unpublished data. Sources for secondary data can be classified as paper-based sources 
(books, journals, periodicals, abstracts, indexes, directories, research reports, conference 
papers, various publications of central/state/local governments, publications of foreign 
governments or of international bodies and their subsidiary organisations, market reports, 
annual reports, internal records of organisations, newspapers and magazines) and 
electronic sources (CD-ROMs, on-line databases, Internet, videos and broadcasts).  
The main source of secondary data was libraries in and around London and Afghanistan. In 
addition, original source material in various languages including English, Pashto, 
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Dari/Persian and Urdu are used for this study such as information available from different 
governmental, non-governmental agencies; and the coverage of the issue in various media 
outlets, including television, radio, newspapers and the Internet.  
I have been working for the BBC for 15 years mostly covering international news and 
current affairs. Afghanistan has been one of the areas of my expertise where I also served 
as the BBC World Service Bureau Chief and Editor in 2010 and 2011. Prior to formally 
starting this study, I had already conducted some field research mainly in Afghanistan but 
also in Turkey with the aim of writing a book on the topic. Although my trip to and field 
work in Turkey was not directly related to my current research topic, I collected 
information and material on the side-lines of my other research project titled “The Survival 
of Sufism in Turkey” which was part of the BBC Onassis Bursary Scheme. During the past 
decade, I have made several trips to Afghanistan and have been following the 
developments there very closely for a long time. Since I enrolled at the University for this 
study in 2011, I visited Afghanistan five times and collected information about the topic 
whenever there was an opportunity. Afghanistan is a conflict zone where a number of my 
interviewees live/lived and I was aware of the risks and hazards involved.  
Although I had initially planned to focus more on the role of “warlords” and their links 
with the illicit drugs economy, I, in consultation with my directors of study, shifted the 
focus of the study towards the insurgency after I found out that warlords were not 
generally willing to talk to me about their links with the drug trade and that focusing too 
much on them might pose unnecessary risks. However, the role of warlords is still 
discussed in the thesis in the context of state-building and the patronage network. I had 
also planned to spend more time in the remote parts of Afghanistan but I didn’t stay for 
longer in one particular place due to the sensitivity of the research topic and the overall 
insecurity. Nevertheless, I am familiar with the country and have contacts there which 
helped me to move around, observe the situation closely and talk to as many people as I 
could. In addition, I speak many languages spoken in the region (Pashto, Dari/Persian, 
Urdu/Hindi) which made travelling and communicating with local people easier. In 
addition to the critical analysis of the existing literature, the ethnographic work in the form 
of mainly interviews further enriched the study and filled the gaps in a comprehensive 






This project revolves around conflict, illicit drug trade and state-building. Drug production 
and trafficking is a multidimensional phenomenon both in character and consequences. 
These problems cannot be viewed outside the context of contemporary economic, social 
and political developments. Although illicit drugs have some positive-sum aspects such as 
income generation and employment creation, they are directly and indirectly linked with 
conflict, money laundering, corruption, addiction, crime and insurgency. Afghanistan has 
been one of the biggest opium producers for the past three decades. Opium economy, 
crimes and insurgency are mutually reinforcing in the country where narcotics finance the 
insurgent groups; while their violence weakens the state institutions and government 
control and encourages poppy cultivation. Both problems have grown more severe in post-
Taliban Afghanistan (2001 onwards) and pose a serious threat to the stability of 
Afghanistan and the wider region.  
In this thesis, I attempt to provide an integrated framework for understanding the conflict 
in general and the conflict in Afghanistan in particular. In doing so, I explore the main 
causes and factors of conflict, analyse the impact of illicit drugs and the role of state and 
non-state actors. To begin with, I show what causes a conflict and what motivates groups 
of people to resort to violence and start an internal war. Overall, the thesis is divided into 
seven main chapters and an introduction and conclusion.  
Chapter 1 analyses the literature concerning the study of civil conflict and internal social 
strife. It assesses a wide range of perspectives and theories that attempt to explain the 
causes and motivations of collective violent action and civil wars. By focusing on key 
themes developed as part of conflict studies, this chapter compares different approaches, 
reviews factors and mechanisms of intra-stae conflicts and assesses the validity and 
relevance of these concepts in explaining and predicting social mobilisation. This chapter 
argues that although different models and formulations -- such as structural violence 
framework and greed-grievance model -- are useful in understanding the causes of 
conflicts, they have several shortcomings such as missing or downplaying some factors 
while overemphasizing others. While discussing the state centric approach, this chapter 
argues that in most cases, civil wars display a strong regional and international character 
and are therefore not a completely domestic phenomenon. The chapter explains that in an 
increasingly globalising world, conflicts are becoming more complex involving a number 
of actors and factors. The chapter concludes by suggesting the “Hybrid Framework” of 
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conflict which takes into account a variety of overlapping causes and motivations as well 
as the complex web of actors at local, regional and international levels.  
Chapter 2 is devoted to the exploration of the dynamics of the conflict in Afghanistan and 
analyses it in the light of the “Hybrid Framework.” The chapter describes that a large body 
of writings on the conflict in Afghanistan has many limitations as it portrays it as either a 
terrorist/extremist problem or the product of “ethnic hatred” while largely ignores or 
downplays other factors. The chapter argues that as one of the world’s most protracted 
conflicts, the war in Afghanistan is the product of a complex web of local motives and 
interactions as well regional and international rivalries and interferences. This chapter 
demonstrates that, like many other so called civil wars, the conflict in Afghanistan displays 
a strong regional and international character and is, therefore, neither a completely 
domestic phenomenon nor solely based on greed. The chapter explains the internal 
motivational elements of the Afghan conflict such as ideology (anti-communist, anti-
Western, Islamist, conservatism, nationalism etc.), greed (resources, power etc.) as well as 
a host of external factors (such as strategic, proxy, criminal etc.). It argues that the Afghan 
conflict is a mixture of a number of complex and overlapping causes and motivations 
involving multiple local and foreign actors competing for promoting their economic, 
political, ideological and strategic interests. This chapter concludes by analysing the role of 
natural resources, especially illict drugs, in the conflict in Afghanistan and argues that it is 
not drugs that caused the conflict but the conflict itself created a suitable environment for 
drug production, processing and trade.   
Chapter 3 discusses the question of profit versus ideology in the context of drugs and 
focuses on the impact of illicit drugs on the structure, strength, political goals and 
ideologies of insurgent groups.  In ding so, the chapter examines the nature and evolution 
of political goals of several insurgent groups and their relationship with the drug trade. In 
the post WWII world, more than a hundred insurgent groups operating in different 
countries have somehow benefited financially from illicit drugs. Although majority of 
these groups have/had religious, nationalist or Marxist ideologies, the link between “holy 
warriors” and criminal groups, especially drug smugglers, has become a familiar theme. In 
many parts of the world, militant groups and organised crime live in symbiosis with each 
other. In order to understand the phenomenon in a wider context, this chapter examines the 
relationship between drugs economy and conflicts outside Afghanistan. Although, the 
chapter gives an overview of the problem, three mini-cases have been selected for this 
comparative part of the study -- Colombia’s Marxist rebel group, FARC (Fuerzas Armadas 
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Revolucionarias de Colombia); Turkey’s Kurdish separatist group, PKK (Partya Kerkeren 
Kurdistan); and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka.  
Chapter 4 provides a historical context of drug production with a special focus on 
Afghanistan and the surrounding countries. The chapter demonstrates that, historically, 
Afghanistan had not been a major opium producer and, unlike many other countries in the 
region, did not have an ‘opium culture.’ That chapter analyses how only during the last two 
decades of the 20
th
 century, Afghanistan emerged as a major opium producer and, in a 
short span of time, became the biggest producer of opium in the world. The chapter also 
examines the trend of drug production, trade and consumption in the wider region and 
explores the impact of regional and international drugs economy on Afghanistan. This 
chapter concludes with a discussion about the links between conflict and drugs and argues 
that the large-scale opium production in Afghanistan is directly linked with the wars and 
upheavals starting with the 1979 Soviet invasion of the country. 
Chapter 5 documents the links between illicit drugs and the Taliban in Afghanistan and 
provides a detailed mechanism of how the drug production and trade funds the insurgent 
group. It shows that although the opium industry had already been established before the 
emergence of the Taliban Movement in 1994, it grew faster under the Taliban regime 
(1996-2001). In 1999, when the Taliban were controlling almost 90% of Afghanistan’s 
territory, the country produced a peak of over 4500 mt. of raw opium.
45
 The chapter 
discusses why in the summer of 2000, the Taliban imposed a ban on poppy cultivation and 
how the strict ban resulted in an “almost total halt to opium growing in the 2001 season.”46 
The chapter also explores why the Taliban reversed their position on opium since their 
regime was toppled as a result of the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001. In post-
Taliban Afghanistan, the opium economy and the insurgency are mutually reinforcing; 
drugs finance the Taliban, while their violence encourages poppy cultivation and weakens 
the state control. This has led to the suggestions that the Taliban might be following the 
FARC’s footsteps and that a “FARCification” of the Taliban is already underway. This 
chapter examines the Taliban’s complicated and evolving relationship with drugs and 
discusses the role of the drug industry in funding the insurgency in Afghanistan. The 
chapter draws on field work and a large number of original interviews with the Taliban 
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members and fighters, drug smugglers, opium poppy farmers, local elders, politicians and 
government and NGO officials to produce a uniquely detailed picture of the Taliban’s 
approach towards drugs and the overall impact of drugs on the insurgency. It details the 
Taliban’s major sources of income and the impact of illict drugs on their strength, 
motivation and ideology. The chapter also provides a comprehensive picture of the 
Taliban’s governance and organisational structure from its emergence to the fall of the 
regime (1994-2001) as well as the post-Emirate insurgency and “shadow government” 
(2001-2015). 
Chapter 6 explores the role illicit drugs play in conflict and impact institution (un)building 
with a special focus on Afghanistan. Based on first-hand information from field research, 
this chapter argues that opium economy, crimes and insurgency are mutually reinforcing in 
Afghanistan. Narcotics finance insurgents while their violence weakens government 
control and encourages poppy cultivation. Similarly, the drugs economy hampers 
institution building due to the complicity of corrupt officials. The chapter describes how 
the narcotics industry has helped in the production of a new elite class in Afghanistan 
which benefits from instability and conflict and has penetrated the state institutions mainly 
through patronage and corruption. The chapter looks at the mechanism of how the drug 
trade undermines governance, weakens state institutions and encourages insecurity and 
warlordism? Based mainly on anectodal evidence and original interviews, the chapter 
argues that corrupt officials and warlords often play both sides -- the insurgents and the 
counterinsurgents -- and infiltrate state institutions by colonising part of the civil and 
security administration. While appreciating the political economy dynamics of drugs in 
Afghanistan, the chapter explores the mechanism and extent to which drug production and 
trafficking inhibit institution-building and facilitate insurgency in the country.  
Chapter 7 assesses the impact of counter-narcotics campaign in Afghanistan since the US 
led-intervention in late 1002 and suggests several policy options. Between 2002 and 2014, 
the international community, especially  the United States, spent around US$10 billion to 
curb drug production, trade and trafficking in Afghanistan.
47
 However, policies aimed at 
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tackling the drug problem have not yielded the intended outcome. The chapter explores 
that despite expenditure of billions of dollars on counter-narcotics, the drug problem in 
Afghanistan only got bigger and the drugs economy still forms a significant portion of the 
country’s GDP. This chapter also examines the role of relevant institutions, the tactics 
applied by the government and the causes of failure. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion about alternatives to opium production and analyses several possible policy 
options to tackle the drug problem in Afghanistan.   
In the conclusion, I summarise the key findings of this study. The concluding part also has 
some discussion of the implications of the thesis findings for scholarship on Afghanistan 
and on research on the relationship between drugs, conflict and state failure and policy. 
The appendices have, among other material, the English translation of several drug related 
decrees issued by the Taliban Supreme Leader, Mullah Muhammad Omar, which 





Civil War and the Politics of Conflict: A Theoretical Framework 
 
This chapter reviews and analyses the literature concerning the study of civil conflict and 
internal social strife. By focusing on key themes and models developed as part of conflict 
studies, the chapter discusses factors and mechanisms of civil violence, compares different 
approaches and frameworks and assesses the validity of these concepts in explaining and 
predicting social mobilisation. This chapter points out that different models and 
formulations about the nature of conflict - such as structural violence framework and 
greed-grievance model - are useful in understanding different causes of conflict and the 
motivations of its actors but argues that these frameworks have their own shortcomings 
such as missing or downplaying some factors while overemphasising others. In addition to 
discussing the state centric approach, this chapter argues that in most cases, civil wars 
display a strong regional and international character and are therefore not a completely 
domestic phenomenon. While discussing a number of conflicts, this chapter concludes by 
suggesting a new approach of “Hybrid Framework” which takes into account the complex 
web of overlapping causes and motivations as well as a variety of actors at local, regional 
and international levels.  
 
Violence and conflict have been part of human society for much of its history. Individuals, 
groups and states, all have used violence in different ways and for a variety of reasons and 
purposes. The capacity to inflict harm increased over time from the development of basic 
tools such as spears and arrows to weapons of mass destruction especially nuclear devices. 
In the First World War (1914-1918), a total of over 35 million people were killed, 
wounded or listed as missing. The Second World War (1939-1945) was more destructive 
still with deaths alone estimated to have exceeded 60 million, including 32 million 
civilians. This reduced the population of several countries including Germany, Poland and 
the Soviet Union by over 10 percent.
1
 On the other hand, intra-state violence and civil wars 
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have also claimed the lives of countless people throughout the world. Civil wars have 
particularly become deadlier since World War II claiming the lives of millions of civilians. 




Although exploring and explaining the nature of inter-state and intra-state violent action is 
a daunting task, a number of scholars have engaged in studying conflict in its different 
forms. Social scientists in various parts of the world and in different times studied and 
analysed the dynamics of violence in order to understand its causes and motivations and 
predict and prevent its occurring. The oldest known military treatise dealing with 
managing conflicts and winning battles is said to be “The Art of War” written by Sun Tzu, 
an ancient Chinese military expert and strategist who lived circa 544–496 BC. While 
discussing the two sides of war, it states: 
It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war that can thoroughly 
understand the profitable way of carrying it on. In war, then, let your great object be 
victory, not lengthy campaigns. The art of war is of vital importance to the State. It is a 
matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry 
which can on no account be neglected.
3
  
Scholars have not only discussed the destructive nature of war and violence, they have also 
explored the ways and means of how to carry out a violent campaign. Writing in his book 
on policies for kings and ministers called Chanakya Neeti (also known as Neetishastra), 
the “Indian Machiavelli”, Chanakya (c. 350-283 BC), says that “there is nothing wrong” in 
using violence. “Be good to the person who does good, return violence to a violent person; 
deal with wickedness with wicked person.”4 Chanakya (who also known as Kautilya and 
Vishnugupta) was a political realist. In his other book called Arthasastra (Science of 
Polity), which is compared to Machiavelli’s “The Prince”, he gives a complex account of 
battlefield strategy and when and how to use violence.
5
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On the other side of the world, in European societies, many thinkers and scholars 
formulated their own ideas about the causes of war and the prevention of violent civil strife. 
“Stasis” -- civil war, or social unrest -- was the scourge of Greek political life and 
frequently disrupted peace and tranquillity in the society.
6
 Berger estimates that during the 
fourth and fifth Century AD, Greek cities or poleis of Sicily and southern Italy underwent 
upheavals once every seven years, while in other parts of the Greek World the outbreaks of 
violence were even more frequent.
7
  
Both Plato (427-347 BC) and his student Aristotle (384 -322 BC), concluded that such 
civil unrest had its roots in growing levels of factionalism within Athenian society. 
Aristotle, for instance, noted that civil discord and internal conflict may be the result of 
three fundamental causes. Writing about tensions in the Athenian society, he noted that 
much social conflict was a result of grievances caused by the combined effects of the 
fundamentally unequal nature of Athenian society, frustration with the perceived weakness 
and incompetence of the city’s leaders in responding to this inequality and the desire for 
wealth and privilege.
8
 Aristotle, in his Politics (book 5), explained the causes of civil 
discord by saying that “We must comprehend (1) the psychological inclination to engage 
in stasis, (2) the end for which it is waged, and third (3) the “beginnings” that set into 
motion the political disturbances and stasis between citizens.”9 
Comprehending the causes and impact of social unrest and civil conflicts has also made up 
a key element of modern social sciences. In recent history, numerous scholars have tried to 
understand the nature of conflictive behaviour and social mobilisation. Especially, there 
has been an explosion of academic interest in conflict studies since the Second World War. 
Civil war usually involves the use of force by opposition groups against the government or 
to capture power. However, there is no consensus in the literature about the causes and 
motivations of violent conflict. Scholars have interpreted the phenomenon in many 
different ways and have come up with a number of models and frameworks aimed at 
understanding and preventing conflicts. Some writers have come with the idea that violent 
conflict is inherent and an inevitable part of human interaction. Therefore, they argue that 
violence cannot be fully eradicated; it can only be obstructed. On the contrary, many other 
scholars approached the causes of violence from the perspective of human learning and 
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suggested that aggressive behaviour is socially learnt and environmentally acquired. In the 
following pages, I have discussed some of the key concepts developed as part of the 
scholarship about understanding violent conflicts and their causes and motivations.   
 
1.1 Structural Violence 
Johan Galtung, a renowned peace and conflict studies scholar, described violence as a 
structural phenomenon and called it a social construct. Galtung was the first to articulate 
the notion of “structural violence” in 1969 in his paper published in the Journal of Peace 
Research. He provided a key conceptual advance and a theoretical framework in which 
conflict and violence at all levels of society (i.e. individuals, communities, etc.) could be 
analysed and understood. He conceived violence as “the cause of the difference between 
the potential and the actual, between what could have been and what is.”10 According to 
this concept, violence is the action that inhibits an individual or group from realising full 
potential. Galtung equates structural violence with social injustice, exploitation and the 
denial of rights and needs such as economic well-being, education, dignity by people who 
might not be directly violent.  
The structural violence theory explores how political, economic and cultural structures 
result in the occurrence of “avoidable” violence. Galtung saw violence as a result of an 
unequal distribution of resources and not as a direct act of any decision or action made by a 
particular person. He posits the notion that behavioral violence represents a significant 
symptom of underlying structural violence. Structural violence exists when some groups, 
classes, genders, nationalities, etc. have and/or assumed to have more access to goods, 
resources, and opportunities than other groups, classes, genders, nationalities, etc. These 
tendencies may be overt such as apartheid or more subtle such as traditions or tendency to 
award some groups privileges over another. It can take many forms including 
institutionalised racism and sexism. 
According to structural violence theory, the cause of violence is the unequal advantage 
built into the very social, political and economic systems that govern societies, states and 
the world. Galtung clarifies these notions by saying that “when one husband beats his wife 
there is a clear case of personal violence, but when one million husbands keep one million 
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wives in ignorance there is structural violence.”11 According to Galtung, violence can take 
many forms. It may be psychological as well as physical; it may be visible and direct 
and/or invisible and indirect. The notion of structural violence may thus range from the use 
of physical force to verbal violence such as humiliation or put downs, and threats to others’ 
interests and values to impairment of fundamental human needs or life which makes it 
impossible or difficult for people to meet their needs or achieve their full potential.  
According to Galtung, features of structural violence are accompanied by cultural violence, 
which makes structures of exploitation “look, even feel, right - or at least not wrong.” 
Galtung defines cultural violence “as any aspect of a culture that can be used to legitimize 
violence in its direct or structural form”.12 Cultural and structural violence causes direct 
violence and direct violence reinforce structural and cultural violence. Direct violence, 
physical and/or verbal, is visible as behaviour. However, this action does not come out of 
nowhere; its roots are cultural and structural. Cultural violence is the prevailing attitudes 
and beliefs that surround us in daily life about the power and necessity of violence. 
The structural violence model has been applied to understand the nature or causes of 
violence and conflict in a society, state or at international level. The following violence 
triangle and a violence strata image, based on Galtung’s work, sum up relations between 






Figure 1.1: Galtung’s Violence Triangle14 
 
Although the structural violence theory provides an interesting framework to understand 
the causes of “avoidable violence”, human experience has shown that political, economic 
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and cultural structures do not always result in violence. A number of communities have 
lived in peace for a long time despite the apparent structures that inhibit individuals or 
groups from realising full potential. The other major drawback of this theory is its 
oversight of the role of foreign actors in inciting or causing violence through various 
means and ways including interference and invasions.  
 
1.2 Relative Deprivation 
It was Aristotle who noted over 2000 years ago that social conflict in the Athenian society 
was a result of grievances caused by inequality and of the inability of leaders to deal with 
this problem.
15
 The impact of grievances as the causes of conflict has been discussed by 
social scientists ever since. Frustration resulting from disparities and deprivation is singled 
out as one of the main causes motivating individuals and groups to take action and launch a 
rebellion.  
Relative deprivation is an old concept. In recent history, both Marx and de Tocqueville 
found it more relevant to understand and analyse civil conflicts and social mobilisations. 
The concept is fundamental to Marx’s notion of alienation and immiseration (emiseration) 
for a social revolution which suggests that progressive degradation of industrial working 
class would finally lead automatically to revolution. Marx also noted that improvement in 
living conditions and general development may still give birth to social tension if 
inequality and the gap between rich and poor existed: “Our desires and pleasures spring 
from society; we measure them, therefore, by society and not by the objects which serve 
for their satisfaction. Because they are of a social nature, they are of a relative nature.”16  
Relative deprivation was also a vital revolutionary factor for de Tocqueville (1805-1859) 
when he analysed the causes of specific upheavals, most notably the French Revolution of 
1789. He noted that relaxation of an oppressive regime and partial reforms engenders 
expectations in the public that further reforms are on the way.
17
 Writing in his book, The 
Old Regime and the (French) Revolution, de Tocqueville asserted that failure to deliver 
reforms becomes intolerable which in turn explodes: “Evils which are patiently endured 
when they seem inevitable, become intolerable when once the idea of escape from them is 
                                                          
15
 Kalimtzis, Kostas, (2000). op.cit. 
16
 Avineri, Shlomo (1968). The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, p. 80   
17
 Gurney, Joan Neff  and Tierney, Kathleen J., (1982). Relative Deprivation and Social Movements: A 
Critical Look at Twenty Years of Theory and Research. In: The Sociological Quarterly, January, 23, (1), 33–
47   
30 
 
suggested. The very redress of grievances throws a new light on those which are left 
untouched, and adds fresh poignancy to their smart: if the pain be less, the patient’s 
sensibility is greater.”18  
Within the grievances framework, a number of experts on various aspects of conflictive 
behaviour have focused on the relationship between deprivation and collective violence. 
The relative deprivation theory suggests that a psychic state of resentment, frustration and 
perceived injustice is the essential cause of rebellion and other forms civil militant action. 
While explaining the concept, Jacoby writes that “Individuals’ lack of personal fulfilment, 
both material and non-material, and the growing realisation of others' wants, as perceived 
within their reference group (or a combination of the two), can be a motivational factor in 
various forms of conflictive behaviour.”19  
Relative deprivation is a simple concept based on the idea that people rebel in response to 
perceived injustice and, as Rule says, it “may be the most appealing” among all the 
theories of civil violence and “hard to dismiss”.20 Robin Willimas has called the basic 
concept of relative deprivation as “deceptively simple” adding that “persons may feel that 
they are deprived of some desired state or thing, in comparison with some standard, or with 
the real or imagined condition of other people”.21  
After World War II, the concept of relative deprivation became more popular and more 
and more social scientists took a renewed interest in the concept. Since then, various 
scholars have explored the linkages between grievance formation and conflictive behaviour 
and drew conclusions that impatience with the frustration of economic and/or political 
needs causes collective action. In 1960s, James C. Davies contended that revolutions (both 
failed and successful) were the result of popular dissatisfaction generated by a “prolonged 
period of rising expectations and rising gratification” followed by a short period of sharp 
reversal, during which the gap between expectations and gratifications quickly widens and 
becomes intolerable. In his well-known study, Toward a Theory of Revolution, Davies 
discussed three revolutionary events: Dorr's Rebellion in early 19th century Rhode Island, 
the Russian revolution of 1917 and the Egyptian revolution of 1952.  
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Revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and 
social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal. People then subjectively 




Davies is known for his so-called “J-Curve” theory which seeks to explain the rise of 
collective actions in terms of rising individual expectations and falling levels of perceived 
well-being. In a later study (1979), he offered a similar analysis of the US civil war, the 
Nazi revolution of 1933, and the rebellions of African Americans in the 1960s. In all 










However, the concept of directly connecting frustration with revolt can be questioned on 
the grounds that that frustrated people in general do not always intend to launch a violent 
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collective action. Inequality and other major grievances – such as political repression, and 
ethnic and religious divisions - do not lead to violent conflicts all the times. According to 
Collier, grievances “simply cannot usually be the cause of such a distinctive phenomenon 
as violent conflict. They may well generate intense political conflict, but such conflict does 
not usually escalate to violent conflict.”25 Giving an economic perspective on the causes of 
civil war, Collier says that “objective measures of social grievance “have had little 
systematic effect on risk.” He points out that “civil wars occur where rebel organisations 
are financially viable” and able to raise revenue. He concludes that inequality is not the 
cause of violence but it is the conflict which “actively needs to create” divisions.26  
Several other critics have also raised questions about the links between deprivation and 
violence. As Jacoby says, deprivation would mean “to label any individual or group that, 
perhaps deliberately and contentedly, does not possess ‘sufficient’ material good as 
inclined to behave aggressively and therefore a potential threat to the established order.”27 
Similarly, Bandura argues that empirically the “vast majority of the disadvantaged do not 
engage in disruptive public protest.”28 After analysing the concept, Rule concludes that 
“deprivation is neither necessary nor sufficient for aggression to occur; it influences 
violence only to the extent that it influences more general political attitudes”.29 
 
1.3 Resource mobilisation 
The challenge to the grievances paradigm emerged in the form of resource mobilisation 
theory which emphasises the importance of material improvement as the incentive for 
taking part in a civil militant action. As Aristotle said that, in addition to the unequal nature 
of the Athenian society and frustration with the weakness of administrators, the other main 
cause of conflict was the desire to get wealth and privileges, resource mobilisation theorists 
argue that people resort to violence because they pursue their own interests after assessing 
the costs and benefits of their action.
30
 The primary objective in this case is enrichment and 
material gains.  
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According to Rule, collective action may be defensive or offensive, but the aim is “to do 
better in the ongoing fight for collective advantage, or to avoid doing worse.”31 Motivated 
by predation of rents from primary commodity exports, “greed-rebellion” subjects to an 
economic calculus of costs and a military survival constraint.
32
 Proponents of this concept 
argue that grievances (such as inequality, political repression, and ethnic and religious 
divisions) provide little or no explanatory power in predicting rebellion.
33
 These scholars 




The centrality of economic agenda to civil wars got momentum in the mid-1990s. David 
Keen was one of the first political scientists who stressed the importance of political 
economy of conflict. He noted that war is “a way of creating an alternative system of profit, 
power and even protection”.35 However, it was Paul Collier who had more influence on the 
scholarship on the subject of economic agendas in civil wars. In their analyses of factors 
responsible for the outbreak and duration of civil war, Collier and his colleague, Anke 
Hoefler, presented a “greed versus grievance” model which extrapolates issues of 
motivation and causation of intra-state conflicts. Collier and Hoeffler say that the 
availability of financial resources, especially natural resources results in the outbreaks of 
civil wars and social unrest.
36
 Collier emphasizes the importance of greed rather than 
grievance and argues that “even where the rationale at the top of the [rebel] organisation is 
essentially greed, the actual discourse may be entirely dominated by grievances.”37 He says 
that “while objective grievances do not generate violent conflict, violent conflict generates 
subjective grievances” 38  and argues that groups initially motivated by grievance may 
become dependent upon primary commodity predation for survival, thus transforming 
itself into a greed-rebellion. Conversely, greed-rebellions need to manufacture subjective 
grievance for military cohesion and may find an objective grievance an effective basis for 
generating it.
39
 Therefore, Collier and Hoeffler have suggested a synthesis of the two by 
saying that greed and grievance can co-habit which they call “an integrated greed-
                                                          
31
 Rule, James B., (1988). op.cit. p. 221  
32
 Collier, Paul and Hoeffler, Anke, (2001). Greed and Grievance in Civil War. World Bank, Policy Research 
Working Paper 2355, Washington DC.  
33
 Collier, Paul, (2006). op.cit. 
34
 Jacoby, Tim, (2008). op.cit. p. 126  
35
 Keen, David, (1998). The economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars. IISS Adelphi Paper No., 320. 
London: Oxford University Press, p. 11 
36
 Collier, Paul and Hoeffler, Anke, (2001). op.cit. 
37
 Collier, Paul, (2000). Doing Well Out of War: An Economic Perspective. In: Berdal, Mats and Malone, 
David M., (editors), Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. (pp. 91-111). London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers.  
38
 Collier, Paul, (2006). Op.cit. p.23  
39
 Collier, Paul and Hoeffler, Anke, (2001). op.cit. 
34 
 
grievance model” and “combine both sets of variables as causes of initial, as well as 
subsequent conflicts.”40 
Natural resources, mainly minerals, drugs, timber, oil, diamonds, and gold, have been 
identified as the main cause of internal conflict and social violence. It is argued that 
resource dependent countries are not only more prone to violence but also suffer from 
economic underperformance and governance failure. According to Le Billon, natural 
resources can both influence the course of conflicts and serve to shape the type of armed 
conflict. In addition to foreign intervention, he has identified four main categories of armed 
conflict: coup d’état, warlordism, secession and rioting/peasant rebellion. The resource 
curse thesis, therefore, states that many rebellions and civil militant conflicts appear to be 
linked to the struggle for capturing resources.
41
  
According to the “resource curse” thesis, control over resources can not only motivate 
people to resort to violent conflict, their availability can also increase its destructiveness. 
Economic motives and the dynamic of profiteering from violence have been an important 
part of a number of conflicts from the ancient times to modern period. This theory 
highlights the importance of natural resources as a major or even the main cause of intra-
state conflicts. However, the fact that not all resource rich countries have civil wars points 
to the limitation of this theory. There are a number of resource rich countries - such as 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Botswana, Australia, Russia and Norway - that 
have been immune from the sort of internal conflicts that the resource mobilisation theory 
focuses on. In addition, there are a number of countries that didn’t have lootable natural 
resources but experienced conflicts, for example, Somalia and Afghanistan. Therefore, the 
resource based model doesn’t explain the motivations and causes of several conflicts and 
falls short to adequately answer the question that why all resource rich countries have not 
experienced conflicts.  
However, one argument that needs to be made in the greed-grievance debate is the fact that 
greed does not always cause wars but helps to perpetuate them. In the Post-Cold War 
period, more attention has been paid to resource based conflicts which are mainly 
associated with failed or failing states. From Liberia and Sierra Leone to Cambodia and 
Burma, the politics of control over resources has played a significant in both financing and 
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 The following table illustrates some of the countries where 
















Sierra Leone  
Rwanda  
El Salvador  
Sri Lanka 
 
drugs, gems, timber 














Limestone, graphite, gems, mineral sands 
 
Table 1.1 – Countries and their natural resources used by rebellious movements  
 
The value of natural resources and the ease to exploit them can affect the strength and 
longevity of a rebellious group and by extension of a conflict. The process of how different 
rebellious groups benefit from and in many cases depend on natural resources is well 
documented. It was due to their significance in financing rebel groups in Angola and Sierra 
Leone that diamonds were called a “guerrilla’s best friend.”43 Rebel groups in other parts 
of the world have benefited from other resources available to them. In addition to timber, 
the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia and the Karen in Burma (Myanmar) benefited from 
sapphires and rubies in early 1990s, while gold helped sustain Laurent Kabila’s rebel 
movement in the former Zaire (now known as Congo). Charles Taylor is estimated to have 
made more than US$400 million per year from the trade in natural resources - mainly 
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diamonds and timber - during the conflict in Liberia between 1992 and 1996.
44
 Moreover, 
he is said to have received between 100-187 million annually from timber.
45
 Although gold, 
coffee and wildlife products and timber were all sources of its funding; diamonds provided 
the majority of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA’s) 
funding. UNITA was controlling some 70 percent of the diamond production in Angola in 
the mid-1990s. In the last decade of the 20
th
 Century, UNITA obtained revenues of 
estimated US$3.72 billion from diamond sales.
46
 The left wing guerrilla group in Colombia, 
FARC, earns between $100 million and $600 million annually from the illegal drug trade 
mainly through “taxing” drug producers or drug trafficking cartels that operate in their 
areas of influence, or selling coca base or processed cocaine to the traffickers.
47
 In addition 
to drugs, kidnapping was one of the biggest sources of income for FARC and ELN. The 




In Afghanistan, during the internal war of the 1990s, the main military commander of the 
anti-Taliban United Front (commonly known as Northern Alliance) secured between $40-
60m per year from the sale of emeralds, lapis lazuli and other precious stones.
49
 The 
Taliban, both before and after the US-led invasion have been benefiting from both drugs 
and minerals including precious stones. The Afghan insurgent group, Taliban, allegedly 
secured between US$155-400 million a year from opium through an elaborate system of 
taxing different stages of opium and heroin production including cultivation, processing 
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 In addition, local warlords and corrupt officials also receive huge sums of 
money from the trade in illicit drugs in Afghanistan.
51
   
On the other hand, Pakistani Taliban insurgents, in their quest for resources to sustain and 
fund their militancy, heavily relied on timber extraction, mining and selling precious stones, 
including fine quality emeralds. They also employed other methods such as kidnapping for 




Controlling and taxing the agriculture sector and cattle markets has also been a source of 
income for several rebel groups. In Somalia, competition for controlling the plantation and 
transportations of bananas resulted in skirmishes between different armed groups. In 1990s, 
in several parts of Afghanistan, the issue of taxation of agricultural land and agricultural 
products provided enough excuse for several local commanders to engage in fighting. 
Similarly, Charles Taylor of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) taxed 
companies operating in rubber plantations. Ellis in his book about the Liberian civilian war 
between 1989 and 1997 writes that “as far as possible, factions avoided fighting other 
armed groups”, and that “simulated attacks, designed solely to facilitate looting, were a 
common tactic, particularly in frontlines areas.”53  
Another factor that affects the activity of an insurgent group and the characteristics of a 
conflict is whether the resource exploited by the belligerents is legal or illegal. As 
compared to governments that are usually concerned with their international reputation and 
obligations, rebel groups find it easier to engage in the production and smuggling of illegal 
resources such as narcotics. Rebel groups have been found involved in the smuggling and 
trafficking of mainly illegal commodities and substances especially in countries where 
lootable natural resources don’t exist or the belligerents don’t have access or the ability to 
                                                          
50
 Schmitt, Eric (2009). Many Sources Feed Taliban’s War Chest. New York Times. Article published on 18 
October. Available online at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/19/world/asia/19taliban.html?_r=0> 
[Accessed 05 June 2012]; See also Azami, Dawood, (2013). Why Afghanistan May Never Eradicate Opium. 
BBC News, 26 February. Available online at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-21548230> [Accessed 
25 Aug 2013]. 
51
 Daily Outlook (2011). IDLG Chief Opposes Forced Poppy Eradication. Daily Outlook, Kabul, 
Afghanistan, 30 November. Available online at: <http://outlookafghanistan.net/news?post_id=2678> 
[Accessed 06 June 2012]. 
52
 Yusufzai, Ashfaq, (2012). Pakistan’s Forests Fall Victim to the Taliban. The Guardian, 17 January. 
Available online at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/jan/17/pakistan-forests-taliban> 
[Accessed 05 June 2012); Roul, Animesh, (2009). Gems, Timber and Jiziya: Pakistan’s Taliban Harness 
Resources to Fund Jihad.  The James Town Foundation, Terrorism Monitor, 1, (11), 30 April. Available 
online at: <http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34928&cHash=39d6075765> 
[Accessed 05 June 2012]; The Economic Times, (2009). Taliban Funded by $800 mn Gems, Marbles Trade. 
India, 11 May. Available online at: <http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2009-05-
11/news/27646932_1_marble-mines-sufi-muhammad> [Accessed 05 June 2012]. 
53
 Ellis, Stephen (2007). The Mask of Anarchy, New York: New York University Press, p. 145 
38 
 
exploit them. For example, the Kurdish separatists (PKK) and the Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers 
(LTTE) had been reportedly involved in the trafficking of drugs produced elsewhere.
54
  
Table 1.2 lists some of the rebel groups with the resources they exploit and the amount of 
money they receive from them on an annual basis.  
 
Combatant Group               Resource    Period   Estimated Revenue 
 
UNITA (Angola)                   diamonds 1992-2001          $4,000m total 
 
RUF (Sierra Leone)    
        
diamonds 1990s   $25 - 125m/year 
Charles Taylor (Liberia 
 
timber, Diamonds       Late 1990s         $100- 187m/year 
Taliban (Afghanistan) 
 






Lapis lazuli, emeralds Mid-1990s–2001 $60m/year 
Khmer Rouge (Cambodia) 
 
Timber Mid-1990s $120 -240m/year 
FARC (Colombia) 
 
Cocaine, Opium Late 90s early 00s $500 - 600m/year 









Table 1.2 – A selection of combatant groups and their estimated revenue from natural resources57 
 
Similarly, rebel movements in certain countries simply extract money from legitimate 
sector in a number of ways ranging from theft and looting to extortion and receiving 
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money for safe passage in areas under the rebels’ control. A 2010 Congressional report 
about Pentagon contracts worth more than $2 billion to supply American military bases in 
Afghanistan found that tens of millions of dollars were paid to warlords, corrupt public 
officials and the Taliban to ensure safe passage for the supply of trucks. An estimated $1.6 
million to $2 million per week were reportedly paid to the insurgents as protection 
money.
58
 In Colombia, in order to keep the oil flowing, the oil sector is believed to be 
paying around $100m annually in protection to guerrilla and paramilitary groups.
59
   
Even in areas where government has some control, certain rebel groups and organised 
criminal networks try to exploit the situation for their own advantage. In such 
circumstances, rebels, criminal groups, corrupt government officials and businesses 
collude with each other for financial gains. Security and border officials usually allow 
traffickers and smugglers to operate in exchange for bribes. In such cases, the continuation 
of conflict itself becomes an instrument of enterprise for the so called ‘conflict 
entrepreneurs’ which, among others, include rebels, traders and corrupt officials who use 
instability as a tool for amassing significant economic power.
60
 It is at this stage when a 
conflict becomes more complex and makes its resolution even more difficult. 
Conflicts usually create war economies where beneficiaries become more interested in 
prolonging the conflict than helping to resolve it. Rebel factions usually employ resources 
to buy weapons and to acquire and maintain power. As Mats Berdal and David M. Malone 
say, economic interests bring different and sometimes opposite groups closer even in a 
conflict environment. They argue that “understanding the source of violence requires an 
understanding of “the economics underpinning it”. While giving the example of the brutal 
war in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995, they conclude that “unlikely alliances emerged on 
the ground that were not exclusively motivated by the desire to defeat the main enemy” 
because “petrol barons” and various middlemen benefited hugely from the war economy 
throughout the war zone. Similarly, they add that in mid 1990s, “many Khmer Rouge 
commanders, Cambodian government officials and Thai army officers were more 
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concerned about enriching themselves through illegal logging activity and trading in gems 
than they were about bringing war to an end”.61 
The war in Afghanistan has also created a suitable environment for armed groups and 
individuals to benefit from the war economy. The weakness of central government meant 
that regional powerful warlords had the freedom to extract resources including timber, 
minerals and precious stones (such as rubies, lapis lazuli, and emerald) and smuggle drugs 
and ancient artefacts; thus enriching themselves and buying loyalties. The conflict has also 
provided numerous opportunities for bureaucratic corruption.  
The greed model explains a very important aspect of internal violent conflicts. However, it 
has been criticised for being incapable of predicting all conflicts and rebellions. As Arnson 
notes, neither greed nor the existence of lootable resources was the cause of a number of 
conflicts. Greed, as she puts it, was a product or later stage of wars started for other 
reasons.
62
 The on-going conflict in Afghanistan has many elements, actors and motivations. 
Therefore, it cannot be explained by the greed theory alone, whose proponents argue that 
civil wars are usually caused by economic and not by socio-political factors.
63
 Historical 
and empirical research shows that the conflict in Afghanistan was not initiated as a result 
of economic incentives. As in the case of a number of conflicts in other parts of the world, 
the incentives for self-enrichment created by access to natural and financial resources were 
neither the primary nor sole cause of the Afghan conflict.
64 
  
Evidence suggests that the main insurgent groups in the conflict in Afghanistan -- the 
Taliban and Hezb-e Islami – as a whole are not driven by an economic agenda. Both are 
hierarchical organisations with their finances controlled by the centre which leaves little 
room for personal corruption. Although it has been observed that some Taliban members 
became rich through donations and drug money, the group’s finance and control system 
remains central. As described in detail in Chapter Five, after the Taliban regime was 
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toppled, they established several commissions which are equivalent to ministries and are 
responsible for specific tasks. The Taliban’s financial affairs are run and controlled by their 
Economic/Financial Commission (Iqtisaadi/Mali Kumisyun) which is responsible for the 
collection and distribution of funds from a variety of sources.  
In many “resource based conflicts”, the motivation of elites seems to be overstated. It is 
true that the presence of primary commodities can further complicate the nature of conflict 
where individuals and groups, afraid of losing their autonomous position, generally tend to 
obstruct a political settlement. But the presence of resources doesn’t always have only an 
internal dimension. In many cases, the external and international dimension is stronger 
than its domestic dimension as foreign powers usually interfere in resource rich countries 
to exploit them for their own benefits. As Winston Churchill said, “God put the West’s oil 
under Middle Eastern feet”, certain resources and their demand in the outside world might 
also pave the way for external powers’ interference while seeking raw material as part of 
their overall national interests.
65
  
In addition, the greed model doesn’t fit most freedom struggles as it downplays the 
ideological and political components in a collective violent action. Among other writers, 
Jeffery Herbst, has questioned the plausibility of the greed concept asking that did Nelson 
Mandela spent nearly three decades in prison “to steal from gold and diamond mines?”66 
Similarly, the Indian National Congress’s struggle for independence and the uprising by 
the Pashtoons
67




 centuries was not 
about greed.
68
 The history of religious struggles in general, in which religious leaders 
usually reject the tendencies of greed, also points to the shortcoming of the greed model.  
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1.4 Ethnic Hatreds and Identity Politics 
Some writers view civil wars as primordial ethnic confrontations and argue that “ancient 
ethnic hatreds” are the root cause of intra-state conflict, especially in Africa and Asia.69, 
While calling the ethnic conflict as “a force shaping human affairs”, Horowitz argues that 
“ethnicity is at the centre of politics” is many countries and “a potent source of challenges 
to the cohesion of states and of international tension.”70 A number of countries with ethnic 
and religious heterogeneity such as Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq, Rwanda, and Sri Lanka 
experienced political mobilization along ethnic lines. Ethnicity has played an important 
role to incite people and to commit violence in various parts of the world. The so called 
conflict entrepreneurs particularly used this card to motivate their followers to wage wars, 
and bolster their power and privileges as the leaders of those particular ethnic groups. As 
Fearson notes, “ethnicity is politicised when political coalitions are organised along ethnic 
lines, or when access to political or economic benefits depends on ethnicity”.71   
Local actors and leaders of different groups usually try to get the maximum out of the 
chaos resulting from state failure or weakening of central government power. By adapting 
themselves to war economy, “war enterprises” and warlords usually base their policies on 
nepotism, tribalism, ethnocentrism, and corruption and try to exercise their political and 
economic politics autonomously. As Donald Kurtz says in his book Political Anthropology, 
a robust economy is a key stone to a leader’s legitimacy that meets the needs of their 
political community. This, he adds, is a much cheaper option to govern, enhance claim to 
authority and exert control than coercion which risks the loss of support.
72
  
In a number of contemporary intra-state wars, civilians have been recruited into unpaid or 
underpaid armies or militias. Some of these recruitments were on ethnic lines and, in other 
cases, a combination of fear, need and greed created a willingness among the civilian 
populations to join the conflict. Forced conscription is also part of most of such conflicts. 
Keen, while explaining the situation in Sierra Leon, notes that those fleeing violence in a 
conflict, “often faced the stark choice between joining the ranks of the destitute and 
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starving, or joining an armed band”.73 It demonstrates that all called ethnic wars or those 
individuals who participate in them are not always driven by ethnic hatreds. Therefore, too 
much emphasis on economic dimension and “ethnic hatreds” of civil wars might not help 
to understand the true nature of the conflict and find a resolution.   
In addition, the “ancient ethnic hatreds” analysis as the cause of war has many other short 
comings as it doesn’t explain the pre-war peaceful history of the “hostile peoples”. 
Historical and empirical evidence shows that there is no essential connection between 
ethnicity and conflict. Relations between different ethnic groups have been in fact peaceful 
and cooperative.
74
 There are numerous examples of different ethnic groups living 
peacefully with each other for a long time. The “ethnic hatreds” analysis also fails to 
explain the violence taking place within a particular ethnic group. As Turton argues, the 
“ethnic hatreds” school ignores the fact that in most cases “ethnic sentiment is often the 
result rather than the cause of war”. 75  Analysing the role of external actors in exploiting 
divisions on ethnic lines, Turton concludes that in times of war and hardship, nationalism 
and ethnicity become “the most effective means available of gaining and/or keeping a 
political following”.76  
As several other conflicts, the conflict in Afghanistan has also been portrayed by many 
writers as either terrorist/extremist problem or an ethnic problem. Afghanistan is a land of 
ancient cultures and civilizations and it is also the home of one of the world’s most 
intractable wars and conflicts. The ongoing violence between different actors with 
competing interest has turned the country into one of the most dangerous places on the 
earth and caused immeasurable devastation and human suffering. Although a large body of 
writing exists on the conflict in Afghanistan, it has many limitations as the role of a 
number of key factors and actors has been largely ignored especially the role of foreign 
actors in starting and fuelling the conflict. Several writers have portrayed the conflict in 
Afghanistan as a primordial conflict based on mutual distrust between different ethnic 
groups and violence spanning over many centuries. But the ground reality tells a different 
story. Most of Afghanistan’s long history has been one of ethnic pluralism and co-
existence. For much of its recent history, especially the decades before the 1979 Soviet 
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invasion, the country was one of the most peaceful countries in the region. Multilateralism 
was common and assimilation of different tribal, linguistic and ethnic groups resulted in 
the creation of a shared Afghan identity. There has been a lot of inter-mixture between 
different ethnic and linguistic groups especially between the two major groups, Pashtoons 
and Tajiks. The two major languages, Pashto and Dari (Afghan Persian) have been both 
official languages and in the new constitution approved in 2004, other smaller languages 
have also been recognized as official languages of the country.   
During the 1980s, all the Mujahideen factions fighting against the Soviet forces were not 
based on ethnicity and all of them were ethnically mixed. Even in the internal factional 
fighting in Kabul in 1990s, the groups from both opposite alliances were mixed, 
representing different ethnic groups whose leaders changed sides frequently. Although 
ethnic card was used by some commanders, mostly at local levels in order to motivate their 
followers, factional leaders and warlords didn’t publically use a language that would 
indicate any hatred for other groups.
 77
  Moreover, major differences within each ethnic 
group and the intra ethnic violence/conflicts and killings have received relatively little 
attention. There are major differences within each ethnic group. The Taliban, whose 
members are mostly from the majority Pashtoons, killed more Pashtoons than members of 
other ethnic groups.  Similarly, violence within other ethnic groups has also occurred from 
time to time which shows that ethnic divisions alone do not explain the conflict in the 
country. In addition, the degree of assimilation and integration is higher in Afghanistan 
than other countries in the region, especially its two neighbours, Iran and Pakistan. As 
opposed to Iran and Pakistan, Afghanistan never had and still doesn’t have an ethnic or 
religious separatist movement.  
Mary Kaldor, the author of New and Old Wars offered a new way of understanding wars, 
in which the actors are both global and local, and public and private who use terror tactics 
and asymmetrical warfare with an informal criminalised economy to fuel their violent 
campaign. Against the assumptions that most of the post-Cold War conflicts are mainly 
‘civil’ wars produced by ‘ethnic conflict’, or greed, Kaldor describes “New Wars” as a 
mixture of wars, and demonstrates that conflicts including the one in Bosnia-Herzegovina  
are political in nature involving state power and ‘private’ actors, with  political elites 
reproducing their power through ‘identity politics’. While appreciative of the dangers 
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posed by failed states, she argues that ‘new wars’ could be understood in the context of 
globalisation and the rise of non-state actors. As opposed to revolutionary wars, the politics 
of ‘new wars’ is based on identity rather than ideology. Moreover, the illegal side-effects 
of old war are central in “new wars”, in which the main victims are civilian populations 
and control is achieved through ethnic cleansing, mass murder, forced migration, 
population displacement and purging territories.  
Although Mary Kaldor’s “new wars” model presents another understanding of 
contemporary violent conflicts and their complexities, it falls short to properly explain a 
number of current conflicts. The term “new” itself can be misleading as the features – such 
as ‘hearts and minds’ vs. ‘fear and hatred’ -- of “new wars” are not really new and can be 
observed in old wars as well. However, the more controversial part of Kaldor’s analysis is 
about labels of ethnicity and culture which play a prominent role in her ‘new wars’ theory. 
She says that identity politics, “the claim to power on the basis of particular identity – be it 
national, clan, religious or linguistic”, behind the conflict is a main feature of ‘new wars’. 
“All wars” she adds “involve a clash of identities”.78  
Identity politics has been part of human society since time immemorial. Clan, tribal, ethnic, 
national, regional, linguistic, sectarian and religious identities have been used and abused 
throughout human history. Even though ethnic groups play an important role in several 
conflicts in Africa and Asia where many violent rebellions have been connected to ethnic 
separation, many other wars don’t fall under this category. For example, Somalia, which 
has experienced turmoil for decades, doesn’t have different ethnic groups and all the tribes 
and clans belong to the same ethnic group. Similarly in Afghanistan, the conflict is not 
based on purely ethnic lines and even during the so called civil war in 1990s, different 
alliances and factions had a mixed membership. Ethnic diversities and cultural identities 
and differences are not always the main reasons behind violent conflicts. In a number of 
conflicts, several other factors, such as ideology, grievances and greed play more important 
role than ethnicity and culture. 
Kaldor’s assertion that the world is progressively becoming bloodier and more violent is 
also criticised on the grounds that it was the twentieth century which was the most violent 
and bloodiest on record. Compared to the past, the world today is comparatively safer and 
peaceful. As Pinker and Goldstein have argued in their separate books, there has been a 
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general decline in armed conflicts and we are living in the most peaceful time in history.
79
 
Kaldor’s conclusion about the higher ratio of civilian to military casualties in ‘new wars’ 
as compared to ‘old wars’ is also contested. One major reason that that more civilians are 
killed in wars today is because there are very few inter-state wars with regular armies 
facing each other. In recent decades, most violent conflicts have been intra-state including 
those where proxies are used by foreign state actors to increase their influence or weaken 
their neighbours.  
William Zartman gets beyond a single factor explanation of internal conflicts and groups 
different elements in his “need, creed, and greed” formulation. In this framework basic 
needs, identity, and resources are the stakes of conflict or as grievances, rights, and greed 
as the motivations of conflict. According to Zartman, grievances caused by political 
repression and economic deprivation (“need”), generalized belief and identity feelings 
especially discrimination based on beliefs and identities (“creed”) and personal or factional 
ambitions of private gain (“greed”) combine to produce conflicts. Zartman says that the 
nature of conflict depends on “how these factors relate to each other in causing and 
sustaining conflict, and how, not whether, conflict is related to these three factors” and 
concludes that the “need feed creed and creed feed greed.”80 Zartman’s formulation is 
interesting as it recognises the multiplicity of factors that cause a conflict or motivate its 
participants. However, he doesn’t appreciate the role of external actors and factors in 
causing or prolonging an internal conflict.  
 
1.5 Transnational Dimensions of Civil Wars 
Transnational factors are also vital in both initiating and perpetuating the conflict. In a 
number of cases, foreign interferences and interventions have not only caused conflicts; 
they have also made them more complex and prolonged.
81
 In the post-Cold War world, a 
number of scholars and theorists have associated conflict with “empire” and “imperialism” 
and the struggles around capital accumulation. Writing about this theme, Marxist political 
scholars, David Harvey and Alex Callinicos, combine a theory of imperialism with a 
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theory of a capitalist state.
82
 Harvey in his concept of “two logics” of power -- the 
‘territorial’ and the ‘capitalist’ -- points to “outright antagonism” between the state and 
capitalism, especially in the context of globalisation and “new imperialism” and states. In 
his book, The New Imperialism, Harvey combines economic and geopolitical nature of 
imperialism. 
The fundamental point is to see the territorial and the capitalist logics of power as distinct 
from each other. Yet it is also undeniable that the two logics intertwine in complex and 
sometimes contradictory ways. The literature on imperialism and empire too often assumes 
an easy accord between them: that political-economic processes are guided by the 




Similarly, Callinicos, in his book, Imperialism and Global Political Economy, draws on 
Harvey’s idea of two logics of imperialism and explores the significance of forms of 
imperialism. While emphasizing that imperialism is not just an economic structure, 
Callinicos argues that it has both economic and geopolitical drivers. According to him, 
some wars and interventions may not have an immediate economic pay-off but may be part 
of a large, international competition in which rivals manoeuvre in order to dominate 
resources at the expense of their rivals.
84
   
The transnational aspect of intra-state wars and conflict is often overlooked in scholarly 
literature and has not been addressed adequately. Literature on internal conflicts is mainly 
focusing on country-specific factors or processes within the boundaries of individual states. 
Countries don’t live in isolation and regimes usually have a tendency of meddling in each 
other’s affairs especially in a bad neighbourhood where serious disputes between states, 
including border disputes, remain unresolved. It is for this reason that, while challenging 
the “closed polity” approach to the study of civil war, Gleditsch argues that “it is 
inappropriate to treat civil war as a fully domestic phenomenon” and concludes that a 
number of contemporary civil wars display a strong transnational character “where actors, 
resources, and events span national boundaries.” These transnational factors and linkages, 
he says, “influence the risk of violent civil conflict.”85 
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It is often the case that countries in a “hostile neighbourhood” don’t want a strong 
neighbour. A weaker neighbour is in the strategic interest of the predatory state or an 
expansionist state. In addition to political and strategic interests, regional actors also often 
have economic incentives in an intra-state war in their neighbourhood as they profit from 
the resources of the state in turmoil. As Mwanasali notes that the war in Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC) – formerly known as Zaire -- enabled neighbouring 
countries such as Rwanda and Uganda to become major exporters of raw materials, 
including gold or cobalt, which they do not naturally possess. He explains how “timber, 
palm oil, coffee, elephant tusks, and precious minerals,” looted from Zaire (Congo) and 
exported through the black market, became “a main source of foreign exchange for Zaire’s 
resource-deprived neighbours.”86 Kennes has reached more or less the same conclusion 
about the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo by saying that the “Congo war 
cannot be simply characterized as grown out of greed.” In addition to grievances, Kennes 
highlights the international involvement and the role the neighbouring states played in the 
conflict in Congo.
87
 Similarly, during the 1980s, 1990s and even 2000s, most of 
Afghanistan’s products, especially carpets, minerals, precious stones, dry and fresh fruits, 
handicrafts and even ancient artefacts, were exported via Pakistan and Iran with a mostly 
“made in Pakistan” or “made in Iran” labels.  
It is not only the neighbouring countries and actors whose actions cause or perpetuate a 
civil war; the role of other international actors and global powers also has a major impact 
on the nature and conduct of an intra-state conflict. In some cases, domestic factors 
combine with transnational factors making the conflict not only more complicated but also 
potentially deadlier. While analysing the conflict in Colombia, Chernick acknowledges the 
role resources play in sustaining and expanding the conflict. However, he concludes that 
the Colombian case doesn’t support the idea that the struggle over access to resources is 
the main cause of the conflict. He adds that “other factors – such as grievances, ideology, 
leadership, military strategy and international factors – are also key” to explain the origins 
or the duration of the war.
88
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While discussing LTTE’s (The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) separatist conflict in Sri 
Lanka, Bandarage also highlights the importance of moving “beyond psychologically 
based interpretations confined to ideology and consciousness and narrow views which see 
it as wither a terrorist or an ethnic problem” and argues that it is necessary to examine 
other factors as well as the local and regional ethnoclass segments and international 
hegemonic interests.
89
 While examining the role of domestic, regional and international 
actors in the Sri Lankan conflict, Bandarage suggests another framework that he calls 
“multipolar model” in which he takes into account the inherent unity between groups as 
well as the socio-economic inequalities and hierarchies at local, regional and international 
level. Bandarage calls LTTE’s (commonly known as the Tamil Tigers) violent campaign in 
Sri Lanka, as “a complex political-economic a conflict perpetuated by the confluences of 
factors.”90   
The “multipolar model” offers a different perspective on intra-state conflicts and 
recognises the multiplicity of factors. However, its main focus is on the Tamil Tigers’ 
conflict in Sri Lanka where the role of international actors was comparatively weak. 
Except for the initial Indian support for the LTTE, the group didn’t enjoy support from 
other state actors and was mainly supported by the Tamil diaspora, especially in Western 
countries. Norway’s role was important but not as a supporter of one of the local parties 
but as a mediator to resolve the conflict. As it will be explained over the next pages, the 
“multipolar model” also ignores the hybridity, homogeneity and commonality of 
motivations and factors in a conflict and allocates a standalone role to different actors.    
  
1.6 Hybrid Framework: Multiple Actors and Overlapping Factors  
All the models and frameworks described above have their benefits and help in 
understanding the complex nature of conflict and recognising its causes and motivations. 
However, the role of ethnic and religious identity (grievance) or the political economy of 
conflict (need) do not appear to be the whole story when it comes to the causes of civil 
wars or internal armed conflicts. Similarly, it is not always the only cause of conflict. As 
Farrell and Schmitt notes, “the greed versus grievance debate is useful for clarifying the 
various potential drivers” of such conflicts but adopting the position that they are 
                                                          
89
 Bandarage, Asoka, (2009). The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka: Terrorism, Ethnicity, Political Economy, 
Oxon: Routledge, p. 28. 
90
 Bandarage, Asoka, (2009). Op.cit. pp. 7-8. 
50 
 
“primarily driven by ethnic difference or economic conditions seems unnecessarily 
limiting.”91  
Human society is very complex and dynamic. There are several conflict drivers and nearly 
all intra-state conflicts “encompass many modes of violence”.92 Therefore, the models and 
frameworks discussed here are useful but they have their own shortcomings. Some of these 
frameworks ignore or downplay the role of some aspects or cause while others overplay 
their role and importance. Similarly, some models ignore the role of foreign actors in intra-
state conflicts and simply describe them as purely domestic conflicts or manifestations of 
greed; while others portray such problems as either terrorist/extremist or ethnic.  
In addition, the existing literature on intra-state conflicts and scholarly discourses 
regarding civil wars have largely ignored or, at least, underestimated the role of external 
actors, especially regional and international state actors. Foreign actors often play a crucial 
role in a variety of forms ranging from interference and intervention to providing 
patronage to the local actors of an intra-state conflict. Similarly, divisions are part of every 
human society. Every community and country, regardless of its level of integration or 
ethnic composition, has a number of visible and easily identifiable characteristics that point 
to differences and divisions. Divisions not only exist within every state; ethnic groups, 
tribes and even extended families have certain differences. The severity of these divisions 
and differences could become one of several identities for certain groups. However, the 
history of conflicts in many parts of the world shows that such divisions can be exploited 
by local and foreign players for their own interests. Those regions of the world are usually 
more prone to exploitation if there are longstanding unresolved disputes. It is in such 
places where foreign actors wait for the right opportunity to exploit these divisions in 
various ways including by providing patronage to their favourite local actors. The ease and 
degree of exploitation depend on a number of factors such as the level of fragmentation 
and divisions in a particular society, the commonality of interests between the local and 
foreign actors and the degree of willingness of different local actors to serve the interests 
of a foreign actor.  
Social cohesion usually suffers as a result of foreign interventions and interferences. It is 
mostly at this stage of relative fragmentation when local groups look for external support 
and foreign actors find an opportunity to find proxies. A number of countries have 
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repeatedly found themselves in this situation, especially in parts of the world where 
governments are not committed to the principles of good neighbourhood. For example, 
Ethiopia, having an old territorial dispute with Somalia, supported certain actors in 
Somalia and eventually physically intervened by sending its troops to the country to beat 
the Islamist-led insurgency of the “Islamic Courts”.93 Similarly, Namibian troops entered 
Angola to help defeat the rebel group UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence 
of Angola); Saudi Arabia led a bombing campaign against the Shia Houthi rebels in 




In Afghanistan too, the problem has been primarily a centuries old international one which 
started as a power struggle between the two super powers of the time. It emanates from the 
original “Great Game” - the geopolitical struggle for dominance between the British and 
Russian Empires in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries - with Afghanistan as their 
chosen battleground.
95
 In a way, the “Great Game” never ended; it just took new forms 
with the addition of new external powers and actors continuously intervening and 
interfering in the country to promote their own interests. The emerging powers have been 
pitting against each other for influence and control over this resources rich and 
strategically important part of the world. We witnessed that in the three Anglo-Afghan 
wars (1839-42; 1878-80; 1919). Later on, the competition between Communist and 
Capitalist blocs also manifested in many forms in Afghanistan as both sides wanted to gain 
more influence in the strategically located country. The Soviet invasion of the country in 
1979 and the resistance by the Afghan Mujahideen who were supported by the West once 
again made it as a main battlefield for major world powers. When the resistance against the 
invading Soviets and the Communist leaning regime in Kabul got momentum, the Afghan 
Mujahideen (resistance fighters) were actively supported by a wide range of foreign 
governments including pre-dominantly Christian Western countries, Muslim and Arab 
countries and even China and Japan. Although the players and actors changed with the 
passage of time, the “game” in Afghanistan continued. The latest version of the Great 
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Game can be seen in the US-led intervention in Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks on 
New York and Washington.  
Although conventional Western public opinion saw the conflict in post-9/11 Afghanistan 
as a struggle between NATO and extremist Islamic militants, foreign interference and 
intervention is once again a major part of the ongoing conflict in which regional and 
international politics and rivalries are entwined at multiple levels. There are many 
permutations of power geo-politics at regional and international levels. Pakistan’s rivalry 
with India, Iran’s conflict with the US, competition with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, and 
many other regional rivalries between state and non-state actors are all at work 
simultaneously. Each foreign actor is engaged in a direct or indirect interference in a 
variety of ways including supporting their favourite proxies. At local level, the presence of 
foreign forces not only complicates the nature of conflict, it also motivates a number of 
people to engage in fighting what they see as occupation and portray their resistance as a 
nationalist and freedom struggle. The presence of US-led forces in the country also 
perpetuates violence as some regional powers see their presence and proximity as a threat 
to their security and long term national interests. This provides them with an excuse to 
support the militants who are fighting against the Afghan government and its foreign allies. 
As Newberg has notes, the regional and international dimensions of the conflict in 
Afghanistan are of vital importance: “No matter how trenchant the local disputes that 
ignited and nurtured them; none could be sustained without active political and economic 
involvement from neighbouring states, foreign donors, and non-state actors in the region 
and beyond.”96  
It is in this context that narrow state centric approaches and looking only to the internal 
dynamics of intra-state conflicts are of limited analytical value. The conflict in Afghanistan 
as well as numerous other intra-state conflicts can only be understood within a broader 
global context. External states can not only cause or encourage a conflict; they can also 
play a crucial role in prolonging and sustaining it. As Cunningham says, the involvement 
of certain external actors in an intra-state conflict makes them “veto players” and “can 
prevent the war from ending” by “constraining the ability of the internal combatants to 
make independent decisions”. 97  In such circumstances, the term “civil war” in its 
traditional sense also becomes misleading. As many “civil wars” in other parts of the world, 
                                                          
96
 Newberg, Paula R. (2005). Surviving State Failure: Internal War and Regional Conflict in Afghanistan’s 
Neighborhood.  In: Arnson, Cynthia J. and Zartman, I. William (editors), Rethinking the Economics of Civil 
War: The intersection of Need, Creed, and Greed.  Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Press, pp. 206-233 
97




the cause of the Afghan conflict is not entirely internal. Civil wars, as King notes, “are 
never entirely internal in character”.98  
In addition, colonial legacies and “unnatural borders” and “artificial boundaries” that 
separate and divide the same ethnic groups, tribes and even extended families -- such as 
Somalis who are divided in four countries, i.e. Somalia, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya -- 
also created a suitable environment for a violent conflict and prepared ground for foreign 
interference. The frontiers created by European nations in their colonial period in Asia and 
Africa have left legacies of bitterness for the independent nations. Dozens of countries in 
Asia and Africa have been haunted by several long political and military conflicts over 
state borders such as the Somali-Ethiopian, the Somali-Kenyan and Eritrean-Ethiopian 
skirmishes and wars.
99
 On the other hand, former colonial powers still have significant 
political and economic influence and in many cases play an active role by supporting local 
actors and thus impacting the internal dynamics of a conflict in their former colonies. 
Like several other conflicts, the conflict in Afghanistan is the product of a complex web of 
local motivations and interactions as well regional and international rivalries and 
interferences that set the stage for political changes at both local and regional level. The 
conflict in Afghanistan has a number of internal elements as its motivating factors such as 
ideology (anti-communist, anti-Western, anti-occupation, Islamist, nationalist), greed 
(resources, power), need (poverty, unemployment), and organised crime (drug mafia, 
corrupt officials etc.). In addition, several regional and international factors are also partly 
responsible for both initiating and perpetuating the conflict. The Afghan conflict in general 
is a mixture of a number of complex and overlapping causes and motivations involving 
multiple local and foreign actors competing for promoting their economic, political, 
ideological and strategic interests.                         
The occurrence of civil militant action depends on the convergence of different conditions, 
rather than what Tilly called a “one sure-fire cause”.100  In an increasingly globalising 
world, conflicts are becoming more and more complex involving a variety of actors at 
local, regional and international levels as well as a combination of different motivations. 
Therefore, I have suggested the “Hybrid Framework” which takes into account a variety of 
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overlapping causes and motivations as well as the complex web of factors and actors at 
local, regional and international levels. Most intra-state conflicts are multi-dimensional in 
nature where, in addition to local actors, the role of foreign actors, both regional and 
international, is of paramount importance in both causing and prolonging the conflict. In 
most cases, the efforts and interest of several actors coincides which ultimately makes 
them allies and collaborators. In the “Hybrid Framework”, the overlapping of goals and 
motivations of different actors is vital because the commonality of purpose brings them 
together as partners. The following diagram demonstrates the interplay between and 
overlapping of interests of local, regional and international actors and factors in an intra-




Figure 1.3: Hybrid Framework of Violent Conflict: Combination and overlapping of different causes, actors 




Violence has been part of human society since time immemorial. In order to understand, 
prevent and resolve this destructive phenomenon, scholars have tried to explore its nature, 
causes and motivation. More than two millennia ago, Aristotle noted that the conflict in 
Athens was the result of the unequal nature of society, frustration at the incompetence of 






















































before and after Aristotle, have shared their insights and suggested theories, models and 
frameworks aimed at explaining and analysing violent conflicts. As the understanding of 
human society, psychology and behaviour increased, more elements related to violence 
became part of social sciences in general and conflict studies in particular.  
Following World War II, scholars in different parts of the world have paid more attention 
to understand conflictive behaviour and its causes. Depending on their scholarly 
background and social and political tendencies, various scholars have identified several 
factors linked with the initiation of violent conflicts. Some scholars have called violence as 
innate and consider it a part of human nature while others consider it a socially acquired 
phenomenon. Scholars, such as Johan Galtung, articulated the notion of ‘structural 
violence’ and conceived violence as “the cause of the difference between the potential and 
the actual”. The structural violence theory explores how political, economic and cultural 
structures result in the occurrence of avoidable violence. On the other hand, the relative 
deprivation theory is based on the concept of grievances and says that violence is the result 
of deprivation and inequality. It argues that frustration of economic and/or political needs 
causes collective violent action. Conversely, the greed-model stresses the importance of 
resources and material gains, both as an instigator and an objective, and argues that 
material gain and remuneration drives social mobilisation.  
However, empirical and historical evidence show that these approaches do not adequately 
appreciate the dynamics of all types of societies. Although there appears to be a link and 
continuity between different scholarly approaches, there is no “one size fits all model”. 
Conflicts have a number of different dynamics and no single cause can explain all of types 
of collective violence as they are as complicated and contingent as the human psyche and 
society.  
In an increasingly globalising world, conflicts are becoming more and more complex 
involving a variety of actors at local, regional and international levels as well as a 
combination of different motivations. Therefore, I have suggested what I call the “Hybrid 
Framework” of civil war which takes into account a variety of overlapping causes and 
motivations as well as the complex web of factors and actors at local, regional and 
international levels. Based on the idea that conflict has multiple drivers, the “Hybrid 
Framework” takes into account the role of multiple actors (international, regional and local) 





The Conflict in Afghanistan: Actors and Factors 
 
This chapter applies the “Hybrid Framework” to an inductive analysis of the conflict in 
Afghanistan. While assessing the Afghan conflict, it demonstrates that intra-state conflicts 
have various internal and external dynamics and involves several actors and motivations 
including ideology, greed and proxy. The chapter argues that the war in Afghanistan, one 
of the most protracted and complicated conflicts in the world, is not a completely domestic 
phenomenon as it displays a strong regional and international character. It is the product of 
a complex web of local motives and as well multiple regional and international rivalries 
and interests. This chapter examines different aspects of the conflict in the country and 
assess the role of major local, regional and international actors and factors responsible for 
initiating and prolonging the conflict. The chapter concludes by analysing the role of 
natural resources, especially drugs, in the Afghan conflict and argues that it is not drugs 
that caused the conflict but the war created a suitable environment for the drug production 
and trade and other illegal activities that are contributing to the perpetuation of violence.    
 
Due to its geographical location and strategic importance, historians and political scientists 
have variously described Afghanistan as “a Land Bridge”, “Roof of the World, “Door of 
India (the Indian sub-continent)”, “Silk Route”, “Eastern Door of the Islamic World”, 
“Melting Pot of Civilizations”, “Hub of Civilizations”, “Highway for the International 
Commerce” and “the Heart of Asia” among others. Geographically, the country links 
Western, Southern and Central Asia. The famous British historian Arnold Toynbee called 
the country as “The Roundabout of the Ancient World”1 while Norchi describes it as 
historically “a land on everyone’s way to someplace else. 2  Afghanistan’s sensitive 
geography has frequently made it a battlefield of major powers and invaders for millennia. 
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The country repeatedly paid a very heavy price in both blood and treasure as millions of its 
inhabitants were killed and infrastructure destroyed. At times, the breakup of society 
resulting from numerous foreign invasions and wars also led to internal strife and 
collective violence.
3









The recent history of Afghanistan shows that the country has been at the centre of multiple 
external encounters rivalries. In the 19
th
 Century, Afghanistan was the main theatre of the 
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Great Game between the two superpowers of the time -- Britain and the Tsarist Russia. 
During the Cold War, the country became a major battlefield in the proxy war between the 
capitalist West and communist Soviet Union (USSR). More recently, after the attacks on 
the US on 11
th
 September 2001, the Afghanistan was turned overnight into the main theatre 
of the US-led “War on Terror”. Within three decades, the two superpowers – USSR and 
the United States – invaded Afghanistan making it an international battlefield and 
involving dozens of regional and international actors. 
However, before the communist coup and the Soviet invasion of the country, Afghanistan 
remained peaceful during most of the 20
th
 Century. In 1973, while King Zahir Shah -- who 
ruled over a peaceful and neutral Afghanistan for 40 years -- was on a trip to Italy, his 
cousin and former prime minister (1953-1963), Mohammad Daoud Khan, staged a 
bloodless coup and put an end to monarchy in Afghanistan. Daoud remained president of 
the Republic for just five years until 27
th
 April 1978 when the Afghan leftists in the 
military surrounded the presidential palace in the capital Kabul killing him with all of his 
family members. The Marxist military officers immediately handed over power to the 
Soviet backed Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) which was divided into 
two main factions -- Khalq (people) and Parcham (Flag). The PDPA proclaimed the 
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) and Noor Muhammad Taraki (the head of the 
Khalq faction of PDPA) became the President. A few months later, on 14
th
 September, his 
deputy, Hafizullah Amin, declared himself the new president after the killing of his 
predecessor as part of an internal power struggle. Amin remained on his post until the 
Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan on 27
th
 December 1979, who killed him and installed 




Meanwhile, the anti-communist resistance by various Mujahideen groups intensified in 
most of the country, especially rural areas. Dozens of countries including the US and its 
Western allies, China, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran started supplying money and arms 
to the Afghan Mujahideen guerrilla fighters. In 1986, Babrak Karmal was replaced by 
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Najibullah as the new head of the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul. Faced with a tough 
resistance and mounting casualties in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union eventually decided to 
leave the country and completed the withdrawal of its troops in February 1989. However, 
after the retreat, Moscow continued supporting the Kabul regime both militarily and 
financially. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia maintained the flow of aid to the 
government in Kabul, albeit on a minor scale. Najibullah thus managed to stay in power 
for another three years until the Mujahideen slowly expanded their control and eventually 
captured Kabul in April 1992.
6
  
However, soon after the Mujahideen victory, a bloody war for the control of Kabul started 
between different factions supported by external powers. The factional war, which was 
centred on Kabul, killed tens of thousands of people and destroyed much of the capital. In 
the fall of 1994, the Taliban Movement emerged in the south of the country, expanded 
their control with a rapid speed and captured Kabul in September 1996. The Taliban, 
marched with a slogan of Islamic Sharia, peace and justice, gradually defeated most of 
their enemies and, by the end of the decade, established its rule over 90% of Afghanistan’s 
territory.  
The attacks on the US on 11
th
 September 2011 linked the Taliban and Afghanistan to 
international politics and security. The US accused the Al-Qaeda network, whose 
leadership as based in the Taliban controlled Afghanistan, for the attacks on New York and 
Washington. On 7
th
 October 2001, as part of its military campaign called “Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF)”, the US-led forces launched strikes against the Taliban regime 
in Afghanistan which refused to hand over Osama bin Laden, head of Al-Qaeda. 
Meanwhile, different Afghan groups participated in a UN sponsored conference in Bonn, 
Germany, and, on 5
th
 December 2001, announced a road map to establish democratic 
intuitions in Afghanistan starting with the formation of an interim government under the 
leadership of Hamid Karzai.  
Following the toppling of the Taliban regime in Kabul, the international community’s 
gradually increased its involvement in Afghanistan and supported the new Afghan 
government both militarily and financially. Expectations were high and Afghans in general 
hoped that peace will prevail and their country will now become a hub for cooperation and 
trade. However, the Taliban soon resurfaced as an insurgency and started fighting the 
Afghan government and its US-led international allies in 2003-2004. The Taliban 
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insurgency has changed the dynamics of the Afghan conflict which started with the 
communist coup in April 1978. Once again, the country has become a competing ground 
for both regional and international powers. As Rubin notes, “this time virtually every 
major international and regional actor decided to become involved in Afghanistan with no 
restraining rules of the game.”7 The country has once again become a battlefield where 
several regional and international conflicts are being fought.  
It is in this context that a number of recent popular works on Afghanistan, especially media 
reports, start the history of the Afghan conflict from 9/11; some go a bit further and begin 
it with the emergence of the Taliban Movement in 1994 while others go as far as the 1979 
Soviet invasion of the country. On the other hand, some commentators portray it as a 
primordial conflict based on mutual distrust between different ethnic groups while others 
see religious extremism and terrorism at the heart of the problem.
8
 Although these factors 
play their role in making things worse, the Afghan conflict is primarily the product of a 
complex web of regional and international rivalries and interferences as well as local 
motives and interactions. The role of foreign actors, both regional and international, is 
highly significant in both causing and prolonging this multi-dimensional conflict.  
The conflict in the country involves a range of issues ranging from strategic and proxy to 
greed and criminality. It also brings together a number of state and non-state actors at local, 
regional and international level. Depending on their nature, goals and motivations, these 
actors have either overlapping and/or competing interests. Understanding and resolving the 
Afghan conflict requires a thorough appraisal of its multiple actors and their objectives. As 
discussed in Chapter 1 in detail, conflict in general have multiple drivers and the existing 
models and frameworks aimed at understanding conflicts have shortcomings and miss one 
or more important elements of a given conflict. The “Hybrid Framework” I have proposed 
takes into account a variety of overlapping causes and motivations. Therefore, it seems 
more suitable to analyse the Afghan conflict in the light of the “Hybrid Framework” which 
takes into consideration the complex web of actors and factors at local, regional and 
international levels. 
Like many other conflicts, the Afghan conflict is not a completely domestic phenomenon 
as it displays a strong regional and international character. It is the outcome of a mixture of 
several complex and overlapping causes and motivations involving multiple local and 
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foreign actors who compete for promoting their own economic, political, ideological and 
strategic interests. The conflict in Afghanistan has a numerous internal, regional and global 
dimensions making it complex and prolonged, difficult to understand and hard to resolve. 
Although most of these issues and interests overlap, I have divided them into four main 
categories to highlight the role of different actors and factors responsible for initiating and 
prolonging the conflict in Afghanistan.  
 
2.1 International Dynamics of the Afghan Conflict: 
The conflict in Afghanistan has a very strong external dimension. The past few decades 
has gradually made the country a theatre of several regional and international conflicts 
including India-Pakistan, Afghanistan-Pakistan, Iran-Pakistan, US-Iran, Sunni-Shia, Iran-
Saudi Arabia, China-India, Russia-NATO, and US-Al-Qaeda conflicts. The country has 
also become a haven for international militants and a hub for global drug mafia and other 
transnational criminal groups. It is mainly due to its strategic location that several 
international actors have been part of the Afghan conflict either directly or indirectly. A 
number of international issues and rivalries are also linked with Afghanistan thus making it 
one of the most protracted and complex conflicts in the world.   
2.1.1 Strategic: From Great Game to Cold War 
The problem in Afghanistan has been mainly a centuries old international one. The conflict 
in the country stems from the original “Great Game” -- the 19th and 20th century 
geopolitical struggle for dominance in Central Asia between the British and Russian 
Empires with Afghanistan as their chosen battleground.
9 
The Great Game never ended, at 
least for Afghanistan; it just took new forms and involved different external players. For at 
least two centuries, a host of foreign powers and actors have been continuously intervening 
and interfering in the country to pursue and promote their economic and strategic interests. 
The emerging powers of the time have been pitting against each other for influence and 
control over this resources rich and strategically important part of the world. The 
superpowers’ desire to dominate manifested in the three Anglo-Afghan wars in the 19th and 
20
th
 centuries and again in the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The latest version of 
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the “Great Game” started with the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. In all of these 
three main phases, the world powers of the time chose to fight against each other in the 
valleys and villages of Afghanistan.   
Although Afghanistan was never colonised, colonial legacies in the region including 
“artificial boundaries” that separate and divide ethnic groups, tribes and even extended 
families also created tensions and prepared ground external interferences. In the 19
th
 
century, Russian armies were trying to expand their control over Central Asian territories 
while the British military was engaged in the struggling to conquer northern India. The 
armies of both superpowers of the time were fast converging towards Afghanistan which in 
itself was a regional empire, stretching from Oxus to the Indus River.
10 
The following 
cartoon published in the Punch Magazine in 1878 illustrates the fierce rivalry game being 
played between the British Empire and the Tsarist Russia in Afghanistan by depicting the 
Afghan ruler, Amir Sher Ali Khan, standing between the Russian bear and the British lion. 
Although both powers were pretending to be the friends of Afghanistan, their aim was to 




Figure 2.2: “Save Me From My Friends!” The Great Game in Afghanistan.11 
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As part of this confrontation between the “Two Giants”, Britain invaded Afghanistan twice 
in the 19
th
 Century from its Indian colony. The first invasion, in 1839, was aimed at 
securing Afghanistan’s support in stopping the Russian advance towards India. The second 
British invasion of Afghanistan in 1878 was intended to physically control parts of the 
Afghan territory and “separate the strategically important points in eastern and north-
eastern Afghanistan from the rest of the country.”12  
As a result of the great powers’ rivalry, Afghanistan was crushed and eventually 
dismembered. Although Afghanistan emerged victorious from the British wars, they made 
it considerably weak. Seizing the opportunity in 1893, the British Empire forced the 
Afghan King, Amir Abdur Rahman, to give up a big chunk of Afghanistan’s territory and 
included it in the British India. The Durand Line -- named after the British administrator, 
Sir Mortimer Durand -- cuts through the Pashtoon people’s homeland and ignores tribal, 
ethnic or cultural realities.
13
 That territory became part of Pakistan when the British left the 
Indian Subcontinent in 1947 and India and Pakistan emerged as two independent countries. 
The partition of the Indian Subcontinent angered many Afghans as it didn’t offer “self-




The Durand Line was drawn in a manner which made the defences of the British India 
easier as the Raj and later Pakistan held most of the main strategic heights and passes. The 
strategy proved its effectiveness when the West backed Afghan Mujahideen fighters 
launched attacks from their sanctuaries on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line during 
their war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1980s.
15
 According to Brigadier 
Mohammed Yousaf, who was the head of the Afghan Desk in Pakistan’s main spy agency, 
ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence), in early 1980s, the logic behind the demarcation of border 
between Afghanistan and the Raj was to give every strategic advantage to British India. He 
adds that “all the dominating heights belonged to Pakistan, and we had good reason to 
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thank the colonial administrator, Durand, who had so long ago drawn his line with such 
tactical insight.”16   
Most of the Afghan Mujahideen were based in Pakistan where they received foreign 
financial and military aid through the Pakistani intermediaries. The leaders of the Afghan 
Mujahideen factions were mainly based in Peshawar, North-West Pakistan, but they also 
had offices in the southern city of Quetta. The close proximity of these two cities to 
Afghanistan and the porous nature of the border between the two countries made it easier 
to plan and launch attacks from the Pakistani side and to transport weapons and other 
logistics to Afghanistan. As Mohammad Yousaf, a key Pakistani military and intelligence 
official in 1980s, and Adkin notes, “the Durand Line was to the Mujahideen what the Amu 
River was to the Soviets. Here Commanders came to collect their supplies, here the trucks 
from Peshawar and Quetta were off-loaded, and here the pack trains of animals assembled 
and loaded up.”17  
The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan proved to be a turning point in the history of the 
region.
18
 Although the Afghans were already fighting against the Soviet occupation on 
their own, the resistance of the Afghan people once again brought new and more powerful 
actors to the region. In order to counter the Soviet influence and remove the “Red Manace” 
from Afghanistan and the wider region, the American CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) 
launched the biggest covert-military aid programme in its history to help the anti-
communist guerrillas in Afghanistan.
19
 The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was not only an 
immediate threat to neighbouring Pakistan; it also threatened the West’s interest in the 
wider region. Therefore, Pakistan’s main spy agency, ISI, became one of the CIA’s main 
partner agencies and the two worked closely to stop the Soviet’s expansion towards warm 
waters of the Indian Sea.
20
 Zbigniew Brzezinski, the National Security Advisor of the US 
President, Jimmy Carter (1977-1981), and many other high ranking US officials saw this 
as a golden opportunity to “make the Russians bleed”. The US and its allies supplied 
weapons and money to the Afghan Mujahideen .  
In 1998, Brzezinski acknowledged that the US’s support for the Afghan Mujahideen had 
started in the early months of 1989 -- a few months after the communist coup in Kabul 
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(April 1988) and six months before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (December 1989).
21
 
In his State of the Union speech of 31 January, 1980, Jimmy Carter asserted: 
“The destruction of the independence of Afghanistan government and the occupation by 
the Soviet Union has altered the strategic situation in that part of the world in a very 
ominous fashion. It has brought the Soviet Union within striking distance of the Indian 
Ocean and even the Persian Gulf. It has eliminated a buffer between the Soviet Union and 
Pakistan, and presented a new threat to Iran. These two countries are now far more 
vulnerable to Soviet political intimidation. If that intimidation were to prove effective, the 
Soviet Union might well control an area of vital strategic and economic significance to the 
survival of Western Europe, the Far East and ultimately the United States. It is clear that 
the entire subcontinent of Asia and especially Pakistan is threatened”.22  
The US’s Afghan policy became more aggressive when Ronald Reagan became president 
in 1981. In April 1984, President Reagan signed the National Security Decision Directive 
166, which sought to expel Soviet forces from Afghanistan “by all means available.”23 In 
1980s, countries from all religious and regions of the world became part of the war in 
Afghanistan. The entire Western Christian world led by the US, along with the communist 
China, Jewish Israel, the Middle Eastern Muslim countries and many others such as Japan 
and South Korea supported the Afghan Mujahideen to fight the Soviet Union. These 
countries also renewed their economic and military assistance to Pakistan which boosted 






On top of the dozens of state actors, numerous non-state actors, especially militant and 
criminal groups, have also been involved in the conflict in Afghanistan. The anti-Soviet 
war in Afghanistan in 1980s attracted tens of thousands of fighters from various Muslim 
countries stretching from North Africa to the Middle East and Central Asia to East Asia. 
According to high ranking Pakistani military officials, upto forty thousand foreign 
militants, mostly Arabs, were trained in Pakistani military camps to fight in Afghanistan 
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 In around a decade, from early 1980s to early 1990s, Muslim 
militants from 43 Muslim countries went to participate in the Jihad.
27 
These Jihadis, most 
of whom had radical views on politics and society, first went to Pakistan and then crossed 
the border to Afghanistan to help fight the “Evil Communist.” A big number of them 
stayed in Pakistan and worked with millions of Afghan refugees who had been displaced 
by war.   
Although the Arabs didn’t have a central role in the Afghan resistance, it was a good 
opportunity for them to get military training and fighting experience. According to Milton 
Bearden, the former CIA station chief in Pakistan, “the idea that the Afghans somehow 
needed fighters from outside their culture was deeply flawed and ignored basic historical 
and cultural facts”.28 The presence of foreign militants, many of whom were wealthy Arabs, 
was mostly felt in the financial sector as they possessed the means to help the Afghan 
refugees and Mujahideen factions and fronts. Meanwhile, many Arab NGOs and state 
funded humanitarian organisations propagated ideologies, creeds and beliefs that were 
alien to the traditional Afghan society. In refugee camps and madrassas (religious schools) 
in Pakistan, they preached the Salafi/Wahabi version of Islam which is critical of 
manifestations of both Sufism and tribalism and nationalism in Afghanistan. These groups 
and individuals partially succeeded to indoctrinate and convert some Afghans from their 
orthodox Hanafis beliefs to Wahabism. According to Rubin, “whatever belief, faith, code, 
and ethics the Afghans had in Afghanistan was shattered by gold and guns in Pakistan”.29 
New terms, such as “Afghan Arabs” were coined to describe volunteer “jihadis” from the 
Arab countries. They associated themselves with different factions of the Afghan 
resistance headquartered in Pakistan and joined various Afghan commanders inside 
Afghanistan to fight.
30
 Osama bin Laden, the Saudi born millionaire, was one of those 
Arab fighters who went to Pakistan and then to Afghanistan in the 1980s and helped in 
recruiting and financing foreign Jihadis.
 31
 In 1988, he created Al-Qaeda in the Pakistani 
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town of Peshawar and used the cover of the war in Afghanistan to transform his 
organisation into a global network. Bin Laden left Afghanistan and Pakistan after the 
defeat of the Soviet Union and went back to his country, Saudi Arabia. However, he soon 
started criticising the Kingdom’s foreign policy especially after the Saudi government 
allocated military bases to US forces as part of the international coalition against Saddam 
Hussain’s Iraq. Bin Laden had to go into exile to Sudan after the Saudi royal family 
became intolerant towards his views and activities.  
In need of a safe haven, Osama bin Laden returned to Afghanistan along with members of 
his family and a few close associates in May 1996. They travelled in a chartered plane that 
took up from Sudan’s capital, Khartoum, and landed in the UAE for refuelling before 
flying to Jalalabad, the centre of Nangarhar province in eastern Afghanistan. The “guests” 
were received by some of his old Afghan friends that he had made during the anti-Soviet 
Jihad in 1980s. He was later joined by more foreign jihadis.  
Bin Laden’s return to Afghanistan was sponsored by the Mujahideen leaders with whom 
he had long lasting friendship. According to Steele, bin Laden’s “plane was chartered by 
the Rabbani’s government” 32  as the government in Kabul was still led by President 
Burhanuddin Rabbani. Contrary to the popular myth, bin Laden was not invited by the 
Taliban who, at the time, were in control of only a few southern provinces of the country. 
Taliban came face to face with Osama bin Laden after they captured the eastern province 
of Nangarhar in September 1996. The Taliban leadership, including the Supreme Leader of 
the Movement, Mullah Muhammad Omar, didn’t know much about bin Laden and his 
aims and objectives.
33
 In the winter of 1996, a few months after the Taliban captured 
Nangarhar and Kabul, bin Laden went to the Taliban’s stronghold, Kandahar, for his first 
meeting with Mullah Omar.
34
 According to former Taliban officials, bin Laden was more 
interested in the Middle Eastern affairs and mostly talked about the traditional hospitality 
of the Afghans, Islamic brotherhood and the anti-American sentiments among Muslims, 
especially the Arabs.
 
These officials add that the Taliban inherited Osama bin Laden and a 
number of other issues associated with him.
35 
Based on the traditional Afghan hospitality 
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and hoping for his financial support, the Taliban allowed him to stay in the country.
36
 Bin 
Laden and his foreign militants soon became part of the Afghan conflict when he asked 
them to support the Taliban in their war against “corruption and warlordism.”  
By the end of 1990s, a few thousand individuals from dozens of different countries were 
living in the Taliban held territories. A number of them didn’t have anywhere else to go as 
they were considered fugitives in their own countries. Some of these foreigners were 
militants while others were there to receive military training in order to start a revolution in 
other Muslim lands. Members of a number of militant organisations were based in 
Afghanistan. They included several Pakistani militant groups, separatists in the Indian 
controlled Kashmir, Al-Qaeda, Islamic activists and fighters from China’s Xinjiang region 
(such as East Turkestan Islamic Movement or ETIM), Chechen separatists from Russia, 
members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Iranian Sunni Muslims 
activists who felt intimidated by the Shia dominated Iran. Some of the foreign militants 
had their own training camps while others were fighting alongside the Taliban. Mawlawi 
Mutawakkil, the former Taliban Foreign Minister, suggests that apparently they were 
supporting the Taliban but their main goal might have been learning military tactics and 
getting fighting experience.
37
 Foreign militant groups tried to influence the Afghan Taliban 
Movement to get support for their own goals and, in the meantime, internationalised the 
conflict in Afghanistan by linking it to militant struggles in the region and beyond. 
After the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, most of the foreign militants were 
either killed or captured. The remaining fled to Pakistan where they joined the local 
militants there and starting fighting back against the new Afghan government and its 
international allies.
38
 As the number of foreign forces decreased by the end of 2014, 
hundreds and possibly thousands of foreign militants returned to Afghanistan to fight the 
Afghan security forces. These foreign militants include Chechens, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Uighurs 
and Pakistanis. In addition, in January 2015, the Islamic State group (IS/ISIS/ISIL) 
headquartered in Syria and Iraq, announced the establishment of its branch in “Khorasan”, 
an old name for Afghanistan and the surrounding parts of Pakistan, Iran and Central Asia. 
It was the first time that IS officially spread outside the Arab world. The emergence of IS 
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or “Daesh”, as it is known by its Arabic acronym, in Afghanistan and Pakistan is changing 
the dynamics of militancy in the region, home to a number of local and foreign militant 
groups motivated by a variety of regional and international agendas.  
2.1.3 United States and its “War on Terror”  
The US left Afghanistan after the Soviet Union was defeated in 1989. However, a decade 
later, it became involved again in the country in a different role.
39
 The US led invasion of 
Afghanistan in October 2011 took place following the 9/11 attacks on the US which 
blamed Al-Qaeda for it, the leadership of which was based in the Taliban controlled 
Afghanistan. Overnight, Afghanistan was turned into a different theatre of war and became 
NATO’s biggest mission in its entire history. The US went to Afghanistan with the policy 
objective of destroying Al-Qaeda and punishing all those states and non-state actors that 
harbour or support terrorists, including the Taliban and other militant organisations. 
Following the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, the number of US-led troops stationed in 
Afghanistan gradually increased reaching its peak in 2010 with around one hundred 
thousand US troops and around fifty thousand from other members of the Coalition, 
including UK, Germany and France. The Coalition’s stated aims included the fight against 
Al-Qaeda, Taliban and other insurgent groups and to stabilise the country to a degree that it 
wouldn’t pose a threat to the US and its allies.40 Although the US and its allies ended their 
combat mission in Afghanistan by the end of 2014, thousands of US and NATO soliders 
are still based in the country as part of their new mission called “Resolute Support.” 
2.1.4 China and its Regional and Global Ambitions  
The existing literature regarding the Sino-Afghan relations is limited. Although the 2011 
Adelphi Book, Afghanistan to 2015 and Beyond, says that Chinese interest in Afghanistan 
and direct communication between the two countries have been non-existent during the 
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 relations between the two neighbours go back around two thousand years. 
For centuries, Chinese monks and merchants travelled to what is now Afghanistan for 
religious and business reasons. Since the 7
th
 century AD, monks travelled through the Silk 
Road to visit Buddhist monasteries and other religious sites in Afghanistan, which was one 
of the biggest centres of Buddhism at the time. The Silk Road was also used for trade 
which stretched across Afghanistan and connected much of the Asia. In recent years, the 
Sino-Afghan relations have been mostly friendly and based on the principle of non-
interference. In 1963, the People’s Republic of China and the Kingdom of Afghanistan 
signed a boundary treaty which settled China’s territorial dispute over the Afghan-
controlled Wakhan on the border between the north-east Badakhshan province of 
Afghanistan and the Xinjiang Region in China. The two countries now share a 92 
kilometre long border.  
During the rule of King Zahir Shah in Afghanistan (1933-1973), Kabul and Beijing had 
neutral relations with each other. As a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM), Afghanistan also enjoyed friendly relations with the Soviet Union. After the 
founding of the People’s Republic under Mao Zedong in 1949, China and the Soviet Union 
enjoyed a very cordial relationship. However, as the strategic competition between China 
and the Soviet Union intensified in 1960s and 1970s, both countries tried to import their 
own version of communism to other countries in the region, including Afghanistan. As 
opposed to the two pro-Soviet communists groups in Afghanistan -- Khalq (People) and 
Parcham (Flag) -- the Maoists in Afghanistan formed their own group called Shola-e-
Javed (also spelt Shola-e-Javid/Jawid)  meaning ‘Eternal Flame’.42  
China also reportedly has links with another small but very vocal Afghan group, RAWA 
(Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan). The group, founded in 1977, 
later distanced itself from Maoist rhetoric, at elast in the public, and focused more on 
women rights.
43
 After the pro-Soviet communist takeover in Kabul, the group’s leadership 
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and most of its activists migrated to Pakistan and “became directly involved in the war of 
resistance.” 44 It established its own refugee camps equipped with healthcare centres and 
schools and hostels for boys and girls in different parts of Pakistan. RAWA calls itself a 
secular, independent political/social organisation of Afghan women fighting for human 
rights, social justice and “the establishment of a government based on democratic and 
secular values in Afghanistan”.45  
By 1960, strains in the Sino-Soviet alliance gradually began to emerge mainly over 
questions of ideology and security. During the 1960s, the dispute between the two 
communist countries deepened and spread to include territorial issues with Moscow 
beginning the process of a military build-up along the border with China. Meanwhile, the 
1978 coup by the pro-Soviet communists in Afghanistan and the Soviet invasion of the 
country in 1979 heightened China’s awareness of the threat of Soviet encirclement and 
further strained its relations with the Soviet Union. China demanded the unconditional 
withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. On the other hand, the Afghan 
Mujahideen’s resistance against the Soviet forces provided Beijing with a great 
opportunity. In order to curtail the Soviet influence in South and South-West Asia, the 
communist China chose Afghanistan as a battlefield to fight its rival communist power, the 
Soviet Union. China was also concerned about Soviet Union’s close relationship with its 
other regional rival, India. On the other hand, Beijing’s close ties with India’s arch-rival 
Pakistan impacted China’s Afghan policy. Pakistan played an important role in 
normalising China’s relations with the US thus forming a Pakistan-China-US Triangle 
against the Soviet Union. The bond between the three countries became stronger after the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
With American cooperation and assistance, China responded by supporting the Afghan 
Mujahideen. Until the mid-1980s, most of China’s training centres for the Afghan rebels 
were located in Pakistan, where the Mujahideen had established their sanctuaries. Foreign 
media also covered China’s heavy involvement in the Afghan resistance and reported the 
presence of Chinese instructors in the refugee and training camps of the Afghan Maoist 
group, Shola-e-Javed, in Pakistan.
46
 Later on, training camps for the Afghan rebels were 
also established in China’s Xinjiang region (bordering Afghanistan and Pakistan), in which 
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“China trained several thousand Mujahideen in camps near Kashgar and Khotan.”47 The 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) personnel “provided training, arms, organisation, 
financial support and military advisers to the Mujahideen resistance throughout nearly the 
entire Soviet military presence in Afghanistan”.48  
In addition, China sold large quantities of arms to Afghan Mujahideen in deals negotiated 
by the CIA station in Beijing in exchange for tens of millions of dollars annually which 
“cemented a growing secret anti-Soviet collaboration between the CIA and Chinese 
intelligence”. 49  The weapons mostly included rocket-propelled grenade-launchers and 
assault rifles. The Chinese copy of the original Soviet light rifle, AK47 -- popularly known 
as Kalashnikov after its founder -- was supplied to Mujahideen in their hundreds of 
thousands; though the Mujahideen preferred the original Russian for its better performance. 
Weapons were transported to Pakistan via the Karakorum Highway which connects 
Pakistan and China. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, relations between 
China and the US have become “less collaborative as the strategic glue that bound their 
interests melted away.”50 Competition between the two powers for more influence in the 
strategic and resource rich Central Asia intensified. 
In recent years, one of China’s major concerns has been the militant and separatist 
activities by some of its Uighur Muslims, a Turkic ethnic group who live primarily in 
China’s western Xinjiang region bordering Afghanistan and Pakistan. Beijing fears that the 
expansion of Islamic militancy into Xinjiang will have a destabilising effect on the rest of 
the country. Hundreds, if not thousands, of Uighur Muslims from China have lived in both 
Afghanistan and Pakistan for decades. Many of them were enrolled in Pakistani madrassas 
during the 1980s while several of them fought alongside the Afghan Mujahideen against 
the Soviet troops in Afghanistan.
51
 After the Mujahideen’s victory in Afghanistan, some 
Uighurs stayed in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In 1989, the year Soviet Union completed its 
troops’ withdrawal from Afghanistan; Uighur militants formed the East Turkestan Islamic 
Movement (ETIM) with the aim of establishing an Islamic government in China’s Xinjiang 
region. During the Taliban rule (1996-2001), several Uighurs were present in the Taliban 
controlled areas of Afghanistan, a situation which antagonised China.  
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Although China didn’t recognise the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, it had close contacts 
with the group. According to the former Taliban ambassador to Islamabad, the Chinese 
ambassador to Pakistan was “the only one to maintain a good relationship with the 
[Afghan] embassy and [the Taliban ruled] Afghanistan.”52 The Chinese ambassador to 
Pakistan also became the first ambassador from a non-Muslim country to travel to 
Kandahar to meet the Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar who “assured him that 
Afghanistan never had any interest or wish to interfere in China’s domestic issues.”53  
In 2000, the name of East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) was changed to the 
Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) which aims to counter what it sees as Beijing’s repressive 
policies; especially its transmigration policies of moving Han Chinese to Xinjiang which 
resulted in Uighur population becoming a minority in the province. After the fall of the 
Taliban regime as a result of the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the remaining 
Uighurs moved back to Pakistan where they joined other militants and established 
sanctuaries to reportedly plan attacks in Xinjiang. 
Over the past few years, Beijing’s strategic and economic interests have grown in 
Afghanistan and the surrounding countries. Afghanistan is important for an increasingly 
ambitious China for several reasons such as securing its Western border, ensuring access to 
natural resources and countering India’s regional influence. Traditionally, Beijing has 
formulated its Afghan policy through the prism of its relationship with one of its closest 
allies, Pakistan. Beijing and Islamabad value one another as a strategic hedge against the 
threat from their joint rival and neighbour, India. Pakistan and India have a border dispute 
and fought three wars and several low-level conflicts since their independence from Britain 
in 1947. Meanwhile, India and China have a territorial dispute of their own which 
culminated in a short border war in 1962.
54
  
Pakistan views China as its security patron and a guarantor against external threats. 
Highlighting Pakistan’s special relationship with China, Haqqani says that “for China, 
Pakistan is a low-cost secondary deterrent to India”, while “for Pakistan, China is a high-
value guarantor of security against India.” 55  According to Afridi and Bajoria, despite 
Pakistani security establishment’s links with certain militant groups, China has been a 
main supplier of arms to Islamabad and helped the later in building several weapon 
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factories. China’s assistance to Pakistan extends to nuclear and missile technology and 
weapons designs. Collaboration between the two neighbours also includes personnel 
training, joint military exercises and intelligence sharing.
56
 
Although Beijing declared full support for the US-led military intervention in Afghanistan 
and the US led war against Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, the long term presence of 
US/NATO forces in its neighbourhood is a cause of concern for Chinese strategic thinkers 
and policy-makers. China is suspicious of the US’s long term strategic goals and military 
bases in the region. Some members of Chinese military see “Afghanistan as a central link 
in a C-shaped land encirclement of China by the US.” 57  China, along with Russia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, is a founding member of the mutual 
security organisation Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), established in 2001. In 
order to counter the US hegemony in the region, “China wants to construct a regional 
architecture in Central and East Asia which offers it the most favourable peripheral 
environment and minimises the risk of strategic encirclement by the US.”58 The perceived 
threat from the US’s military presence in the region has brought China even closer with its 
traditional ally, Pakistan. On the other hand, Pakistan considers Beijing a more reliable ally 
than Washington, with Pakistani officials calling China their “all-weather friend” and 
labelling the US as a “fair-weather friend.” 
Beijing has avoided pursuing policies in Afghanistan that would irritate the Pakistani 
government. Afghan and US officials have encouraged China to persuade or pressurise 
Pakistan to take action against the Afghan Taliban and deny them sanctuaries on its soil.
59
 
In early 2015, Chinese officials acknowledged that they have contacts with the Taliban and 
wanted to play a supportive role in the Afghan Peace Process.
60
 Meanwhile, China and the 
Afghan government in Kabul have shown willingness to increase cooperation and expand 
their economic and military ties. The resource-hungry China is one the first countries 
which signed economic agreements to invest billions of dollars in Afghanistan’s mineral 
resources.  
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2.1.5 Russia-US Relations and the Afghan Theatre 
Russia’s relations with Afghanistan have three main phases. Its involvement in Afghan 
affairs goes back to the 19
th
 century when it was engaged in a geopolitical rivalry with the 
British Empire, popularly known as “the Great Game”.61 The Soviet Union’s invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1979 and its traumatic experience, commonly called as “the Afghan 
Syndrome”, 62  and its aftermath comprises Moscow’s second major interaction with 
Afghanistan. Moscow’s policy is mainly based on the experience of post-Soviet Russia in 
its Republics of Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia where Islamist separatist movements 
have been fighting for independence since the fall of USSR. In 1990’s, the Taliban in 
Afghanistan was the only regime in the world that had officially recognised the 
government of the Chechen separatists. Several Chechens had sought refuge in 
Afghanistan during the Taliban rule (1996-2001). On the other hand, Russia was a 
principal supporter of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance and gave it logistical, financial 
and political support. Russia’s Afghan policy is also aimed at dealing with the threats and 
challenges emerged after the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. The presence of 
Islamist militant groups in Central Asia (such as IS/ISIL, Al-Qaeda, IMU, ETIM and the 
Taliban) poses a major security threat to Russia and its allies. In the meantime, Moscow 
continues to maintain links with leaders of the former Northern Alliance and several other 
local Afghan actors.  
Although Russia supports the US-led war in Afghanistan, it opposes a permanent 
US/NATO deployment in Afghanistan. Russia doesn’t want to see the long term presence 
of NATO in former Soviet territories and on its borders. Moscow aspires to soft dominance 
over Central Asia and has been anxious about the expansion of both militancy and NATO 
in the region. On the other hand, as Oksana says, “Russia was often interpreted as hoping 
to see the Alliance tied down in Afghanistan for years, and thus unable to intervene in 
regions of greater importance to Russia”.63 
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2.2 Regional Dynamics of the Afghan Conflict: 
Afghanistan has also been at the centre of a number of regional conflicts and rivalries. 
Following the collapse of state in Afghanistan as a result of years of wars and destruction, 
several neighbouring and regional countries exported their strife to the war torn country. 
Regional players not only tried to increase their influence in a weakened Afghanistan, they 
also chose to harm each other in the Afghan battlefields. Following are a few regional 
conflicts and rivalries that are linked to the conflict in Afghanistan.  
2.2.1 Afghanistan-Pakistan Tension 
Afghanistan and Pakistan are connected by various ties including historical, cultural, 
linguistic, religious and economic. Both neighbours are Islamic republics and part of a 
number of regional organisations such as SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation), ECO (Economic Cooperation Organisation) and OIC (Organisation of 
Islamic Countries). However, relations between the two neighbours have been tense since 
the creation of Pakistan in 1947 mainly “over the right of self-determination of the people 
of Afghan origin in the territories which had been forcibly separated by Britain in the 
course of the 19
th
 century”64 and made part of the British Raj in India. Following the 
division “British India” into independent India and Pakistan in 1947, the land and 
population of historical Afghanistan were included in Pakistan. Afghanistan raised the 
issue of its lost territories and population at the time of the British withdrawal from the 
Indian sub-continent and later with the authorities of the newly created state of Pakistan.
65
  
However, the border issue still remains disputed until this day as the two countries have 
different interpretations of the Durand Line agreement and its status. Since the creation of 
Afghanistan has not formally recognised the Line as its international boundary with 
Pakistan. Pakistan, there hasn’t been any agreement between the two countries to formalise 
its status.
66
 On the other hand, Pakistan, while desiring that Afghanistan ratifies the 
agreement, has always insisted that Durand Line is a “non-issue” and calls it an 
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 So, the seeds of tension sown more than a century ago 
still haunt the region.  
Paradoxically, Afghanistan’s relations were warm with secular India, the Muslim 
Pakistan’s arch rival. The Afghanistan-Pakistan dispute and the Indo-Afghan alliance left 
Pakistan more insecure especially after the cessation of East Pakistan and the creation of 
Bangladesh.
68
Although Afghanistan was a founding member of the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM),
69
 Pakistan was a member of the two US-backed regional military 
alliances; SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization) and CENTO (Central Treaty 




A combination of internal and external factors prompted Pakistan’s establishment to use 
Islam as a tool to create a new national identity and integrate its diverse ethnic groups. 
Pakistan -- home to different and diverse ethnic groups including Pashtoons, Punjabis, 
Sindhis and Balochis -- was built on weak social, historical and political structures. As 
Hussain says, the country “appeared to be an artificial construct at independence.” 71 
Therefore, Islam was used as a binding factor and a unifying force and, in the meantime, 
religious nationalism was promoted to weaken ethnic nationalist identities, counter popular 
nationalist and leftist movements and demands for provincial autonomy. 
The Durand Line divides ethnic Pashtoons who comprise the biggest ethnic group in 
Afghanistan and the second biggest in Pakistan. Therefore, Pakistan also actively 
supported Islamists in Afghanistan to weaken Pashtoon/Afghan nationalism and put 
pressure on the government in Kabul. As Ahmad and Barnet say, Pakistan’s support for the 
guerrilla movement of Afghan Islamists was “an expression of this long-standing border 
dispute between Pakistan and Afghanistan” and “to harass the Kabul government” led by a 
fervent Afghan nationalist, Mohammad Daoud.
72
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An antecedents of the current turmoil in Afghanistan arose in the beginning of 1973 when 
members of the small nascent Islamist opposition movement took refuge in Pakistan at the 
invitation of the Pakistani establishment at a time when tensions between Kabul and 
Islamabad were running high over Afghanistan’s renewed interest in the Pashtoonistan 
issue -- creating an autonomous or semi-autonomous entity comprising of Pashtoon 
inhabited areas in Pakistan. For many Pashtoons living in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
“Pashtoonistan” is the idea of a historic homeland that was divided by the British Empire 
in 1893.
73
 Moreover, the ethnic Baloch insurgency in Pakistan in 1970s spilled over its 
borders to include Afghanistan and the Shah’s regime in Iran. While thousands of 
nationalist Balochis migrated to Afghanistan where they received a warm welcome, the 
Shah of Iran supported Pakistan in crushing the Baloch rebellion in the latter’s Balochistan 
province which borders both Iran and Afghanistan.
74
    
Pashtoon nationalism was already a major political and social force in pre-partition India, 
especially in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) where resistance against British 
colonialism was based mainly on ethnicity rather than religion. Political movements and 
tribal groups in NWFP and Balochistan provinces of Pakistan stressed their kinship ties 
with their brethren in Afghanistan. On the other hand, Pakistan viewed Afghanistan’s 
support for the Pashtoon irredentism as a threat to its territorial integrity.
75
  
Since its inception, Pakistan used Islamist ideology and actively pursued a foreign policy, 
especially vis-à-vis Afghanistan and India, rooted in religious idiom. The “Islamisation” of 
Pakistan and its foreign policy led to the state favouring radical Islamist groups and other 
non-state actors. The strategy of deploying religion as a foreign policy tool became more 
aggressive in 1970s, especially after the 1973 palace coup in Kabul against King Zahir 
Shah by his cousin Mohammad Daoud Khan. President Daoud was pursuing a nationalist 
and secular approach and was a strong supporter of the right of self-determination of ethnic 
Pashtoons and Balochis inside Pakistan.
76
 
Contrary to the popular notion that Pakistan started helping the Afghan Mujahideen after 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the relationship between Islamabad and 
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Afghan Islamists was built many years earlier at the time when the supposedly secular 
minded Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was Prime Minister of Pakistan (1973-1977). Pakistan began 
training and providing logistical and financial support to “Afghan proxies” at least five 
years before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
77
  
In view of the changed situation in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s Frontier Corps, a federal 
paramilitary force commanded by a senior officer from the army with the rank of Major 
General, “was dragged into regional as well as local political battles at the behest of the 
state.”78 In October 1973, the Pakistani Prime Minister, Zulifqar Bhutto, tasked Major 
General (Retd) Naseerullah Khan Babar, the Inspector General of Frontier Corps in North-
West Frontier Province (now called Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa/Pashtoonkhwa),
79
 to set up 
training camps for Afghan Islamists inside Pakistani territory. In March 1976, Prime 
Minister Bhutto appointed General Babar as the governor of North-West Frontier Province 
asking him to “organise the nascent Afghan resistance” in order “to convey a message to 
Sardar Daoud”,80 the new Afghan president. Pakistan welcomed these Afghan Islamists, 
whose explicit aim was to overthrow the regime in Kabul, and gave them protection and 
military training. As Weinbaum says, within a year of Daoud’s takeover (1973), the 
“collusion of the Islamabad government with enemies of the Daoud government was 
unmistakable.”81  
These “proxies” were sheltered in Pakistan with an immediate aim to destabilise 
Afghanistan. A few months later, in August 1975, with the help of some Afghan Islamists, 
an operation was initiated in Afghanistan’s Panjsher Valley in which, according to General 
Babar “the Afghans suffered heavily in men and equipment” and “was a total success” for 
Pakistan.
82
 On the part of Pakistan, it was a powerful signal to the Kabul government. 
However, the planned uprising against the government in Kabul in 1975 is generally 
viewed as a failure as it didn’t cause a lot of disturbance. In addition, the initiative didn’t 
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Some dissident Afghan Islamists considered President Daoud “a dangerous modernist, 
even a Communist”. 84  General Babar publically acknowledged that Afghan Islamists 
including Burhanuddin Rabbani, Habib-ur-Rahman, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Ahmad 
Shah Massoud were among “a host of others”, who went to Pakistan in 1973 and were 
enlisted and trained as Frontier Corps personnel.
85
 Taj notes that at the time, “Pakistan 
cultivated more than one thousand disgruntled”86 Afghans who had Islamist tendencies 
with some fleeing to Pakistan after participating in the 1974 anti-government rioting in 
Kabul.
87  
However, Griffin says that 5,000 Islamists underwent military training in 
Pakistan.
88 
According to Coll, the exiled Islamists offered the Pakistani military “a way to 
pursue influence in Afghanistan”.89  
These “proxies” were sheltered and trained in Pakistan to destabilise Afghanistan and put 
pressure on the new Afghan regime. Camps were established in the Tribal Areas on the 
Pakistan side of the Durand Line that border Afghanistan’s Paktia, Paktika and Logar 
provinces.
90
 They were enlisted in Pakistan’s paramilitary Frontier Corps in order to hide 
their identities. According to General Babar, Pakistan gave them “basic infantry weapons” 
and an SSG (Pakistani military’s Special Services Group) team gave them “specialised 
training in how to conduct guerrilla warfare”. He adds that “it was a top secret affair” and 
only a handful top officials such as General Babar, Prime Minister Bhutto, Aziz Ahmad
91
 
and the  then Army Chief, General Tikka Khan, were in the picture. Other officials and 
institutions such as foreign ministry were not privy to this secret mission.
92 
 
A couple of months after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, General Babar revealed 
in an interview with the New York Times that “we wanted to build up a leadership to 
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influence events” inside Afghanistan. He also claimed that the US knew about this covert 
operation and had been financing such potential leaders since 1973. He also added that the 
US had taken Gulbuddin Hekmatyar “under its umbrella” months before the Soviet 
intervention in December 1979.
93
  
Taj notes that “the cultivation of religious forces” and using them for foreign policy 
objectives was “an ideal opportunity in the strategic calculus of the ironically secular 
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto led Pakistan.”94 Islamabad had hoped that by supporting these Afghan 
proxies, it will not only get rid of its “Pashtoonistan problem” but it will also provide it 
with a “strategic depth” in the event of a conflict with India. As Hussain says, it was 
Bhutto’s “forward policy” in Afghanistan to destabilise the country by assisting and 
organising the disparate Islamic groups who were opposed to the secularly oriented regime 
of President Daoud, did not back Kabul’s policy on the territorial dispute with Pakistan and 
were opposed to Afghanistan’s friendly relations with India.95 Roy has reached the same 
conclusion by saying that “Pakistan’s support was not ideological but strategical: the 
Afghan Islamists were opposed to a nationalist ideology and the claim made at Kabul 
concerning Pashtoonistan, and they rejected the traditional Kabul-New Delhi coalition in 
the name of Muslim solidarity. They were, therefore, the best defenders of Pakistan’s 
integrity.”96 The establishment of the base for Afghan Islamists in Pakistan in 1970s was 
also aimed at countering the growing influence of the Soviet Union. Both the US and 
Pakistan feared that it would be “a step towards the fulfilment of Peter the Great’s will” of 
1777 to reach the warm waters of Indian Ocean.
97
  
Following the communist coup in Afghanistan in 1978 and the Soviet invasion of the 
country in 1979, “these assets proved very valuable” for Pakistan as well as the West.98 In 
the subsequent years, Pakistan used these “proxies” as a strategic tool to achieve its foreign 
policy goals in Afghanistan and the wider region. Individuals trained by Pakistan in 1970s 
– such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Ahmad Shah Massoud, Burhanuddin Rabbani, Mawlawi 
Yunus Khalis -- later rose to prominence and were made leaders of the Afghan Jihad 
(resistance) to the communist rule and Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
99
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Shortly before the 1978 communist coup in Afghanistan and the Soviet invasion in the 
following year, the Pakistani army chief, General Zia-ul-Haq, had already seized power in 
a coup by overthrowing the elected Prime Minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. This was a period 
when Pakistan was under a lot of external pressure and was isolated internationally. The 
country’s relations with the US were tense for a number of reasons including Pakistan’s 
secret nuclear program and the imposition of sanctions by the Carter administration in 
1978 and again in 1979, the execution of Prime Minister Bhutto in April 1979, and the 
ransacking of the US Embassy in Islamabad in November 1979. In addition, Pakistan’s 
economy was in a shamble, and its military lacked modern and sufficient weapons and 
equipment. 
It is in this context that Marwat says that the “Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was not 
less than a blessing in disguise for Zia-ul-Haq’s dictatorial regime, a chance of to extract 
itself from the quagmire of internal and external problems”.100 The entire Western world, 
led by the US came to the support of Pakistan where the leadership of the Afghan 
Mujahideen was based. The situation in Afghanistan also helped General Zia domestically. 
As Hussain notes, Pakistan’s greater involvement in the internal affairs of Afghanistan was 
also related to the internal political dynamics of the country by providing the martial law 
regime of General Zia-ul-Haq respite from internal opposition and diverted public’s 
attention from the domestic turmoil.
101 
General Zia, who was isolated internationally by 
staging a coup against an elected government and hanging Prime Minister, Zulfiqar Ali 
Bhutto, in a “politically motivated case”, skilfully used the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
and the communist threat to the wider region to his own benefit in order to achieve several 
objectives. General Zia consolidated his “position internally by stamping out the 
democratic opposition” while Pakistani military in general got the much needed and long 
awaited support from the US.
102 
  
During the Jihad years, Islamabad invested heavily in individuals and groups that were 
radical and side-lined nationalists in the resistance. According to Ahmad and Barnet say, 
General Zia “used the weapons flow to build up the Islamic elements of the Afghan 
resistance - at the expense of the more moderate and secular elements.”103 The Director 
General of Pakistan’s main intelligence agency ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence), General 
Akhtar Abdur Rahman, and his team “tended to freeze out traditional Afghan royalty and 
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tribal leaders, depriving them of weapons”104 and favoured the radical Islamists many of 
whom had links with Muslim Brotherhood. The policy of side-lining the nationalists and 
other moderates engaged in the resistance “not only agreed with Zia’s faith but it weakened 
the Afghan rebels most likely to stir up Pashtoon nationalism inside Pakistani territory”.105  
Building on the initiative launched by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, General Zia further 
consolidated the Afghan resistance on religious lines. According to Ahmad and Barnet:  
“[F]or fifteen years, two very different Pakistani governments - the civilian government of 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and the military regime of Zia-ul-Haq - have used the Afghan 
resistance first as a way of exerting pressure on Kabul, then as a means to strengthen the 
often wavering American commitment to Pakistan. The more the United States involved 
itself in the Afghan cause, the more Pakistan would emerge as the indispensable staging 
area for the fight against Communism, and the more secure the flow of American aid to 
Pakistan would be”.106 
Shortly before his death in a plane crash in August 1988, General Zia explained his designs 
for Afghanistan and the region and stated that his goal had been “to destroy the Communist 
infrastructure, install a client regime, and bring about a ‘strategic alignment’ in South 
Asia”.107 In an interview with a US scholar, Selig Harrison, he declared that: “We have 
earned the right to have a friendly regime there. We took risks as a frontline state, and we 
won’t permit it to be like it was before, with Indian and Soviet influence there and claim on 
our territory. It will be a real Islamic state, parts of a Pan-Islamic revival that will one day 
win over the Muslims in the Soviet Union”.108 
Pakistan’s policy of supporting the Islamists continued under Benazir Bhutto who became 
Prime Minister of Pakistan after the death of General Zia. Benazir Bhutto was helped by 
some of those who worked with her father, Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. General 
Naseerullah Babar --the then Inspector General Frontier Corps and governor in North-West 
Frontier province of Pakistan and a confident of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto -- also served as one 
of her close aides. He was “a man in whom she placed particular trust in military and 
Afghan matters”. According to Babar, “Ms. Bhutto had a strong inclination to support the 
military’s Afghan policy because it evolved under her father’s rule”.109 
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A year after the collapse of the communist regime in Kabul, Babar became the federal 
interior minister in Benazir Bhutto’s second government (1993-95) and tried to shape 
events in Afghanistan through his old ties and contacts. He is also known for galvanizing 
and supporting the Taliban Movement in Afghanistan which emerged in Kandahar in 1994. 
The Taliban captured a number of cities and towns in a quick succession and eventually 
capturing around 90% of Afghanistan’s territory. Pakistan was the first and one of the only 
three countries (Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates) that officially 
recognized the Taliban government in Afghanistan. Although the Taliban leaders in 
general call launch of the Taliban Movement an entirely Afghan phenomenon and reject 
the assertion that its launch was supported by Pakistani military establishment as part of its 
efforts to install a client regime in Kabul,
110
 Pakistan’s links with the Afghan Taliban have 
now become an open secret.
111
 Even though, many Afghans appreciated the Taliban’s 
effort to bring peace and removing the corrupt and predatory warlords, they objected to 
their closeness to and, in some cases, dependence on Pakistan.
112
  
2.2.2 The India-Pakistan Rivalry  
The strategic competition between India and Pakistan has also engulfed Afghanistan. Since 
their independence in 1947, the two regional arch rivals have been vying for influence in 
Kabul. Although Afghanistan-Pakistan relations remained tense mainly over the issue of 
Durand Line and Pashtoonistan, Kabul usually enjoyed cordial relations with New Delhi. 
In addition, Afghanistan and Pakistan were in two different camps during the Cold War. 
Afghanistan, along with India, was a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM) while Pakistan joined the US-led coalitions aimed at countering the Soviet Union. 
As Newell says, it was Afghanistan’s search for more trade and transportation 
arrangements as well as diplomatic support against Pakistan that led to even closer 
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relations with India and the Soviet Union in 1950s and 1960s. On the other hand, Pakistan 
was India’s arch enemy and the two had a border dispute of their own over Kashmir.113  
When the Soviet backed communists ceased power in a coup in 1978, India also extended 
its hand of friendship to the new regime in Kabul. On the other hand, Pakistan as well as 
Western and most Muslim countries became hostile to the new government in Afghanistan 
and supported the Afghan Mujahideen leaders who were mostly based in Pakistan. After 
the the victory of the Mujahideen in Afghanistan in 1992, Pakistan gained unprecedented 
influence in Afghanistan. The emergence of the Taliban Movement in Afghanistan in 1994 
and their close ties with Pakistan presented another security challenge to India. While the 
Taliban had a symbiotic relationship with Pakistan; India, along with Russia and Iran, 
supported the anti-Taliban groups called the Northern Alliance.  
Traditionally, India has been supporting the central government in Kabul with the 
exception of the Taliban.
114
 When the Taliban regime fell as a result of the US-led invasion 
in December 2001, most of the Northern Alliance leaders took prominent positions in the 
new government in Kabul. India to revived its friendship with the Kabul government and 
restored the influence it had lost during the Mujahideen and the Taliban rule, mostly at the 
expense of Pakistan. India became one of the biggest donors of aid for the reconstruction 
of post-Taliban Afghanistan. In addition to its embassy in Kabul, India opened consulates 
in major Afghan cities of Kandahar (south), Herat (West), Jalalabad (East) and Mazar-e-
Sharif (North); thus expanding its reach and influence in the country. However, this 
annoyed Islamabad with Pakistani officials publically expressing their concern over the 
increased Indian presence in Afghanistan. Pakistani security establishment sees India’s 
increasing presence in Afghanistan as part of an effort to encircle Pakistan. Islamabad also 
fears of a possible Afghan-Indian alliance which it thinks might result in two front wars on 
its Eastern and Western borders. Meanwhile, Islamabad accused Delhi of supporting ethnic 
Baloch separatists in Pakistan’s southern Balochistan province.115 
On the other hand, despite Pakistan’s assurances to the international community that it was 
a US ally in the “War on Terror”, Islamabad’s close ties with the Afghan Taliban have 
been exposed by high ranking Pakistani and Western officials. In September 2011, 
Admiral Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was the first high ranking 
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US official who directly linked Pakistan’s main intelligence agency (ISI) with the Taliban 
saying that it supported the insurgent as a way to extend Pakistani influence in 
Afghanistan.
116
 More importantly, General Pervez Musharraf, who was Pakistan’s 
president and army chief (1999-2008), publically admitted in several interviews in 2014 
and 2015 that his country supported the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan and justified 
the move as an effort to counter the Indian influence. He added that Pakistani intelligence 
agencies “cultivated” the Taliban after 2001 because the Afghan government was 
dominated by officials who favoured India and revealed that “Pakistan had its own proxies, 
India had its proxies.”117  
Traditionally, Pakistan has linked the Afghan issue with its relations with India. On the 
other hand, India wants to ensure that a Pakistani client and radically Islamist regime with 
links to the military-jihadi nexus in Pakistan doesn’t return to Kabul. The India-Pakistan 
rivalry and their “proxy war” has been one the main factors behind the conflict in 
Afghanistan, especially since 1990s.
118
 Once again, there is an overlapping of interests and 
matching of motivations in the India-Pakistan rivalry in Afghanistan. Pakistan supports the 
Afghan Taliban to counter India’s influence in Afghanistan while the Taliban receive 
Pakistan’s support to achieve its goal of weakening the Afghan government and eventually 
capturing the state. On the other hand, India supports the anti-Taliban factions in 
Afghanistan, who, in turn, find a commonality between their interests and those of India’s.  
2.2.3 Central Asian Countries and Their Role and Interests in Afghanistan 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, several new countries emerged 
as Afghanistan’s neighbours in Central Asia. Since then, Afghanistan shares its northern 
border with three Central Asian countries -- Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. 
Inspired by both the defeat and withdrawal of Soviet forces in Afghanistan in 1989 and the 
fall of USSR two years later, a number of Central Asian Muslims wanted to establish an 
Islamic system in their countries. Some of them resorted to militancy aiming to overthrow 
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their secular governments ruled by the former communist elite. Faced with prosecution, a 
number of Islamist and political activists, mainly from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, fled to 
Afghanistan from where they planned to hit back at their regimes.   
However, when the Taliban emerged in Afghanistan in mid 1990s and established their 
control over most of the country’s territory, Central Asian Islamists reorganised themselves. 
The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) was founded in 1998 in northern Afghanistan 
with the aim establishing an Islamic government in Uzbekistan. The group also attracted 
new recruits including separatist Islamists from Chechnya and ethnic Uighurs from 
Xinjiang region in Western China. These militants, who were mostly based in northern 
Afghanistan, close to their own homelands, actively participated in Afghanistan’s factional 
war and fought alongside the Taliban against those Afghan groups that were opposed to the 
Taliban rule. After the fall of the Taliban regime in late 2011, most of the Central Asian 
militants fled to Pakistan where they established sanctuaries mainly in the tribal areas of 
North and South Waziristan.
 119
 Over the next few years, they re-organised themselves and 
established close ties with Pakistani militant groups and Al-Qaeda. The Central Asian 
militants regularly attacked Afghan and NATO forces across the border in Afghanistan.
120
 
It is not only Central Asia militants, who are involved in the conflict in Afghanistan. 
Central Asian countries, especially Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, became players and 
supported factions from their own ethnic groups during the factional war in Afghanistan in 
1990s. Having a sizable population of ethnic Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmens, Afghanistan 
shares a few ethnic groups with its Central Asian neighbours. During the war between the 
Taliban and the Northern Alliance, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan provided significant support 
to anti-Taliban groups and commanders. In addition, after the Taliban captured most of 
Afghanistan, a number of these commanders fled to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and were 
operating from their bases and sanctuaries in the host countries. In post-Taliban 
Afghanistan, both Uzbekistan and Tajikistan supported the central government in Kabul 
and helped in the US led war against Taliban and Al-Qaeda.
121
 However, the two countries 
                                                          
119 BBC News, (2014). Pakistan’s ‘fanatical’ Uzbek militants. BBC News, 11 June 2014. Available online at: 
ccessed 16 Aug 2014].[A> 27801257-asia-http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world< 
120
 Azami, Dawood, (2010c). Hire and Fire: Al-Qaeda Sets Sights on Taliban Recruits. BBC News, 13 
October. Available online at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11444334> [Accessed 26 Oct 
2012]. 
121
 Tanrisever, Oktay F. (2013). Afghanistan and Central Asia: NATO’s Role in Regional Security Since 9/11. 
Amsterdam: IOS Press.  
88 
 




2.2.4 Iran-Saudi Competition for Regional Dominance  
Iran is one of the major players in Afghanistan and enjoys substantial political, economic 
and cultural leverage in Afghanistan.
123
 Its Afghan policy has usually been a by-product of 
its rivalries with other regional and international powers. Iran, a Shia powerhouse, and 
Saudi Arabia have been using Afghanistan in their competition for the leadership of the 
Islamic world. In addition, Iran has tried to prevent the dominance of a radical Sunni 
power in Afghanistan with hostility to Shias which would check the Iranian influence.
124
  
During the Afghan Jihad in 1980s, several Afghan Shia Mujahideen factions were based 
there and organised their war against the Soviet troops from their Iranian sanctuaries. Iran 
was also engaged in a bitter rivalry with Pakistan and its ally Saudi Arabia in 1990s for 
regional dominance. It conducted a bitter proxy war on Afghan soil in1990s, first by 
supporting the alliance which included its co-religionists, the Shia Hazaras, against the 
alliance backed by the Sunni Saudi Arabia and its ally Pakistan. After the fall of the 
Communist regime in 1992, Iran supported the government led by President Burhanuddin 
Rabbani while Pakistan and Saudi Arabia stood behind Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who fought 
against the government in an effort to capture power.  
After the emergence of the Taliban in 1994, Iran gave generous support to Northern 
Alliance and hosted its leaders while Taliban were helped by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. 
Tehran, together with India and Russia, provided military, financial and political support to 
Northern Alliance which was fighting the Pakistan and Saudi backed Sunni Taliban. In the 
wake of the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, the Northern Alliance and its patron Iran 
helped the US to overthrow the Taliban regime and collaborated in the process of forging a 
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new government in post-Taliban Afghanistan.
125
 However, the honeymoon between 
Tehran and Washington ended very soon after the Bush administration rebuffed Iran’s 
overtures and called it a state sponsor of terrorism and part of the “Axis of Evil” along with 
North Korea and Libya.
126
 Although Tehran vocally backed the central government in 
Afghanistan led by Hamid Karzai, it maintained its relations with the leaders and 
commander of the former Northern Alliance. Cultivating good relations with different 
Afghan factions and individuals has been part of Iran’s strategy to counter Saudi and 
Pakistani attempts to displace it from the Afghan scene.
127
  
Traditionally, Iran’s policy towards Afghanistan has been based on its geo-strategic 
interests aiming to expand its influence and become a regional hegemon. It applies several 
strategies, tools and tactics to achieve its objectives. Iran promotes its soft power especially 
in the realms of media and education. Over the past few years, Iran has exported millions 
of books to Afghanistan to influence public opinion, spread Persian culture and increase 
support for the Islamic Republic. It has also built in roads in the Afghan media and 
established close ties with a several Afghan media outlets both in the capital Kabul and 
provinces. Its state radio has special transmissions in Pashto and Dari (Afghan Persian) 
targeted at the Afghan population.
128
 The country is also using religious rhetoric to gain the 
trust and good will of Afghans in general. Culturally, it tries to extend its influence on 
Afghanistan’s Dari/Persian speaking ethnic groups mainly Tajiks as well as, Hazaras, who 
are predominantly Shia Muslims.
129
  
Although Iran took a sigh of relief after the US-led coalitions toppled Tehran’s two main 
regional rivals -- Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the 
presence of foreign forces in the neighbouring countries of Afghanistan and Iraq as well as 
the Gulf increased Iran’s fears of encirclement. Tehran is concerned about the perceived 
breaches of its sovereignty and meddling in its internal affairs by the US and other Western 
powers. Tehran openly opposes the presence of foreign forces in Afghanistan and wants to 
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ensure that US/NATO does not uses the Afghan territory against Iran. Iran is also 
suspicious of foreign powers inciting unrest on its soil by supporting its Sunni minority. It 
accuses the US, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia for backing the religiously Sunni and ethnically 
Baloch militant group, Jundallah, which has carried out several attacks inside Iran.  
Although Iran’s relations with the Taliban were extremely tense and, unlike Pakistan and 
Saudi Arabia, didn’t recognise the Taliban regime, its view of the Taliban changed when 
they were removed from power. After the international pressure increased on Iran due to 
its nuclear programme, Tehran began establishing links with the insurgents in Afghanistan 
to warn of the consequences of West’s possible attack. According to Afghan officials, Iran 
started training camps for the Taliban and gave them financial and logistical support 
including arms from 2010.
130
 At several occasions, the US and NATO officials accused 
Iran of supplying weapons to the Afghan Taliban.
131
 Several delegations of the Afghan 
Taliban visited Iran between 2010 and 2015. Some of these visits were made public but a 
number of others were kept secret by both sides. The Afghan government officials and the 
Taliban sources say that Iran increased its cooperation with the Afghan Taliban in 2014 
and 2015 when it was faced with a new threat – the emergence of the vehemently anti-Shia 
group, Islamic State (IS/ISIL), in Afghanistan. Although Iran was already engaged in 
countering the Islamic State group in Iraq, it needed the cooperation of the Taliban in 
Afghanistan to tackle the threat of IS/ISIS in order to secure its eastern border.
132
  
Iran’s links with the Taliban seems to be tactical not strategic and ideological133. However, 
there is an overlapping of interest and motivations of the two sides. Both actors are against 
the presence of the US/NATO forces in Afghanistan and, more recently, against the 
emergence of Islamic State group (IS/ISIL) in Afghanistan. The relationship serves the 
interests of both the Taliban and Tehran. Taliban get support from elements in another 
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regional actor and an important neighbour of Afghanistan. On the other hand, the Taliban 
try to neutralise the IS/ISIL group in Afghanistan which threatens Iran. In addition, Iran 
can also exploit its links with the Taliban to put pressure on the US as well as the Afghan 
government.   
Tehran’s support for the insurgents in Afghanistan is restraint as the former avoids an overt 
or direct confrontation with the US-led coalition. In the meantime, a degree of synergy 
exists between the goals of Iran and the US in Afghanistan. Both are interested in stability 
(albeit on their own terms) and the reduction of opium for which Iran is a major 
consumption market). In addition, both want to prevent the dominance and expansion of 
IS/ISIL and Al-Qaeda linked radical groups in Afghanistan.  
Iran’s relations with the central government in Kabul have been warm and friendly. 
However, Iran now and then creates a “controlled chaos” for the Afghan government and 
its international allies perhaps to highlight its relevance and gain leverage. At several 
occasions over the past ten years, it started expelling Afghan refugees living in Iran which 
put a lot of pressure on the Afghan government and its Western allies. In other instances, it 
imposed a brief oil embargo on Afghanistan; increased restrictions on the joint border with 
Afghanistan and made visa issuance to Afghans more difficult. In addition, Iran doesn’t 
seem to be keen on the construction of the proposed Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-
India (TAPI) pipeline that bypasses Iran and undermines the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) 
pipeline. Continued instability in Afghanistan has been one of the main hurdles in starting 
the work on the multi-billion TAPI project. Although Iran doesn’t have any border dispute 
with Afghanistan, the issue of access to water that flows to Iran from the Afghan rivers is 
still unresolved. A stable and strong Afghanistan might mean less water for Iran which has 
the potential of creating tension between the two neighbours.  
 
2.3 Local Dynamics of the Afghan Conflict: 
On top of the international and regional factors, several factors within Afghanistan 
contribute to the conflict in the country including militancy, illicit drug economy, 
organised crime and warlordism. Local actors of the Afghan conflict have a wide range of 
motivations such as financial gains and control over territory, people and resources (greed), 
poverty (need) and ideology/Islamism, nationalism, ethnicity and tribalism (creed). In 
some cases in what appears to be a creed motivation, there is a strong element of proxy and 
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patronage as they enjoy varying degrees of external support. Highlighting the role of 
foreign actors, Rubin says that “every group in the population has been mobilized 
militarily and politically and enjoys some patronage from foreign powers or 
movements”.134  
2.3.1 Ethnicity and Tribalism   
Internationally, it is the “ethnic problem” in Afghanistan that has received more attention 
with many commentators calling the conflict in the country as a manifestation of “ethnic 
hatreds”. A number of studies frame the conflict in an ethnic discourse and portray it as an 
outcome of the age old “ethnic tension.” Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic country with the 
Pashtoons making up the largest ethnic group followed by Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks. In 
addition, there are several other smaller ethnic groups living in different parts of the 
country.
135  
Some writers have made sweeping statements without properly exploring various 
dynamics of the conflict. The conflict in the country, especially the factional war in Kabul 
after the fall of the communist regime in 1992 is viewed by many as a clash between 
different ethnic groups. Writing about the fighting between different Mujahideen factions 
in the capital in 1990s, a commentator notes that “the line was drawn between Pushtoons 
and non-Pashtoons for the battle of Kabul”.136 Another writer concluded in 1996 that “the 
Tajiks are totally against the Pashtoons”.137 The same author noted that “a power game 
converted into an ethnic war”138 and added that “the ethnic war in Afghanistan has left the 
country in a state of anarchy”.139 Such writers usually reduce ideological, proxy, greed and 
various other factors to only communal aspect of some commanders and politicians.  
The founding father of modern Afghanistan, Ahmad Shah Abdali/Durrani) was an ethnic 
Pashtoon who was elected King in the southern city of Kandahar in 1747 and ruled over 
today’s Afghanistan and parts of its neighbouring countries. 140  The Durrani dynasty 
continued ruling over Afghanistan for nearly 250 years up until the April 1978 communist 
coup and the subsequent invasion by the Soviet Union. 
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The Afghan society was a good example of ethnic pluralism and co-existence before 
upheavals of the late 1970s. For several decades before that, Afghanistan remained as one 
of the most peaceful countries in the world. Assimilation of different linguistic, ethnic and 
tribal groups created a shared Afghan identity. Inter-mixture between various groups has 
been a common feature all over the country. The two major languages, Pashto and Dari 
(Afghan Persian) had been official languages. The 2004 Constitution also gave the status 
of official languages to other smaller languages.   
Historically, Pashtoons enjoyed political and military dominance in the country. However, 
with the Soviet invasion, the social and economic fabric of the Afghan society began to 
break down. Even the ideologically communist Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan 
(PDPA), which took power in the 1978 coup, couldn’t remain immune from these social 
fractures. Although there were members of all ethnic groups in both factions of the PDPA 
(Khalq and Parcham), ethnic tensions were evident among some of the PDPA leaders who 
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have been accused of “cultivating ethnic conflict to advance their own political 
objectives.”142  
The Pashtoon-dominated Khalq faction of the PDPA, which ruled over the country from 
April 1978-December 1979, adopted measures to promote minority languages and cultures 
and also recognised Uzbeki, Turkmeni, Balochi and Nooristani as official languages. In the 
meantime, it also took steps to promoted Pashto language and culture. However, these 
policies were reversed after the December 1979 Soviet invasion, which brought the mainly 
non-Pashtoon Parcham faction into power.
143
 Babrak Karmal, the leader of the Parcham 
faction, was installed as the president and remained on the post until 1986. Karmal has 
been accused of deliberate attempts to transform the ideological struggle into an ethnic one. 
According to Ahady, in order “to perpetuate his own and his faction’s relevance to Afghan 
politics, he attempted a new alliance based on ethnic affiliations” involving “non-Pashtoon 
resistance commanders and non-Pashtoon communist military officers and bureaucrats.”144  
The rise of some ethnic minorities resulted in a sense of alienation among a number of 
Pashtoons who felt that they were losing clout and that their share of power in the state 
institutions had been gradually reduced. Pashtoons’ decline in state institutions continued 
during the 1980s. The representation of ethnic Pashtoons was further reduced when the 
Soviet backed regime in Kabul fell in 1992 at the hands of the Mujahideen and a coalition 
of mainly ethnic minorities took over the capital and occupied most of the important 
positions including the presidency and the important ministries of defence and the interior.  
However, the alliance between mainly non-Pashtoon ethnic groups collapsed in less than a 
year. The ethnic Hazara leader, Abdul Ali Mazari, who was previously of the government, 
started fighting against the forces of Ahmad Shah Massoud, the defence minister, and 
President Burhanuddin Rabbani, both ethnic Tajiks. The ethnic Uzbek, General Abdul 
Rashid Dostum, also abandoned the Tajik dominated governing coalition. Both Dostum 
and Mazari joined an ethnic Pashtoon and leader of Hezb-e-Islami (Islamic Party), 
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and fought jointly against the forces of ethnic Tajiks, Massoud and 
Rabbani, who were controlling most of the government buildings in the capital. During the 
Mujahideen regime (1992-1996), local commanders and warlords frequently shifted 
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alliances for various reasons including money and weapons. However, they usually 
justified the move and claimed that they did so to protect the interests of their own ethnic 
communities. However, “their struggle ultimately centred on individual survival and power 
grabs while often using ethnicity as a convenient cover and a powerful mobilizing tool.”145  
When the US invaded Afghanistan in 2001, it used the Northern Alliance’s ground forces 
to fight against the Taliban and allowed them to enter and capture Kabul after the departure 
of the Taliban forces from the capital. Once again, it was the alliance of the mainly non-
Pashtoons which began to dominate the political scene of Afghanistan. The UN and US 
sponsored conference about the future political set up of post-Taliban Afghanistan in Bonn, 
Germany, gave the anti-Taliban non-Pashtoon groups a dominant role in the new 
government. Although Hamid Karzai, a Pashtoon, was chosen as the new president, most 
key ministries (such as defense, interior and foreign ministries) were given to non-
Pashtoons, especially the Tajiks. As the US allies against the Taliban, the Northern 
Alliance leaders were generally empowered with money, weapons and political positions 
in the post-Taliban Afghanistan. The dominant presence of Northern Alliance members 
was evident in almost all government sectors, especially the security institutions. This 
created a sense of neglect and loss among a number of Pashtoons. It was a factor that 
created a distance between the new Afghan government and some people, especially in the 
Pashtoon areas of the country. The insurgents also benefited from the sense of political 
alienation that was evident in a number of Pashtoons.   
Although ethnicity has been used as a military-political peg by some leaders, its impact 
remained limited in the overall conflict in the country. As Hussain says, “despite prolonged 
civil war and sharpening of ethnic boundaries, still a large number of Afghans call 
themselves Afghans”. 146  As opposed to its two neighbours, Iran and Pakistan, where 
different ethnic and religious groups have been struggling for independence and/or 
cessation and suffer from violent ethnic conflicts, Afghanistan never had any separatist 
movement. The campaign by members of different ethnic groups is mainly about gaining 
more political power in the centre.  
In addition, several commentators equate Pashtoons in general with the Taliban while 
others reduce the whole conflict to a war between Pashtoons and non Pashtoons. However, 
they ignore rivalries that exist among several non-Pashtoon groups. Meanwhile, Pashtoons 
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and other ethnic groups in the country have been wrongly projected as homogenous 
categories on their own. The intra-ethnic differences and divisions that exist in all ethnic 
groups have again been largely ignored. Several commanders from the same ethnic groups 
fought against each other for various reasons including factional and political differences 
and territorial control. Many Pashtoon commanders fought against other Pashtoon 
commanders in different parts of the country. For example, two powerful commanders in 
southern Helmand province -- Mulla Naseem Akhundzadah and Rais Abdul Wahid – who 
were members of the same Pashtoon sub-tribe, fought bitterly for years which resulted in 
the killing of thousands of people from both sides. The situation was the same among other 
ethnic groups. Similarly, a number of Tajik and Uzbek commanders clashed with 
commanders of the same ethnic groups. Tajik Mujahideen commanders from Hezb-e 
Islami led by a Pashtoon, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and Jamiat-e Islami led by a Tajik 
Burhanuddin Rabbani frequently fought against eachother even during the Soviet 
occupation (1979-1989). Such rivalries indicate that alliances and factions were not formed 
along the ethnic lines alone. Several other factors such as political and ideological 
affiliations, financial benefits, political power, patronage and even acquaintances played 
important role in the formation of an alliance, faction or front. 
In general, the Mujahideen factions fighting the Soviet forces in 1980s were ethnically 
mixed, except the Iran based Shia Hazara groups which had almost exclusively Hazara 
members. The two major factions, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e Islami and 
Burhanuddin Rabbani’s Jamiat-e Islami, were some of the most mixed groups having 
members from almost all ethnic groups. During the factional war that followed the fall of 
the communist regime in 1992, the warring factions in Kabul were also mixed. President 
Burhanuddin Rabbani and his defence minister, Ahmad Shah Massoud, were both Tajik. 
However, dozens of other commanders as well as Rasool Sayyaf, the head of Itihad-e 
Islami faction, were non Tajiks and were part of the government. On the other hand, the 
opposition was also mixed. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the main leader of the opposition was a 
Pashtoon, while his major allies included General Dostum, an Uzbek, and Abdul Ali 
Mazari, a Hazara Shia. They all fought together against the government. In addition, the 
two sides also recruited and mobilised fighters from other parts of the country who 
belonged to all ethnic groups. When the ethnic Pashtoon Gulbuddin Hekmatyar finally 
reconciled with the government, the person he recommended from his faction for the post 
of Prime Minister was Ustad Farid, a Tajik from north of the country. Moreover, many 
Mujahideen leaders and prominent commanders remained neutral during this factional 
fighting. Ismael Khan a Tajik from Herat, Haji Abdul Qadeer, a Pashtoon from Nangarhar, 
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Jalaluddin Haqqani, a Pashtoon from Khost and dozens of others from all ethnic groups 
refused to take part in the power struggle. In addition, the factional war was confined to 
Kabul and the rest of the country didn’t follow the same pattern of violence. Commanders 
and ordinary Afghans from different ethnicities and factions generally remained peaceful.   
Although the Taliban Movement was dominated by Pashtoons, it did not represent a 
particular ethnicity. Thousands of people from other ethnic groups of Afghanistan also 
joined the Taliban with some of them appointed as governors and ministers in their 
government. As Barnett Rubin argues, Taliban represented a social group rather than an 
ethnic groups as it consisted of “the privately educated, rural ulama and their students 
affiliated to the Deobandi movement.”147  In addition, the Taliban fought against both 
Pashtoons and non-Pashtoons. All those who opposed them were regarded as enemies 
regardless of their ethnicity. In fact, the first opposition to the Taliban came from the 
Pashtoon commanders in Kandahar, the birth place of the Taliban Movement. Out of the 
six main commanders in the province, the group was supported by one of them, Mullah 
Naqib who was a commander of the Jamiat-e Islami faction led by the then President, 
Burhanuddin Rabbani, a Tajik from north-eastern Badakhshan province. In addition, the 
Tajik led central government in Kabul was one of the first and major supporters of the 
Taliban. On the other hand, hundreds of Pashtoon commanders including leaders of 
Mujahideen factions – such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Abdul Rab Rasool Sayyaf, 
fought against the Taliban. Although several Hazara leaders -- such as Mohammad 
Muhaqiq, Abdul Karim Khalili -- opposed the Taliban, a number of ethnic Hazara and Shia 
commanders in central Afghanistan’s Ghazni, Bamiyan and Urozgan provinces joined the 
Taliban. Mohammad Akbari, the head of his own Hazara faction was even a high ranking 
official in the Taliban government.
148
  
After the emergence of the Taliban Movement in Kandahar in 1994, many local 
commanders fled and joined the anti-Taliban factions. Although most of these commanders 
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were ethnic Pashtoons, they fought back against the pre-dominantly Pashtoon Taliban as 
part of the Northern Alliance, which was led by non-Pashtoons. Even in the internal 
factional wars of the 1990s, the role of foreign actors was as evident as ever. Pakistan, 
Saudi Arabia and UAE, the only three countries that had recognised the Taliban regime, 
supported the Taliban; while Russia, Iran and India were backing the anti-Taliban Northern 
Alliance which was led by mainly non-Pashtoon ethnic groups such as Tajiks, Hazaras and 
Uzbeks.  
The Taliban, after the fall of their regime, seems to be careful about using ethno-nationalist 
language. Their slogans have been rooted in Afghan nationalism and Islam and usually 
warn against ethnic tensions and conflict and use terms milli (national) and millat (nation) 
in their statements. However, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the leader of the second biggest 
insurgent group in Afghanistan, Hezb-e-Islami (Islamic Party), has recently adopted an 
unprecedentedly ethno-nationalistic tone apparently to tap into Pashtoon fears that they are 
being marginalized by the US and some of its Afghan allies. In one of his Eid (Muslim 
religious festival) messages posted on his party’s website on 8 August 2013, Hekmatyar 
described the Pashtoons as the “victimized absolute majority.” He also warned that the 
departing Americans were planning to partition Afghanistan with the help of some ethnic 
“minorities” to perpetuate civil war in order to make up for their defeat.149  
After the fall of the Taliban regime, the country has been ruled by a government consisting 
of all ethnic groups. However, some commentators including Griffiths concluded that 
bringing together “such volatile and contentious elements” was a futile exercise and 
suggested that the long term solution of Afghanistan may be a break up.
150
 Although such 
portrayal of the conflict in Afghanistan is common in the media, several Western officials 
and academicians believe this narrative to be the truth.
151
 As Dorronsoro notes, “the 
employment of the category of ‘ethnic warfare’ to describe the Afghan conflict is far from 
being neutral, and is in itself an ideological position.”152  
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Ethnicity and ethnic grievances have contributed to the Afghan conflict at different stages 
and levels.
153
 At times, some commanders and politicians have used ethno-nationalist 
rhetoric to mobilise their followers and galvanise support.
154
 Meanwhile, other factors such 
as tribal and provincial/regional were also used for the same purpose. Following the state 
collapse, different people sought the help of their immediate relatives and clan members as 
well as tribes and ethnic groups. Therefore, “ethnicity is not the cause of the conflict, but 
the consequence of political and military mobilisation.”155  
The Soviet invasion and the internal war paved way for the politics of patronage with 
foreign backers supporting different militia commanders who led groups belonging to 
certain ethnic groups. Many commanders exploited ethnicity, especially during the 
intensive phases of conflict. However, economic and political factors played a more 
important role. Several commanders and warlords used ethnicity to mobilise people when 
they felt they were losing support. It is in this context that Schetter says that “in spite of the 
ethnicisation of the war, an ethnicisation of the masses is nowhere to be found”. 156 
Therefore, despite occasional tensions, “Afghans do have a sense of nationhood” and 
“shared history.”157 
2.3.2 Nationalism and Ideology 
The insurgency in Afghanistan is driven by a mixture of different and overlapping 
motivations including nationalism and ideology. Although the Taliban Movement was 
widely seen as an ethnic Pashtoon phenomenon due its predominant Pashtoon membership 
at the time of its launch in 1994, its emergence “was not purely a question of ethnicity. 
Ordinary Afghans, weary of the prevailing lawlessness in many parts of the country” 
welcomed the Taliban for “stamping out corruption, restoring peace and allowing 
commerce to flourish again”.158 Following the 2001 US-led invasion of Afghanistan and 
the removal of the Taliban regime, the group re-emerged in 2003-04 as an insurgency and 
has been exploiting the presence of the foreign troops in Afghanistan. They encourage their 
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followers and ordinary Afghans to wage jihad or holy war against what they call “infidel 
invaders” and “foreign occupation”.159 The Taliban present themselves as the victim of 
foreign aggression and invoke nationalist and Islamic ideals to keep the resistance alive.
160
  
Some NATO and Afghan officials have also suggested that majority of the unemployed 
youth join the Taliban for hard cash thus calling them as “ten-dollar-a-day-Taliban”.161 
They argue that the Taliban pay their fighters on a daily basis in order to motivate them to 
fight against the Afghan and NATO forces.
162 
Although unemployment pushed a number 
of Afghans to join the insurgency, “resource distribution was not a key element of Taliban 
remobilization”. 163  It is hard to believe that the Taliban take these big risks such as 
committing a suicide attacks, which needs a strong conviction, for “ten dollars.” The 
Taliban literature and statements as well my field work indicates that the bulk of Taliban 
fighters, especially mid-level commanders and foot soldiers, are motivated by a mixture of 
nationalism and ideology.
164
 The Taliban members brand themselves as liberation fighters 
who strive to expel the “invaders” and free the country and its people from the yoke of 
occupation. The have always portrayed themselves “as nationalist actors upholding the 
undeniable Islamic right to self-defence” and insist “that their intent and ambitions are 
entirely Afghan-centric.” 165 They channel nationalist sentiments within an Islamic 
framework and try to maximise the impact of their resistance by unifying religious and 
nationalist slogans.  
In their statements, the Taliban repeatedly mention country, nation and Islam. They 
frequently refer to two things: a), Afghanistan has never been occupied by foreigners and it 
is the duty of every Afghan to free their country from foreign occupation, and b), 
                                                          
159
 For details of Taliban statements, commentaries, speeches, interviews and battlefield reports see the 
Taliban’s official website with material in five languages including English, Pashto, Dari/Persian, Urdu and 
Arabic at: <http://shahamat.info/>.   
160
 Azami, Dawood, (2010b). Taliban harness power of the web. BBC News, 17 July. Available online at: 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8570742.stm> [Accessed 5 Oct 2014]. See also Azami, 
Dawood, (2012b). Taliban poetry and the lone fighter. BBC News, 10 July. Available online at: 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-17905361>[Accessed 5 Oct 2014]. 
161
 Fergusson, James, (2010). Taliban: The True Story of the World’s Most Feared Guerrilla Fighters. 
London: Random House, p.160. See also Johnson, Robert, (2011). The Afghan Way of War: How and Why 
They Fight. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 278. 
162
 Morarjee, Rachel, (2006). Taliban Goes for Cash Over Ideology. Financial Times, London, 26 July. 
Available online at: <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c3b3fa7a-1c06-11db-a555-
0000779e2340.html#axzz2enbH1Uey> [Accessed 5 Oct 2012].   
163
 Checkel, Jeffrey T., (2013). Transnational Dynamics of Civil War. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, p.105. 
164
 Author’s own observations and interviews with Taliban members/sympathisers (T1, T2, T3, T4) as well as 
Afghan and NATO officials and villagers (V1, V3 and V4), Nov, 2011, Nov. 2012, Nov. 2013. See also the 
Taliban official website at: <http://shahamat.info/>. 
165
 Brahimi, Alia, (2010). The Taliban’s Evolving Ideology. LSE Global Governance Working Paper. 
Available Online at: <http://www.lse.ac.uk/globalGovernance/publications/workingPapers/WP022010.pdf> 
[Accessed 5 Oct 2012]. 
101 
 
Afghanistan is a Muslim country invaded by foreign infidels; therefore, it is religiously 
obligatory to free the Muslim land and establish a government system based on Afghan 
and Islamic traditions.
166
 For example, in a statement issued in August 2013 to mark the 
anniversary of Afghanistan’s victory over Britain in the third Anglo-Afghan war (1919), 
the Taliban referred to the valour and bravery of Afghan people and said that “Britain, with 
all its power and empire made three failed attempts to digest Afghanistan, but, with the 
help of God, today’s Britain and America can never implement its colonial plans in 
Afghanistan.”167 In addition, the Taliban cleverly exploit the principles of Pashtoonwali – 
the unwritten traditional code of life of Pashtoons which, among other values, stresses 
honour and revenge. They invoke the Pashtoon tribal traditions to mobilise the population 
and achieve its support. The Taliban also get support from a number of those Pashtoons 
who think they have been “alienated” and did not get their share in the government in 
Kabul in post-Taliban Afghanistan.
168
   
2.3.3 Criminality, Greed and Need 
There is a strong criminal element in the conflict in Afghanistan mainly involving the 
trafficking of drugs, smuggling of artefacts and excavations of minerals. Instability and 
fighting creates a suitable environment for these illegal activities to continue and flourish. 
Therefore, it has been seen in many parts of the country that drug traders and others 
involved in illegal activities cooperate with the insurgents as they have share interest in 
keeping the state institution weak. The production and trafficking of drug production link a 
number of regional and international cartel and mafia groups. Drugs mafia from regional 
countries such as Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Central Asian states and Russia are involved in 
the Afghan drug trade at different stages. There are hundreds of cartels and groups in each 
region involved in the trafficking of drugs from one country to another. In late 2013, 
officials from Russia’s Federal Drug Control Service (FSKN) revealed that “almost 1,900 
organised criminal groups and 150 major drug cartels in Central Asia [were] trafficking 
illicit drugs from Afghanistan to Russia” while about 100,000 drug “mules” were used to 
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 Russia is not only one of the main conduits of Afghan drugs, it is 
also a major drug consuming markets with an estimated 8.5 million people, or almost six 
percent of the total population, addicted to drugs.
170
 In addition, European drug traffickers 
as well as Italy’s mafia are also active in the Afghan drug trade.171 Meanwhile, corrupt 
government officials in Afghanistan and neighbouring countries have a financial incentive 
in the continuation of drug production as they benefit from the illicit economy mainly in 
the form of bribes. According to Afghanistan’s Second Vice-President, Mohammad Karim 
Khalili, several Afghan officials support the drug trade and smuggle narcotics in police 
vehicles in order to avoid detection.
172
  
In addition, the looting of antiquities and smuggling of ancient artifacts, often called 
“Blood Antiquities”, have gone hand-in-hand with warfare in many parts of the world. 
Like drugs, it is also a multi-billion dollar trade and involves international criminal 
groups.
173
 The looting of archaeological sites has been one of the most profitable activities 
for organised crime groups in Afghanistan. Numerous historical sites scattered throughout 
the country have been systematically targeted by criminal groups over the past few 
decades.
174
As in the case of drugs, the factors behind looting of Afghanistan’s 
archaeological treasures are mainly financial that often motivate people to illegally dig up 
objects while the logistical forces that facilitate the illicit export of antiquities are the 
conflict, lawlessness and weak state institutions.
175  
Therefore, smugglers involved in 
Afghanistan’s illicit antiquities trade often have a symbiotic relationship with warlords, 
corrupt officials and insurgents. Their ultimate goals might be different but they have a 
shared interest in keeping the flames of war alive as it enables them to continue their 
activities with impunity.
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Afghanistan, with its long and adventurous history, is a land of ancient cultures and 
civilizations. Over the past three decades, tens of thousands of ancient artefacts have been 
smuggled from Afghanistan to markets in regional countries as well as Europe, US and 
East Asia. Due to weak state institutions and lack of government capacity to enforce law 
and order, it is “easy to illegally export ancient artefacts, and Afghanistan’s rich and 
diverse cultural heritage.”176 The continuity of “war has been a boon for both looters and 
smugglers”177 as it makes combating illicit antiquities trafficking difficult if not impossible. 
In many parts of the country, especially in areas outside the government’s control, looters 
find it easier to plunder the country’s historical sites and steal valuable objects.  
Poverty is another important factor in the conflict in Afghanistan. The decades long 
conflict has devastated the country’s economy resulting in the loss of livelihoods of 
millions Afghans. Therefore, a number of people are driven to conflict simply by need. 
During the course of my fieldwork, many people told me that they joined different factions 
out of desperation as that was the only job available to them in order to survive and feed 
their families. When the state collapsed, different people in various parts of the country 
allied themselves with different factions and warlords to protect themselves in a turbulent 
time and ensure their livelihoods. For a number of people neutrality was not option as they 
feared that their superior commanders or other predatory actors might harm them unless 
they joined a group.  
It also a fact that many people are driven by greed whether they are involved in the drug 
trade or are part of the organised crime, insurgency or government. Their main motivation 
is to get richer and more powerful and the conflict brings them enough opportunities to 
realize their dream. Greed seems to be a major factor in the Afghan conflict mainly at 
certain leadership levels as it is that group of people which is benefitting the most from 
conflict and insecurity. That is why, some local actors found the “spoils” of war and chaos 
irresistible. They exploit local population and resources for their own benefit and 
contribute to lawlessness and exacerbate disorder in order to maximize their wealth and 
power. 
As described above, there are dozens of actors involved at international, regional and local 
levels in the conflict in Afghanistan. Although the number of actors, their role and the 
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degree of their involvement has evolved over time, the multiplicity of actors has made the 
conflict prolonged and multi-dimensional and multi-motivational. Following is a summary 
of the actors directly and indirectly associated with the complex situation of Afghanistan.  
 
International Actors in the conflict in Afghanistan 
 







Around fifty countries 
including all five 
permanent members of 
the UN Security 
Council and all 
member countries of 
NATO. 
 
Militant networks  such as 
Al-Qaeda, and Islamic 
State (IS/ISIS/ISIL), 
International drug mafia, 





UN (and its 




ILO, IOM, NATO, 
EU, OIC, IOM 
 
Amnesty International, 
MSF (Doctors Without 
Borders), Oxfam, 




Regional Actors in the conflict in Afghanistan 
 
State actors Non-state actors Regional 
Organisations  
 








TTP (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan),  
SSP (Sipah-e-Sahaba) Pakistan,  
LeJ (Lashkar-e-Jhangvi) Pakistan,  
LeT (Lashkar-e-Taiba) Pakistan, 
JuD (Jamaat-ud-Dawa) Pakistan,  
JI (Jamaat-e-Islami) Pakistan, 
JUI (Jamiat-e Ulema-e-Islam) Pakistan, 
Jundallah (Iran, Pakistan) 
IMU (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan),  
ETIM (East Turkestan Islamic Movement) 
Al Quds force of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps,  
Co-ethnic/tribal groups in neighbouring countries,  
Regional drug mafia,  
Transnational criminal networks, 
Businesses/corporations, smuggling groups.  
 
OIC, SAARC, ECO, 
SCO 
 
Local Actors in the conflict in Afghanistan 
 





Afghan Taliban (including the  
Haqqani Network),  
Hizb-e Islami (Hektmatyar), 
Fidayi Mahaz, 
IS/ISIS/ISIL (Islamic State) etc. 
 
 
Warlords and private militias, Religious 
leaders,  
Tribal elders  
Ethnic leaders/groups,  




Human traffickers,  
Criminal groups (kidnapping gangs, 




Table 2.1: State and non-state actors involved in Afghanistan. 
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2.4 Natural Resources and the Afghan Conflict: 
Having hundreds of mineral fields containing lithium, copper, gold, precious and semi-
precious stones among others, Afghanistan’s natural resources make it one of the richest 
mining countries in the world. Its untapped mineral wealth is believed to be worth around 
three trillion dollars.
178
 In December 2013, President Hamid Karzai claimed Afghanistan’s 
mineral deposits are actually worth $30 trillion.
179
 The conflict and collapse of state 
institutions prepared grounds for illegal and unauthorised excavation and exploitation of 
the country’s natural resources. Illegal armed groups and regional warlords could easily 
extract natural resources such as timber, precious stones – such as rubies, lapis lazuli, 
emerald – and other minerals to enrich themselves and buy loyalties. They also found the 
freedom to trade drugs and steal and smuggle ancient artefacts. Meanwhile, the conflict 
provided ample opportunities for bureaucratic corruption which resulted in further 
weakening of the already weak state institutions. 
During the factional war in Afghanistan in 1990s, all sides exploited natural resources 
available to them. The anti-Taliban faction, United Front popularly known as Northern 
Alliance, which was led by its main military commander, Ahmed Shah Massoud, 
benefitted from both minerals and drugs. However, according to Rubin, Massoud’s “main 
income” came from the gem trade180 and, in the 1990s, received between US$40-60 million 
annually from the sale of precious stones such as emeralds and lapis lazuli.
181 
Rubin adds 
that Massoud “taxed trade in lapis lazuli and emeralds, collecting ushr [tax] from mine 
owners and zakat from traders. In 1997, however, Massoud established a monopoly in 
purchase of the gems and in 1999 signed an agreement with a Polish firm, Inter Commerce, 
to market them”.182 His aides estimated that “the new joint venture could make as much as 
$200 million in annual income”.183   
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Lack of security and weak state institutions resulted in the expansion of illegal extraction 
of mines. The looting of minerals and precious stones including rubies, lapis lazuli, 
chromite, aquamarine, emerald, fluorite, garnet, kunzite, gold, marble and sapphire 
continues today. Taliban commanders, criminal groups, corrupt officials and other local 
powerful actors are involved in the plunder of a number of mines in several provinces 
including Kabul, Nangarhar, Badakhshan, Panjsher and Kunar. Minerals have become an 
important source of income for the Taliban insurgents who use the money to buy weapons 
and pay their fighters. In addition, local villagers from these mineral rich provinces told me 
during my field work in 2012 and 2013, that a number of ordinary people also mine these 
sites unprofessionally to earn a living.
184
 According to government officials, by the end of 
2013, more than 1400 small and large mines in Afghanistan were extracted and traded 
illegally mostly by local “influential figures” and mining companies linked to powerful 
individuals and “warlords”.185  
2.4.1 Drugs and Conflict   
Although traditional production of opium for medicine and recreation existed in a limited 
fashion before the conflict, Afghanistan was at peace and didn’t experience any drug 
related conflict. However, drug production (mainly opium and cannabis) grew rapidly in 
the period succeeding the onset of the conflict that started in late 1970s. In 1979, the year 
when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, less than 200 tons of opium was produced in 
the country. Opium production continued to expand and reached 1000 metric tons in 1988. 
In 2007, the country produced around 9,000 mt of opium; record high and around 90% of 
the world’s opium in that year.186  
The initiation of the conflict in Afghanistan is not linked to the drugs. On the contrary, it 
was the war that prepared grounds for a flourishing drugs economy and provided a suitable 
environment for a large scale drug production and trafficking. Global patterns of drug 
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cultivation indicate that it tends to migrate toward conflict areas.
187
 The situation in 
Colombia was similar to Afghanistan where large scale drug production occurred after the 
conflict. The Marxist rebel group, FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia 
or The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), established in 1966 as an ideological 
movement, didn’t have any links to drugs and wasn’t motivated to control the narcotics 
business. The South American country became a major drug producer several years after it 
was plagued by the armed conflict.
188
  
Although the conflict in Afghanistan evolved and some of its actors changed with the 
passage of time, drugs and other natural resources played an important role in financing 
armed groups and individual warlords. From 1979-1989, the anti-Soviet Mujahideen 
factions received generous financial support from Arab and Western countries. However, 
some of them were also involved in the drug trade to finance their resistance. Nearly all 
groups benefitted from the drugs economy during the factional war in 1990s as their 
external financial support decreased after the withdrawal of Soviet forces. From 1995 to 
2001, the country faced a mainly bipolar confrontation between the Taliban and the United 
Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan commonly known as the Northern Alliance. 
Both sides benefitted heavily from natural resources including drugs. As Mass says, “the 
drug industry served as a source of fiscal revenue for the Taliban regime while providing 
the ‘war entrepreneurs’ of the Northern Alliance in their fragmented territories with an 
illicit source of funding.”189 In addition to the international marketing of gems, the anti-
Taliban coalition, Northern Alliance, directly benefitted from the drugs economy through 
taxation and supervision of farmers. According to Goodhand, the group levied a tax on 
opium cultivation which starting at around 2.5 percent and climbed through the 1990s, 
eventually reaching 20 percent.
190
 The groups also controlled one of the main drug 
trafficking routes into Central Asia.
191
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On the other hand, the Taliban, right from its emergence in 1994, received tens of millions 
of dollars annually from production opium and trade in opiates. Since 2001, when the 
Taliban regime was toppled, revenues from the drug trade have become one of the main 
sources of income for the Taliban. In post-Taliban Afghanistan, poppy cultivation grew 
significantly as soaring prices pushed farmers nationwide to expand opium production. 
Illicit narcotics bring huge sums for warlords, drug traffickers, corrupt officials as well as 
the insurgents. The Taliban, the main insurgent group, and Hezb-e-Islami led by 
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the second biggest insurgent group, fighting the Afghan 
government and its US/NATO allies, have been benefitting from the lucrative drug trade. 
In November 2011, Afghanistan’s Counter-narcotics Minister claimed that the Taliban got 
US$155 million per year from opium.
192 
Some other sources say that proceeds from the 
illicit drug trade brings up to US$400 million a year to the Taliban coffins through an 
elaborate system of taxing different stages of opium and heroin including cultivation, 
processing and shipment.
193  
It is the overlapping of war and poverty usually results in the expansion of opium poppies. 
As Chouvy says “illicit opium production has benefited not only from synergies between 
war economies and drug economies: it has also thrived on economic underdevelopment 
and poverty, whether war-induced or not.”194 Majority of Afghan farmers are among the 
poorest in the world; therefore, a number of them started cultivating opium poppies as it 
brings them more money than what they get from other licit crops. Even today, as my own 
empirical research as well official records show, large scale opium production is mostly 
confined to areas of the country which are less secure and underdeveloped.
195
 As I found 
out during my field work, drug production is also a main source of income for numerous 
poor farmers. Ironically, the interest of many poppy farmers also lies in a weak state which 
is incapable of implementing its poppy ban.     
Drugs production and trade generally play a major role in deteriorating the security 
situation in Afghanistan. Narcotics are also closely linked with the issues of warlordism, 
bad-governance and corruption in the Afghan security and judicial institutions.
196
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Narcotics have resulted in three main problems in the country namely governance, security 
and social well-being. The problem of governance in the form of corruption and the 
influence of drug mafia on state is a prominent phenomenon. This has also distorted the 
young democracy in the country. Drugs also provide the much needed cash to the 
insurgents and support militants’ activities. In addition, drugs have a negative impact on 
social wellbeing in the country where crime rate is high and drug addiction is rapidly rising. 
2.4.2 War Economy 
The conflict in Afghanistan created a suitable environment for groups and individuals to 
benefit from the war economy at different levels. As David Keen argues, war is not simply 
the breakdown of societies and economies, but “the emergence of an alternative system of 
profit, power, and even protection”.197 The reorganisation of Afghan society as a result of 
decades of war and upheavals brought about the evolution of a war economy partly based 
on natural resources, including drugs. These resources are mostly located in areas where 
the government doesn’t have proper control. Warlords who, benefit from illegal extraction 
of natural resources, generally not only try to preserve their power and influence but also 
strive to expand it. Over the past two decades, money from the drug trade and other natural 
resources has become the main motivation for some warlords.  Therefore, insecurity and 
weak government serves their interest. In addition, the insurgents resist the government 
and fight to keep a guaranteed source of income secure. This mixture of actors and factors 
has made the conflict more complicated as it involves new actors and creates additional 
motivating factors. 
As Kurtz suggests in his book on political anthropology, most political agents acquire 
resources through the goods that their community provides them and are generally 
notorious manipulators of their political economies.
198
 In many conflict and post conflict 
societies, self-service has become an important part of politics where political agents use 
skills and power to ensure political survival and social and economic well-being.
199
 There 
are elements of greed in the on-going conflict in Afghanistan where several warlords and 
militia commanders -- who were part of the ideological resistance during the anti-Soviet 
Jihad -- transformed into “conflict entrepreneurs” aiming to get rich and expand power and 
influence. A number of such former commanders were supportive of the US-led 
                                                          
197
 Keen, David, (2000). Incentives and Disincentives for Violence. In: Berdal, Mats and Malone, David M. 
(editors), Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 
19-41  
198
 Kurtz, Donald V., (2001). Political Anthropology: Power and Paradigms. Oxford: Westview Press, p. 162  
199
 Ibid. p. 10.  
110 
 
intervention in late 2001 to topple the Taliban regime and later became part of the US 
backed Afghan government.  
As discussed above, a host of actors and factors are contributing to the decades conflict in 
Afghanistan. Some of actors were responsible for initiating the conflict while the role and 
involvement of others are simply exacerbating and perpetuating it. Applying the Hybrid 
Framework, the following diagram can illustrate better the complexity and multi-


























Figure 2.4: Hybrid Framework and the conflict in Afghanistan: The combination of overlapping causes, 































In a globalised world, conflicts are becoming more and more complex involving a variety 
of state and non-state actors at local, regional and international levels as well as a 
combination of various overlapping causes and motivations. The existing models and 
framework about conflict do not properly explain the multiplicity of actors and factors in 
conflicts such as the one in Afghanistan. They either focus too much on one aspect of the 
conflict (such as greed) or ignore other important factors (such as transnational factors). 
The Hybrid Framework I have suggested takes into account the multiple drivers of conflict 
as well as the hybrid nature of interests, actors and motivations. The Afghan conflict 
provides a perfect case for the Hybrid Framework which demonstrates the overlapping 
nature of motivations and interests pursued by a variety of local, regional and international 
actors. As discussed, the multiplicity of actors and motivations has made the conflict 
prolonged and multi-dimensional.  
The collapse of the Afghan state after the communist coup in 1978 and the Soviet invasion 
the following year made the country a major theatre of war in which local and foreign 
actors started their competition for influence and dominance. This chapter demonstrated 
that the conflict in Afghanistan is neither just a terrorist/extremist problem, nor a 
confrontation between different ethnic groups of the country. On the contrary, it is a 
combination of several overlapping factors including strategic, economic, religious, 
historical, proxy and criminal. For example, Pakistan allegedly supports the Afghan 
Taliban because it makes Islamabad an influential player in Afghanistan and reduces the 
influence of its arch-rival, India. Moreover, the Afghan Taliban want to get power in 
Afghanistan, expel foreign forces and enforce their interpretation of the Islamic law in the 
country. Although this “cooperation” prolongs the Afghan conflict, both the Afghan 
Taliban and Pakistan gain from this relationship as their interests overlap. For the Taliban, 
it is a question of religion (creed), nationalism (identity), power (greed), need and 
grievances. However, for Pakistan, it is a matter of gaining strategic influence in 
Afghanistan, having a friendly/client regime in Kabul and reducing the influence of its 
regional rivals. On the other hand, India and Iran supported the anti-Taliban Northern 
Alliance to expand their regional influence at the expense of their rivals especially Pakistan 
and Saudi Arabia. In addition, Afghanistan became the main theatre of the US led “war on 
terrorism” adding more regional and international actors including NATO, transnational 
jihadi groups and international criminal networks and mafia.  
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As demonstrated above, foreign interferences and invasions of the country resulted in the 
collapse of state institutions which created a perfect environment for the production of 
drugs. As seen in many other countries, drugs didn’t cause the conflict in Afghanistan; it 
was the conflict that resulted in a thriving drug industry. However, the illicit drug trade has 
made the conflict more complicated and intense as it brings drug traders, corrupt 
government officials and the insurgent together. Once again, there is an overlap if interests 
and motivations of different actors. Violence, instability and weak state institutions are 
beneficial for both the insurgents and drug traders. All these factors such as ideology, 
nationalism, proxy and criminal have a role in causing, enhancing, transforming and 






Funding the Insurgencies: The impact of illicit drugs on insurgent groups 
 
This chapter focuses on the impact of the drug trade on insurgent groups through a 
comparison of mainly three mini-cases – FARC in Columbia, PKK in Turkey and LTTE in 
Sri Lanka. The chapter argues that in the post WWII world, the link between “holy 
warriors” and criminal groups, especially drug smugglers, has become stronger. More than 
a hundred insurgent groups, mostly driven religious, nationalist or Marxist ideologies at the 
beginning, have somehow benefited financially from illicit drugs. The chapter also 
discusses the issue of profit versus ideology in the context of illicit drugs and examines the 
impact of narcotics business on the structure, strength, motivation and ideologies of 
insurgent groups. The chapter concludes by arguing that, at least in all the three cases 
discussed in detail here, the insurgencies were primarily driven by creed, the involvement 
of the insurgencies in the drugs trade came later, and the drugs trade did not hijack the 




 groups need money to sustain their armed struggle and expand the territories 
they control. They generally seek a reliable source of income as lack of sufficient funds 
can limit their scope and inhibit their prospects for success. These groups need a 
continuous flow of money to buy weapons and ammunition, pay salaries to their soldiers, 
buy medicines and provide health services such as treating injured colleagues, clothing, 
shelter, food and travelling. In recent decades, several insurgent groups have been 
allocating a significant amount of their financial resources to media and propaganda 
activities.  
In the absence of a friendly country or individual donors, several insurgent groups try to 
find money from a variety of other activities. In order to raise funds, they exploit several 
resources and resort to various activities including taxation, extortion, donations, 
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investments, robbery, arms smuggling, people smuggling, goods smuggling (contraband), 
kidnapping for ransom, blackmailing, money laundering, fake documents (including ID 
cards and passports), fake currency, credit card fraud, illegal mining, stealing and selling 
ancient artefacts, looting of natural resources and drug production and trafficking. In many 
parts of the world, the involvement of insurgent groups in illegal activities is becoming 
more common. In some cases, this involvement becomes so deep that the distinction 
between political insurgency and organised criminality becomes blurred. In other cases, 
ideological and political groups engaged in an armed struggle enter into an alliance of 
convenience with organised crime and even live in symbiosis with each other.  
For a number of insurgent groups, the drug trade comes at the top of this list as it usually 
involves a stable flow of than many other illegal activities. As the number of insurgent 
groups benefiting from the drug trade has grown in recent decades, especially after WW II, 
the transformation from “holy warrior” to drug smugglers has become a familiar theme in 
an increasingly globalising world. Dozens of insurgent groups worldwide have been 
involved directly or indirectly in the cultivation, manufacturing, distribution, taxation and 
sale of illicit drugs.
2
 The phenomenon has become more evident over the past three 
decades; hence the terms “narco-terrorism” and “narco-terrorists” are being used to 
describe the interface between “terrorist organisations” and narcotics smugglers.   
Contemporary “narco-terrorism” has its roots in the 1980s, when the FARC and other 
similar groups began using drugs to fund their insurgencies. The term “narco-terrorism” is 
attributed to former Peruvian President, Fernando Belaunde Terry (1912-2002), who first 
used it in 1982 to describe terrorist-type attacks against his nation’s counter-narcotics 
police by the Shining Path or SL (Sendero Luminoso) Marxist rebels. At the time, “narco-
terrorism” meant “the union of the vice of narcotics with the violence of terrorism.”3 The 
term became instantly popular and gained prominence in the news as well as political and 
government circles. Five years later, criminologist Grant Wardlaw called it a “catchword” 
and added that the term had become “so inflated and its meanings so many that it has little 
or no analytical value”.4 Writing in 1988, Wardlaw argued that: “‘Narcoterrorism’ has 
                                                          
2
 UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime), (2012). World Drug Report 2012. Vienna, pp. 84-85. 
Available online at: <http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-
analysis/WDR2012/WDR_2012_web_small.pdf> [Accessed 10 Aug 2013].  
3
 Thomas, John E. Jr., (2009). Narco-Terrorism: Could the Legislative and Prosecutorial Responses Threaten 
Our Civil Liberties? Washington and Lee Law Review, 66, (4): 1881-1920.  (Quote from pp.1885-1886).  
4
 Wardlaw, Grant, (1988). Linkages Between the Illegal Drugs Traffic and Terrorism. Conflict Quarterly, 
Summer 8, (3): 5-26. (Quote from pp. 6-7).  
115 
 
emerged as a potent weapon in the propaganda war waged by governments against 
terrorists, insurgents, organised crime, drug traffickers, and even other sovereign states.”5 
The literature on insurgent groups and their sources of funding is generally dominated by 
references to their involvement in the drug trade. Drugs are usually linked with insurgent 
groups and described as a main reason behind several armed conflicts. Ehrenfeld, in her 
books on the links between drugs and insurgencies, claims that insurgent groups use 
ideologies as a cloak for thriving criminal activity, especially the drug trade. She even 
implies that “terrorism” is a money making business while ideology is a tool for recruiting 
fighters who are used as cannon fodder.
6
 Writing about the “nexus between drugs and 
terrorism”, a number of other American writers also see a strong link between militancy 
and illicit drug trade. For example, Lee argues: “There is a direct connection between drug 
trafficking organisations and terrorism. Terrorist organisations have been funded for years 
by the profits of drug traffickers, and it is likely to continue in the future.”7  
American officials generally label any insurgent group that resorts to illicit drug proceeds 
for funding its campaign a “narco-terrorist” group. 8  The US government’s Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) believes that insurgent groups rely on drug traffickers 
“as a straightforward, easy source of income to finance their political agendas”, while drug 
traders “rely on the terrorists to provide protection for their laboratory and drug 
distribution endeavours. Through protection rackets, extortion, or ‘taxation’ of drug 
traffickers, terrorists receive the funds necessary to carry out their violent acts.”9  
 
3.1 Insurgency in the post-Cold War World 
The end of Cold War and the subsequent collapse of the bipolar system resulted in the 
decline of state sponsorship (proxy wars) for ideologically motivated insurgent groups.  
Many groups found it hard for insurgent groups to survive without international support in 
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terms of logistics, finance, arsenals and safe havens. With the demise of the bipolar 
confrontation, fighting a communist or non-communist regime no longer translated into 
financial support from a superpower or its allies and proxies.
10  
The decline of the 
superpower support meant a struggle for survival for many armed groups engaged in 
political violence. The loss of state support also caused a decline in the strength of 
revolutionary political ideologies in several groups such as the Khmer Rouge (Cambodia) 
and the US-backed and Moist oriented UNITA (The National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola).
11
 In some cases, the changed global geo-politics resulted in the 
weakening of their political goals as some groups moved from political and ideological 
struggle to one dominated by economic aims. After losing external material and strategic 
support, several groups resorted to find alternative sources of funding including 
involvement in organised crime. A number of them started benefiting from drugs by taxing 




The changing circumstances in the post-Cold War world brought new challenges which 
forced many insurgent and criminal groups to shift their operational focus. The new global 
political and economic scene also brought new opportunities and resulted in the growth of 
transnational organised crime. The existence of a number of failed and weak states and 
ungoverned spaces meant that both insurgent and criminal groups could operate easily. On 
the other hand, globalisation of communication technologies and transportation made it 
easier for them to expand their markets and maximise profits. While some insurgent groups 
focused on illegal activities to replace the financial support they received from state actors, 
several criminal groups engaged in political activities such as participating in and/or 
influencing local politics in an effort to manipulate operational conditions present in a 
numbers of weak states. This phenomenon resulted in widening of the concept of security 
of state and populations alike. These groups stared benefiting from technological 
advancements, financial and global market structures, diaspora communities worldwide, 
weak and failing states, and numerous geographical safe-havens. According to Makarenko, 
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security has become “a cauldron of traditional and emerging threats that interact with one 
another, and at times, converge.”13  
Although their backgrounds and goals are usually different, insurgent and organised 
criminal groups share many similar traits. According to Lee, both of them “plan, stage, and 
execute their crimes shrouded in secrecy. Both have cells established around the world to 
achieve their goals. They rely on compartmentalisation for operational security, and exhibit 
ingenious ways to smuggle co-conspirators, explosives, drugs, equipment, money, 
weapons, and other contraband long distances from one country to another.”14  
Thus the cooperation and alliance between criminal groups and insurgencies on hand posed 
a new challenge to the security of states at a national and international level, on the other, it 
started a lively debate in the academic circles. The post-Cold War scholarly discussions 
about the intersection and convergence of organised crime and insurgency resulted in the 
development of the “crime-terror nexus” model15 which is aimed at understanding this 
relationship and resolving the problems of both crime and conflict. The “crime-terror” or 
“crime-rebellion” nexus refers to the formation of alliances between criminal and 
insurgent/terrorist organisations that are originally espousing either criminal or political 
motivations. It involves the use of crime by insurgent groups as a source of funding such as 
involvement in the drug trade, diamonds smuggling, and people smuggling or engaging in 
credit card fraud.
16
 The “crime-rebellion nexus” was consolidated at a time when the two 
traditionally separate phenomena (crime and insurgency) began to reveal many operational 
and organisational similarities. In some cases, the relationship between certain insurgent 
and criminal groups has blurred the lines and ranges from partnership to transformation 
and even merger and convergence. 
Cooperation between insurgent and criminal groups usually helps both actors as they 
utilise each other’s capabilities to undertake political or criminal activities. A 2002 Library 
of Congress study of criminal and insurgent groups identified three broad patterns in which 
the nexus (association) of the two types of entities occur; (a) alliances for mutual benefit, 
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in which insurgents enter an arrangement with criminals solely to gain funding, without 
engaging directly in commercial activities or compromising their ideologically based 
mission; (b) direct involvement in which insurgent groups directly involves in organised 
crime by removing the “middleman” but maintaining the ideological premise of their 
strategy, and (c) replacement of ideology by profit as the main motive for operations.
17
  
According to Rosenthal, three main catalysts have the potential to transform a politically 
motivated group into one that is driven primarily by profit maximisation: (a) destruction of 
leadership structure, (b) political transformations that “debunk the ideological basis of the 
group” and (c) the opportunities for financial gains are so great that they subsume 
ideological motives.
18 Makarenko’s analytical construct of a security continuum, which 
places pure organised crime at one end of the spectrum and pure ideological groups at the 
other, shows the wide variety of possible interactions between criminal and political 
groups.
19
 In this continuum, there is a “grey area” between the two ideal types, with certain 
variations and combinations between them. As shown in the “crime-rebellion continuum” 
depicted below, the interactions between criminal and ideological groups can take place 
either through cooperation between criminal and ideological groups; or through the 
involvement of an ideological group in crime or vice versa. As seen in the case of some 
insurgent groups, involvement in criminal activities for purely financial reasons tends to 
affect the motivational structures of the originally ideological groups. In addition, profit 
through crime, including the drug trade, can become a motivation in its own right for the 





Figure 3.1: The Crime-Terror Continuum
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The United Wa State Army (UWSA) in Burma (Myanmar) appear to be affected by this 
phenomenon when the heroin industry became more important than nationalism for the 
group. According to Conrnell, UWSA and other Burmese groups have entered into the 
“convergence” position on the crime–terror continuum.22 In several parts of the world, 
there is an overlap of organised crime, drug trafficking organisations and insurgent groups. 
The symbiotic relationship allows all of them to profit financially at different stages of the 
trade. In some cases, the relationship and cooperation becomes a convergence and reaches 
a point when “a single entity simultaneously exhibits criminal and terrorist 
characteristics.”23 In such cases, an insurgent group or its members might remain devoted 
to their original cause and, at the same time, try to maintain a degree of instability and 
resist the state control so they can continue to make profits. It is mainly at this stage when 
the two types of groups become almost dependent on each other. On one hand, criminal 
groups becomes interested in influencing the political environment in a state; on the other 
hand, the insurgent groups create an environment conducive to the exploitation of 
opportunities provided by criminal activities.
24  
 
3.2 Insurgents’ Sources of Income 
In general, insurgents are very entrepreneurial. Insurgent groups acquire wealth and fund 
their activities through a variety of initiatives and sources. Their reliance on certain sources 
of income depends on the environment they operate in. Insurgent groups usually try to 
diversify their sources of income in order to avoid the risk of bankruptcy. Some groups 
become so rich that their income sometimes equals that of a state’s army. In November 
2014, Forbes ranked the 10 wealthiest militant groups. It placed the mainly Iraqi-Syrian 
group, Islamic State (IS, also known by the acronyms ISIS or ISIL) on top by calling it 
“the richest terrorist organisation” today and in history with an annual turnover of US$2 
billion. The Palestinian group, Hamas, was put in second place, with yearly revenues of $1 
billion. The FARC (Colombia) was ranked third with $600 million; Hezbollah (Lebanon) 
was fourth with $500 million; Afghan Taliban was fifth with $400 million; Al-Qaeda and 
its affiliates with $150 million; Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) with $100 million; 
Somalia’s Al-Shabaab with $100 million; Real IRA with $50 million; and, closing the top-
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ten list was the Nigerian group, Boko Haram, with $25 million annual revenue. According 
to the report, the sources of income for these groups ranged from raising money through 
charities, donations and, in some cases, government agencies to drug trafficking, robberies 
and extortion.
25
 The Islamic State (IS) group also took significant amount of money and 
large quantity of gold bullion from government banks in areas of Iraq it captured. In 
addition, oil has become one of the main sources of revenues for the group which controls 
big chunks of Iraq and Syria.  
The estimates about the revenues of these groups keep changing. In 2009, the operating 
budget of the Afghan Taliban was put somewhere between US$70 million and US$400 
million.
26
 A 2014 Washington Post report said that Hezbollah was working with between 
$200 million and $500 million while FARC had annual revenues of $80 million to $350 
million.
27
 Another report about Al-Qaeda’s finances concluded that the network was 
working with an annual $30 million operating budget at the time of the 9/11 attacks in 
2001, most of which was raised through donations.
28  
Illicit drug trade has been a major source of income for several insurgent groups in 
different parts of the world. Since 1945, over one hundred belligerent groups have been 
involved to some extent in the illicit drug trade.
29
 Although it is nearly impossible to know 
exactly how much money do they get from it, a consensus exist that drugs play a major 
role in funding many insurgent groups. The size of financial benefits that insurgent groups 
derive annually from participating in the drug trade ranges from hundreds of thousands to 
hundreds of millions of dollars. This issue is relevant for drug producing, drug transiting 
and drug consuming states in both developing and developed world.  
Governments and international organisations have been responding in different ways to 
break the nexus between drug cartels and militant groups. A number of international 
documents and treatise have been formulated to address this phenomenon. For example, 
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the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances (1988) recognises “the links between illicit traffic and other related organised 
criminal activities which undermine the legitimate economies and threaten the stability, 
security and sovereignty of States.”30 The UN International Narcotics Control Board’s 
(INCB) 1992 report points out that “illicit cultivation of narcotic plants and illicit 
trafficking in drugs continue to be a threat to the political, economic and social stability of 
several countries. Links appear to exist between illicit cultivation and drug trafficking and 
the activities of subversive organisations in some countries.”31 In addition, the 1993 INCB 
report draws attention to the connections between drug trade and insurgency, and also to 
the globalisation of drug smuggling.
32
 Similarly, the Vienna Declaration and Programme 
of Action (also known as VDPA) adopted at the World Conference on Human Rights (25 
June 1993) states that: 
The acts, methods and practices of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations as well as 
linkage in some countries to drug trafficking are activities aimed at the destruction of 
human rights, fundamental freedoms and democracy, threatening territorial integrity, 
security of states and destabilizing legitimately constituted Governments, and the 




At national level, a number of governments have taken strict measures to tackle illicit drug 
trade as part of their national security strategies. The US government has been at the 
forefront of the “War on Drugs”. American officials have been strong advocates of fighting 
against the drugs for a long time and argue that the “war on drugs” and the “war on 
terrorism” are linked and should be dealt with simultaneously. This assertion has become 
stronger in the US over the past two decades. On 5
th
 October 2001, just two days before the 
US-led invasion of Afghanistan, the Department of State identified 12 of 28 “Foreign 
Terrorist Organisations (FTO)” that traffic drugs for raising funds which included FARC 
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(Colombia), PKK (Turkey), LTTE (Sri Lanka) and Al-Qaeda.
34
 Three months after the 
9/11 attacks on New York and Washington, the US President, George W. Bush, while 
launching a new anti-drug use campaign, linked drugs with terrorism: “It is so important 
for Americans to know that the trafficking in drugs finances the work of terror, sustaining 
terrorists. Terrorists use drug profits to fund their cells to commit acts of murder. If you 
quit drugs, you join the fight against terror in America.”35  
In 2002, Rand Beers, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and 
Law Enforcement Affairs, and Francis Taylor, the US Department of State’s ambassador-
at-large for counterterrorism, told a US Senate Committee that “terrorist groups have 
looked increasingly at drug trafficking as a source of revenue”.36 According to the two 
officials, the involvement in drug trade also has a secondary strategic purpose: “Not only 
does it provide funds; it also furthers the strategic objectives of the terrorists. Some 
terrorist groups believe that they can weaken their enemies by flooding their societies with 
addictive drugs.”37 This is one of the reasons that some insurgents give their members and 
supporters in order to justify their involvement in the drug trade.  
Governments in drug consuming countries spend billions of dollars each year on drug 
related problems and deal with the negative effects of drug abuse and its cost to the society. 
A study from the University of Maryland estimated that for the year 2000, the cost of illicit 
drug abuse in the US -- such as lack of productivity, the cost of health, and the accidents, 
crime, and other drug related effects -- was more than 160 billion dollars. In addition, the 
budget for the “war on drugs” was another US$19.2 billion.38 Steven Casteel, the Assistant 
Administrator for Intelligence at the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), 
reported to the US Senate in 2003 that 14 of the 36 groups (39 percent) designated as 
Foreign Terrorist Organisations (FTO) on the US State Department’s list were involved in 
                                                          
34
 Lee, Gregory D., (2007). The Global Drug Trade and its Nexus to Terrorism; Chapter 11. In: Forest, James 
J. F. (editor), Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century: Combating the sources and 
facilitators. Connecticut: Greenwood, pp. 184-185.  
35
 Bush, George W., (2001). President Signs Drug-Free Communities Reauthorization Bill. Speech was aired 
on 14
th
 December, 2001. Transcript of Bush’s speech available at: 
<http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0112/14/se.01.html [Accessed  15 Nov 2014].  
36
 Beers, Rand and Francis X. Taylor, (2002). Narco-Terror: The Worldwide Connection Between Drugs and 
Terror. A hearing held by the US Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and 
Government Information, March 13. Available online at: <http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/inl/rls/rm/8743.htm> 
[Accessed  15 Nov 2014].  
37
 ibid.  
38
 Ehrenfeld, Rachel, (2002). Funding Terrorism: Sources and Methods. In: Gupta, Rajan and Perez, Mario R., 
Confronting Terrorism, Workshop held at Los Alamos National Laboratory, March 25-29, p. 394. Available 
online at: <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/lanl/funding_terror.pdf>; See full details of the workshop 
online at: <http://library.lanl.gov/ccw/ct2002/> [Accessed 13 Nov 2014].  
123 
 
drug trade and claimed that “the nexus between drugs and terrorism is perilously 
evident”.39  
The drug business increases physical capabilities of insurgent groups by bringing them 
money, weapons and increases their manpower. The term “narco-terrorism” is used for a 
number of ongoing conflicts around the world. It is applied in the context of the conflict in 
Afghanistan as it is suggested that the illicit drug trade in the country is “fuelling terrorism.” 
Speaking in early 2004, Antonio Maria Costa, the executive director of the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), warned of mounting evidence of drug money being 
used to finance criminal activities including “terrorism” and declared that “fighting drug 
trafficking equals fighting terrorism.”40     
Moreover, a number of other major armed groups have attracted attention of officials and 
scholars alike due to their sources of income which allegedly include drugs. They are 
Colombia’s Marxist rebel group, FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia), 
Colombia’s second largest leftist rebel group ELN (the National Liberation 
Army); Turkey’s Kurdish Marxist separatist group, PKK (Partya Kerkeren Kurdistan) and 
the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) of Sri Lanka. Several smaller groups are also accused of 
benefitting from the drugs economy. For examples, Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA); some 
Chechen rebel groups and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) which was 
established after the collapse of the Soviet Union in Farghana Valley has allegedly links 
with the smuggling of opiates from Afghanistan to Central Asian Republics. In addition, 
profits from the trafficking of cannabis and cocaine have reportedly been used by the Al-
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) while in Lebanon, Hezbullah has been accused of 
involvement in drug trafficking.
41
 Similarly, the ethnic secessionist armed group in 
Myanmar, the United Wa State Army (UWSA), and the Communist Party of Peru, 
commonly known as the Shining Path or SL (Sendero Luminoso), have been linked to the 
drug trade. The involvement of belligerent groups in illicit drugs is not confined to the 
Third World. In Europe, ETA (Basque Fatherland and Liberty) and the Irish Republican 
Army (IRA) have also been accused of benefitting from the international drug trade.  
The list of criminal groups involved in the drug trade is very long and goes into thousands. 
Therefore, details about their activities and the nature of their involvement in the drugs 
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economy are outside the scope of this study. However, following are a few separatist, 
political and ideological insurgent groups accused of having links with drugs.  
 
Militant Groups Country Description & Aims Involvement in Drugs 
FARC Colombia Oldest and most capable 
Marxist insurgency aiming 
to establish Marxism in the 
country. 
Taxing  cultivation, processing 
and trafficking of opiates 
Taliban Afghanistan/P
akistan 
Movement of mainly 
religious students aiming to 
establish an Islamic system 
in the country.  
Taxing  cultivation, processing 
and trafficking of opiates 
Hezbullah Lebanon  Anti-Israel Shia group with 
aims for the creation of 
Iranian-style Islamic 
republic  
Taxing and trafficking of 








group aims to create a state 
for ethnic Kurds 
Taxing processing and 
trafficking of opiates 
Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan (IMU) 
Central Asia  Islamic militants opposed to 
replace Uzbek President 
Karimov’s secular regime 
with an Islamic state 
Trafficking of opiates 
Tamil Tigers (LTTE)  Sri Lanka   The most powerful militant 
ethnic Tamil group in Sri 
Lanka until it was 
dismantled in 2009; aiming 
to create a Tamil state 
Taxing and trafficking 
Kachin Independence 
Organisation (KMT) 
Burma Separatist movement aiming 
to get independence for 
Kachin from Burma. 
Taxing and cultivation of 
opiates 
United Wa State Army Burma Separatist movement aiming 
to get independence and 
protect the rights of 
indigenous people. 
Taxing  cultivation, processing 
and trafficking of opiates 
MNLA (National 
Movement for the 
Liberation of Azawad) 
Mali Ethnic separatist movement 
in Mali aiming to establish a 
state for ethnic Azawads in 
northern Mali.  
Taxing and trafficking of 
cocaine and Marijuana 
ETA (Basque Fatherland 
and Liberty) 
Spain, France Established to create an 
independent Basque 





Somalia Al-Qaeda linked militant 
group aiming to establish 
Islamic state in Somalia 
Trafficking 
Jundallah, also known as 
People’s Resistance 




Iran/Pakistan Militant Sunni Islamic group 
targeting the Shia dominated 
Islamic Republic of Iran and 
fighting for equal rights for 
Sunni Muslims in Iran  
Trafficking 
Shining Path (Sendero 
Luminoso, SL)  
Peru Based on Maoist teachings, 
aims to destroy Peruvian 
institutions and build 
communist regime 
Taxing,  cultivation, 
processing and trafficking of 
opiates 
 
Table 3.1: Some insurgent/militant groups with alleged links to drug trade 
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Although each insurgent group and conflict has its unique characteristics and evolves in 
the context of its own peculiar environment, comparison helps to understand the issue in a 
broader context. Before analysing the impact of drug trade on the motivation and strength 
of insurgent groups, I have discussed, in the following pages, the emergence, evolution and 
transformation of three major contemporary insurgencies -- Colombia’s Marxist rebel 
group, FARC (The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia); Turkey’s Kurdish Marxist 
separatist group, PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party); and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka. Although the main focus of this study is on Afghanistan, I 
have chosen these three examples for the following reasons; a) They are insurgencies with 
defined ideologies and clear political objectives. b) The strength of these three insurgencies 
is comparable with the Afghan Taliban. c) As they come from different parts of the word, 
it will help in understanding the issue in a broader context. d) They have links with drugs 
trade. e) They have many organisations and operational similarities with the Taliban 
insurgency in Afghanistan.  
 
3.3 Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)  
PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, or Kurdistan Workers’ Party) was founded on 27 
November 1978 at the end of a six day congress in Fis, Turkey, to advocate independence 
for the ethnic Kurds and the establishment of Kurdistan -- Land of the Kurds. The 
foundation congress, attended by the 22 delegates, elected Abdullah Öcalan -- one of seven 
children of a poor farming family -- the General Secretary of the group and produced the 
PKK’s first Central Committee.42 The following year, Öcalan fled Turkey for Syria and 
continued his struggle from exile.  
The Kurds are a non-Arabic and largely Sunni Muslim people who speak a language 
related to Persian. They live in a mountainous area straddling the borders of Armenia, Iran, 
Iraq, Syria and Turkey. Majority of Kurds live in Turkey where they are thought to make 
up around 20% of the country’s population.43 The number of Kurds in Turkey ranges from 
12 million to over 20 million.
44
 Kurd nationalists generally complain of the harsh treatment 
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they received at the hands of the Turkish government which tried to deprive them of their 
Kurdish identity. The Turkish government have used several tactics including designating 
the Kurds “Mountain Turks” and outlawing their language in educational and official 
institutions. The Turkish government also encouraged the migration of Kurds to the cities 
to dilute the population in the uplands.  
Since the launch of the PKK, Öcalan has led a robust campaign of recruiting thousands of 
young Kurds, especially those who were poor and felt that the Turkish state was repressing 
their culture and language. The PKK launched its armed struggle against the Turkish state 
in 1984 by carrying out a large scale attack on the Turkish army. Turkish officials called 
the offensive on 15 August, 1984 as the work of a “bunch of bandits” and started a 
counter-insurgency operation against the PKK guerrillas. Kurds had been engaged in a 
number of short lived armed rebellions since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 
1923. The PKK’s armed struggle against the Turkish Republic is considered to be the ‘29th 
Revolt’ of the Kurds, which the Turkish officials promised to smash within weeks or 
months just like the previous rebellions. Kurds had been quite for more than three decades 
since ‘the 28th revolt’, which took place in Dersim province in 1937 and 1938 but was 
suppressed in less than six months -- the longest one to date.
45
  
However, PKK’s 1984 revolt which disrupted a relatively longer period of uninterrupted 
peace was different in many ways. It started the longest and most destructive war with 
political and social ramifications extending far beyond Kurdish and Turkish territories and 
involved neighbouring countries such as Syria, Iraq, and Iran. PKK had the alleged support 
of the Syrian government and had established bases across the border in Iraq, for years. 
The PKK insurgency has dragged on for decades costing tens of thousands of lives and 
displacing millions of people, mainly in the north-eastern Turkey.
46
Meanwhile, the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party, the PKK, waging a guerrilla insurgency in south-eastern Turkey, 
has rejected the Iraqi Kurds’ decision to seek local self-government within a federal Iraq. 
The PKK believes any independent Kurdish state should be a homeland for all Kurds.
47
 
In 1999, the PKK’s leader, Abdullah Öcalan, was arrested and jailed in Turkey for treason. 
It was a major blow for the group. The PKK agreed to enter into talks with the Turkish 
government and a fragile ceasefire came into effect. In exchange, the Turkish government 
                                                          
45
 Ibid. p. 73.  
46
 Barkey, Henri J. and Fuller, Graham E., (1998). Turkey’s Kurdish Question. Maryland: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers. 
47
 Bilgin, Fevzi and Sarihan, Ali (editors), (2013). Understanding Turkey’s Kurdish Question. Plymoth: 
Lexington Books; Aydin, Aysegul and Emrence, Cem, (2015). Zones of Rebellion: Kurdish Insurgents and 
the Turkish State. Cornell: Cornell University Press. Özcan, Ali Kemal, (2006). Turkey’s Kurds, Op.cit. 
127 
 
made several concessions to Kurdish areas including relaxing the use of Kurdish language 
in education and media. Despite the ceasefire agreement, frictions continue with both sides 
occasionally breaching the ceasefire by carrying out attacks in which dozens people have 
been killed.
48
   
In April 2002, at its 8
th
 Party Congress, the PKK changed its name to Kurdistan Freedom 
and Democracy Congress (KADEK) and proclaimed that it was committed to non-violent 
activities for achieving Kurdish rights. In late 2003, the group named itself as Kongra-Gel 
(KGK) in an effort to improve its image and promote itself as a “peaceful” group. However, 
it carried out attacks in what it called in “self-defence” and refused disarmament. Although 
the name changes were part of its effort to widen its appeal, eventually the group decided it 
wanted to be known as the PKK.
49
 
The number of PKK’s active and full time fighters changed over time. A 2011 ICG report 
estimated the PKK had 3,000-5,000 insurgents, mostly Turkish Kurd, based in northern 
Iraq and in Turkey’s Kurdish areas. In addition, the group has substantial minority support 
among Turkish Kurds.
50
 The PKK is banned as a terrorist and drug-smuggling organisation 
by Turkey, the EU, the U.S. and a number of other countries. In May 2002, the EU also 
designated the organisation a terrorist group.
51
  
3.3.1 PKK’s Drug Links 
Turkey is a major transhipment point and a main transit route for opiates moving towards 
Europe and “serves as a staging area for major drug traffickers and brokers”.52 According 
to the US officials, some heroin and opium is also smuggled to the US from Turkey. Drugs 
are generally smuggled overland from Afghanistan and Pakistan to Iran and then to Turkey. 
Opiates and hashish are also smuggled to Turkey overland from Afghanistan via 
Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. US government sources suggest that some 
processing of opium and morphine base from Afghanistan is occurring in laboratories on 
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both sides of the Turkey-Iran border. From Turkey, the drugs are then smuggled along the 
Balkan Route. Some traffickers use a more northern route: through Georgia, Russia, and 
Ukraine. In addition, traffickers utilize Roll-on, Roll-off (RORO) ferries to move long-haul 
and Customs-sealed TIR
53
 trucks with drugs concealed in hidden compartments or within 
legitimate cargo. After arriving from Turkey to Italy, these trucks are then driven to other 
European countries.
54
 However, it is mainly the crime syndicates in Eastern Europe and the 
Balkans that have grown rich on the traffic of drugs through Turkey.
55
 
PKK has been accused of financing its military and political activities through blackmail 
schemes, involvement in drug trafficking, gunrunning and human smuggling and tax 
collection efforts that are linked to transnational criminal enterprises in the region.
56
 PKK 
fighters are mainly based in Turkey-Iraq-Iran-Syria border regions from where a 
significant amount of drugs are smuggled through. It is in these border areas where, 
according to Eccarius-Kelly, “alongside the truckers, weapons smugglers and drug 
traffickers pay so called ‘transfer taxes’ or ‘customs fees’ to local representatives as they 
pass through territory under their control.”57  
Turkey’s government has long provided evidence of the PKK’s involvement in the drug 
trade between Turkey and Europe. In addition, many researchers have identified linkages 
between the PKK and drug cartels.
58
 Conrnell has called the PKK as one of “the best 
known rebel groups to have financed their activities through the heroin trade”.59 Dozens of 
peoples have been arrested in different European countries including France, Germany and 
Belgium who were accused of drug trafficking and financing the PKK. In its 2011 report, 
the International Crisis Group (ICG) called the PKK’s fundraising methods “dubious” and 
added that the opacity of its financial dealings prompted the US authorities to put the group 
and some of its top leaders on the US drug-trafficking watch lists.
60
 While calling Turkey 
“a significant drug conduit”, West says drug smuggling in the remote Turkish border 
regions is “fairly established” and that the “terrorists finance their organisations through 
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heroin trafficking.”61 According to Evans, the PKK has been “a major participant” in the 
drug trade and “runs its own processing laboratories and trafficking arrangements.”62 The 
Marxist-Leninist PKK is also accused of not only smuggling heroin in areas between the 
Caspian and Black Sea but also of manufacturing heroin in Azerbaijan.
63
 
The US has been accusing the PKK or Kongra-Gel of participation in drug trafficking for 
decades arguing that “drug trade is one of the Kongra-Gel’s most lucrative criminal 
activities”.64  According to US officials, the PKK is involved in running drug labs in 
Turkey and has military units in the border areas it controls to collect money from drug 
traffickers. The US government says that the PKK “uses its network across Europe to 
produce, transport, and traffic opiates and cannabis.”65 The US government’s figures show 
that nearly three hundred individuals connected to Kongra-Gel or PKK were arrested on 




In May 2008, the US listed the PKK in its Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act 
(Kingpin Act) for “using its European network to produce, transport, and traffic opiates 
and cannabis” and called it a “significant foreign narcotics trafficker”.67 While announcing 
the move, President George W. Bush imposed financial sanctions on the PKK denying it 
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 October 2009, the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets 
Control (OFAC) targeted three senior leaders of PKK/Kongra-Gel, designating them as 
“significant foreign narcotics traffickers” under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation 
Act (Kingpin Act).
69
  On 20
th
 April, 2011, the Department of the Treasury announced the 
designation of five more PKK leaders including two of the PKK founders and three other 
high-ranking members as “Specially Designated Narcotics Traffickers” (SDNT) pursuant 
to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (Kingpin Act). Justifying the move, 
David S. Cohen, Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, said that the US 
was “striking at the heart of Kongra Gel with this action against its founders, key leaders 
and sources of funding”.70  
On 2
nd
 January 2012, the US Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control 
(OFAC) declared three Europe based individuals; all identified as the PKK activists, as 
Specially Designated Narcotics Traffickers (SDNTs) “for acting for or on behalf of the 
PKK”. It also ordered the freezing of their assets under the US jurisdiction and prohibiting 
US persons from conducting financial or commercial transactions with the designees. It 
was the first designation under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (Kingpin 
Act) of entities that are owned or controlled by individuals acting for the PKK in Europe. 
The US authorities identified one of them as a “high ranking member of the PKK, and a 
member of a Romania-based drug trafficking organisation utilizing import and export 
companies for illicit activities across Europe”.71  According to the US State Department, 
PKK uses Europe for fundraising and conducting political propaganda.
72  
Moreover, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) listed PKK as a well-
known example of an “illegal” armed group using “income from the heroin trade to finance 
illegal armed activities in Turkey”.73 According to UNODC, these groups may sell on 
these drugs in Turkey or traffic them to Europe through their own networks.
74
 Citing 
NATO intelligence analysts, UNODC said in its 2010 report entitled as The Globalization 
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of Crime that “PKK pockets upwards of US$50 million to US$100 million annually from 
heroin trafficking alone.”75 The Report also points to the arrest of several PKK members in 
Europe in 2008 on heroin trafficking charges as a further demonstration of the group’s 
involvement in the drug trade.
76
  
Like other militant groups, the PKK needs millions of dollars annually to buy weapons and 
cover other costs such as logistics and communication. Although, there is a lack of reliable 
information about the PKK finances, estimates show a big fluctuation in its revenues. 
Different estimates have put the PKK annual income from US$50-800. It is also difficult to 
say how much of the PKK’s revenues come from the drug trade. In early 1990s, it was 
suggested that the group received most of its money from drug related activities. In 1993, 
the British National Service of Criminal Intelligence estimated that “PKK obtained 2.6 
million pounds sterling from extortion and 56 million German marks from drug 
smuggling.”77 During the 1990s, it was estimated that the group’s annual income was 
US$200-500 million annually. However, during early 2000s, its revenues decreased to 




Syria apparently cut its ties with the PKK in 1998 after Turkey threatened to invade what 
was then the group’s primary sanctuary inside Syrian territory. On 20th October 1998, the 
governments of Turkey and Syria signed the “Adana agreement” in which Damascus 
agreed to recognise the PKK as a terrorist organisation, cease all aid to the group and to 
deport its leader Abdullah Öcalan from Syria. In 2002, Iran also recognised the PKK as a 
terrorist organisation in exchange for Turkey doing the same for the Iranian rebel group 
Mujahideen-e-Khalq based in Iraq.  
Faced with increasing hostility in the region, the PKK diversified its sources of funding 
including money from “the Kurdish diaspora in Europe and revenue derived from drug 
trafficking”.79  According to Radu, in 2001, the PKK’s annual income from “criminal 
activities” was estimated at US$86 million.80 The 2007 NATO Terrorist Threat Intelligence 
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Unit report puts the PKK’s annual revenues at US$50-100 million.81 On the other hand, 
Turkish officials usually say that the PKK earns hundreds of millions of dollar each year 
from illegal activities including illicit drugs. In March 2008, the deputy chief of the 
Turkish General Staff put the PKK’s annual income at 400-500 million euros (around 
US$600-750 million) obtained mainly from four sources such as “drug dealing, human 
trafficking, smuggling and donations.” According to the same official, the PKK received 
most of its revenues from drugs (€200-250 million), followed by various smuggling 
activities (€100-150 million) and donations (€15-20 million).82  
There is a sizeable Kurdish diaspora in Western Europe, particularly in Germany, the 
Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) and Scandinavia. They are 
considered an important and stable source of income for the PKK. It is also reported that 
the PKK activists extorts money from Kurdish businessmen and professionals residing in 
Western countries. Anecdotal evidence from several European countries suggests that the 
diaspora funding is more voluntary; however, some of it is reportedly received through 
coercion and threats of violence. Personal friendships and clan connections also play an 
important role in fund raising. Even after the arrest of the PKK’s leader, Abdullah Öcalan, 
in 1999, the German authorities estimated that the diaspora funding from Germany alone 
was US$9 million in 2001.
83
 
The PKK denies any involvement in the illicit drug trade insisting that these allegations are 
part of propaganda aimed at distorting its image. Given its geographical location, there are 
many incentives and opportunities for the PKK to exploit the drug trade for their own 
benefits. However, there seems to be an element of exaggeration in the amount of money 
the groups might be pocketing from the drug trade.
84
 According to Galeotti, the PKK 
members “have traded in drugs to fuel their operations. In practice, the PPK has largely 
managed to avoid losing its political identity and is not so much directly involved in the 
trade as in charging rent to gangs for the use of PKK-held territory on which to grow 
opium, operate site-processing facilities, or transport drugs.”85 In addition, the group’s 
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strategy and main characteristics are in contrast with those of criminal groups that 
generally focus on profits and personal enrichment and keep a low profile. The PKK does 
not seem to be mainly motivated by getting money through criminal activities and its links 











Figure 3.3: Map showing Kurdish population density in four countries (Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran)
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3.4 The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 
Established in 1966 as the military wing of the Colombian Communist Party, the FARC 
(Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia or The Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia) is one of the world’s most tenacious armed groups. It is Colombia’s oldest, 
largest, most capable, and best-equipped left-wing insurgency engaged in the longest-
running war in the Western Hemisphere. Since its inception, the FARC maintained close 
ties with the Communist party of Colombia, which was traditionally pro-Soviet Union.
89
 
The FARC has been operating in areas of coca and opium poppy cultivation and claims to 
represent the rural poor in a struggle against Colombia’s rich and powerful. The group 
places land reform, local governance and military reform high on its political agenda.
90
 
Initially, the organisation consisted of those liberals who took up arms to defend 
themselves from members of the rival Conservative Party and the local police forces. The 
FARC leader, Manuel Marulanda Vélez, better known as Tirofijo (“Sureshot”), came from 
a peasant family and, like many liberal and leftist peasants, rose up in arms during La 
Violencia (The Violence) -- the roughly ten-year (1948–58) period of civil war in 
Colombia between the Colombian Conservative party and the Colombian Liberal Party 
which had more supporters in the rural areas. La Violencia began after the assassination of 
the Liberal Party’s leader and presidential candidate, Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, in 1948.91  
The violence associated with FARC or against it has claimed thousands of lives over the 
past six decades. The Marxist-Leninist-inspired FARC is, therefore, labelled as a terrorist 
organisation by many countries. The group is listed on the US State Department list of 
terrorist groups and, since 2002; the European Union also listed it as a terrorist 
organisation. Its main sources of income include taxes on drug production and trafficking, 
cattle stealing, extortion and kidnappings.
92
 However, in February 2012, the FARC 
leadership pledged to renounce kidnapping altogether. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
  
89
 Chernick, Marc, (1999). Negotiating Peace Amid Multiple Forms of Violence. In: Arson, Cynthia J. 
(editor), Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America.  Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, p. 
197.  
90
 IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies), (1997). Colombia’s Escalating Violence: Crime, 
Conflict and Politics. Strategic Comments, 3, (4), May. London. [Online]. 
<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1356788970343> [Accessed 22 March 2013].  
91
 Leech, Garry, (2011). The FARC: The Longest Insurgency. New York: Zed Books; Spencer, David E., et al, 
(2011). Colombia’s Road to Recovery: Security and Governance 1982-2010. Washington DC.: National 
Defense University. Available online at: 
<https://digitalndulibrary.ndu.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/chdspubs/id/18234/rec/4> [Accessed 21 
March 2013]. 
92




In its early stages, the FARC guerrillas were active in a small area of the country. Their 
main concern was how to survival in the face of a determined effort by the Colombian 
army to eliminate them. At the time, the group was mainly engaged in ambushes of 
military units in order to capture military equipment and raided farms to secure food and 
supplies. The guerrillas were also conducting raids to capture hostages for ransom and to 
punish government informers and spies. However, from the 1960s onwards, the group 
slowly expanded and opened new guerrilla fronts in areas where they had no or little 
activity such as Magdalena valley and the Urabá area, in the Darien gap between Panama 
and Colombia.  In 1980s, the FARC saw a rapid expansion and established several new 
fronts. The aim was to have at least one front for each of Colombia’s fifty-odd 
departments.
93
   
The estimates about the number of FARC fronts and manpower vary greatly. According to 
Rabasa and Chalk, the FARC grew from 350 fighters at its founding in mid-1960 to 
approximately 3600 in 32 fronts in 1986; 7000 in 60 fronts in 1995; and 15,000–20,000 in 
over 70 fronts in 2000
94
. Although FARC’s major presence is along the agrarian frontier in 
the eastern plains and jungles, its members operated in more than half of the country’s 
municipalities.  In 1985, a Colombian government report, which was based on police and 
military data, concluded that there was some type of guerrilla activity in 173 municipalities 
of a total of 1,005 municipalities, or in 17.2 percent of all municipalities. By 1995, the 




Although FARC suffered heavy losses in the first decade of the 21
st
 century at the hands of 
US backed Colombian government, it still recruits “among the most marginal sectors 
where the guerrillas represent a lifestyle as well as one of the few sources of 
employment.”96 FARC’s insurgents are well trained and well-armed and generally highly 
motivated. A New York Times article in October 2012 said that FARC had “an estimated 
9,000 fighters, down from about 17,000 in the 1990s”97.  
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The 1980s was an important decade in the history of FARC in which it saw an 
unprecedented expansion and started exploiting natural resources and primary 
commodities. By taking advantage of a ceasefire with the government of President 
Belisario Betancur (1984-1987), the group expanded in many resource-rich areas (cattle in 
the eastern plains, commercial agriculture in Urabá and Santander, oil in the middle 
Magdalena valley, and gold in Antioquia).
98
 The FARC’s expansionist strategy brought 
new sources of income. In addition to money derived from natural resources and primary 
commodities, it also earned money from smuggling in the border regions. More 




3.4.1 FARC’s Relationship with Drugs  
A number of reports and publications, both governmental and non-governmental, have 
documented that drugs are an integral part of the Colombian conflict. Although FARC 
receive a significant portion of its funding from the drug trade, the group’s initial 
involvement in illicit drugs was unplanned and unintentional. In the 1980s, the Marxist 
group discovered the coca profits when it expanded its operations in areas rich in resources 
such as cattle (eastern plains), oil (the middle Magdalena valley), gold (Antioquia) and 
commercial agriculture (Urabá and Santander). Meanwhile, the guerrillas established new 
fronts in the departments of Caquetá and Meta, which became the main source of the 
country’s coca crop. When the regional drug traffickers, protected by paramilitaries, 
moved into the coca cultivating areas, drug production became the dominant economic 
activity in several parts of the country.
100
 FARC’s arrival in such drug producing regions 
coincided with poverty. At the time, farmers were generally poor due to crop failures and 
drought which also resulted in the death of a big number of cattle. Compared with other 
traditional licit crops, the coca plant brought poor peasants more money. By the time the 
FARC entered drug producing regions, at least 300,000 people were directly dependent on 
the coca economy for basic subsistence.
101
  
As the FARC considered drugs counter-revolutionary and, initially, forbade the cultivation 
of coca and marijuana in areas under it controlled. However, the FARC’s anti-drug policy 
was not popular with many local people whose livelihood largely depended on coca 
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cultivation. FARC was also reluctant to embrace the drug economy as a lot of other 
Colombians, especially those residing in drug free regions, opposed the cultivation of coca 
and turning Colombia into a major drug producing country.
102
 The founding fathers of 
FARC faced a dilemma as they found themselves in an uncharted territory. On one hand, 
supporting the drug trade was against the founding principles of the insurgency, on the 
other; there was a question of public support and image and reputation. The decision was 
bound to have enormous implication for the future of not only the FARC and Colombia but 
the entire region. Finally, social pressure, lack of other economic opportunities as well as 
the fear of losing agricultural migrants, FARC’s main social base, to its political enemies 
forced the group to change its attitude towards drug trade. From 1981 onwards, the 
guerillas not only tolerated coca cultivation but also began promoting and protecting the 
coca crop themselves; thus assuming effective control of the coca economy.
 103
      
Using its previous experience of exploiting natural resources, the FARC quickly learnt 
how to maximise the drug profits. It laid out a policy of taxing the drug industry and 
formulated mechanism to regulate the drug market. The group recruited people in the 
lower end of the drug business and started with taxing the cultivation of coca. Then they 
expanded the tax system to include drug traders and traffickers. More money started 
flowing in exchange for providing protection to the narcos who owned coca-paste and ran 
cocaine labs. After the FARC consolidated its control in several parts of the country, it also 




It is estimated that FARC’s overall annual income is hundreds of millions of dollars.105 
FARC’s drugs revenues, as reported in various reports, vary from US$100 million to 
US$800 million annually. In 1994, the Colombian government estimated the annual 
income of FARC and ELN (revenues on investments and income flows from different 
sources  such as kidnapping for ransom, investments in gold and coal mines, extortion, 
diversion of states’ funds, investments in public transportation, war tax, tax on coca and 
poppy paste and gramaje tax) at US$600 million. FARC’s share was more than half of the 
total estimate. In addition, a balance sheet prepared for the Colombian government in the 
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same year concluded that the two guerrilla groups (FARC and ELN) spent about US$65 
million of the total US$600 million they received per year. This meant that their profits 
totalled US$535 million during that year alone.
106
   
In 1996, some intelligence sources placed the total revenues for the two guerrilla groups as 
high as US$800 million.
107  
A 1997 report by the London based security think tank, 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), estimated that the total annual income of 
the Colombia’s guerrillas was US$800 million. By contrast, the country’s defence budget 
was about US$1.4 billion that year.
108
 According to the IISS report, FARC derived around 
$140m annually from drugs while the rest of the money came from extortion, kidnapping 
and embezzlement, as well as legal investments.
109 
A 2000 study by the Colombian police 
puts the monthly income of FARC and the right-wing group, AUC (United Self-Defence 
Forces of Colombia),
110
  at US$105 million; meaning more than US$1.2 billion per year.
111  
A study conducted in 2005, estimated FARC’s annual income from taxing the illicit drug 
economy to be fluctuating between US$60 and US$100 million per year.
112
 According to 
another study in the same year, the drug profits represent at least 50 percent of the overall 
income for the FARC and around 20 percent
113
 for the other Colombian leftist guerrilla 
movement, the ELN (the National Liberation Army).
114
 However, as the 2005 International 
Crisis Group’s (ICG) report says “most calculations of FARC income are overstated” and 
don’t match the amount of drugs produced in the country and their prices.115 A number of 
studies about the drug revenues of Colombia’s anti-government armed groups are based on 
data which relies mainly on Colombian military sources. There is a huge gap between 
different estimates about FARC’s revenues from the drug trade. The clandestine nature of 
the drug economy makes it hard to find out the exact amount of money the guerrillas get 
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from the drug trade. Therefore, we don’t have any other option but to rely upon the 
existing literature. According to International Crisis Group (ICG), the FARC receives a 
maximum of $100 million a year from the drug trade.
116
 However, even if it is $US100 
million a year; this is still a large amount of money to sustain an insurgent group. It is 
estimated that the cost of maintaining an armed fighter is US$3 a day while a force the size 
of the FARC could be maintained for roughly $20 million per year.
117
 It is worth noting 
that despite benefitting financially from the drug trade, the FARC did not publicly endorse 
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3.5 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)  
Commonly known as the Tamil Tigers, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was 
formed in 1976 as a reaction to the growth of assertive Sinhala nationalism in Sri Lanka 
after its independence from Britain in 1948.
119
 Based mainly in the ethnic Tamil dominated 
northern Sri Lanka, LTTE was a separatist militant group founded by the revolutionary 
socialist, Velupillai Prabhakaran (1954-2009). The formation of LTTE was part of the 
Tamil struggle for self-determination and the creation of an independent state for Tamil 
people in the north and east of Sri Lanka which was described by the Tamil separatists as 
“the historical homeland of the Tamil-speaking people.”120  
LTTE emerged as a result of ethnic divisions between mainly Hindu Tamil minority and 
Buddhist Sinhala majority. Polarisation further widened between the two communities 
when Sri Lanka changed its name from Ceylon in 1976 and Buddhism was given primary 
place as the country’s religion. Against a background of perceived and real deprivation and 
grievances, LTTE emerged championing the cause of self-rule for what it called the “Tamil 
Eelam” nation.121 The political campaign for the rights of Tamil evolved into a civil war in 
Sri Lanka in 1983.
122
  
At the height of its power, the LTTE possessed a well-developed army and was the only 
insurgent organisation in the world with its own army, navy (known as Sea Tigers with 
having speedboats, fishing vessels, mini-subs of indigenous construction, and underwater 
demolition teams) and even a rudimentary air force (Air Tigers).
123
 The quarter-century 
war claimed the lives of more than 70,000 people on both sides of the conflict.
124
 In 1997, 
the United States proscribed the LTTE as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO) and 
demanded the organisation to foreswear the use of force. According to the US State 
Department’s Counterterrorism Office: 
 “LTTE has integrated a battlefield insurgent strategy with a terrorist program that targets 
key personnel in the countryside and senior Sri Lankan political and military leaders in 
Colombo and other urban centers. It also has conducted a sustained campaign targeting 
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rival Tamil groups and figures... The LTTE is most notorious for its cadre of suicide 
bombers, the Black Tigers.”125  
The US
 
Federal Bureau of investigation (FBI) described LTTE as one of “the most 
dangerous and deadly extremists in the world” whose “ruthless tactics have inspired 
terrorist networks worldwide”. FBI also called LTTE as the group that “perfected the use 
of suicide bombers, invented the suicide belt, pioneered the use of women in suicide 
attacks” and “assassinated two world leaders—the only terrorist organisation to do so.”126 
The former Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi assassinated by a suspected female LTTE 
suicide bomber in 1991 while he was campaigning for a parliamentary candidate of his 
Congress Party in India’s Tamil Nadu state. 127  Sri Lankan President, Ranasinghe 
Premadasa, was killed by an LTTE suicide bomber in 1993 during a May Day political 
rally in the Sri Lankan capital, Colombo. In addition, the group carried out many other 
high-profile attacks, including the assassinations of several high-ranking politicians and 
officials in Sri Lanka and India. Due to its violence and war tactics, LTTE was designated 
as a terrorist organisation by more than 30 countries. The European Union designated the 
LTTE as a terrorist organisation in 2006. Although, these measures had a negative impact 
on the collection of funds from members and supporters in Western countries, LTTE 
continued to receive huge sums of money from the Tamil diaspora.  
The LTTE was organised along a two-tier structure – military and a subordinate political 
wing -- both of which were overseen by a Central Governing Committee headed by the 
LTTE supreme leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran. The military wing was reminiscent of many 
professional armies and included several specific subdivisions headed by leaders who were 
expert in that particular field. The subdivisions included, (a) an amphibious group (the Sea 
Tigers), (b) an airborne group (known as the Air Tigers), (c) a suicide commando unit (the 
Black Tigers), (d) an elite fighting wing (known as the Charles Anthony Regiment), and (e) 
a highly secretive intelligence group.
128
  
LTTE continued until 2009 when the group was defeated and all the areas it controlled 
were seized by the Sri Lankan military. The group’s founder and leader, Velupillai 
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Prabhakaran, was also killed in the 2009 military offensive. This was considered the end of 
the Tamil Tigers. However, the group is said to be still active in a different way. In its 
2013 report on “Foreign Terrorist Organisations (FTO)”, the US State Department says 
that despite its military defeat in 2009, “the LTTE’s international network of sympathizers 
and financial support persists”.129 
3.5.1 LTTE’s Sources of Funding 
LTTE’s major external activities included fundraising, publicity and propaganda, and arms 
procurement and shipping. As a multi-facetted organisation, the group was allegedly 
funded by donations, extortion (mainly from the Tamil diaspora in the USA, Canada, 
Norway, UK, Western Europe and Australia and Tamils in Sri Lanka), people smuggling, 
documents forgery, gunrunning, drug trafficking, money laundering, sea piracy, 
contraband trade and innumerable business ventures.
130 
 LTTE’s sophisticated and diverse 
system of funding and access to financial resources helped it to prolong its political and 
military campaign. According to Solomon and Tan, although it was based in the north and 
east of Sri Lanka, the ethnic separatist organisation fulfilled its financial and procurement 
needs abroad through “a complex global network of professional managers and outsourced 
people who acquire[d] money and guns in countries with significant Tamil diaspora 
communities”.131 
LTTE used its funds on a number of causes including logistics and purchasing of weapons 
and equipment, providing medical care for fighters injured on the battlefields, assisting 
families of seriously injured fighters who cannot earn a living anymore as well as families 
of those members who were killed in action. A substantial amount was also dedicated to 
propaganda activities both inside Sri Lanka and abroad to portray a better image of the 
group and to attract more supporters and members.  
3.5.2 LTTE and the Drug Trade 
Compared with Afghanistan, Colombia and Turkey; Sri Lanka has a lesser drug problem. 
The Indian Ocean country is not a significant producer of narcotics or precursor chemicals 
but, according to US government reports, it plays a minor role as a trans-shipment route for 
heroin from India. Recently, a surge is noted in domestic consumption, consisting of heroin, 
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cannabis, and to a lesser extent, Ecstasy.
132
 The increasing demand for heroin in Sri Lanka 
was partly due to the expanding tourism industry which “induced the smugglers to 
establish contact with suppliers as far a-field as Pakistan and metropolitan Mumbai 
(Bombay), and with delivery destinations as far south as Colombo.”133  
LTTE’s strategic geographical location with access to sea routes and ports including the 
notorious port of northern peninsula, Velvettihurai (better known as VVT), put it in a 
highly advantageous position to smuggle illegal goods around the world, especially 
munitions. Many of these weapons smuggling routes pass either directly through or very 
close to major drug producing and transit countries.
134
 Due to LTTE’s proximity to 
“Golden Triangle” (one of Asia’s two main opium producing areas that envelops the 
mountains of three countries of mainland South East Asia -- Myanmar, Laos and Thailand) 
and “Golden Crescent” (encompassing three nations -- Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan) as 
well as its expertise and highly developed international and regional network, it was 
tempting to get involved in the lucrative drug trade which was already established in the 
region.  
The nature and extent of LTTE’s involvement in the drug trade has received very little 
attention from both the media and academia. However, some sources point to the 
involvement of LTTE’s members and supporters in the illicit drug trade. LTTE’s links with 
the illicit drug trade have been described as “unorthodox ones” as the group was said to be 
“the service providers” to drug traders “in the form of LTTE-affiliated drug couriers on air 
flights.” 135  Force has described LTTE’s “partnerships with Pakistani heroin 
producers/traffickers” as one of the group’s “numerous trans-national criminal activities” 
to raise funds for their insurgent activities.
136
 Writing in the context of Canada, home to the 
largest Tamil diaspora, Stewart Bell concludes in his book that LTTE used “every 
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conceivable tactic” including drugs to raise funds for their cause.137 A Stanford University 
study also puts drug trafficking as a source of LTTE’s funding.138   
The October 2001 US Department of State’s report on “Foreign Terrorist Organizations” 
(FTOs) linked the LTTE with drug trade and accused its members of acting as drug 
couriers, primarily for Pakistani hashish.
139
 Another US official report, The Worldwide 
Connection Between Drugs and Terror, in March 2002, also linked LTTE with illicit drug 
trafficking.
140
 In addition, according to a 2002 Library of Congress report, LTTE’s 
individual members and sympathisers worldwide traffic drugs, principally heroin, to raise 
money for their cause. The group was also accused of having close ties with drug-
trafficking networks in Burma (Myanmar).
141
 The 2007 Jane’s Intelligence Review says 
that LTTE’s activities in foreign countries also included narcotics trafficking.142 Citing 
sources from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)/Canadian Security Intelligence 
Service, Jane’s intelligence Review says that Sri Lankans connected to LTTE controlled “a 
portion of the one billion US dollar drug market” in the Canadian city of Montreal. The 
report added that the group’s annual income was US$200-300 while narcotics smuggling 
comprised one of its major sources of money.
143
 Several other intelligence agencies also 
accused the LTTE of being involved in drug trafficking. The US State Department 
frequently condemned LTTE for its involvement in the drug trade. In its 2010 International 
Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), the State Department said: 
Since 1983, the LTTE was involved in bulk delivery of heroin and cannabis from 
producing areas in Asia to consuming countries. Mumbai was the key link in the LTTE 
drug trade. While Sri Lanka’s coast remains highly vulnerable to transshipment of heroin 
moving from India, observers expect a dramatic reduction in drug-related activity in the 
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The same report added that the 2009 defeat of the LTTE by the Sri Lankan military “may 
have changed the dynamics of the drug trade in Asia.”145 Indian authorities have also 
accused LTTE operatives of drugs smuggling within India and arrested several Sri Lankan 
Tamils on charges of drug smuggling. Delhi hoped that the fall of the LTTE will result in 
the reduction of drug trafficking.
146  
In addition, a number of LTTE supporters and 
sympathiser have been arrested in various Asian, European and North American countries 
on charges of drug trafficking and possession of narcotics. On the other hand, several 




The United Nations also accused LTTE of benefiting from illegal drug trade. In its 2012 
annual report, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) described LTTE 
as a group deriving “some of their income from heroin trafficking prior to being 
dismantled in 2009”.148 The LTTE supporters reportedly provided the ‘mules’ or couriers, 
traffickers, peddlers and bulk distributors from producing areas in Asia to consuming 
countries. According to Peiris, the involvement of LTTE in narcotics transactions was 
taking place mainly in four  forms -- (a) bulk delivery of heroin and cannabis from 
producing areas in Asia via transit points; (b) conveying (as travellers) relatively small 
consignments of heroin (concealed in personal baggage) from suppliers in Asian countries 
to intermediary contact persons in consumer countries; (c) operation of drug distribution 
networks dealing in consuming countries; and (d) working as couriers between dealers and 
distributors (i.e. “muleing”).”149 However, the Jane’s Intelligence Review about LTTE’s 
funding activities said that LTTE’s involvement in street-level distribution of heroin was 
“unlikely” but it was “possible” that LTTE-affiliated street gangs may have been involved 
in lower-level distribution.
150
 Peiris says that as opposed to criminal groups, LTTE didn’t 
have any extensive involvement in drug ‘peddling’ in the retail market and there was no 
indication of LTTE participation in opium growing and refining of heroin.
151
 It is worth 
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noting that LTTE itself never acknowledged its involvement in the drug trade and denied 
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3.6 Drugs and Insurgents 
Although a number of rebel groups rely on drugs and contraband as their major sources of 
income, the impact of natural resources on conflict depends on the opportunities they have 
to exploit them as well as the motivation of the insurgents. The availability of natural 
resources might increase the risk of a conflict, both in the first place and during the post-
conflict peace period, especially when exploitation of resources constitutes the main 
motivation and access to them is considered “a valuable prize worth fighting for.”154 
However, in “non-resource” conflicts (i.e. conflicts not motivated by natural resource 
distribution), this mechanism doesn’t apply. 
In addition, other factors such as physical characteristics, spatial spread and mode of 
exploitation of natural resources are usually linked to the degree of illegal exploitation and 
the conflict itself. Illegality, lootability, and obstructability of resources are also associated 
with the initiation and duration as well as intensity of many conflicts. The type of natural 
resources is another factor closely linked to the nature of a conflict. Natural resources can 
be divided into two major categories – lootable/diffuse and non-lootable/point. Lootable or 
diffuse resources are easily accessible to criminal and insurgent groups and are generally 
exploited over a wide area and through a large number of small-scale illegal operators. As 
opposed to non-lootable or point resources, lootable resources are generally not exploited 
through industrial modes of production.
 155 
  
Lootable and diffuse resources include alluvial gems, minerals and agricultural products 
such as opium and coca.
 
However, illegal drugs have a number of peculiar characteristics 
that distinguishes them from many other natural resources. First of all, the very nature of 
drugs makes it harder for the government to control its production and trade. Drugs, like 
gemstones, can be relatively easily appropriated and transported to markets by individuals 
and small groups of people. Unlike oil, minerals and timber, which require much more 
time and complicated enterprises to loot, the high value-to-size ratio of drugs and alluvial 
diamonds make them less obstructable.
156
 In addition, the constant demand and increasing 
consumption of drugs means they are marketable almost everywhere. Therefore, illegal 
drugs are favoured by a number of insurgent groups as they have become among the most 
reliable sources of income in the world. Moreover, drugs can not only buy weapons, they 
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also corrupt officials and often weaken government institutions. The weakening or collapse 
of state institutions facilitate in turn usually result in more drug production and trafficking 
and create a suitable environment for the processing of finished products such as the 
conversion of opium into heroin and coca into cocaine. Drugs bring the two actors -- drug 
traders and insurgents -- into a close contact and, sometimes, even make the two 
facilitators or partners.  
The interaction between drugs and the insurgents usually starts with tolerating the 
production and trafficking of drugs, evolves into taxation and eventually self-involvement. 
According to UNODC (United Nations Offices on Drugs and Crime), the problem of 
insurgency diminished in several countries when authorities targeted illicit drug production 
and drug trafficking. The UNODC report mentions government counter-narcotics efforts in 
Peru in the 1990s and Colombia in the 2000s which also weakened the Shining Path and 
FARC respectively as it “helped to reduce the income of the illegal armed groups and thus 
their capacity to fight.”157 
The relationship between illicit drugs and rebel groups stands out for at least twelve 
reasons described below. First, compared to many other resources in terms of profit margin, 
drugs are immensely profitable, especially in the processed form such as heroin and 
cocaine. Second, they are renewable as the same plant can be cultivated year after year, 
bringing continuous profits. Third, drugs are generally illegal which make them more 
demanding, especially in consuming countries.
158  
Fourth, illegal drug trade is a more 
enduring source of income than other activities such as kidnapping and bank robberies. 
Fifth, drugs can be taxed in several stages -- farming, trafficking and processing -- and, 
therefore, can bring more money to insurgents groups. Sixth, unlike minerals, oil, gas and 
timber; drugs are “lootable” and easy to appropriate by a small number of people as well as 
individuals. Seventh, compared to several other natural resources, it is easier to hide and 
smuggle drugs.  Eight, as the demand for drugs is constantly high, they are generally sold 
at farmgate and farmers don’t have to take them to far away markets. Ninth, as opposed to 
other agricultural products, opium/coca farmers usually get advance credit from traffickers 
and drug traders before their yield. Tenth, unlike most other agricultural products, drugs 
can be easily stored for years and can be sold at anytime by the farmers. Eleventh, drugs 
can be cultivated in almost all kinds of climates and weather conditions. In addition, 
compared to many other traditional legal crops, drugs, especially the opium poppy crop, 
need less water and less time.    
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Moreover, the drug trade provides employment and a source of income to a large number 
of people including farmers, traffickers and processors. In most cases, drug production is 
the livelihood of ordinary farmers. Therefore, destruction or suppression of drugs 
production and trafficking by government officials increases support for the insurgents. For 
the insurgent, involvement in the drug trade is also a major source of “political capital” -- 
support from the local population.
159
 As Felbab-Brown says, insurgent groups derive three 
sets of gains from their involvement in the illicit economy; a) increased physical 
capabilities (money, weapons and manpower); b) increased freedom of action (the ability 
to optimize tactics and strategy); and c) increased political capital (legitimacy, relationship 
with the local population. It is the political capital element of the drugs that, at times, 
proves more valuable to the insurgents than financial gains. Local population, especially in 
drug producing areas, is usually willing to withhold intelligence on the insurgents from the 
government, and, meanwhile, provide intelligence about government units to them; a 
crucial asset for the insurgent to avoid being captured or killed.
160
  
Research by several scholars analysing the relationship between natural resources and 
conflict as well as post-conflict peace show that natural resources affect the onset, duration 
and intensity of internal armed conflicts.
161
 While examining the role contrabands play in 
several long-running civil wars since 1945, Fearon concludes that compared to wars 
emerging from coups or revolutions as well as anti-colonial wars, civil wars have lasted 
much longer when they have involved land or natural resource conflicts, the so-called 
“sons of the soil” wars that typically involve land conflict between a peripheral ethnic 
minority and state-supported migrants from a dominant ethnic group. He adds that internal 
armed conflicts also last longer when the rebels have access to finance from contraband 
goods. Fearon argues that durations for conflicts in which the rebel group has access to 
funds from contraband such as opium, diamonds, or coca were longer and had a mean 
duration of 48.2 years as compared to 8.8 years for other conflicts.
162 
In addition, Fearon 
has demonstrated that narcotics extend the duration of conflicts and that civil wars “last 
longer when the rebels have access to finance from contraband goods like opium or 
cocaine.”163 On the other hand, Ross says that ‘lootable’ commodities tend to lengthen 
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existing conflicts but they do not make conflict more likely to begin.
164 
On the other hand, 
empirical research also indicates that, rather than generating or being generated by drug 
cultivation, armed conflict qualitatively and quantitatively transforms existing drug 
cultivation as it strengthens the capacity of insurgent groups while weakens the state.
165
 
A number of drug producing countries are experiencing conflicts. Meanwhile, the bulk of 
the global drug cultivation is taking place in conflict zones. As Cornell argues, drug 
production today is mainly concentrated in four countries -- Afghanistan, Burma, 
Colombia, and Peru -- all of whom have been ravaged by some of the world’s longest-
lasting wars.
166 
However, there are several examples of drug producing countries where it 
didn’t automatically result in a long lasting conflict. In 1960s and 1970s, countries such as 
Turkey, Iran, Thailand and Bolivia were major producers of opium and coca without 
experiencing armed conflicts. In addition, Pakistan produced substantial amount of drugs 
in 1970s and 1980s but didn’t have a drugs-linked conflict/insurgency.  
On the other hand, there are several criminal groups that are not involved in any 
cooperation with the insurgents. Many transnational organised crime groups such as the 
Italian/Sicilian Mafia, the Russian Mafiya, the Hong Kong/Chinese Triads, South 
American Cartels, the Mexican gangs, and the Italian-American Mafias have usually 
stayed away from working closely with insurgent/terror groups mainly for two reasons -- 
(a), they don’t need the help of insurgent groups because they already have their own 
longstanding financial strategies and stable government contacts/collaborators and (b), 
cooperating with the insurgent/terror groups will attract more attention from the 
governments at home and abroad and will put them in a riskier position.  
Similarly, a number of insurgent groups have refused to cooperate with national or 
transnational criminal groups due to a deliberate strategy of preserving their “moral high 
ground” and not “diluting” their ideology. Some insurgent groups didn’t want to jeopardize 
internal support and international goodwill by making an alliance with criminal groups and 
drug traders. For example, Mexico’s EZLN (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional or 
Zapatista National Liberation Army -- a revolutionary leftist group based in Chiapas, the 
southernmost state of Mexico),  avoided participating in the drug trade or any dealing with 
the drug traffickers because of its concerns that it might result in losing funding in the form 
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of donations. In addition, insurgency by the Hmong people in Laos avoided full scale 
involvement in the drug trade. Several other major insurgencies, such as the anti-British 
Mau Mau Rebellion in Kenya (1952-1960) and the Malayan National Liberation Army–
MNLA
167
 (1948 to 1960), were also not involved in drugs.  
On the other hand, a number of insurgent groups get only a small amount of money from 
illegal drugs and they do not constitute their main sources of income. Tamil Tigers’ (LTTE) 
involvement in the drug trade had been the least as compared to other major insurgent 
groups discussed in details here; namely FARC, PKK and the Taliban. Despite LTTE’s 
minimal involvement in drugs, it was one of the richest insurgent groups in the world right 
until its defeat by the Sri Lankan government in 2009. The strength, longevity and 
activities of LTTE suggest that, even today when drugs play a prominent role in financing 
a number of militant organisations, it is possible for an insurgency to finance itself through 
other means and sources.   
In recent years, Al-Qaeda has been often accused of benefiting from the illicit drug trade. 
Without providing any hard evidence, several Western officials claimed that the Al-Qaeda 
network was mainly funded by the drug trade. For example, French Defense Minister, 
Michèle Alliot-Marie, declared in 2003 that “drugs are now the principal source of funding 
for Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda network.”168 However, investigations showed that such 
assertions were not always based on reality. In a Congressional Testimony on 3
rd
 October 
2001, Asa Hutchinson, Administrator of the US’s Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEA), acknowledged in his statement that his agency “has no direct evidence to confirm 
that Bin Laden is involved in the drug trade.”169 Similarly, Kaplan says in his investigation 
about militant organisations’ sources of funding, that Al-Qaeda’s leadership “proved more 
wary about jumping into the drug trade” and “steered clear” of the heroin trade. 170 
Interviews with several Al-Qaeda captives in the US custody also revealed that the group’s 
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strategists “encouraged their members not to get involved” with the drug barons.171 In 
addition, the 9/11 Commission Report, released in 2004, notes that “while the drug trade 
was a source of income for the Taliban, it did not serve the same purpose for Al-Qaeda, 
and there is no reliable evidence that Bin Laden was involved in or made his money 
through drug trafficking.”172 Moreover, a 2009 report by the US Senate’s Foreign Relations 
Committee about links between drug trade and insurgency also concludes that: 
“surprisingly, there is no evidence that any significant amount of the drug proceeds go to 
Al-Qaeda. Contrary to conventional wisdom, numerous money laundering and counter-
narcotics experts with the United States Government in Afghanistan and Washington said 
flatly that they have seen no indication of the Taliban or traffickers paying off Al-Qaeda 
forces left inside the country.” 173 The report quotes a senior State Department official 
involved in the region who rejects Al-Qaeda’s role in drug trafficking by saying that “it’s 
not really there.”174  
One of the reasons for Al-Qaeda’s avoidance to get involved in the drug trade was likely 
the idea that “drug trafficking would expose them to possible detection”.175 Moreover, Al-
Qaeda has many other sources of income. Like many other Islamist groups, Al-Qaeda 
relies on charitable and religious donations mainly from wealthy individuals in the Gulf 
region. As a special report on “Terrorist Financing” by the New York based Council of 
Foreign Relations says, “Al-Qaeda is not the only terrorist organization to make use of 
these mechanisms. Terrorists the world over have long used charities, for example, to help 
raise and move their funds— as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) did for decades in 
American cities such as Boston and New York.”176 However, many Al-Qaeda affiliates in 
several parts of the world have been linked to the drug trade such as the Islamic Movement 
of Uzbekistan (IMU), Al-Shabab in Somalia and Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines.  
Although insurgent and organised crime groups have many common traits, there are 
several differences between the two types of groups and their realms. Discussing the 
distinctions between the two types of organisations, Lee says that “all terrorists are 
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criminals, but not all criminals are terrorists.” 177 In addition, “criminals are motivated 
solely by profit” as their primary motivation is illicit profit-maximisation, while insurgents 
“commit violent crimes to make a political statement.”178 Similarly, risk reduction is a key 
motive for the criminal, while the insurgent may ignore risk. Classic criminal groups rely 
on defined organisation, while insurgent groups mutate more frequently and violent acts 
can be accomplished by individuals or very small cells of the insurgency.
179
 On the other 
hand, organised criminal groups have usually used violent tactics mainly to threaten 
authorities, secure their operational environment and/or destroy competitors. As Hoffman 
notes, there is a clear dividing line between these two opposing ideal types: 
[U]nlike the ordinary criminal or the lunatic assassin, the terrorist is not pursuing purely 
egocentric goals -- he is not driven by the wish to line his own pocket or satisfy some 
personal need or grievance. The terrorist is fundamentally an altruist: he believes that he is 
serving a ‘good’ cause designed to achieve a greater good for a wider constituency -- 
whether real or imagined -- which the terrorist and his organization purport to represent. 




Rebel groups can make extensive profits from the drug trade. Self-involvement in narcotics, 
generally strengthens the insurgent group, enhances its capabilities and enables it to escape 
defeat. Now the question is that much does self-involvement in the drug trade impact the 
nature and goals of the insurgent groups? Many scholars argue that some of today’s 
insurgent groups have transformed into transnational criminal organisations (TCOs) and 
that they are more interested in profits than politics. They also analysed the implications of 
this phenomenon for politically motivated rebel groups. According to David Keen, 
“increasingly, civil wars that appear to have begun with political aims have mutated into 
conflicts in which short-term economic benefits are paramount. While ideology and 
identity remain important in understanding conflict, they may not tell the whole story”.181 
On the other hand, Cornell says that self-involvement in narcotics by rebel groups “alters 
the cohesion and motivations of insurgent forces. It tends to weaken ideological 
motivations and strengthen economic ones.”182 While discussing various degrees of this 
                                                          
177




 Curtis, Glenn E. and Karacan,Tara, (2002). op.cit. p. 4. 
180
 Hoffman, Bruce, (1998). Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press, p. 43.  
181
 Keen, David, (1998). The economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars. IISS Adelphi Paper No., 320. 
London: Oxford University Press, p. 7.  
182
 Cornell, Svante E., (2007). Narcotics and Armed Conflict. op.cit. 
154 
 
transformation, Dishman argues that “some terrorists commit criminal acts to support 
political operations, while others view profit-driven criminal acts as their end game.”183  
However, it is worth noting that despite benefiting from illegal sources, many traditional 
insurgencies have not fully lost their original goals and objectives. Due to the lack of state 
funding and external sources of support, many insurgent groups turned to internal source of 
funding. Many of them replaced the external funding with resources they could exploit 
inside their countries. In most of these cases, “access to resources is not determinative; it is 
facilitative.”184 Involvement in the drugs economy is the common link among all the four 
groups discussed in detail here -- FARC, PKK, LTTE and the Taliban. PKK and LTTE 
started their campaign against the state as ethnic separatist militant groups. However, both 
the PKK and LTTE had not been involved in the cultivation and production of drugs. Their 
engagement in the drug economy was mainly confined to trafficking or sale of narcotics. 
On the other hand, the FARC and the Taliban are not fighting purely for ethnic reasons and, 
as opposed to PKK and LTTE; they are not separatists or representatives of particular 
ethno-national groups. Ideology is more prominent in the struggle of FARC and the 
Taliban. In addition, the FARC and the Taliban are benefitting from both production and 
trafficking of illicit drugs. However, the involvement of LTTE and the PKK is mainly 
limited to trafficking.  
According to Chernick, “FARC’s original grievances have not disappeared” with their 
involvement in the drug trade.
185
 He adds that “there is no evidence that the leaders or 
fighters in the FARC are accumulating individual wealth. No secret bank account have 
ever been exposed or confiscated. FARC guerrillas do not receive salaries, unless they are 
taken political prisoners. Then they and their families are given small monthly sums. The 
FARC’s statues expressly prohibit individual property.” 186  It is in this context that, 
according to the International Crisis Group (ICG), describing the conflict in Colombia in 
terms of democracy against merely “narco-terrorists” does not do justice to the complexity 
of the decades-old struggle. The ICG recommends to the Colombia Government to 
“acknowledge that the left-wing insurgencies, FARC and ELN, are not simply “narco-
terrorists” but are motivated in part by political ideology, and combat them accordingly, 
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complementing military and prosecutorial programs with social programs that come to 
grips with some of the roots of the armed conflict, such as land rights questions.”187  
Similarly, the ideals and objectives of LTTE and PKK remained the same despite their 
involvement in illegal activities and dubious source of funding. Although it is possible that 
some members have used the group’s money for personal benefits, the groups finance and 
control system have remained very central and all funds have been used for the groups’ 
benefit. Although, LTTE and PKK allegedly benefited from drug trafficking, their political 
goals remained the same even after their involvement in the drug trade. As Felbab-Brown 
says, despite its involvement in the drug trade and other illegal activities, “PKK is not 
simply a criminal group, it has political goals.”188  
There are many other groups for whom the involvement in the illicit drugs economy did 
not mean the end of their original goals. As Cornell says, Peru’s Sendero Luminoso (SL), 
which is also linked to the drug trade, “did not appear to be mainly motivated by greed. 
The strict and dogmatic character of the organisation was somewhat eased in coca-
producing regions for pragmatic purposes, securing continued access to the crucial funding 
that the coca industry provided the organisation. However, there is no indication that the 
motivations of the organisation were affected.”189 
Although proponents of the greed theory argue that civil wars are usually caused by 
economic rather than socio-political factors,
190
 empirical research shows that conflicts, 
especially national and liberations movements, have not been initiated as a result of 
economic incentives. As a detailed study of dozens of conflicts in different parts of the 
world argues, “combatants’ incentives for self-enrichment and/or opportunities for 
insurgent mobilization created by access to natural and financial resources were neither the 
primary nor sole cause of the separatist and non-separatist conflicts analysed.”191  
In addition, the operational mechanism and hierarchical structure of most insurgent groups 
including the PKK, FARC, LTTE and the Taliban are in many ways different from drug 
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cartels and organised criminal syndicates. Unlike most criminal gangs, insurgent groups 
operate as hierarchical organised guerrilla armies with a robust and efficient financial 
system controlled by the centre. The centralization of their finances translates into a robust 
and greater control by the governing council or central committee and usually results in an 
equitable distribution of funds among different regions and fronts. As Chernick says, the 
FARC’s central governing council has been managing all funds since 1985;192 the period 
when FARC started receiving huge sums of money from the drug trade. Financial 
corruption is usually not tolerated and those found guilty of using the group’s money for 
personal interests are often severely punished. The FARC has generally punished 
commanders of frentes (fronts) who have misappropriated funds or have been involved in 
corruption with death penalty.
193
 In addition, LTTE and PKK also have an ethnic 
dimension which further distinguishes them from criminal groups where the issue of 
ethnicity is not a binding or motivating factor. 
Involvement of insurgent groups in the illicit drug trade is mostly driven and even 
predetermined by a combination of two factors; (a), the main areas of their origin and areas 
of operation/control and (b), the comparative high profitability of the narcotics business as 
compared to majority of other formal and informal sources of funding.
194
 The links 
between politico-military armed non-state actors and the drug business are most profound 
in major drug-producing regions as well as in areas along the major trafficking routes that 
are usually outside the government control. Although both limited and unlimited 
cooperation exists between many insurgent groups and drug traders, it is not always a 
hybrid relationship and does not always result in their merger with organised crime. The 
integration or merger of a militant non-state actor with illicit drug cartels happens when 
one can no longer discern whether its motives are mainly profit-oriented or its agenda is 
dominated by political and ideological goals. The Mong Thai Army – which was the 
largest insurgent and drug trafficking actor in Myanmar until a decisive crack-down by the 
government in 1996 -- is a good example of such a merger between insurgents and narco-
traders. The full criminalization and political/ideological degradation of the originally 
socio-political armed groups is another important phases in their lifecycle. In such a 
scenario, the original ideals of such groups or their splinter factions fade away as they 
become involved in pure criminal activities without having any political or social agenda. 
Although there are several examples ideological degradation and even merger with 
organised crime, many armed non-state actors -- such as FARC, LTTE, PKK and the 
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Taliban in Afghanistan -- are in many ways different from organised crime, despite their 
involvement in the illicit narcotics business. Another main distinction is that these 
insurgent groups “contest a declared political incompatibility over territory or government, 
whereas criminal groups generally do not.”195 
Discussing the “vagueness and morally charged meaning of the concept” of narcoterrorism, 
Dandurand and Chin argue that frequent references in the literature to the term 
(narcoterrorism) are often aimed at “further vilifying insurgent groups and terrorists”.196 
While emphasizing the difference between drug trade and insurgency, Chouvy argues that 
the two phenomena “have nothing to do with each other -- one being a means of coping 
with economic difficulties; the other being a violent way to register political -- and 
sometimes economic --claims.”197 According to Chouvy: 
[N]arco-terrorism should not refer to terrorist groups that have been only partly funded by 
illegal drugs -- since any terrorist outfit is likely to at least try to benefit from such a 
resource. Rather, it should be used to identify organised drug traffickers who try to affect 
the policies of a government by terrorist means, i.e. by the systematic threat or use of terror. 
In the same way that ‘narco’ does not politically define a state, neither does it politically 
define terrorism. States are defined and categorised according to their political regimes 
(monarchy, democracy, military dictatorship, etc.) and not according to their economic 
resources, except sometimes for rentier states. Neither Afghanistan nor Burma can be said 
to be ‘narco-states’ as they are far from fitting any definition of rentier states and as illicit 
opium production is far too limited in terms of cultivated areas to justify such a designation 
(between 1 and 5 percent of arable land in Afghanistan.)
198 
 
On the other hand, insurgent groups understand the negativity associated with illicit drugs. 
Insurgent groups are generally careful about the image as they want to be seen as freedom 
fighters and reformers and not as criminals and drug traffickers. They go at great lengths to 
portray themselves as the “good guys” fighting against cruelty and injustices. Therefore, 
they are generally reluctant to admit their support for the production and trade of narcotics. 
These groups have not even publically acknowledged their involvement in the drug trade 
and usually prefer silence on the topic. They fear that they will lose popular support if they 
are perceived to be benefiting from criminal activities or have abandoned their ideological 
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goals. They mostly put the issue of drugs to one side and keep it separate from their main 
goals. Some insurgent groups, including FARC and the Taliban, have been more 
successful in incorporating drugs into their ideology than others.   
It is also worth noting that a number of insurgent groups found illicit drugs by chance as 
their involvement in narcotics was not by choice. When FARC (Colombia) and Taliban 
(Afghanistan) emerged, drugs already existed and the drugs economy had already been 
established in areas of their birth and expansion. The groups just needed to adjust to the 
environment they operated in. Initially, FARC prohibited drugs on ideological grounds 
arguing that Marx and Lenin spoke against it. The internal argument among the FARC’s 
leaders was that the group’s involvement in illicit drugs would mean that FARC was 
criminal. Therefore, FARC was avoided direct involvement in the cultivation, trafficking, 
and trans-shipment of drugs in 1960 and 1970s. However, after an intense debate in 1980s, 
the FARC leadership decided to participate in the drugs economy as part of its strategy of 
taxing all economic activity, including coca cultivation, in areas under the group’s control. 
Even after FARC’s involvement in the drugs, it kept its political ideals intact and didn’t 
completely transform into a criminal group. FARC’s justified its involvement in the drugs 
as it fits its struggle to champion the rights of poor peasants and protect their fields and 
livelihoods from the government’s counter-narcotics forces. As Felbab-Brown says, 
ideological groups that are involved in the drugs economy are “able to claim nationalist 
credit if a foreign power threatens the local illicit economy” and have “embraced the anti-
eradication cause as a fundamentally nationalist and anti-imperial cause.”199 
Similarly, the Taliban in Afghanistan declared the use of drugs forbidden (haram) on 
religious grounds but allowed the drug trade and taxed its production and trafficking since 
the movement was launched in 1994. When the Taliban banned drug cultivation in 2000-
2001, the production in areas they controlled practically disappeared. However, after the 
Taliban regime was toppled in late 2001, the group’s leadership saw drugs production and 
smuggling as part of their overall insurgency against the Afghan government and its 
Western allies. Although they are still against the consumption of drugs, many Taliban 
commanders consider the drug trade as a tool to weaken Western societies. In addition, the 
Taliban portray themselves as the protectors of poor poppy farmers whose livelihood are 
being destroyed by the Afghan government and its NATO allies as part of their counter-
narcotics strategy.  
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3.7 Insurgents’ Local vs. Foreign Support  
Since the end of Second World War, majority of internal armed conflicts “had been fuelled 
by superpower rivalry and injections of arms and aid.”200 There was a hope that the new 
world order that emerged after the Cold War and the collapse of the bi-polar world will be 
based on international cooperation and peace. It was hoped that in the absence of foreign 
support, local insurgencies will not be able survive and thrive on local resources alone. 
However, this optimism was short lived as state actors continued to interfere and intervene 
in other countries for their own political and economic interests.  
Foreign involvement remained a dominant feature in many so called civil wars and 
insurgencies even after the Cold War. For example, Sri Lankan Tamils Tigers (LTTE) 
found an ideal sanctuary in the Tamil Nadu state of India where ethno-religious and 
linguistic ties facilitated their operations. The ties between Indian and Sri Lankan Tamils 
were incorporated into India’s semi-clandestine foreign policy when, from 1983, the Indian 
government tasked its intelligence agency, Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), to 
provided arms, training and monetary support to Sri Lankan Tamil militant groups 
including the LTTE. Tamil insurgents were trained in camps inside the Indian territory and 
their leaders, including LTTE’s Supreme Commander, Prabakaran, frequently visited India. 
By supporting Sri Lanka’s northern insurgency, India probably wanted to achieve 
influence in Colombo, destabilise Sri Lanka and possibly incorporate the Sri Lankan 
Tamils with India. In addition, India had several geo-political reasons. Since 1977, many 
Indian hard-liners viewed Sri Lanka to be stepping out of the non-aligned orbit and had 
become an ally of the West. The Indian government and press expressed concerns about 
rumours that US Navy establishing a major base at Trincomalee, one of the finest deep 
water harbours in Sri Lanka. Meanwhile, the presence of Israeli intelligence operatives, 
British counter insurgency experts and South African mercenaries was also reported there. 
In addition, Sri Lanka enjoyed good relations with India’s two regional rivals, Pakistan and 
China. The two countries were planning to increase their military assistance to Colombo.
201
 
However, when Delhi realized that the LTTE-India nexus did not secure the intended 
geopolitical objectives, it reversed its policy of supporting the LTTE in 1987. When 
relations between the LTTE and the Indian government soured, Delhi helped broker a 
peace accord between the government in Colombo and the LTTE. After the LTTE refused 
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to accept the peace plan and lay down their weapons, the Indian Prime minister, Rajiv 
Gandhi, despatched Indian security forces (Indian Peace Keeping Force - IPKF) to fight 
the LTTE. This prompted LTTE to turn against the Indian government and resulted in the 
killing of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in a suicide attack.
202
 The Indian support for LTTE 
weakened both Indian as well as Sri Lankan domestic security. 
The foreign element is also crucial in the cases of PKK, FARC and the Afghan Taliban. 
The Taliban movement was supported by Pakistan and received huge sums of money from 
several Gulf countries.
203
 The PKK had the support of neighbouring Syria and Iraq and 
have using its sanctuaries across the Iraqi border for more decades.
204
 Similarly, FARC had 




3.8 Conclusion  
In the absence or lack of external state funding, especially after WWII and collapse of the 
bi-polar world, many insurgencies resorted to benefit from a variety of sources including 
involvement in the drug trade. Many of them receive millions of dollars annually from 
direct and indirect protection, production and trafficking of illicit drugs. Drugs bring them 
money they use for buying weapons, providing medicine and healthcare, covering logistics, 
paying their rank and file and conducting propaganda.  
In most cases, insurgent groups are funded by multiple sources. Even in the drug producing 
and transiting countries, insurgent groups have not always and wholly relied on drugs only. 
For example, drug trade, kidnapping and cattle-rustling have been the main sources of 
income for the FARC. PKK has been funded by donations/extortion, investment in legal 
businesses as well as narcotics. For the LTTE, in addition to drug trafficking, donations 
from Tamils living in India and Western countries had been the biggest source of income. 
Similarly, the Taliban in Afghanistan have developed a complex mechanism of funding 
from a variety of local and external sources which involves drugs as well as many other 




 See Chapter 2 and Chapter 5 for a detailed account of the Afghan Taliban and their foreign supporters.  
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sources including donations and the exploitation of mines and minerals. In addition, there 
are several insurgent groups that are not benefiting from the drugs.    
Although drugs bring a lot of money to many insurgent groups, they don’t always 
transform the conflict. As seen in a number of cases, the drug trade in general don’t always 
hijack the political/ideological struggle and remains subservient to ideology and politics. 
Although illicit Drugs bring the much needed cash and extra resources to the insurgent 
groups, they don’t control the conflict.  
The three insurgencies - FARC in Columbia, PKK in Turkey and LTTE in Sri Lanka - 
discussed in detail above can be described as classic insurgencies as they were not initiated 
for economic benefits and financial gains and were not driven by greed. In addition, these 
groups didn’t become involved in illicit drugs at the beginning of their insurgency as their 
interaction with narcotics came later. In most cases, the drugs economy already existed and 
was functioning autonomously well before these groups were founded.  
The origins of these three conflicts are based on ideology and grievance as they were 
launched with a clear political vision. The involvement of FARC, PKK and LTTE in the 
drug trade didn’t have a major impact on their overall motivation and organisational 
structures. It is possible that certain elements within these groups might have adopted an 
economic agenda and are motivated by financial benefits as opposed to ideology, the 
groups’ collective goals and aspirations remain the same. Despite profound changes in 
global geo-politics and the emergence of new sources of funding, the demands and goals of 
these groups have been consistent and their support still stems from an ideological framing 
of grievances. Despite the illegal nature of the drug trade and the huge sums of money 
involved in it, their original agenda does not seem to have been hijacked by greed. Their 
original grievances and political objectives did not disappear after their involvement in the 
drug trade.  
Insurgents, by their nature, are very entrepreneurial and usually exploit whatever is 
available in the environment they operate in. Evidence from a number of drug producing 
and conflict stricken countries shows that rather than generated by drug cultivation, armed 
conflict qualitatively and quantitatively transforms existing drug production by 
strengthening the capacity of insurgent groups while, at the same time, weakens the state 
institutions.
 
As seen in many cases, targeting the drug trade or eliminating narcotics 
altogether can make the insurgent groups weaker but this alone doesn’t mean the end of 





Drug Production: A Historical Appraisal 
 
Naturally-occurring drugs have been part of cultural, social, economic, medical and 
spiritual life of nearly all communities in the world since time immemorial. Psychoactive 
plants have been cultivated in different parts of the world for thousands of years. However, 
the cultivation pattern, scale and location have changed over time. This chapter explores 
the historical development of drug production and consumption in the world with a special 
focus on Afghanistan. Historically, Afghanistan was not a major opium producer and 
unlike many other countries in the region, did not have an ‘opium culture’. The chapter 
examines how the drug economy took roots in the country within a short span of time and 
identifies the main causes responsible for making it the biggest opium producer in the 
world. While discussing the dynamics of drugs economy, the chapter also provides a 
historical context of drug production and trade in the wider region and analyses the impact 
of regional and international drug economy on the country. The chapter argues that the 
large-scale opium production in Afghanistan is closely linked with regional and global 
geo-politics and conflicts mainly the Soviet invasion of the country in 1979.  
 
4.1 Drugs and Human Society: From Cure to Addiction 
Human beings have used psychoactive plants, both as a medicine and a source of euphoria, 
since time immemorial. Naturally-occurring drugs are an integral part of cultural, social, 
economic, medical and spiritual life in almost all communities in the world. Out of the 237 
cultures worldwide, only four have no record of intoxicating substance use; these being 
societies that are isolated and incapable of cultivating psychoactive plants such as the Inuit 
community. Throughout human history, drugs and intoxicating substances have been 
consumed mainly for five purposes. Firstly, as a medicine as various drugs, especially 
opium and cannabis, are highly valued for their medicinal properties. Secondly, for 
physical stimulation especially by those engaged in arduous employment. These drugs -- 
such as Khat, Betel, Opium and Tobacco -- are called “work drugs” and are usually 
consumed to increase stamina, reduce appetite and boost physical endurance. Thirdly, 
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certain drugs including coca leaves, opium, cannabis and hallucinogenic plants (such as 
peyote and psilocybin) have been used in religious, pagan, shamanic and cultural 
ceremonies. These drugs have been considered as gifts from nature or god/s and promoted 
as a means of communicating with the divine and achieving trance and spiritual 
enlightenment. Fourthly, drugs have been consumed for the purpose of relaxation, 
especially in cultures where they were the preserve of the elite. In addition, drugs were 
used as part of social and tribal life. In many cultures, social drug use has been an integral 
part of community and traditional life. Fifthly, several drug plants such as cannabis and 
coca and opium poppy have been cultivated as a food source. The seeds and seed oil of a 
number of drug plants are highly nutritious and form a staple of rural diets in various 
societies. Moreover, drug plants and products were used as a means of exchange in early 
trading systems and bartered for spices, dyes and precious metals.
1
 
Opium has a special place among the narcotics drugs and has been widely produced and 
consumed for around eight thousands years.
2
 The opium poppy was cultivated in 
Mesopotamia around 5,400 years ago. Opium has been used as a medicine to cure a long 
list of diseases including diarrhoea, dysentery, bronchitis, asthma, cold, cough, flu, colic, 
fever, rheumatism and diabetes. It has been part of folk medicine in a number of cultures 
and is also used to increase working efficiency and relieve tiredness in adults. In some 
cultures, it is even given to infants to pacify them and lull them to sleep.  
Opium has been hailed as the world’s great pain killer, a most potent of all drugs in the 
pharmacopoeia and a remedy for hundreds of problems. Egyptians were famous for their 
opium production around 3,500 years ago. The city of Thebes was so famous for its poppy 
fields that Egyptian opium was called Thebic opium.
3
 The Ebers Papyrus -- the ancient 
Egyptian compilation of herbal knowledge and one of the oldest known medical works 
dating to 1550 BC -- mentions opium among approximately seven hundred other 
remedies.
4
 Ancient Egyptians used opium recipes as an analgesic and tranquiliser. They 
also prescribed opium for a wide range of ailments including tooth pain in infants and to 
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“keep children from crying too loudly.”5 The use of opium for calming down the infants 
and children later became common in many other cultures including Europe, India and 
China. This practice is still common in many parts of the world such as Central and South 
Asia.  
In his study of ancient Assyrian vegetable drugs, Reginald C. Thompson has shown that 
opium was known to the Assyrians at least in the seventh century BC. The Ancient 
Medical Tablets which were originally written around the end of the third millennium BC 
and formed the library of the great Assyrian King, Sardanapalus (also called Aschurbanipal, 
668-626 BC) in his capital at Nineveh (today’s Iraq), refer to both opium poppy plant and 
opium. In a list of the 115 most commonly mentioned plant drugs, opium is mentioned 
frequently and occurs forty-two times in these cuneiform tablets. Describing the procedure 
of collecting opium, one tablet says: “Early in the morning old women, boys and girls 
collect the juice by scraping it off the wounds (in the poppies/poppy capsules) with a small 
iron scoope (blade), and deposit the whole in an earthen pot.”6 As Thompson says, “it 
seems that nothing has changed in the method of collecting opium.”7  
Opium had an important place in the ancient Greek mythology and medicine where it was 
consumed as a drink. In the Corinth region, a city was named Mekone (meaning poppy 
Town) signifying the cultivation of opium poppies there. Therefore, one Greek word for 
opium is mekon or mekone. The word, “opium,” comes from another Greek word – opion – 
meaning “liquid.” In fact, it is this Greek word which appears in many variations around 
the world including Arabic “Afiyoon”. Poppy is also referred to in Homer’s (c. 850 BC) 
Odyssey where he mentions nepenthe, the opium-based drug of forgetfulness, which was 
employed by Helen of Troy to soothe mourning warriors.
8
  
Afyon (opium) is also the name of the historical city in today’s west-central Turkey, 150 
miles southwest of the capital, Ankara. The name comes from the poppy farms in the area. 
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The Seljuq conquerors changed the name of the city to Qara Hisar (meaning Black 
Fortress), but in later times it took on its old name of Afyon (Opium). The famous French 
trader and traveller, Jean-Baptiste Tavernier (1605 –1689 CE) has called the city “Aphiom-
Carassar” when he visited it in the 17th century. Tavernier wrote: “The Black City of 
Aphiom or Opium; because it has a prospect over a fair and large country well cultivated, 
where they sow great store of poppies, whence they draw their opium or Aphiom, as the 
Turks call it.”9  
Opium has been an essential part of the eastern medicinal system where its name is 
synonymous with remedy and antidote. A number of physicians and healers have 
prescribed opium to their patients and wrote commentaries on the miraculous 
characteristics and magical powers of the drug. Several Muslim physicians and healers also 
used opium as a remedy for various illnesses. Muhammad ibn Zakariya Razi (854-925 CE), 
known in medieval Europe by his Latinized name as Rhazes or Rasis, is an important 
figure in the history of medicine and was a physician and chemist among other things. 
Writing about the soothing qualities of opium, he said that “after this wonderful drug, the 
heart remains but it hurts less”.10 Razi, also an expert surgeon, is believed to be the first to 
use opium for anaesthesia and recommended opium and its mixture for several illnesses.
11
 
The renowned Muslim physician and philosopher Abu Ali Ibn Sina (980-1037) who hailed 
from the ancient city of Balkh in present-day Afghanistan (known in the West by the 
Latinized name as Avicenna) recommended it especially in diarrhoea and diseases of the 
eye.
12
 The famous 13th century Persian poet, Saadi mentions opium as an antidote in one 
of his master pieces, Gulistan (The Rose Garden), composed in 1258.  
دَوب هدرم هديزگرام ،دوش هدروآ قارع زا قايرت ات 
(Till the opium (antidote) is brought from Iraq, the snake-bitten person dies.)
13
 
Europe too has a long history of opium consumption and cultivation which dates back to at 
least five thousand years. Opium has been used as a medicine as well as for reaction. The 
                                                          
9
 Tavernier, Jean-Baptiste, (1677). The Six Voyages of Jean-Baptiste Tavernier, Finished in the year 1670. 
Book VII, The Persian Travels. (Translated from French into English by John Phillips). London: R.L. and 
Moses Pitt, p. 37. Available online at: <http://www.biodiversitylibrary.org/item/123215#page/530/mode/1up> 
[Accessed 01 Jan 2014].  
10
 Dormandy, Thomas, (2012). Opium: Reality’s Dark Dream. Cornwall: TJ International/Yale University 
Press, p. 32. 
11
 Estreicher, Stefan K., (2006). Wine: From Neolithic Times to the 21st Century. New York: Algora 
Publishing, p. 46. See also, New World Encyclopaedia. Entry, Razi, ibn Zakariya al-, Available online at:  
<http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Razi,_ibn_Zakariya_al-> [Accessed 29 Dec 2013].   
12
 Terry, Charles E. and Pellens, Mildred, (1928). The Opium Problem. op.cit. p. 55. See also Dormandy, 
Thomas, (2012). Opium: Reality’s Dark Dream. op.cit., p. 32-33.  
13
 Saadi Shirazi, Sheikh Muslihuddin. Gulistan (The Rose Garden), Chapter 1, Story No. 16. Available online 





 century famous English physician, Thomas Sydenham, while praising opium, stated: 
“Among the remedies which has pleased Almighty God to give to man to relieve his 
sufferings, none is so universal and so efficient as opium”.14 Writing in the 19th century, 
the influential Canadian physician Sir William Osler famously called opium “God’s own 
medicine”.15 
In addition to the Middle East and Europe, opium poppies have been cultivated in West 
Asia, East Asia, Central Asia and South Asia for a long time. Historically, some areas have 
been more famous for opium production than others. Opium production in Persia (Iran) 
and Turkey outdates the Southeast Asian production. Opium was a by-product of early 
commerce along this route. Cities such as Kabul and Kunduz in Afghanistan, Peshawar in 
Pakistan and the Makran coast in Pakistan’s Balochistan province served as commercial 
hubs and relays for merchants who also traded in opium as early as the 1 AD.
 16
 Over time, 
the extent and gravity of opium production and consumption has moved and fluctuated in 
these regions.  
 In South Asia, opium has been produced used for centuries. Nyberg suggests that opium 
poppy had spread to India in Vedic Times (1700-500 BCE)
 17
. India has been known as a 
major producer of opium where production has undergone a number of ups and downs. By 
the year 1000 AD, opium was widely used throughout the social spectrum in India. 
Emperor Allauddin Khilji, the second and most powerful ruler of the Afghan Khilji 
dynasty in India (reign 1296 to 1316) banned opium in 1310. However, the Mughal Empire 
in India gave opium production government patronage for revenue generating purposes.
18
 
Its founder, Zahiruddin Babur (1483-1530), and his son and successor, Humayun (1508-
1556), were known opium eaters.
19
 Later on, European colonial powers such as the Dutch, 
French, British and Portuguese also encouraged opium production as well as consumption 
in both South Asia and South East Asia. The massive opium production in South and 
Southeast Asia is the culmination of 400 years’ Western patronage of opium. The 
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centuries every European colony had its official dens.
20
   
However, it was Britain which is credited with building an “opium empire” in the region. 
Some scholars have even called the opium trade as the “Englishman’s other great 
contribution to Asia”.21  Britain’s active involvement in the opium trade started in the 
middle of the 18
th
 century, when Bengal, the richest province in the Indian sub-continent, 
fell to East Indian Company (EIC) following the battle of Plessy in 1764. EIC leased out 
the opium trade to Patna Traders and “ordered farmers to give up food production and 
convert their lands into a monoculture of opium poppies.”22 In 1773, the Governor General 
of the East India Company and the First Governor General of British India, Warren 
Hastings, abolished the Patna syndicate and brought the opium trade under the direct 
control of the Company. The move gave the EIC or its agents exclusive rights to purchase 
opium from Bengali farmers and auction it for export.
23
 Thus Patna (in today’s Bihar State), 
one of the most ancient Indian city and the Mauryan capital in the third century BC, 
became “the unofficial capital of opium empire that the British had created.” Patna was not 
only synonymous with opium trade; it was also a brand name for one of the major types of 
British Indian opium.
24
 Some regions in India became known for their opium production. 
‘Bengal Opium’ was produced in Kolkata (Calcutta) and ‘Malwa Opium’ in Mumbai 
(Bombay) Overall, poppy cultivation in India became a state monopoly and important 
article of trade with mainly China where consumption was greater than India.
25
   
In the 18
th
 century, British India had a huge balance of payment problem in relation to 
China. Therefore, it was transformed into the largest opium exporter and remained so for 
the next few centuries. As part of its strategy to balance trade with China, which was 
exporting enormous quantities of goods but wasn’t interested in importing European 
products, the British colonialists started exporting opium to China.
26
 As Chouvy says, “it 
was not until the British Empire started organizing and commercializing opium production 
in the 19th century that the opium poppy became entrenched in the world economy. The 
opium produced in British India was the first drug to become integrated into the then 
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emerging globalisation.”27 The two so-called “opium wars” (1839-1842 and 1856-1860) 
waged by the British to impose their opium trade onto China provoked the biggest 
addiction ever to happen in world history. In addition, the rapidly increasing domestic 
consumption made China “the world’s foremost opium producer.”28  
Opium trade proved very lucrative for British colonialists. Throughout the 19th century, 
opium sent to consumers in China and, on a lesser scale, Southeast Asia was one of British 
India’s most valuable exports. 29  By 1869, the Bengal government was taking active 
measures such as advancing interest free loans to producers to increase the supply of 
opium to the Chinese market. By 1800, British export of Bengal opium were an estimated 
127 mt; however, by 1857, production had increased to 6,372 mt. Opium monopoly was a 
crucial revenue source for the British authorities in India and made a vital contribution to 
the maintenance of the colonial structure. The authorities not only exported opium, they 
also sought to maximise revenues by encouraging domestic consumption. Opium could be 
purchased only through government-administered shops, of which there were 10,000 by 
1893. Retail sales of opium were heavily taxed. By the end of the 1830s, opium sales 
contributed 11 percent of total Indian revenues to the British administration. By the 1850s, 
this had increased to 17% of India’s total revenues.30 With the expansion of production and 




Opium was presented and promoted as a normal agricultural commodity. The report of the 
Royal Commission on Opium published in 1896, says that a moderate habitual use of 
opium which is common among 5-7 percent of the Indian population is quiet harmless to 
the well-being of the people. The report also notes the custom of giving opium to children 
especially in the states of Rajputana, Malwa and Bombay presidency, to keep them quiet 
and to enable the mother to carry on her work undisturbed, and describes it as 
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In his book published in 1907, David Eraser wrote that the “notable export” from Yarkand 
(Chinese Turkestan, now known as Xinjiang region in China) to India was chars (Hashish) 
which was “in high favour” in the Punjab. On the other hand, “India returned the diabolic 
compliment with interest by exporting to Chinese Turkestan large quantities of opium.”33 
In the 19
th
 century, despite the export of “enormous quantities of opium then being 
exported to China”, local production vastly increased until the cultivation covered more 
than 2,000,000 hectares.
34
 The increasing demand and expansion of poppy cultivation 
resulted in the production of record quantities of opium. According to the World Drug 




The world realising the seriousness of the problem agreed at the beginning of the 20
th
 
century to control drugs throughout the world. The increasing global opium production, 
which was comparatively higher a century ago, was one of the reasons for convening the 
International Opium Commission in Shanghai in 1909 that led to the first instrument of 
international anti-drug law: the Hague Opium Convention of 1912.
36
 Meanwhile, 
international criticism of the opium trade as well as public pressure to curtail the drug trade 
increased. In response, pledges were made in the Opium Conventions of 1912 and 1925 
which resulted in imposing restrictions and the eventual decline of opium production.  
The British Raj continued to export “an enormous amount of opium” out of India until the 
1920s as the opium income was crucial for the sustainability of the European Enterprise in 
Asia.
37
 Trocki even argues that “without the drugs, there probably would have been no 
British Empire.”38 According to Ghosh, 20 years after the opium trade and opium profits 
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stopped, the British Raj in India “more or less packed up its bags and left” as “India was 
not a paying proposition any longer”.39 
By 1930s, several countries had already established industries to use opium for 
pharmaceutical purposes. In the Soviet Union (USSR), which had a border with 
Afghanistan’s northern provinces, opium was produced mainly “for medical and 
manufacturing purposes”. According to the UN report, in 1930s and 1940s, the USSR was 
“one of the chief countries of the world for the manufacture of morphine and other narcotic 
drugs from opium.” On average, opium production in USSR was some 70 tons per year 
during the ten years from 1929 to 1938. The UN report adds that USSR sometimes 
imported and sometimes exported opium.
40
 
However, in India, the low mark in opium production came in 1941, when the whole 
country produced around 170 tons. Production was then stepped up on account of the 
World War II and reached 750 tons in 1945. In 1946, a year before the partition of India 
into two independent states of India and Pakistan, the overall production of opium in India 
(both ‘British India’ and the ‘Indian States’) was more than 400 tons. Opium production 
reduced in India after the end of WW II in 1945 and the departure of British from there in 
1947. However, India still produced significant amount of opium both for local 
consumption and export. The 1949 UN report calls India as “one of the major opium-
producing, opium-exporting and opium-using countries”.41  
 
4.2 The Creation of the Golden Triangle: 
Although India had been a major exporter of opium to Southeast Asian markets for a long 
time, Iran emerged as a major competitor in the regional opium market in early 20
th
 
century. The export of Iranian opium to Southeast Asia continued until after the World 
War II and had supplied the region’s addicts for almost a hundred years. Following World 
War II, the dynamics of the opium industry in South and Southeast Asia changed 
significantly with Southeast Asia emerging as a major player. Three steps taken by 
different governments contributed to the emergence of Southeast Asia as a major opium 
producing region. Firstly, the shutdown of China’s vast illicit opium producing market 
following the victory of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army and the change of 
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government in 1949 served as serious blow to the drug economy in Southeast Asia. 
Secondly, major opium producing countries in Europe, Middle East and South Asia signed 
the UN’s Opium Protocol of 1953 and agreed not to sell opium on the international market 
for smoking or eating. Although this international accord ended large shipments of mainly 
Iranian opium to Southeast Asia, Thai and French opium monopolies and international 
smugglers simply took over the Iranian government’s role to export opium legally. Thirdly, 
opium production reduced sharply in Iran in 1950s resulting in the decline in exports from 
246 tons in 1950 to 41 tons in 1954. The Iranian government’s announcement of a 
complete ban on opium production in 1955 proved to be very effective.  
However, Turkey filled the void by replacing Iran as a major supplier of opium to Western 
countries. On the other hand, opium addiction in Southeast Asia continued to expand 
resulting in the cultivation of opium poppies in what came to be known as the Golden 
Triangle consisting Thailand, Burma and Laos.
42
 In 1950s, Southeast Asia not only became 
self-sufficient in opium, the Golden Triangle region was started to export the drug as it was 
producing approximately seven hundred tons of raw opium; about 50 percent of the 
world’s total illicit production.43  
Although opium production and trade patterns changed significantly over the past two 
centuries, the overall global production of opium has reduced, especially since WWI. 
According to the 2006 World Drug Report, almost a century from the 1909 Shanghai 
Commission (when the world opium production was estimated to have been at least 30,000 
metric tons), the global opium production came down to about 5,000 metric tons.
44
 This 
“success story” cannot not be attributed to the multilateral drug control regime only; a 
number of other factors such as measures taken in China to curb opium addiction as well as 
new pharmaceutical products replacing the medicinal and recreational use of opium have 
also contributed to the reduction of global opium production.
45
   
Global drug production trends also show that it moves around from region to region and 
from country to country. Several factors have contributed to the problem including 
ineffective government control, internal political turmoil, involvement of government 
officials in illicit drug trafficking, regional instability and global reach of the drug 
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syndicates. These conditions not only perpetuate the growth of drug production and 
trafficking but make the implementation of counter-narcotics policies extremely difficult, 
if not impossible. As observed in the drug producing countries of Latin America and Asia 
in 1970s and 1980s, they all experienced some sort of instability including coup d’etat, 




In recent times, opium production in Asia has shifted with relatively more speed. Some 
countries with a long history of opium production managed to control the crop while 
several others with no history of large scale opium production became major producers. 
Both economic and political factors contributed to the movement of drug production in the 
region. The wider regional instability further helped the drug industry to flourish and 
contributed to the expansion of drug cultivation and trafficking. Political unrest and 
weakening state institutions, especially in border areas provides a conducive environment 
for drug dealers as well as armed groups to mobilise people and finance them through 
drugs money. The expansion of drug trade further impinges on regional security especially 
when it becomes a two-way traffic. Precursor chemicals required for converting raw opium 
into more potent drugs are usually smuggled into drug producing countries. In other cases, 
raw material is exported from the drug producing countries for conversion in drug 
laboratories in neighbouring/regional countries.    
Although, the quantity of opium production reduced globally, the cultivation trends 
continued and expanded to the regions of the world where farmers were not familiar with 
the cultivation of opium poppy plants. By mid-20
th
 century, the “Poppy Belt” spread across 
the great Eurasian land-mass in most of the temperate and sub-tropical areas. At the time, 
opium poppy was also cultivated in parts of northern Africa and, on a smaller scale, in the 
western hemisphere.
47
 Today, the varying degrees of legal or illegal cultivation of opium 
poppies can be found in almost all the inhibited world including, Asia, Europe, Americas 
and Africa. 
The Cold War and the politics of proxies helped the drug economy to thrive in a number of 
world regions, especially in conflict zones. The Cold War made it difficult for the two 
super powers and their allies to cooperate on a number of issues including controlling the 
illegal drug trade. In addition, the two sides turned a blind eye towards their proxies’ 
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involvement in narcotics. Alfred McCoy argues that the Cold War helped the expansion of 
illicit opium economies thrive in both Southeast Asia (Laos and in Burma) and Southwest 
Asia (especially Afghanistan) where the anti-communist groups supported by the US’s 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) benefited from and in some cases were directly 
involved in drug production and trade such as Hmong in Laos and some Mujahideen 
groups in Afghanistan.
48
 The expansion of drugs economy in various counties is closely 
linked to the competition between the super powers of the bi-polar world and conflict 
between predatory regional players. It is in this context that Chouvy says that 
“Afghanistan’s opium production is the direct outcome of Cold War rivalries and conflicts 
waged by proxies who helped develop a thriving narcotic economy in the country.”49  
Drugs, particularly opium and heroin, also played an important role in the 10-year Vietnam 
War where, by 1972, at least 85% of the US military personnel irrespective of rank were 
being offered heroin within a day of arrival. An estimated 37,000 members of the US 
military in Vietnam were addicts with many GIs smoking heroin through “their pipes 
sometimes made from cartridge cases or human bones.” 50 The heroin habit in Vietnam 
resulted in the smuggling of thousands of kilos of drugs out of the Southeast Asia to the 
United States. Initially, GIs sent drugs in letters and parcels and later large lumps of heroin 
were also sent back home “hidden inside a body bag and sometimes buried in the wounds 
of the corpse”.51  
In addition, drug prohibition regimes had the opposite results in a number of cases. As 
Chouvy says, the expansion of drug trafficking in Asia and elsewhere is linked to two 
unsuccessful drives to prohibit narcotics internationally -- the 1961 adaptation of the 
United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and the 1971 declaration of a global 
“war on drugs” by the US President Richard Nixon’s administration.52 As the demand in 
drug consuming countries remained high, measures taken to eliminate drug production did 
not yield the intended outcome. In a number of cases, drug production simply moved to 
other and/or new areas.   
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4.3 The Rise of the Golden Crescent 
Although opium has been produced and consumed in what came to be known as the 
Golden Crescent (Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan) for at least a thousand years, the scale 
and scope of opium production, trafficking and consumption vastly expanded and moved 
frequently in the second half of the 20
th
 country. The 1955 prohibition in Iran stimulated 
production in neighbouring Afghanistan and Pakistan. Similarly, Turkish prohibition of 
opium production in 1972 spurred production in the Golden Crescent region and linked 
together Asia’s two main poppy growing areas, namely the Golden Triangle (Burma, 
Thailand and Laos) in Southeast Asia and the Golden Crescent (Iran, Pakistan and 
Afghanistan) in Southwest Asia.
53
  
However, in late 1960s and early 1970s, it was Southeast Asia which established itself as 
the world’s most important source of illicit opium with the Golden Triangle region -- 
north-eastern Burma, northern Thailand, and northern Laos -- producing about 70 percent 
of the world’s illicit supply (around one thousand tons of raw opium).54 On the other hand, 
farmers in South Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India) harvested about 24 percent of the 
world’s illicit opium supply, most of which was consumed locally while only small 
quantities find their way to Europe or the US.
55
 
In the meantime, the US’s strategy in 1978 to spray Mexican poppy fields with toxic 
herbicide, Agent Orange, to eliminate the source of raw opium also resulted in a global 
shortage of illicit opium.
56
 The aerial spraying worked as the amount of “Mexican Mud” in 
the US drug market was significantly reduced. Responding to the increasing demand, 
another source of opiates emerged in the “Golden Crescent” area consisting of Afghanistan, 




Although the reduction of opium in Mexica had an impact on the expansion of drug 
economy in Asia, the rise of the “Golden Crescent” is mainly linked to a few regional 
developments in 1970s and 1980s that led to the commercialisation and export of huge 
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quantities of opium. The meteoric rise in opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan since 
1980s is neither an isolated event nor can it be solely attributed to one single factor. 
Therefore, in order to understand the geopolitics of opium in Afghanistan, it is important to 
locate the country in the geographical context of south-west Asia. In particular, events in  
Iran and Pakistan directly influenced the expansion of opium poppy cultivation in 
Afghanistan. Before discussing the dynamics of drug production in Afghanistan, it seems 
imperative to analyse the phenomenon of illicit drugs in Iran and Pakistan -- Afghanistan’s 
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4.3.1 Iran and the Development of Regional Opium Economy 
Historically, the eastern neighbour of Afghanistan had been a major producer, consumer 
and transit of opiates. There are several historical records of opium use some of which date 
back to around one thousand years ago. According to legends, the founder of the cult of 
“Assassins” or “Fida’in” (self-sacrificing agents), the “Grand-master” Hassan Sabbah 
(1050s–1124) used drugs to train young devotees of the Ismaili sect, an off-shoot of the 
Shia Muslims. On the order of the Grand-master, members of the secret society of the 
assassins were ready to give up their lives in order to eliminate the adversaries who were 
mainly politicians and generals. According to the famous Venetian traveler, Marco Polo 
(1254 – 1324), these devotees were given an opiate before they went to sleep and awoke to 
find themselves in a garden with streams of wine and beautiful ladies. The simple youth 
mostly from the rural areas were allowed to enjoy these delights for a few days before they 
were again given an opiate and taken back to the fortress where they pledged their full 
allegiance and obedience to the Grand-master with the belief that only he could take them 
to “paradise”.59 
In Persia (modern day Iran), opium had been mostly used recreational purposes. A number 
of famous Persian poets have not only mentioned the drug in their poems, they also used it 
regularly. One of the most famous Persian poets, Hafiz of Shiraz (1325-1389), wrote the 
following verse more than seven centuries ago in which he described the combined effect 
of wine and opium.  
قاس هك نویفا نآ زایم رد ی  دنكفا  
راتسد هن و دنامرس هن ار نافيرح 
(From the opium that the cupbearer threw into the wine, 
Our opponents were left with neither head nor turban.) 
Opium has been used in various ways including eating it or drinking it after mixing it with 
wine, tea or another liquid. During the Safavid Dynasty (1501 to 1722), even some of the 
Shahs (kings) were addicted to the drug.
60
 Kuknar (poppy seeds) were served in the so 
called kuknar khanas -- opium dens where addicts would gather to drink their kuknar 
                                                          
59
 Frampton, John (1929). The Most Noble and Famous Travels of Marco Polo together with the travels of 
Nicolò de ́Conti. London: Argonaut Press, 265-269. See also Kienholz, M., (2008). Opium Traders and Their 
Worlds -Volume One: A Revisionist Exposé of the World’s Greatest Opium Traders. Bllomington, IN: 
iUniverse. Lewis suggests that the association of drugs with the Assassins might have been untrue, see Lewis, 
Bernard, (2003). The Assassins: A Radical Sect in Islam. New York: Basic Books. See also Daftary, Farhad, 
(1994). The Assassin Legends: Myths of the Isma’ilis. London: I.B.Tauris, 109 -113. 
60
 Assadi, Seyed Hassan, (1998). Two Important Problems (Population Growth and Illicit Drugs) at the 
Threshold of Twenty-First Century. (Persian Language book). Tehran: Sepehr, p. 154. 
177 
 
(opium) drink. Solid opium (Afyun or Taryak) was sold at separate shops and was also 
offered at the regular coffeehouses.
61
 The use of other drugs such as bang (drink based on 
hempseed or dried hemp leaves) and hashish also has a long history in Iran and were 
commonly used in Safavid Iran. Bang and Hashish were used either medicinally to lessen 
injury, recreationally to find oblivion from boredom or as an ‘illuminating’ drink as part of 
some ecstatic rituals.
62
 Soldiers and mercenaries also used opium as it was believed that 
that eating it would make them valiant and fearless. It is recorded that at least at one 
occasion, opium and poppy seed drinks were given to Persian/Iranian soldiers who were 
sent to fight the Ottomans.
63
   
 The Persian ruling elite also found opium attractive and used it regularly for reacreation. 
Tahmasb I (1514 –1576), the second Shah of the Safavid Dynasty of Persia, who enjoyed 
the longest reign of any member of this dynasty, used opium from an early age. Most of his 
brothers and sons, including his successor Shah Ismail II, as well as a number of his 
military officers and members of his court consumed opium. They used to carry opium 
with them in special boxes ornamented with jewels
64
 and used it whenever the urge came 
whether it during their daily jobs or other activities. Small opium pills about the size of a 
pea were made to be swallowed when needed. For many, especially those who were 
addicted to the drug, the main objective of the addicts was to be euphoric. Opium was even 
used as a weapon to assassinate the third Safavid Shah of Persia, Shah Ismail II, who died 
on 24
th
 November 1577 when he was given poisoned opium drink.
65
 Matthee has called the 






 century French merchant and traveller, Jean-Baptiste Tavernier (1605 –1689) 
witnessed Kuknar Khanas (places where a sherbet (drink) made from poppies was 
consumed) and Bang Khanas, (places where bang i.e. hashish or cannabis was consumed) 
                                                          
61
 Matthee, Rudi, (2005). The Pursuit of Pleasure: Drugs and Stimulants in Iranian History, 1500-1900. New 




 Nader, Doctor, (2010). History of Drug Use in Iran. Daily Hammaihan (Persian language website), 20 July. 
[Online]: <http://forum.iransalamat.com/> [Accessed 29 Dec 2013].   
64
 Majdzadah, Sepehrdad, (Not Dated). Taryak (Opium). Encyclopaedia Islamica (in Persian Language). 
[Online]. Available at: <http://www.encyclopaediaislamica.com/madkhal2.php?sid=3509> [Accessed on 29 
Dec 2013]. 
65
 Majdzadah, Sepehrdad, (Not Dated). Taryak (Opium). op.cit; Matthee, Rudi, (2005). The Pursuit of 
Pleasure. op.cit.p. 104.  
66
 Matthee, Rudi, (2005). The Pursuit of Pleasure. op.cit. p.104.  
178 
 






Besides their tobacco they have also opium made of poppies, cut as they grow, out of 
which they draw the juice and make it into pills. They take no more at first than the head of 
a pin, increasing their dose by degrees, till they come to take the quantity of half a wall-nut. 
When they are come to that pitch, they dare not give over, for fear of endangering their 
lives, or addicting themselves to drink wine. In their youth you shall see these Theriakis or 
takers of opium, with pale pensive and dejected countenances, and the use of their speech 
almost loft; If they omit to take for a day together this ill-continued drug that heats their 
brains, and causes them to act ridiculously and to talk idly, when it has done working, they 
are as cold and stupid as before, which obliges ’em to take it again. For this reason they are 
short liv’d: or if they do live till forty, they complain heavily of the pains that proceed from 
the cold venom of the herb. They that have a mind to kill themselves, swallow a large piece, 
and drink Vinegar after it, to prevent the relief of any other counterpoyson, and so they dye 
smiling. 
They have another sort of drink to make themselves merry, which they call Kokemaar, 
composed of boyld poppy seed. They take it in broth, and there are particular houses called 
Kokemar Krone, where people meet to divertise those that see the ridiculous postures 
which that intoxicating drink causes them to shew. Before it works they quarrel with one 
another, and call one another all to naught, but never fight. When the drug begins to work, 
they grow friends; and some are for making complements, others for telling a long tedious 
story, which renders them very vain. They have also another sort of liquor, which is called 
Bongue, very bitter, being made of the leaves of Hemp and some other drug mixed with it. 
It makes those that use it shamfully foolish and ridiculous, which is the reason the Law has 
forbid that and not the former.
68
  
Similarly, John Fryer, an English physician employed by the East India Company observed 
in 1670s that both poppy cultivation and opium addiction were common in Persian. He 
also noted the “large quantities of opium eaten at a time” and the high rate of drug 
addiction in the country. According to Fryer, Iranians quaff koquenar (kuknar or opium) 
“when they have a mind to be merry.”69 Opium production in Persia reached new heights 
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during the Qajar Dynasty (1785 to 1925) when the commodity became “the main 
merchandise and majority of rural areas in Iran were involved in the cultivation of opium 
poppies.”70 Many farmers switched to poppies as it brought more money than wheat and 
other crops. Opium cultivation became so popular and widespread that it made the country 
vulnerable to famine. As a result, the local silk and fabric industry also suffered heavily. 
Opium was not only consumed inside the country where herbalists made huge profits by 
selling it to local addicts, it was also exported to East Asia, Ottoman Empire (especially 
modern Turkey) and Britain. Iranian traders opened shops and offices in Hong Kong and 
Shanghai to trade opium.
71
 A significant quantity of Persian opium was also send out to 
Lebanon, the Arab states, and Europe.
72
  
On the other hand, social ills including criminality and deterioration of family life grew 
manifold as a result of increasing drug addiction. Traditionally, opium had been ingested in 
Persian society; it underwent an important shift when many people began smoking it as of 
the later 19
th
 century. Measures taken to control the problem were haphazard and short 
lived as Persia under the Qajar dynasty remained a traditional society.
73
Opium 
consumption was so common in Qajar Iran that inveterate opium users could get 
dispensation from the obligation to abstain during Ramadan by paying the fidyah or 
offering extra alms to the poor (a leeway given in Islam to the elderly and sick persons 
who find it difficult to fast. They have to give food or its monetary equivalent to a poor 
person for each day they do not fast during the month of Ramadan). However, tobacco 
smokers didn’t enjoy the same clemency as it was not considered a necessity of life.74  
Iran continued to remain as a major producer and consumer of opium in the 20
th
 century. 
Phantastica, the classic study by a world-renowned pharmacologist and toxicologist Louis 
Lewin published in 1924 also describes Iran as a country that “occupies an important rank 
among opium-consuming lands. According to Lewin, both Muslims and non-Muslims 
“smoke a great deal of opium”, especially in Northern provinces of Iran, while “Bokhara 
and Afghanistan consume only a small amount.”75 Although Iran produced huge quantities 
of opium locally, the increasing rate of consumption meant that it had to import opium 
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from other regional producers. The League of Nations report published in 1925 says that 




Local production of opium continued to rise over the next few years. In 1934, when opium 
production was still legal in Iran, the country produced 459 tons. However, the largest 
production of opium ever reported by Iran was in 1936, when it produced some 1,346 tons 
of the drug. In 1930s, Iran produced an average of 1,000 tons annually. According to the 
Iranian government figures, the production amount in 1940 was 789 tons.
77
  
The 1949 UN report describes Iran as “one of the chief opium-producing and exporting 
countries” as well as a nation “where opium addiction is widespread”.78 Opium production 
was common in most parts of the country. Khorassan, Luristan, Isfahan and Fars were the 
largest opium producing provinces while Kermanshah, Hamadan, Yazd and Kerman 
provinces produced comparatively lower quantities of opium.
79
 Iranian opium was mainly 
consumed inside the country where it was issued in the form of sticks about six and a half 
inches long, wrapped in paper with Persian characters and a design printed in colour; blue, 
purplish red or green. Opium smoking had also been permitted until 1946 when it was 
prohibited by a decree which said that consumption of the drug in this way was not 
allowed anymore. However, the government could not enforce the ban effectively and 
drugs consumption remained alarmingly high. According to Iranian official figures, for a 
period of five years, from 1937 to 1942, the average annual opium consumption by home 
addicts was around 270 tons. At the time, the population of Iran was about sixteen and a 
half million.
80
 In 1955, the Iranian Health Minister reported that there were 1.5 million 
opium addicts in Iran and that about 2,000 kilograms of opium was smoked daily.
81
  
In 1946, when the country produced an estimated 800 tons of opium, the Council of 
Ministers issued a decree banning the cultivation of opium poppies. The following year, 
opium production in the country was estimated at 300 tons.
82
 Despite the ban on 
cultivation, Iran continued to produce large quantities of opium. At the fourth session of 
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the Commission on Narcotic Drugs in 1949, the representatives of the United States and 
the United Kingdom estimated the production of illicit opium in Iran in the year 1948-1949 
at 1,500 tons or more. However, the Iranian representative at the Commission considered 




The 1946 decree banning opium production was not enacted into law by the Iranian 
Parliament for almost a decade. It was only in October 1955 when “after many stormy 
discussions in both houses of parliament”, the bill was finally passed.84 According to Jehan 
S. Saleh, the Iranian Health Minster at the time, during the ten years from 1945 to 1955, 
the total opium harvest in Iran varied between 700 and 1,200 tons annually and exports 
during those ten years averaged 90 tons annually. Following the enactment of the law in 
1955, the Iranian government reported a strict control over poppy cultivation and opium 
consumption involving the eradication of poppy fields and the closure of hundreds of 
opium dens throughout the country.
85
  
Following the poppy ban Iran, local consumption didn’t see a significant fall. The demand 
in the local market was mostly met by supplies from elsewhere, especially Turkey, 
Pakistan and Afghanistan. On the other hand, the opium ban had a negative impact on the 
Iranian economy and growth. As opium traders made their payment for illicit opium with 
gold, it severely depleted the country’s gold reserves. Therefore, in 1969, Iran lifted the 
total ban on opium production and a scheme of licenced poppy cultivation was launched.
86
 
The licensing scheme was widely abused as huge quantities of opium were sold and 
smuggled illegally. On the other hand, the introduction of heroin in 1970s further 
complicated the drug market in Iran. As the consumption of heroin became popular, a 
number of laboratories were also set up in the country to convert opium into heroin, thus 
making Iran a heroin exporting country.
87
  
It was only after the Islamic Revolution of 1979 when tackling the drug problem became a 
main priority for the new Iranian authorities. The Iranian Supreme Leader, Ayatollah 
Khomeini, adopted several measures to reduce drug production and consumption in the 
country. Harsh punishments were introduced in order to deter drug dealers. For example, 
drug traffickers possessing more than 30 grams of heroin and five kilogram of opium were 
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given death penalty. Farmers who cultivated opium poppies were also faced harsh 
penalties. Khomeini’s regime was also successful, at least partly, to disrupt the trafficking 
of drugs from Afghanistan and Pakistan via the deserts of Central Iran to Turkey, and from 
Turkey to Europe and North America. These measures resulted in the relocation of heroin 
conversion facilities from Iran to Pakistan’s North-West frontier region as well as 
Balochistan province which shares a border with Iran. Meanwhile, poppy cultivation also 
increased in both Pakistan and Afghanistan to meet the ongoing demand for opium and 
heroin in Iran. Although, Iran managed to control opium production in the country, it 
remains one of main transit routes for drug trafficking and one of the biggest drug 
consumers.  
 
4.3.2 Pakistan: a leading opium producer of the Golden Crescent 
The territory that became Pakistan in 1947 has a long history of opium and cannabis 
production and consumption. As the UN report says, drug use “has acquired a degree of 
psychological and socio-cultural acceptance” in the country.88 The cultivation of opium 
poppies in what is now called the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Khyber-
Pakhtunkhwa/Khyber-Pashtoonkhwa province as well as parts of Punjab province predates 
the colonial times. Under the British Raj, opium production continued in a number of those 
areas which later became parts of Pakistan. 
89
 
After the creation of Pakistan, the extent and gravity of illicit drug production and 
consumption has fluctuated over time. According to the 1949 UN report, the rulers of the 
new country allowed the cultivation of opium poppies in 1947 in Khairpur State (today 
part of Sindh province), which had already been a small producer under the British 
colonial administration.
90
 Meanwhile, the government imported opium from India to sell it 
through the well-established vend system which involved licenced shops marketing opium 
to registered users and hakeems (traditional medicinal practitioners and herbalists). In 1947, 
there were 328 such shops of which 267 were in Punjab, and only a few of them were in 
the North-West Frontier Province.  
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In mid 1950s, the government ceased importations of opium from India and permitted 
cultivation in Punjab province under the International Opium Protocol of 1953. An opium 
factory was also established in Lahore, the capital of Punjab province, to supply opium to 
the vend shops. The central government then shifted attention to the North-West Frontier 
Province (NWFP) and allowed poppy cultivation in three settled districts (Swabi, Mardan 
and Peshawar) in 1956-57 through a licensing scheme. By the end of the decade, the 
licencing scheme was abused by both officials and farmers. Monitoring of poppy 
cultivation was not robust as officials usually took bribes from violators of licensing 
scheme as well as drug dealers. As a result, unregulated cultivation expanded to many 
other districts as well as in the Tribal Areas on the border with Afghanistan.
91
 Within three 
decades of its existence, drug production expanded dramatically in Pakistan and the 
country became a major world producer of opium. In mid-1970s, the annual opium 
production in the country was estimated to be between 150 and 200 tons
92
 while the 1977-
8 opium production was 500 metric tons.
93
 By 1978-79, the NWF province alone produced 
800 metric tons, of which less than 5 metric tons were legally produced. The illicit raw 
opium was either converted into heroin locally or smuggled to Iran or Turkey for furterh 
processing. The 1978-79 bumper crop in Pakistan resulted in a huge international pressure, 
both from the UN and Western countries, as the government was repeatedly asked to 
outlaw opium production altogether. 
94
    
In addition to local dynamics, two regional factors contributed to the rapid expansion of 
drug production in Pakistan in 1970s. The enforcement of the ban on opium production 
and the imposition of severe restrictions on drug trafficking in Iran after the 1979 Islamic 
revolution forced several drug producers and traffickers to shift to Pakistan (and 
Afghanistan). The new Iranian government led by Khomeini, also started a systematic 
campaign to reduce opium and heroin consumption in the country. Coincidently, Iran took 
these tough measures in the same year (1979), when Pakistan had a record opium 
production. Consequently, Pakistani traffickers, who used to traffic a significant quantity 
of their opium to Iran, resorted to heroin refining inside the country. This spurred heroin 
consumption in Pakistan itself while the remainder was smuggled to Europe and the US.
95
 
Meanwhile, regional instability resulting from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 
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also created a suitable environment for drugs production and trafficking in both Pakistan 
and Afghanistan.  
In 1970s, Pakistan was not only cultivation opium poppies on a large scale; it also started 
drug processing and heroin manufacturing. Anticipating a crackdown from the authorities, 
a number of drug laboratories were moved into the semi-autonomous Tribal Areas along 
the Durand Line where, due separate political and legal structures, they could operate with 
near impunity. By 1978, heroin was not only manufactured in the Tribal Areas, the 
industry had been established in several settled districts where the government had full 
jurisdiction.
96
 Thus by the end of the decade, Pakistan was not only a major producer of 
drugs, it was also “a major transit and consumer of heroin.” 97 By 1981, it was “a fully-
pledged production country”, the year when “Pakistani heroin accounted for 73% of all 
heroin seized in Europe, the Middle-East, Africa and Central Asia including 90% of that 
seized in the United Kingdom”.98  
In the meantime, the policies of the Pakistani military dictator, General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-
1988), who got power in a coup, also changed the dynamics of drugs economy in Pakistan 
and the wider region. As drug production increased during the first years of his rule, 
General Zia was under a continued US pressure to put an end to poppy cultivation. On the 
other hand, he was also promoting his own agenda of enacting Islamic norms for public 
life. Therefore, in February 1979, General Zia promulgated the Hudood Ordinance which 
banned the use of all intoxicants, including narcotics, and prohibited the legal and 
regulated production, sale, and consumption of intoxicants such as opium, cannabis as well 
as alcohol.
99
 General Zia also ordered the closure of “previously licensed opium shops, 
hence cutting the legitimate supply to consumers.”100 Years later, in 1995, Presidential 
Ordinance further clarified the situation around the opium production and trafficking in 
Pakistan which resulted in further reduction in opium production. Pakistan passed two 
more laws -- the Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF) Act and the Control of Narcotics Substances 
Act -- during the second government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (1997-1999). 
However, due to the “failure or the reluctance of the various government agencies to 
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enforce the Acts passed”, Pakistan failed to prevent drug production and trafficking or 
convict major drug traffickers. 
There were three main reasons for reducing drug production in Pakistan since the 
government’s ban in 1979. The eradication of opium poppy fields was a key part of the 
country’s counter-narcotics strategy. In addition, the international community helped in the 
provision of alternative development/alternative livelihood for poppy farmers.
101
 As a 





where the war that had started with the 1979 Soviet invasion had weakened the state 
institutions and destroyed much of the agricultural infrastructure in many parts of the 
country. The ban on poppy cultivation in Pakistan triggered the illegal drugs industry in the 
country and resulted in an increased number of factories converting opium into heroin. As 
Booth says, at the time, most of the “Golden Crescent” heroin was refined in laboratories 
in Pakistan.
104
 The heroin was then smuggled to Pakistan’s coastal and border areas from 
where it is destined further to the high priced markets of Europe and the US.
105
 
Meanwhile, many farmers in Pakistan continued to cultivate opium poppies despite the ban. 
In 1980s, poverty, falling prices of legal agricultural commodities such as cotton, wheat 
and tobacco as well as the farmers’ debt problems forced many farmers to cultivate 
poppies. In addition, the food aid Islamabad received regularly from the international 
community for distribution among the hundreds of thousands Afghan refugees, who had 
started migrating to Pakistan since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, also 
contributed to the fall of prices of local commodities especially in the former’s North-West 
region. Thus it was mainly a combination of these factors which prompted a number of 
farmers in Pakistan to turn to expansive cash crops such as opium poppies to avoid 
economic ruin. However, during the 1980s, the gradual and large scale shift of poppy 
cultivation from Pakistan to Afghanistan altered Pakistan’s position from a major drug 
producer to a main transit nation for narcotics produced in Afghanistan. Large quantities of 
drugs were smuggled in and through the Pakistani territory especially through its coastal 
areas and along the border with Iran.  
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Infiltration of state institutions by narco-traffickers and the links between drug barons, 
politicians and security officials -- often referred to as “narcotics-politics nexus” and 
“drug-military nexus” -- created a suitable environment for a large scale trafficking of 
illicit drugs in Pakistan. Based on the principle of mutual benefits, this nexus which “began 
in the late 1970s came to be consolidated by the 1980s.” 106  Officials in nearly all 
government institutions, including the military, have been accused of involvement in or 
benefiting from the illicit drugs economy. According to Chandran, the Army, the most 
powerful institution in the country, “needed the drug money to pursue its security interests 
in Afghanistan and northern India. The drug mafia needed the support of the Army for the 
safe passage of drugs.”107  
Shanty also says that the Pakistani military and intelligence agencies used the drug trade 
“as a funding mechanism for various insurgent movements.”108  Serious allegations of 
official Pakistani involvement in the drug trade emerged during the 1980s when Pakistan’s 
main intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), was serving as a conduit for 
delivery of US covert arms and material to Afghan Mujahideen groups fighting against the 
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Moreover, it was also reported that both civilian and 
military officials of President Zia’s government (1977-1988) were involved in the 
transportation of drugs from Afghanistan in 1980s. A report prepared by a consultant for 
the CIA in 1992, said that “drug corruption had permeated virtually all segments of 
Pakistani society” and that “drug kingpins were closely connected to the country’s key 
institutions of power, including the president and military intelligence agencies”.109 In 
addition, the US’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officials turned “a blind eye to 
participation in the trade by some of the anti-Soviet Afghan guerrillas they backed from 
Pakistan in the war”.110  
According to Bird and Marshal, many Pakistani officials including those “at the highest 
level in government were complicit”111 in the drug trade. Sixteen military officers were 
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arrested on charges of heroin trafficking in 1986 alone.
112
 Officials of Pakistan’s main 
intelligence agency, ISI, have also been accused of protecting heroin traffickers.
113
 In 
addition, the country’s army reportedly used its vehicles to traffic drugs within Pakistan. 
The ISI usually used trucks from Pakistan’s military National Logistics Cell (NLC) to 
carry arms from Karachi sea port to the Afghan border. According to Chouvy, the agency 
“also allowed NLC trucks to return from the border loaded with opium and heroin.”114 The 




Although some of the locally produced heroin was consumed inside the country, most of it 
was smuggled abroad, mainly to Europe, US and the Middle East. According to US 
intelligence officials in 1990s, the heroin smuggled through Pakistan accounted “for 
perhaps 20 percent of the heroin market in the United States.”116 On the other hand, several 
members of Pakistani air force also used their planes to smuggle heroin outside Pakistan. 
At one occasion, the US’s Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) arrested a Squadron 
Leader of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF), who was carrying two kilogram of heroin in the 
Pakistan Air Force (PAF) flight in New York.
117
  
A study commissioned by the CIA and leaked to the media in 1993, disclosed that a 
number of members of the Pakistani military and intelligence agencies were “significantly 
involved in narcotics” and used the drug money to finance covert operations or to enrich 
themselves.
118
 Pakistani officials rejected these accusations as usual. However, a few 
months later in September 1994, Nawaz Sharif
119
 who had been Prime Minster of Pakistan 
first from 1990-1993, told the Washington Post, that “Pakistan’s army chief and the head 
of its intelligence agency proposed a detailed ‘blueprint’ for selling heroin to pay for the 
country’s covert military operations” and sought his approval. In an interview with the 
Newspaper, “Sharif claimed that three months after his election as prime minister in 
November 1990, General Aslam Beg, then army chief of staff, and General Asad Durrani, 
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then head of the main intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), told him the 
armed forces needed more money for covert foreign operations and wanted to raise it 
through large-scale drug deals”. Sharif said that “both General Beg and General Durrani 
insisted that Pakistan’s name would not be cited at any place because the whole operation 
would be arrived at by trustworthy third parties.”120 In addition, politicians and political 
parties have also been accused of accepting donations from known drug barons some of 
whom became politicians themselves and won seats in the national parliament and 
provincial assemblies.  
Pakistan faced three main drug problems since early 1970s; (a) drug cultivation and 
trafficking within the country, (b) drug trafficking through the country as a transit route 
and (c) drug consumption within the country. The country also became an outlet as well as 
a market for the drugs produced in neighbouring Afghanistan. In addition, opium produced 
in Afghanistan was converted into high-quality white heroin in make shift laboratories in 
Pakistan. Although Pakistan still remains both a market and an outlet for drugs, the country 
managed to reduce its annual harvest from 800 tonnes in 1979 to near zero levels in 1999 
and 2000. It eventually got “poppy free” status in 2000-01121; the year Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan imposed a total ban on opium poppy cultivation. However, poppy cultivation 
was reported again soon and since 2003, small scale opium production has been taking 
place in Balochistan province and in the North-West of the country.
122
  
In recent years, Pakistan, though considered by the US as a “close ally” in its “war on 
terror” has been again accused of having benefitted from the drug trade. When on 20th 
March 2003, the former US ambassador to Pakistan, Wendy Chamberlin, was asked while 
testifying under oath before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the House 
Committee on International Relations, about the degree of “the Pakistani ISI involvement 
in the opium business on the Afghan-Pakistan border over the last 6 years”, her answer was 
“substantial.”123 Pakistan is still a major drug transit route, a main source for precursor 
chemicals to convert opium into heroin and a chief consumer of opaites.  
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4.4 Afghanistan and the Opium Production 
Opium poppies have been cultivated in the area which later became known as Afghanistan 
for centuries. With its many healing properties, opium has been known as an important 
medicine used to cure several problems including pain and flu. In addition, opium has also 
been used for recreational purposes in certain parts of the country, especially in some 
eastern and northern regions. In 2008, an international team of conservators and 
archaeologists found the world’s oldest-known oil paintings dating back to the mid-seventh 
century A.D. depicting images of Buddha, bodhisattvas, and female devotees among other 
scenes in a series of caves in Afghanistan’s Bamiyan Valley, which lay on the Silk Road 
where goods and ideas flowed between the East and the West for millennia. Their research 
revealed that paint samples contained drying oils, most likely walnut and poppy-seed oils, 
which are key ingredients in oil-based paints.
124
 Around one thousand years ago, opium 
poppies were cultivated on a limited scale during the Ghaznavid Empire (975 to 1186) 
whose capital was in Ghazni - a city in today’s south-central Afghanistan. It was mostly 
used as a medicine to kill pains and cure sleeplessness/insomnia.
125
  
Perhaps the first historical account of the opium consumption in Afghanistan is that of 
Abu’l Fazl Bayhaqi (995-1077) who was born in what is now western Afghanistan, and 
served as the head of the secretariat of the Ghaznavid court and official historian of the 
dynasty.
126
 According to Bayhaqi, the Ghaznavid Sultan, Masud I (Reign 1031-1040), who 
was famous for his valour and martial skills, took some opium due to tiredness on his way 
to Nishapur (in today’s Iran) to fight the rebellious Seljuk General, Toghril Beg. After 
consuming opium, the Sultan went to sleep while riding on an elephant. The elephant 
driver reduced the speed thinking moving fast will disturb his sleep. This gave Toghril 
enough time to escape the area and go to safety.
127
 Toghril later managed to assemble a 
bigger army to weaken the Ghaznavid Sultan and declared himself as an independent ruler.  
Although the medicinal use of opium had been known for a long time in Afghanistan, its 
production was not widespread. The recreational use of drugs including opium is generally 
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discouraged in the Afghan society and opium eaters are not seen as respected members of 
the society. A popular Pashto proverb calls people addicted to opium as worthless.  
يکيا هپ هود !يکايرات.  
(Opium eater(s)! two with a coin.) 
Opium was rare in Turkestan (roughly today’s Central Asia) as late as the 19th century and 
people usually smoke bang/hashish as a narcotic.
128
 As the UN report says, opium 
consumption remained relatively low in Afghanistan with only a few parts of the country, 
especially north-eastern Badakhshan province had “something like an ‘opium tradition’; 
but even this does not appear to date back much longer than the 18th century.” 129 
According to the classic study of narcotic plants, Phantastica, published in 1924, opium 
production and consumption was not common in Central Asia. The book adds that “the 
Uzbeks and Tartars are addicted to hemp” while mainly dervishes consumed hashish in 
Afghanistan and Balochistan as part of their ecstatic practices.
130
 Contemporary record 
show that even hashish production was not widespread in Afghanistan in the 19
th
 century. 
As locally produced hashish was not enough for a small number of users in the country, the 
commodity was imported from the Chinese Turkestan. French explorer, Gabriel Bonvalot, 
who visited Central Asia in 1880s, wrote about one of his encounters with a couple of 
Afghan traders in the snowy Pamir mountains who were on their way from Kashgar 
(Chinese Turkestan) to Kabul through Badakhshan bringing Khame (cotton fabric), Tibet 
goats’ wool and hashish.131 
In the first half of the 20
th
 century, Afghan authorities reported opium production inside the 
country “though it was then still very modest.”132 Afghanistan participated in the meetings 
of the Permanent Central Opium Board held under the auspices of the League of 
Nations.
133
 Representatives of the Afghan government also attended the Second Opium 
Conference held in Geneva in 1924
134
 and reported poppy cultivation in only three regions 
-- northern Badakhshan (bordering Chinese Turkestan), western Herat (bordering Iran) and 
eastern Jalalabad (bordering North-West Frontier region of the then British India and now 
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 However, the amounts of opium produced in these areas, was “still very small 
compared to other reporting countries.”136 Most of the opium produced was exported to 
Iran while a very small amount was consumed locally mainly as a medicine.
137
  
For the first time, quantitative estimates of opium production in Afghanistan were provided 
for the year 1932 during which the country produced 75 tons of opium with an area of 
cultivation of 3,846 hectares.
138
 China, in comparison, produced about 6,000 tons in the 
same year.
139
 According to the UN report, importations by the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR) from Afghanistan averaged nearly 18 tons from 1934 to 1937 and 
reached just above 50 tons in 1938. Some of the Afghan opium was also imported by 
Germany, France and the US in 1930s.
140
 
Afghanistan prohibited opium production in 1945.
141
 Although the government was not 
able to enforce the ban fully, opium production had fallen to 12 tons by 1956.
142
 In 1955, 
the Afghan government issues another Opium Law containing guidelines for legal opium 
production through a licensing scheme. According to the Law, licenses had to be renewed 
annually and, in addition, the government representatives were tasked to supervise and 
monitor poppy farms and opium production. The Law also made the government the sole 
controller of cultivation and export of opium and made it obligatory for farmers to sell 
their produce to the government in exchange of cash. On the other hand, the health 
ministry was instructed to formulate and implement a strategy to fight opium consumption 
in the country.
143
 In 1956, the government promulgated another law called “the law of 
prohibiting the cultivation, trade, selling and buying, shipment and consumption of opium 
in Afghanistan” and declared that violators will be punished. 144  The new law which 
replaced the previous one allowed legal production of opium under a licensing scheme. 
However, despite the official ban, small scale opium production continued in some remote 
areas. According to the report of the International Narcotics Control Board in 1970, the 
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4.5 Expansion of Opium Industry in Afghanistan 
Although Aghanistan is a mountainous country and only around 12 percent of its land is 
arable, it has been mainly an agricultural society. Even today, farming remains the 
primary means of existence for around 70 percent of Afghans. By the time the 
communists staged a coup in Kabul in April 1978 (which was followed by the Soviet 
invasion of the country the next year), agriculture accounted for 60% of the country’s 
production and 85% of the population were peasants or nomads.
146
 The main agricultural 
products in Afghanistan include fresh and dry fruits, vegatables and wheat. Contrary to the 
popular perception, “historically, Afghanistan did not have a strong opium tradition or 
culture.”147 As Byrd and Gildestad say, before 1978, Afghanistan was self-sufficient in 
food production and agricultural products constituted over 30% of the total exports earning 
the country US$ 100 million per year.
148
 According to a UN report:  
“In contrast to India, Iran and other parts of Asia, opium poppy was not really a ‘traditional 
crop’ in Afghanistan. It was not cultivated in most parts of the country until the 1990s. 
Unlike many other countries in the region, Afghanistan did not have much of an ‘opium 
culture’…It was only in the late 20th century, notably in its last two decades, that 
Afghanistan emerged as an important opium producer.”149 
A combination of several external and internal factors including war, a spill-over from 
regional countries and increasing demand for opium in the region and beyond triggered the 
rapid expansion of poppy cultivation and the entrenchment of drugs economy in 
Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, opium production can be divided into two major phases -- 
before and after the Soviet invasion of 1979. The pre-Soviet invasion opium production 
was much lower and was mainly exported to Iran. In addition, the cultivation of opium 
poppies was limited to only a few areas as majority of farmers didn’t even know how to 
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produce opium. There were four main factors that contributed to eventually make 
Afghanistan as the biggest opium producer in the world. 
Firstly, the ban on opium production in Iran in 1955 was the first major external factor 
responsible for an increased poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. The Iranian ban brought a 
halt to the drug production in the country that has been a major producer and home to a 
large population of drug addicts. A number of Iranian smugglers fled to Pakistan to avoid 
the crack down of the new government in Tehran. The shortage of opium in Iran stimulated 
production in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Several Afghan farmers, especially in 
southern and western provinces benefitted from the resources and expertise of the Iranian 
drug dealers and started cultivating opium poppies.  
Secondly, at around the same time, the opium harvest in East Asia was bad which 
increased the international demand for opium. The prices of opium also went high which 
served as an extra incentive for many farmers in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
150
 Meanwhile, 
Turkey also controlled its illicit production of opium adding to the demand both in the 
established markets as well as countries where the consumption of opiates was a new 
phenomenon. Meanwhile, international drug trafficking groups in various countries 
including China, Colombia, Mexico and Nigeria were “aggressively marketing heroin in 
the United States and Europe.” 151 In Afghanistan, despite the increasing regional and 
international demand, opium production remained low until mid-1970s and almost all of it 
was exported to Iran.
152
  
Thirdly, responding to an increasing Western pressure to curb opium production, and part 
of his own Islamisation agenda, the Pakistani dictator, General Zia-ul-Haq, banned the 
crop in February 1979. The poppy ban in Pakistan also pushed some Pakistani drugs 
smugglers and producers to go to Afghanistan from who then taught the Afghan farmers 
how to produce opium. At the same time, opium production experienced another set-back 
in the region when Afghanistan’s eastern neighbour, Iran, imposed a strict ban on drug 
production after the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Following the ban by the Khomeini 
regime, “the Iran drug barons shifted their capital to the Afghan Helmand Valley”,153 
where poppy cultivation expanded markedly.  
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Fourthly, the 1979 Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan destroyed most of the 
country’s agricultural infrastructure and resulted in the collapse of government in many 
parts of the country. Most of the rural economy deteriorated in the war with food 
production falling by half to two thirds in 1979-80. This resulted in a shift in agricultural 
livelihood strategies as the collateral damage from intense fighting destroyed other income 
generating activities. A number of farmers started cultivating opium poppies, especially in 
areas where the government control was absent; to get the much needed cash to survive.
154
    
As most of the Mujahideen resistance fighters were based in the country side, the Soviet 
forces “pursued a determined campaign of destroying agriculture in Afghanistan”.155 The 
strategy was aimed at starving the Mujahideen by denying them food supplies and 
deterring farmers and villagers from giving them food and shelter. The Soviet forces 
employed several tactics including arresting and killing of farmers suspected of having 
links with the Mujahideen, destroying food supplies and means of food production and 
reprisal attacks. This resulted in the “whole regions” of the country becoming “areas if 
barren waste”.156 The delicate and complex Afghan food system mostly involved Karez -- 
the traditional underground aqueduct system or underground water channels -- which bring 
water from hills and springs to cultivate flatlands through a series of underground wells 
connected by tunnels. These channels require constant maintenance against silting and 
cave-ins and are extremely vulnerable to bombing. As Karezes were sometimes used by 
the Mujahideen fighters to hide, the Soviet forces targeted these wells and channels which 
resulted in the destruction of the entire agricultural infrastructure in many parts of the 
country. In addition, as the war displaced millions of people internally, and millions other 
became refugee in Pakistan and Iran, Karezes were not maintained anymore and most of 
them eventually dried.
157 
In general, the war destroyed most of the country’s economy and 
resulted in a substantial fall in the gross domestic product (GDP). Summing the destructive 
impact of the war on Afghan economy, the 2003 UN report says:    
“There was considerable destruction in the country resulting in the gross national product 
(GNP) per capita falling from an already very low level of $222 in 1984 to $164 in 1991, a 
decline by more than a quarter in seven years and – compared with published UNDP 
figures – the third lowest GNP per capita figure in the world after Mozambique and 
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Ethiopia. As an estimated 9% of the population were killed between 1978 and 1989 and a 
third fled the country, thus the decline of overall GDP amounted to almost 60% over the 
1981-1991 period. In addition, UNDP estimated Afghanistan’s GDP to have amounted to 
$1.72 bn in 1991/92 compared to $2.6 bn in 1978/79, i.e. a decline by some 50% based on 
nominal US-dollar figures. If the calculation is based on constant US-dollars (i.e. taking 
inflation into account), the real decline was again close to 60%...Between 1979 and 1989 
regular agricultural production was severely disrupted. Between half and two thirds of all 
villages were bombed. The amount of live-stock fell by 70%. Between a quarter and one 
third of the country’s irrigation systems were destroyed. About one third of all farms were 
abandoned. The reduction in fertilizer availability and affordability lowered crop yields 
further; in some areas fertilizer use declined by 90 percent. Thus, by 1988 total food 
production had declined to around 45% of the level prevailing before the Soviet invasion in 
1979. The country had to import 500,000 tons of wheat annually from the Soviet Union. 
This went hand in hand with a severe depopulation in the rural parts of the country: a third 
of the population fled the country between 1978 and 1989 and 11 percent became internal 
refugees, migrating to the urban centres.”158 
On the other hand, the war made Afghanistan as one of the most mine-affected countries in 
the world. By the end of 2000, a total area of about 940 sq. km. of mine-contaminated land 
had been identified and surveyed and additional minefields are still being discovered in 
previously unsurveyed areas. Landmines have been taking a devastating toll of human 
lives, health, and livelihoods with farmers and nomads being the main victims. Many parts 
of the country became no go areas for them due to mines and unexploded ordnance.
159
 
Therefore, a number of farmers switched to opium as the crop needed less water and 
brought them more money than other crops.  
Meanwhile, some of the Mujahideen also started benefitting from the drugs economy and 
used the production and sale of opium to purchase arms as part of their war against the 
Soviet occupation. Some local commanders exploited drugs for their own personal goals 
and used the drugs money to expand their power and control. It was in these anarchic 
circumstances that an “opium for arms trade” also emerged.160 In addition, the collapse of 
the state in the Afghan countryside was a golden opportunity for the regional and 
international drug mafia to invest in new suppliers of drugs in order to fill the gap opened 
up in the international opium market. In addition, the existence of refining laboratories and 
international smugglers in next door in Pakistan also played an important role to make 
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Afghanistan a major opium producing country.
161
 By 1980s, it was becoming clear that 
“internal factors were leading to an upswing in Afghan opium production while external 
factors were opening major markets, ensuring the economic viability of opium 
production.”162 
According to the UN report, “opium production in Afghanistan grew at an average rate of 
15% per annum over the 1980-2000 period, almost twice as fast as the global opium 
production growth rate of 8%.”163 In 1979, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, 
less than 200 tons of opium was produced in the country.
164
 In the period succeeding the 
onset of the conflict, drug production continued to expand. Afghanistan produced about 19% 
of world opium in 1980. In 1988, in less than a decade, the production rose from 200 tons 
to 1,000 tons. Ove the previous four decades, the Golden Triangle region of Southeast Asia 
was the main opium producer. Thus the demand created internationally, as well as conflict, 
poverty and drought in Afghanistan prepared ground for a bumper opium crop year after 
year. The proportion of opium production in Afghanistan grew to 52% by 1995, the year 
prior to the Taliban takeover of Kabul, when production levels in the country reached 
3,000 mt. In 1999, Afghanistan produced of 4,600 tons; around 79% of the global illicit 
opium. Thus within just two decades, (1980s and 1990s), an opium economy became 
firmly established in the country and flourished in the conditions of conflict.
165
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A number of internal factors supported the trend of opium production in the country such 
as (a) climatic conditions for poppy cultivation are very favourable in Afghanistan, (b) 
farmers derive more income from illicit narcotic crops than from legitimate ones, (c) rural 
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poverty, and (d) weakness or absence of state institutions especially in remote country side. 
Although most of these conditions had existed in Afghanistan for a long time, they didn’t 
result in making the country a major producer of drugs. It was mainly the conflict that 
created a suitable environment for the drugs economy to flourish.  
 As a UN report says, “the Soviet occupation triggered the development of an opium 
economy”, in Afghanistan.168 However, the drug economy became even more entrenched 
in Afghanistan’s domestic economy after the withdrawal of the Soviet forces. During the 
ten years of the Soviet occupation of the country (1979-1989), “the average annual growth 
rate for the production of opium in Afghanistan was 14%...but it accelerated to 19% 
between 1989 and 1994.”169  
For ordinary farmers, the main motivation for cultivating opium poppies has generally 
been the high price of opium. Opium proved to be “a miracle crop for Afghanistan’s 
battered rural economy -- a durable commodity commanding a high price, with a 
guaranteed market outlet, easy to transport, and non-perishable, so that stocks can be 
carried over as a price hedge.”170 The dozens of farmers and villagers I interviewed during 
my field work repeatedly said that opium turned a much higher profit than other traditional 
crops such as wheat, cotton and fruits and vegetables. It is consistent with several other 
surveys conducted by the UN and other organisations. In October 2003, shortly before the 
start of the 2003/04 opium planting season, UNODC interviewed a sample of 1,329 
farmers and village headmen in the opium producing regions of Afghanistan about their 
intention and motivation to plant opium poppies. The main reasons cited included the 
alleviation of poverty (31%); high prices of opium (30%); access to credit (18%); 
purchasing luxury items such as motorcycles (7%); and the expectation of compensation 
for eradication (8%). In addition, 77% of the farmers interviewed were aware of the 
Afghan government ban, and 33% were “prepared to respect it”, most adding the caveat “if 
there is development assistance”.171 A decade later, in 2013, the UNODC report said that 
72% of farmers cited high sale price to be the most important reason for cultivating opium 
poppy. In addition, high income from little land, improving living conditions, and the 
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Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, the country entered the new 
decade with its economy destroyed and infrastructure in ruins. Meanwhile, aid, both from 
the Soviet Union and Western countries decreased dramatically. As the international 
strategic scene changed after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, 
Afghanistan was largely neglected by the United States and its allies. New players, mainly 
neighbouring and regional countries including Pakistan, Iran, the newly emerged Central 
Asian states, Russia and Saudi Arabia competed for influence in an Afghanistan severely 
weakened by years of wars and destruction. These state actors backed their proxies in a 
changed regional set up and engaged in a new struggle to dominate the strategically located 
Afghanistan. 
When the Kabul government backed by the Soviet Union and later Russia collapsed in 
April 1992, an internal war began in the country with local commanders and factional 
leaders violently struggling to expand their political and economic power. The breakdown 
of the central government resulted in the weakening of social and legal constraints on 
opium trade. Opium increasingly became the means of financing the activities of warlords 
who took greater control of trafficking activities. Opium provided a viable source of 
income for warring factions. As sources of external support and patronage of warring 
factions ceased or decreased, drug production, trafficking and taxing the drug trade and 
production became a major source for many factions and warlords. As the internal conflict 
expanded “various factions had a direct interest in giving opium a market of increasingly 
viability while markets for other crops continued to deteriorate.” 173  
On the other hand, farmers who returned home after living in Pakistan and Iran as refugees 
for years found their farms and irrigation canals destroyed. As their families had grown in 
size, opium seemed a better option and sustainable alternative for a number of farmers to 
feed their families and pay for other expanses such medicines and transportation. In 
addition, drug dealers were readily available to give farmers credit -- cash before the poppy 
cultivation to buy seed and fertilizers which they paid the pay back after the harvest.  
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Drought and water scarcity also pushed numerous farmers towards opium poppy which is a 
less thirsty crop. In addition, opium is a durable commodity and can be retained and 
stocked for years. Meanwhile, “food prices rose by factors of five or ten and the 
government financed its growing budget deficits by printing money. People lost faith in the 
currency and opium increasingly became a means of saving and exchange”.174 Moreover, 
the increasing monetization of the economy necessitated by the war had created incentives 
for cash based activities such as the sale of opiates.
175
 Therefore, in a high-risk 
environment and in the context of a highly fragmented power, a number of farmers and 
local commanders pursued new survival strategies including predation (by commanders 
and) and poppy cultivation (by peasants).
176
 These conditions made whole sectors of the 
economy perverted as in many parts of the country, cultivating opium became the only 
form of survival for rural communities. In addition, commodity trade was distorted because, 
“apart from arms and contraband, the only other commodity worth trading was opium.”177  
By the time the Taliban emerged in the fall of 1994, Afghanistan was already a major 
opium producer with about 56% of the poppy crop grown in those areas of southern 
Afghanistan the group captured within a year, while 39% was cultivated in eastern 
provinces, which it took a year later.
178
 In 1990s, with the state control absent, neither the 
Taliban nor their opponents treated poppy cultivation and opium trading as criminal 
activities.  The opium trade in the country was by and large peaceful and competitive.
179
 It 
was open and new traders could easily enter the drug market.  
In the second half of 1999s, the security brought by the Taliban created a more suitable 
environment for opium trade. As the risk decreased in the Taliban controlled areas, the 
drug traders felt safe to travel and conduct their business without the fear of being 
intimidated by local warlords or robbed by criminals. The Taliban regime not only allowed 
the opium market to remain open, it also levied taxes on both poppy farmers and drug 
dealers. Although the eastern and north-eastern regions of Afghanistan had a relatively 
long history of opium production, it was under the Taliban regime when opium production 
increased dramatically in southern Afghanistan. In 2000, the Taliban controlled southern 
Helmand province was the highest producer of raw opium with 1,853 mt. or 57% of the 
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 However, in the same year, the Taliban announced a total ban on 
opium cultivation. Due to the Taliban opium ban, The national production of raw opium 
for the year 2001 was only 185 mt. which constituted a reduction of 94% from 3,276 mt. 
recorded in 2000 and a reduction of 96% from the record high of nearly 4,600 mt. After the 
Taliban’s poppy ban, opium production was mainly confined to just those three provinces 
which were still outside the Taliban control. This was a marked reduction from the year 
2000 when opium production was reported from 22 provinces.
181
 In 2001, 151 mt. opium 
(out of the national total of 185 mt.) was produced in the north-eastern Badakhshan 
province which was controlled by anti-Taliban coalition commonly called as the Northern 
Alliance. The combined opium production of Badakhshan’s two biggest producing districts, 
Jurm and Keshim, was 134 mt; 72% of the national total.
182
   
In the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Taliban as a result of the US led intervention 
in late 2001, the new Afghan government renewed the ban on the production and trade of 
drugs. However, it lacked the capacity and resources to enforce its ban. Meanwhile, former 
warlords, who returned to areas they had lost to the Taliban, exploited the vacuum of 
power in many parts of the country and encouraged opium production. On the other hand, 
farmers suffering from several years of drought and the Taliban opium ban used the 
transitional vacuum to cultivate opium poppies in order to pay back the accumulated debts 
and earn relatively more money. In 2003-2004, the Taliban slowly re-emerged as an 
insurgent movement and took control of huge areas in the country side. The group not only 
reversed its ban on poppy cultivation, it started providing protection to poppy farmers by 
fighting against the Afghan government’s forces who were tasked to eradicate poppy fields.  
On the other hand, over the next few years, the drug mafia became more organised in the 
country and infiltrated the state institutions. By late 2005, the consolidation of control over 
drug trafficking by a limited number of key traffickers was well underway. As Shaw says, 
these major drug dealers are “connected through payment and patronage to senior political 
figures who provide the required protection”. 183  Therefore, an informal alliance was 
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established between poppy farmers, local commanders, Taliban insurgents and corrupt 
government officials, all of whom want to continue benefitting from the drugs economy. 
Although the Afghan government eradicates thousands of hectares of poppy farms every 
year, poppy cultivation has continuously increased since the fall of the Taliban. The vast 
majority (around 90%) of poppy cultivation takes place in most insecure provinces of the 
country. Southern Helmand province, a main theatre of the war, has been Afghanistan’s 
principal poppy cultivating province since 2004, with around half of the country’s total 
poppy cultivation.
184
 According to UNODC’s 2014 Afghanistan Opium Survey, the total 
area under opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan was estimated to be 224,000 hectares 









As shown in the figure below, drug production has also increased year over year. In 2014, 
the UNODC and Afghanistan’s Ministry of Counter-narcotics estimated that opium 
production in Afghanistan amounted to 6,400 tons (5,100-7,800 tons), an increase of 17% 
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from its 2013 level (5,500 tons). The increase in the production of opium was mainly 







Figure 4.5: Opium production in Afghanistan, 1994-2014 (Tons). (Source: UNODC, (2014)
187 
 
Afghans earn relatively little from the illegal drug trade while the greatest proportion of 
profit is accrued by foreigners. As Rubin says, “super-profits in the global drug market 
derive from the risk premium of marketing an illegal commodity in wealthy societies.” 
Afghan opium traders generally sell only to the border and are not involved in the lucrative 
retail markets mainly in the West.
188
  
According to the 2010 World Drug Report, the total value of the heroin market at retail 
level is an estimated US$55 billion while the size of the annual opium market is US$7-10 
billion. Nearly half of the overall opiate (opium/heroin) market value (US$65) is accounted 
for by Europe (some US$20 billion) and the Russian Federation (US$13 billion). 
According to UNODC, “most profits are generated downstream, leaving Afghan producers 
with only a fraction of the profits.” After adjusting to include the profits derived from 
trafficking of opium and the conversion of opium to morphine and/or heroin, the UNODC 
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estimated the value to the Afghan opium economy in 2009 at US$2.4 billion or only about 
3.5% of the total value of the global opiate industry. Among all the major actors in the 
drugs economy, poppy farmers usually get the least amount of money. The report adds that 
the farm-gate value to the farmer for cultivation and immediate sale of opium was 
estimated at US$0.4 billion in 2009.
189
 According to the UN report, Afghan farmers earn 
less than one percent of the value of the global opium economy.
190
 
Vertical price structure and the price margins at different stages show a huge price 
variation at each main stage starting from the farm-gate inside Afghanistan to the main 
transit countries surrounding Afghanistan and finally, in the distant consuming countries. 
The figure below illustrates vertical structure of opiate prices from farms in Afghanistan to 
the wholesale and final retail level in the United Kingdom, a major consumer of the 
Afghan opium. It shows that “the vast bulk of ‘value added’ in the drug industry is 
generated outside Afghanistan, with a substantial chunk accruing in neighbouring countries 
but even bigger price margins in transit to industrialized consumer countries.”191  
 
 
Figure 4.6: UK “Value Chain” for Heroin in 2004. (Source: UNODC, World Bank)192 
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Even at record levels of cultivation, opium poppy takes up a small proportion of 
Afghanistan’s agricultural land overall. Despite being the biggest opium producer for 
around two decades, opium poppy remains a minor crop in terms of relative cultivation 
levels, with only 3-4 percent of natural agricultural land used towards its cultivation.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
Opium has been part of human society for thousand of year. The drug has been used both 
for reacreation and medicianl purposes. The cultivation of opium poppies has moved from 
one place to antoher due to several factiors incuding climate changes and conflicts. 
Afghanistan, which has been an agricultural country with 70 percent of its inhabitiants still 
relying on farming as a means of income, is a relatively new player in global drugs 
economy. Unlike other countries in the region such as Iran, Turkey and Pakistan; 
historically, Afghanistan was not a major opium producer and did not have an ‘opium 
culture’. Although a small scale production of opium for medicine and recreation existed 
for a long time, drug production (mainly opium) grew rapidly during the wars in 1980s and 
1990s. It was in these two decades when the country emerged as a major opium producer.  
The rapid expansion of opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan is closely linked to the 
conflict in Afghanistan and geo-politics in the surrounding countries. Mainly two factors 
are responsible for making Afghanistan as the biggest opium producer in the world – war 
in Afghanistan and the destruction of its economy and the increasing demand for drugs.  
Firstly, the increasing demand for opium in the region (especially in Turkey, Iran and 
Pakistan) prompted a number of Afghan farmers to cultivate opium poppies. When Turkey 
banned the production of illegal opium in 1972, it created a gap in the global and regional 
drug market. Meanwhile, the harvest in East Asia was bad in late 1970s which further 
increased international prices of opiates. On the other hand, the Iranian opium ban 
following the 1979 Islamic Revolution also brought a halt to the drug production in the 
country -- a traditional consumer with a large population of drug addicts. In addition, faced 
with an increasing international pressure and as part of his Islamisation policies, the 
Pakistan military dictator, General Zia-ul-Haq, banned opium production in his country in 
1979. The poppy ban in Pakistan, which had been a major opium producer, also pushed 
several Pakistani smugglers and drug producers to go to Afghanistan who then taught 
many Afghan farmers how to produce drugs.  
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Secondly, the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan proved to be the biggest factor in 
popularising poppy cultivation in the country. The decade long war against the Soviet 
occupation destroyed much of Afghanistan’s economy, especially its agricultural 
infrastructure, and forced a number of farmers to producer opium which brought them 
more money than traditional licit crops. Meanwhile, opium proved very lucrative for the 
Mujahideen in their war against the Soviet forces to get the much needed cash to survive 
and buy weapons. The conflict also resulted in the collapse of the Afghan central state and 
the lack of credible law enforcement. Following the Soviet withdrawal and the collapse of 
the Kabul regime, local warlords and warring factions benefitted heavily from the drug 
trade during factional fighting in 1990s. Despite the US led invasion in late 2001 combined 
with the international community’s efforts to re-build the Afghan state and the economic 
infrastructure, both the area under cultivation and the overall production of opium has 
increased.  
In Afghanistan, opium economy flourished in conditions of war and anarchy and later 
became part of a vicious circle, contributing to the perpetuation of war and anarchy. Even 
at record levels of cultivation, opium poppy takes up a small proportion of Afghanistan’s 
agricultural land overall, with only 3-4 percent of natural agricultural land used towards 
its cultivation. As long as the conflict remains and Afghan farmers are not provided 
with real alternatives, the issue of drug production is likely to remain an acute problem for 












Drugs, Taliban and the Insurgency  
 
This chapter explores the Taliban’s attitude towards narcotics and examines the impact of 
drugs economy on the group since its launch in 1994. It analyses how the opium industry, 
which existed before the Taliban’s emergence, grew faster under their regime. The chapter 
also discusses the reasons behind Taliban’s strict ban on poppy cultivation in 2000 which 
resulted in an almost total halt to poppy growing. However, the Taliban reversed their 
opium policy after their regime was toppled by the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in late 
2001 and quietly incorporated narcotics into their overall insurgency. This chapter goes 
into detail on the multiple sources of the Taliban income and explores the Taliban’s 
complicated and evolving relationship with illict drugs. It analyses how the opium 
economy and the insurgency mutually reinforce eachother and discusses whether a 
“FARCification” of the Taliban is already underway? The chapter draws on field work and 
a large number of original interviews with the Taliban members and supporters, drug 
smugglers, opium poppy farmers, local elders and government officials to produce a 
uniquely detailed account of the mechanism and extent to which the drug trade inhibits 
state building and facilitates insurgency in Afghanistan. It also details the Taliban’s 
sources of income and the impact of their involvement in the drugs on their strength, 
motivation and ideology. The chapter also provides a comprehensive picture of the 
Taliban’s governance and organisational structure during its rule (1994-2001) and their 
post-Emirate insurgency and “shadow government” (2001-2015).  
 
5.1 The Emergence of the Taliban 
The Taliban is an Islamic militant organisation that emerged in Kandahar province, 
southern Afghanistan, in 1994 under the leadership of Mullah Muhammad Omar and soon 
became the pre-eminent politico-military force in the country. The direct Pashto translation 
of the word “Taliban” is “students” as most of the leaders and members were graduates or 
students of Islamic religious seminaries (madrassas). The Taliban recruited heavily among 
the rural population of Afghanistan as well as poor Afghan refugee population in Pakistan. 
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In addition, a number of Pakistani madrassa students also joined them in their campiagn to 
establish their rule all over Afghanistan.   
The emergence of the Taliban Movement has been a matter of debate and controversy 
since its inception. The first and somehow prevailing theory gives the credit of the 
Taliban’s creation to Pakistan.1 The Taliban emerged at a time when Pakistan was keen to 
establish trade links with the landlocked countries of Central Asian via Afghanistan. 
However, the environment for a transnational trade was not suitable due to factional 
fighting, warlordism and the existence of numerous private militias across the Afghan 
territory. Many of those local commander detested Pakistani government, especially its 
security establishment, for what they saw its interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs. 
Despite security risks, a Pakistani trade convoy consisting of around thirty trucks and led 
by a Pakistani intelligence officer, Sultan Amir Tarar, popularly known by his nom de 
guerre, Colonel Imam,
2
 embarked from Pakistan’s Quetta city in October 1996 and headed 
for Turkmenistan via the Afghan cities of Kandahar and Herat. The convoy was stopped in 
Kandahar by some local commanders who kept custody of the trucks and demanded 
exorbitant toll. As the trucks encountered check points, armed Taliban flooded to break the 
blockade and freed the convoy and its passengers.
3
 The incident led to the belief that 
Islamabad had a role in the creation of the Taliban Movement in Afghanistan.
4
  
In addition, the Taliban soon attracted interest and support from Pakistan’s powerful 
military. Within weeks of the emergence of the Taliban, hundreds of additional students 
arrived from religious madrassas in Pakistan. The Pakistani government established the 
Taliban’s communication system and all the major Afghan cities were linked to Pakistan’s 
telephone grid.
5
 With the expansion of the Taliban territorial control in Afghanistan, their 
reliance on Pakistan increased further. Pakistan also extended its helping hand as the 
Taliban were a much better option for Islamabad. Islamabad’s support for the Taliban was 
both for strategic and economic reasons. The group brought stability to Afghanistan; 
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somehting that Pakistan needed to trade with Central Asian countries. As Goodhand 
suggests, “the stability brought by a pliant regime would also enable Pakistan to establish 
an economic bridgehead -- through transport, communications and pipelines – with Central 
Asia.”6 On the other hand, the Afghan government in Kabul, led by President Burhanuddin 
Rabbani, and a number of other local commanders were hostile to Pakistan for its 
meddling in the Afghan affairs and supporting their opponents. In addition, the Kabul 
government was close to India, Pakistan’s arch rival. However, Pakistan has denied any 
formal role in the creation of the Taliban. Colonel Imam, a famous Pakistani intelligence 
officer with close links to the Taliban, denied that he or the Pakistan’s main intelligence 
agency, ISI (Inter-Sevices Intelligence), had any role in the formation of the Afghan 
Taliban Movement. Although Colonel acknowledged that he personally knew many 
founding members of the Taliban from the time of the Afghan Jihad against the Soviet 
occupation in 1980s, he insisted that Pakistan’s security established was taken by surprise 
when it got the news about the emergence of a group called the Taliban.
7
 As opposed to the 
first theory, which says that the Taliban are Pakistani creation, some others believe that the 
group was an indeginous formation. Therefore, Gall says that “Pakistan did no create the 
Taliban, it acted swiftly to co-opt the movement.”8  
Thirdly, some rumours that existed at the time of the emergence of the Taliban also 
“suggested that the old alliance of the USA, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia is again operational, 
this time in support of the Taliban rather than the Mujahideen.”9 Pakistan, Saudi Arabia 
and the UAE; all major US allies, were the only three countries that recognised the Taliban 
regime and supported the regime politically and financially.
10
 The idea of a possible US 
support for the Taliban was further strengthened after American oil companies, especially 
Unocal and Bridas, “courted” the Taliban to connect the gas fields of Turkmenistan with 
the energy hungry markets of Pakistan and India through pipelines via Afghanistan.
11
 
However, the US government has denied any links with the Taliban indicating its unease 
with the way the Taliban were ruling over Afghanistan.  
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Fourthly, the Taliban themselves challenge the prevailing notion of the movement’s origins 
and reject the idea that it was harboured and nurtured by foreigners. They describe the 
Taliban Movement as a home-grown phenomenon and retrace their history to the “Taliban 
Fronts” -- bands of religious students who fought alongside the mainstream Afghan 
Mujahideen in southern Kandahar and neighboring provinces; a region generally referred 
to as Loy or Greater Kandahar. The Taliban Fronts operated during the 1980s Afghan 
resistance against the Soviets and were organised by mostly local religious scholars 
(mullahs) and religious students (talibans). Some of these jihadi fronts were independent 
while others were semi-independent or were fully associated with one of the eight (later 
seven) mujahideen factions (tanzim) which supplied them with weapons and money to 
coduct their jihad.  
The Taliban guerrilla fronts were mostly associated with the mujahideen’s clerical faction 
(party), Harakat-i Enqelab-i Islami (Movement of the Islamic Revolution) led by Mawlawi 
Muhammad Nabi. A number of them were also linked to the Mawlai Yunus Khalis’s 
Hezb-e Islami faction (Islamic Party). Most of the Taliban fronts ceased fighting after the 
withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989 followed by the fall of the Kabul regime in 1992. 
Members of the Taliban Fronts went back to their normal life of learning religion and 
earning a living mostly as farmers. However, appalled by the chaos created by local militia 
commanders after the fallof the government in Kabul, some members of the Taliban 
Fronts remobalised and formed what they called the “Islamic Movement of the Taliban” 
(Da Talibanu Islami Tahreek/Ghurzang, in Pashto).
12
   
The founding members of the Taliban generally emphasize that the group was started as an 
indigenous movement and gave its leadership to Mullah Muhammad Omar, who had been 
serving as a prayer leader (mullah) in a small village outside Kandahar city. Initially, less 
than one hundred village mullahs (prayer leaders/religious scholars) and religious students 
(taliban) started a coordinated military campaign against local armed militia commanders. 
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At that early stage, the group was supported with money and weapons by a few local 
notables. However, its membership soon increased as more and more people kept joining 
them from Kandahar as well neighbouring provinces.
13
 The initial response of the local 
population, who was fed up with the anarchy and chaos that had prevailed in the country, 
was generally positive. Local commanders had established their own fiefdoms with people 
living in fear and facing constant intimidation. Initially, the Taliban declared that they were 
not interested in power and their aim was simply to bring peace and order and enforce the 
true Islamic values. The Taliban announced that they wanted to end lawlessness and 
corruption and dispense speedy and cheap justice.  
Although most founding members of the Taliban Movement were veterans of the Afghan 
Jihad, there were many differences between the style and ideology of the Taliban 
Movement in the 1990s and the Taliban Fronts of the 1980s. In contrast to the Taliban 
Fronts, the Taliban Movement was more political in their strategy, ambitions and tactics. 
The Taliban Movement also wanted to capture power and impose Sharia (Islamic law). On 
the other hand, the 1980s Taliban Fronts focused mainly on fighting the Soviets and didn’t 
systematically try to “Islamise” the Afghan society and culture or enforce certain aspects 
of Sharia on individuals such as forcing them to keep beard or stop listening to music. In 
addition, the Taliban Movement was more organised and much more powerful than the 
Taliban Fronts.   
Around two years after the launch of the movement, Mullah Muhammad Omar’s position 
as the leader was later officially recognised in a public ceremony in Kandahar. On 
Thursday, 4
th
 April 1996, hundreds of religious scholars selected Mullah Omar as the 
overall leader and gave him the title of Amir-ul-Momineen (leader of the faithful).
14
 He 
became both the military and political leader and acquired a mythical status. As the 
Supreme Leader, he controlled the affairs from his seat in Kandahar and issued orders and 
edicts which were implemented to the letter. From the very beginning, Mullah Omar 
established his authority over the group and left no room for disobedience and violation of 
his decrees. He controlled every aspect of the group and the activities of its members. For 
example, after receiving reports about the increasing number of Taliban fighters smoking 
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cigarettes and its rising costs to the Taliban’s treasury, Mullah Omar issued a decree 
ordering all of them to immediately stop smoking cigarettes. The ban on smoking, which 
was only for the Taliban members and not for the general public, proved very effective. 
Eventhough the ban was not based on religious grounds, tens of thousands of Taliban 
members quit smoking overnight.   
The Taliban fought continuously with local commanders and warlords as well as the 
governmet in Kabul and rapidly expanded their control. On 26 September 1996, the 
Taliban captured the capital Kabul and established the “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.” 
The group eventually managed to capture more than 90 percent of Afghanistan’s territory 
and remained in power until the US-led invasion toppled their government in late 2001 as 
part of the US’s Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Only three states -- Pakistan, Saudi 
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) had officially recognised the Taliban 
government while the rest of the international community continued to recognise the 
deposed government led by President Burhanuddin Rabbani.  
 
5.2 Taliban’s Governance Structure (1994-2001) 
There has been a change and continuity in the overall functionality of the Taliban during 
the first two decades of its existence. The group’s organisation and command structure has 
evolved since its launch in 1994 to cope with new demands and challenges. At the 
beggning, the group had a basic structure with Mullah Muhammad Omar as the overall 
political and military head who was called Amir (leader) and a Leadership Council 
(Rahbari Shura) comprising of a few veteran commanders of the anti-Soviet Jihad who 
became founding members of the Taliban Movement. When the Taliban captured southern 
Kandahar province, Mullah Muhammad Hassan Akhund was appointed as the provincial 
governor; Mullah Obaidullah became the Kandahar Corps Commander; Mullah Akhtar 
Muhammad Mansour was appointed head of the air force/aviation in Kandahar which has 
one of the biggest airports in the country, while Mullah Bor Jan became the security chief 
of the province. The Leadership or Supreme Council’s (Rahbari Shura) meetings were 
chaired by Mullah Muhammad Rabbani who served as Mullah Omar’s deputy. Other 
Taliban members were appointed to lead government departments in the province.
15
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The group captured a number of provinces with a quick succession and its strength and 
membership continuously increased as thousands of new volunteers joined it ever month. 
About two years later, on 4
th
 April 1994, around fifteen hundred religious scholars (Ulama) 
gathered together in a famous mosque in Kandahar city and named Mullah Omar as the 
“Leader of the Faithful” (Amir-ul-Momineen), a title with great resonance in Islamic 
history. With this, the Taliban Movement entered a new phase and Mullah Omar’s sole 
authority in all political and military affairs was formally endorsed.  
Within two years of the launch of the Movement, the Taliban created five main 
institutional and governance structures including the office/secretariat of the Supreme 
Leader known as the “Leader of the Faithful” (Amir-ul-Momineen), the Leadership Council 
(Rahbari Shura) based in Kandahar, the Council of Religious Scholars (Ulama Shura) 
based in Kandahar and the Military Council (Nizami Shura) based in Kandahar. The Kabul 
based Caretaker Council (Sarparast Shura), also called as the Council of Ministers 
(Waziranu Shura), was formed after the group captured the capital in 1996.
16
  
The Taliban’s regional government before the seizure of Kabul and northern provinces, 
had a dual nature. On one hand, it was an Amarati/Emirati system as it had the leader 
(Amir) at the top who possessed the overall authority including veto power over the 
Leadership Council’s (Rahbari Shura) decisions and generally ruled with a decree. On the 
other hand, it was also a Shura (Consultation) system as the Leadership Council (Shura) 
was a recognised institution which met regularly to consult, create consensus and advise 
Mullah Omar on important issues. The Leadership Council was also called the Kandahar 
Shura as it was based in Kandahar, even after the Taliban took Kabul. It was divided into 
two mini-councils (shuras). The “Inner” Shura consisted of more than twenty most 
important Taliban leaders and was once “considered the Taliban’s collective leadership”. 
The “Outer” Shura was a council with over 100 members including religious figures and 
notables among others. Its aim was to provide advice to the Inner Shura. Although the 
Kandahar Shura had influence on decision making process and the overall direction of the 
Taliban Movement/government, it lost most of its clout since Mullah Omar assumed the 
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title of Amir-ul-Momineen (Leader of the Faithful). In addition, the Kandahar Shura did 
not have a fixed criterian and specific number of members and its decisions were not 
binding on the executive branch. The ultimate power to make decision remained in the 
hands of the Amir (Mullah Omar) while the Shura mainly had an advisory role.
17
  
The third major institution of the Taliban government was Religious Scholars’ Council 
(Ulama Shura) headed by Mawlawi Abdul Ghafoor Sanani. The Ulama Council also 
served as the judiciary and played a key role in advising Mullah Omar on Islamic law and 
Jurisprudence. The Council of Religious Scholars was also based in Kandahar and had 
significant influence on social policies.  
When the Taliban captured Kabul in September 1994, the group changed its name from 
“The Islamic Movement of Taliban” to the “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.” Mullah 
Omar issued an executive order (Farman) dispatching the provincial officials in Kandahar 
to head the national institutions in Kabul while their deputies were promoted to fill in their 
positions in the province. The Taliban announced a national cabinet of twenty-five- 
“acting/caretaker ministers” as well as heads of other national intuitions including the 
Central Bank. For example, the head of Religious Scholars’ Council (Ulama Shura) and 
judiciary in Kandahar, Mawlawi Abdul Ghafoor Sanani, was appointed as the Chief Justice 
of the Supreme Court in Kabul; Mullah Obaidullah, the Kandahar Corps Commander, was 
appointed as the Defence Minister; Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansour, head of air 
force/aviation in Kandahar became the Aviation Minister. Thus the Council of Ministers 
(Waziranu Shura) became the fourth major institution created by the Taliban. The Council 
of Ministers, also called as Caretaker Council (Sarparast Shura) and Kabul Shura, was 
charged with implementing policies approved by the Leadership Council and the Supreme 
Leader, Mullah Omar. The Council of Ministers was headed by Mullah Muhammad 
Rabbani, who until then headed the Leadership Council (Rahbari Shura) in Kandahar and 
was the Taliban Movement’s deputy chief. Meanwhile, the former governor of Kandahar 
province, Mullah Muhammad Hassan Akhund, became his deputy. Mullah Muhammad 
Rabbani’s official title varied between “Chairman of the Acting/Caretaker Council (Da 
Sarparast Shura Rais)” in Kabul and “Chairman of the Interim/Acting/Caretaker 
government.” Later on, his title was changed to the Head of Ministers/Cabinet (Rais-ul-
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Wuzara) with the responsibilities of a prime minister in a presidential system. Initially, all 
the members of the Taliban cabinet in Kabul were called acting/caretaker ministers as they 
didn’t have control over most of the Afghan territory. Once they captured most of the 
country, the prefix of acting was removed from the titles of cabinet ministers and heads of 
national institutions.
18
 In 1999, the Taliban overhauled their administrative structure and 
government in Kabul as part of their state building efforts and adopted the old offices 
previously employed by King Zaher Shah.
19
 Mullah Omar was based in Kandahar even 
after the Taliban captured around 90% of Afghanistan while the cabinet and judiciary were 
located in Kabul. Although the Kabul based institutions had a degree of independence, 
they were controlled and directed through executive orders (farmans) issued from Mullah 
Omar’s office in Kandahar.20  
The fifth major institution in the Taliban regime was the Military Council (Nizami Shura) 
which was based in Kandahar. Its members were generally commanders, especially those 
who had fought against the Soviet forces in the 1980s and were headed by Mullah Omar 
himself as he was also the Commander in Chief. As the Taliban were continuously at war 
with their opponents, the role of the Military Council was to give advice to Mullah Omar 
on military issues including the appointment of security officials. Mullah Omar, in his 
capacity as the Commander in Chief was closely following the developments on the 
frontlines and spoke regularly with the field commander through wireless telephone system 
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Figure 5.1: Taliban’s governance structure during its rule (1994-2001) 
 
5.2.1 Structure and Organisation of the Taliban Insurgency (2001-2015) 
Most of the Taliban’s governance infrastructure shattered as a result of the US-led invasion 
of Afghanistan which started on 7
th
 October 2001. Several high ranking Taliban officials 
were either killed or captured. However, most of the group’s senior leaders managed to 
flee to Pakistan where they established sanctuaries and reinvented the movement as an 
insurgency. The Taliban insurgency’s inner workings are shrouded in mystery and its 
structure and decision making process has remained opaque. This study has relied on a 
number of credible sources to draw a comprehensive picture of the group’s administrative 
structure formed after it was expelled from power. They include interviews with the 
Taliban members and supporters, Taliban statements and information on their websites and 
social media accounts, interviews with experts, general media outlets, independent 
research and literature and other published and unpublished documents. These findings 
reveal that the group’s structure and organisation in both phases of existence has a 
remarkable degree of continuity. The Taliban’s shadow government, formed after the fall 
of their regime, almost mirrors their old governance structure and the current government 
in Kabul. The group still calls itself the “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan”, the name it used 
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when in power, thus reinforcing the claim that it is still the legitimate government of 
Afghanistan.
21
   
After the fall of the Taliban regime, most of the Taliban leaders didn’t have the plan to 
continue fighting. Although several Taliban leaders and officials were either killed or 
captured in the US-led military operations, most of them went back to their own villages 
hoping to start a new living. Fearing detention and prosecution by the US forces and the 
new Afghan government, many top leaders fled to Pakistan. There was a lull in violence 
for a while. However, when the crackdown on the Taliban intensified, their leaders re-
organised themselves and re-emerged as a group intent on fighting. 
In 2003, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar (the Taliban Supreme Leader’s close confidante), 
and Mullah Obaidullah (the Taliban government’s Defence Minister) rearranged the 
organisation and laid down the foundations of the Taliban insurgency.
22
 A new Leadership 
Council (Rahbari Shura) was formed consisting of around 10 Taliban leaders
23
 which 
made decisions based on consensus. Mullah Baradar became head of the Leadership 
Council overseeing the group’s revival, organisation and activities. Since the fall of the 
Taliban regime, Mullah Omar had been hiding for security reasons and was mostly 
inaccessible even to high ranking Taliban leaders including members of the Leadership 
Council. Mullah Baradar ran the organisation as his deputy as he and Mullah Obaidullah 
were among the only few members of the inner core of the Taliban leader with a direct 
access to him. However, Mullah Obaidullah, who reported to Mulla Baradar,
24
 was 
arrested by Pakistani authorities in early 2007.
25
 Following Mullah Obaiduallah’s arrest, 
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Mullah Baradar headed the group’s overall political and military activities in the capacity 
of the Taliban’s depty head. Mullah Baradar had developed a profile as a political and 
military strategist and remained the most powerful man after Mullah Omar after the fall of 
the Taliban regime. Mullah Baradar was eventually captured in a joint US-Pakistani raid in 
Pakistan in February 2010.
26
  
Until 2010, the Taliban Supreme Leader, Mullah Omar, had one deputy. Howover, 
following the arrest of Mullah Baradar, he changed the structure and appointed two new 
deputies. Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour (Aviation Minister in the Taliban 
government and a member of the Leadership Council after the fall of the regime), was 
selected the head of political affairs and Mullah Abdul Qayyum Zakir (an ex-Guantanamo 




The Afghan Taliban’s Leadership Council (Rahbari Shura) was reportedly formed in the 
Pakistani city of Quetta and is, therefore, often referred to as the Quetta Shura. The 
membership of the Leadership Council has changed since its reinvention in 2003 when it 
had around 10 members. At one stage, the membership rose to more than twenty; however, 
by early 2015, the Leadership Council had about 18 members, all of them veterans of the 
pre-2001 conflict. As opposed to a classic politburo, the membership of the Taliban’s 
Leadership Council has an element of informality and is more fluid. In addition to full 
members, cadre of senior figures also have a degree of access to decision making without 
formally belonging to it. The Leadership Council remains the central organ of the Taliban 
insurgency which also appoints higher level commanders and shadow governors for almost 
all of Afghanistan’s thirty four provinces. The portfolios and responsibilities of the 
Leadership Shura’s members are constantly changing; ranging from taking up civilian 
positions to fighting and organising the war. Those members who are killed or captured are 
quickly replaced with others. However, the Mulla Omar, the Supreme Leader, remained 
the constant in the group. The overall leadership lies with the Supreme Leader but the day-
to-day operations and decisions are made by his deputy/deputies who usually chair/s the 
Leadership Shura (Rahbari Shura).
28
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Under the Leadership Council, sevral commissions function as ministries and project the 
image of a government. From time to time, new formal institutional structures emerge 
within the Taliban to address specific issues. The number and responsibilities of the 
Taliban commissions have also evolved over time. From around 2009, the Taliban 
reshuffled the governance structure; some new commissions were created or some of the 
old ones were re-staffed or merged. By early 2015, the Taliban had nine commissions each 
responsible for specific affairs. They included: Military Commission (Nizami), 
Financial/Economic Commission (Maali/Iqtisaadi), Political Commission (Siyaasi), 
Cultural Commission (Farhangi/Kalturi), Educational & Training Commission (Talimi), 
Health Commission (Sihi/Roghtiyayi), Recruitment, Invitation & Integration Commission 




As the group’s main function has been fighting the Afghan government and its foreign 
allies, its Military Commission (Nizami Kumisyun) is the biggest and most resourceful. In 
fact, Military Commission is the most important institution after the Leadership Council 
(Rahbari Shura) and its head is equivalent to the defence minister in a government. There 
are several sub-commissions with the Military Commission responsible for specific tasks 
and operations. The Taliban’s head of intelligence, in charge of targeted assassinations and 
special police are also part of this commission. The group sub-divided the Military 
Commission/Council into three or four individual sub-commissions/smaller councils based 
in different cities/towns of Pakistan – Quetta/Girdi Jangal, Peshawar and Miran Shah. 
These sub-commissions are responsible for the clusters of the adjacent provinces of 
Afghanistan. For examples, the Quetta and Girdi Jangal subdivisions or subsidiaries of the 
Military Council are responsible for carrying out military operations in the southern and 
western provinces of Afghanistan, the Peshawar Shura (Taliban’s eastern Afghan wing) 
manages the affairs of Afghanistan’s eastern and northern provinces and the sub-
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commission based in the Tribal Areas (especially Miran Shah in North Waziristan) is 
responsible for operations in the south-east and north of Afghanistan. 
30
  
The Taliban’s “Economic/Financial Commission” (Iqtisaadi/Maali Kumisyun), which 
resembles a finance ministry, is responsible for collecting money from a number of 
different sources including donations, taxing the drug trade and commissions/protection 
money from NATO supply convoys inside Afghanistan. The Financial Commission has a 
number of representatives in different cities and countries. Occasionally, it sends its 
emissaries to foreign countries including the oil rich Gulf region, to collect donation and 
charity payments. From time to time, it also makes international public appeals for 
donations through advertisements published on the Taliban’s website. The Taliban’s 
Financial Commission has also reportedly invested money in legal businesses, including 
farming and real state, to generate more funds and avoid sanctions.
31
   
As part of their strategy to establish a robust organizational structure inside Afghanistan, 
the Taliban started appointing provincial governors from 2003 onwards. From about 2006, 
they have been appointing district governors, judges and have been filling a few other less-
important positions, especially in areas outside the government control. The Taliban’s 
shadow provincial governors are part of the second tier of the group’s leadership and are 
mostly appointed for their leadership qualities and fighting expertise. Nearly all of 
Afghanistan’s 34 provinces have a Taliban “shadow governor (Wali)” and, in many cases, 
a shadow government with functional courts and revenue collection mechanisms. In 
addition, almost every district with a Taliban presence has a Taliban district 
governor/administrator (Wulaswaal). The Taliban’s shadow governors are basically 
military commanders as their main esponsibilty to lead and organise the war in their areas. 
However, they also address local grievances and arbitrate local disputes.
32
  
In post-Emirate Taliban (after the fall of the Taliban’s government which was called the 
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan), fighting remains the group’s main priority and activity. 
However, the insurgents also have a small civilian administration largely consists of three 
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pillars -- judiciary, education and health. The group have established a basic health sector 
in some remote areas with a primary purpose of offering treatment to wounded Taliban 
fighters. Local population also reportedly benefitted from these medical services. Many of 
the seriously wounded fighters are helped by the ICRC (International Committee of the 
Red Cross) and, in some cases, are treated in hospitals in Pakistan. The Taliban have also 
carried out minor efforts in education, mostly in the form of religious madrassas. However, 
the biggest part of their civilian administration is the establishment of a separate judiciary. 
Operated by the Taliban-appointed judges, these courts exist in dozens of districts 
especially in areas where the government control is weak. In places where the Taliban are 
not in full control or the risk of being targeted by the government of US/NATO forces is 
high, they usually invite people to take their cases to the Taliban judge in the neighbouring 
district. The provision of judicial services and resolving and mediating disputes between 
individuals and communities has been a winning card and a major source of legitimacy for 
the Taliban. By providing a speedy and cheap justice, the Taliban have earned the support 
of a lot of people especially in rural areas where the population usually complain from the 
government’s lengthy, expensive and corrupt judicial system.33 
Despite developing a formal organisational and governance structure, the Taliban generally 
work as a collection of networks. The nature of these networks is predominantly religious, 
and the typical commander is a mullah or a religious student (talib). However, former 
mujahideen
34
 and other non-clerical elements also have presence in some layers of the 
network. At the lowest level, usually a local commander has a few fighters gathered around 
him. A variable number of these small groups are networked together around a bigger 
commander such as a district-level Taliban leader/commander. This network is then linked 
to a larger network through its leader, who would pay obedience to some greater figure, for 
example a province-level leader such as provincial shadow governor or head of the 
provincial council. The figures at the centre of these larger networks might be the leader of 
a front (mahaz), a member of the Leadership Council or head of the relevant commission. 
These individuals are answerable to the Leadership Council (Rahbari Shura) and the 
deputy head of the group. The Taliban have also developed a provincial and district 
management structure in the shape of provincial councils (Wilayati Shura) and district 
councils (Wulaswali Shura) through which they organise their affairs and plan operations 
(Figure 5.3).  
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The Taliban’s formal structure has several layers and individuals are encouraged to play 
their role within the system, report to the superior and obey the chain of command. 
However, personal relations also play an important role and, in several cases, direct 
relations exist between relatively small Taliban networks and the top leaders. Although the 
Taliban’s provincial and district governors as well as heads of provincial and district 
councils are supposed to be in on the ground inside Afghanistan, the principal leaders of 
the insurgency are reportedly based in Pakistan and operate from there. However, Pakistani 
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Figure 5.2: Structure and organisation of the Taliban insurgency after the fall of their regime (2001-2015) 
 
5.3 Taliban and Drugs 
By the time the Taliban emerged, drug trade was already and established business in many 
parts of the country. As different factions and commanders fought for power and resources 
during the 1990s, many of them relied on incomes from drug production and trafficking. 
The Taliban, in a way, inherited the drug problem. Initially, drug traders feared that, given 
the Taliban’s strict enforcement of Sharia, the group might try to ban narcotics altogather. 
The production and consumption had been a controversial topic among religious circles in 
Afghanistan even before the formation of the Taliban Movement. Afghan religious 
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scholars (ualama/mullahs) debated the religious status of drugs cultivation including 
opium poppies for years as part of an effort to guide the public opinion.  
As opium had been used in Afghanistan as a medicine for centuries, a number of religious 
scholars had a favourable view towards poppy growing. However, drugs which didn’t have 
medicinal use and were mainly used for recreation, such as cannabis (chars), were 
considered harmful addictive substances and the mullahs couldn’t allow their production 
on religious grounds. Even before the formation of the Taliban, a near consensus had 
emerged among the religious establishment that the production of opium could be justified 
on religious grounds due to its medicinal properties while the production of other drugs 
was considered un-Islamic. A number of farmers interviewed as part of this study clarified 
their position towards different drugs by saying that they “don’t produce cannabis because 
it is against the Sharia (ghair-e-sharaii)”. However they considered poppy cultivation as 
religiously permitted (halal) because “opium was a medicine”.36 On the other hand, there 
are a number of farmers who cultivate cannabis too without getting involved in the 
complexities of religious justification. For them, it is simply a matter of livelihood and 
feeding their families and the drugs bring them more money than other licit traditional 
crops.  
The Taliban Movement was already against the use of addictive drugs and considered them 
un-Islamic and fighting narcotics was part of its initial agenda. Therefore, some Taliban 
leaders and religious scholars also considered a ban on drugs as soon as they took charge 
of several drug producing areas in the south of Afghanistan. They also took a few initial 
steps which indicated their displeasure with the drug trade. The group had already 
prohibited other practices it considered un-Islamic such as the sale of musical instruments, 
playing of music, watching television and taking pictures of all living things. However, 
taxing the drugs economy was one the biggest sources of its income. On the other hand, as 
the group got most of its support from rural communities many of whom relied on poppy 
cultivation, taking action against drug production risked their financial as well as political 
capital. In addition, a number of rich individuals who were involved in drug production 
and trafficking supported the Taliban financially in the form donations.  
The Taliban faces the same dilemma vis-à-vis illicit drugs the Marxist rebel group, FARC 
(Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) faced in Colombia in early 1980s. The FARC 
considered drugs as counter-revolutionary and contrary to the group’s founding principles. 
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Therefore, the FARC initially prohibited the cultivation of coca and marijuana in areas it 
controlled. However, as its area of operation expanded, the groups found out that its anti-
drug policy was not popular with the local people, especially those whose livelihood 
mostly depended on coca cultivation. At the end, due to social pressure and lack of other 
economic opportunities, the FARC not only relaxed its rules by accepting drug production 
but also began to encourage and protect coca crop themselves.
37
 
The Taliban leadership in Afghanistan initially thought that a total ban on drug production 
will cause poverty and alienate a lot of people, especially those who were associated with 
the drugs economy and whose livelihood dependent on poppy cultivation including poppy 
farmers, drug traders and traffickers as well as sharecroppers. Several Taliban leaders 
concluded that it would be too costly for them, both politically and economically, to crack 
down on poppy farmers and the drug trade. Commenting on the Taliban’s appraoch 
towards illict drugs, Abdul Hakeem Mujahid, the group’s representative in the United 
States said that, “[w]e are against poppy cultivation, narcotics production and drugs…but 
we cannot fight our own people. They are the sole source of our authority.”38 The Taliban 
leaders were also cautious about banning drugs as many of them believed they will not be 
able to impose a full ban at a time when the group was in its infancy and had not 
established its rule on most of the country. Therefore, the Taliban allowed the drugs 
business to continue as usual. Taliban’s tolerance towards drugs and the overall peaceful 
environment they created also helped the drugs economy to flourish, especially in areas 
they controlled. The Taliban’s revenues from the drug production and trade also increased 
with their victories over most of the warring factions and commanders and the 
establishment of their writ in most of Afghanistan. The poppy growers had to pay them the 
Islamic tithe (ushr)
39
 on all agricultural produce, including opium, at the farmgate and 
mostly in kind. 
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As the Taliban saw itself as the guardian of people’s morality, they banned the recreational 
use of drugs such as cannabis and heroin and decalred the practice as un-Islamic. 
They considered drugs addiction as “a threat to personality, wisdom, life, health, economy 
and morality.” 40  The regime had established rehabilitation centres mainly for heroin 
addicts and its police regularly arrested addicts from the streets and locked them up in 
these centres until they were rehabilitated. The Taliban’s drug rehabilitation centres 
became so popular that several families from Pakistan used to take their addicited relatives 
to Afghanistan and handed them over to the Taliban for rehabilitation. The Taliban also 
arresred and punished cannabis users. In a decree issued in April 1999, the Taliban leader, 
Mullah Omar declared that “cultivating cannabis is completely prohibited throughout the 
country. Those who cultivate marijuana will be punished severely in accordance with the 
Islamic Sharia.”41 A few months later, in August 1999, Mullah Omar issued another decree 
calling the use of cannabis/marijuana as a “religiously bad practice” and an “un-religious 
act” which “weakens human’s intellectual senses and even destroys them.” 42 This time, he 
ordered the officials of the Taliban’s government to “destroy cannabis and its 
factories/laboratories completely wherever they are.”43  
When the Taliban banned the use of cannabis and heroin in the 1990s, drugs addiction, 
especially opium and heroin use, was already very low in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the 
Taliban officials, while justifying the production of opium due to its medicinal values, saw 
the reactional use of drugs as a problem of Western countries and something that was not 
damaging their own people in Afghanistan. According to a Taliban official, the Westerners 
“can use opium as a medicine, or as a narcotic. It’s their choice”.44 Initially the Taliban 
also taxed the conversion stage of the drug, but, later on, they discouraged the processing 
of opium and its conversion into heroin and destroyed some heroin laboratories in areas 
they controlled. Most processing was, therefore, taking place in areas outside the Taliban 
control or abraod; mainly in Pakistan.  
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Opium was treated like any other agricultural commodity by all factions involved in the 
conflict in Afghanistan including the Taliban and their adversary, the Northern Alliance. 
There was nothing illegal or un-Islamic about it and farmers and traders were allowed to 
continue as usual. People used to carry opium in their “back-packs” to carry it from one 
part of the country to another. Some people even took opium on domestic flights as their 
hand baggage.
45
 The Taliban’s rise to power initially led to a minor decrease in opium 
production, but the opium production soon started to grow. By the time the Taliban 
captured Kabul (September 1996), the country was already one of the biggest opium 
producers in the world with many farmers switching to an agricultural monoculture. 
Opium production in Afghanistan reached 2,700 tons in 1997-98, while in 1999; the 







Figure 5.3: Opium production in Afghanistan, 1994-2014 (tons). (Source: UNODC, (2014)
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Since the emergence of the Taliban, opium became an important source of funding as they 
were engaged in a bloody war against their opponents. In addition to covering the cost of 
war, the Taliban also needed cash to run the civilian institution as they established their 
government in most of the country’s territory. Like all other trade and economic activities, 
the opium economy was also dependent on the Taliban for protection and transportation. 
On top of taxing the opium industry, the Taliban also received regular funding from drug 
trafficking groups.  
It is difficult to know exactly the amount of revenues the Taliban derived from the drug 
trade in the 1990s. Estimates range from US$15 million to US$300 million. According to a 
1998 newspaper report, the Taliban derived something between US$60 and US$300 
million a year from the drug production.
48
 A report by the United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC) says that between 1995 and 2000, the Taliban earned some US$ 75-
100 million annually from taxing the opium industry.
49
  
However, the Taliban raised more revenues from the transit trade than drugs. The group 
removed armed militias and warlords who were taxing traders in their little fiefdoms which 
changed after every few kilometres. The security that the Taliban established allowed 
cross-border trade to flourish. Therefore, several non-state interests such as transport 
groups and “smuggling mafia” in Pakistan also gave the groups donations and taxes. Most 
of the main road system was now free for the duty free consumer goods brought from 
Dubai in ships to Iran, from where truckers transported them to Afghanistan and finally 
smuggled to Pakistan. Similarly, goods were also brought in ships to Pakistan, taken to 
Afghanistan by road under the Afghan Transit Trade Agreement (ATTA) and then 
smuggled back to Pakistan by Afghan and Pakistani traders. According to a 1999 World 
Bank study, the Taliban derived US$75 million in one year in revenues from taxing this 
regional trade in consumer goods, compared to US$27 million from taxing poppy 
cultivation.
50
 Given the levels of opium produced in the Taliban controlled areas and the 
amount of money they received indicate the correct estimate of the Taliban income from 
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the drug industry to be around US$30 million dollars annually.
51
 In addition to taxing the 
drugs and transit trade, the Taliban sent fundraisers to Arab countries, especially in the 
Gulf region, to get additional financial support and resources. Some networks of Islamic 
groups such as Al-Qaeda, whose leaders established links with the Taliban, also gave 
financial assistance to the Taliban.   
 
5.4 Taliban’s Poppy Ban 
In the summer of 2000, the Taliban’s supreme leader, Mullah Muhammad Omar, 
unexpectedly announced a total ban on opium poppy cultivation. In a decree issued in 
August, just a few weeks before the 2000 poppy cultivation season, Mullah Omar declared 
that “poppy cultivation is absolutely prohibited throughout the country. Those who 
cultivate poppies and violate this order will be given a severe Islamic punishment.”52 He 
ordered his government officials to take necessary measures to prevent opium poppy 
cultivation. The poppy ban announced by the Taliban’s leader was not only shocking for 
poppy farmers; it also surprised many across the world. A couple of months later, Mullah 
Omar issued another decree; this time addressed to the district and provincial councils of 
religious scholars (ulama shuras). They were asked to convey this message to the general 
public and instruct prayer leaders (imams/mullahs) in mosques throughout the country to 
let people know that poppy cultivation was not allowed anymore.
53
 
Despite the ban on poppy growing, the Taliban allowed the trade of opium produced over 
the previous years. The ban on poppy growing was announced when there were signs of an 
increasing domestic drug addiction, especially among those Afghans returnees who had 
become addicted in refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran – countries where drug addiction 
has been one of the highests in the world. Some of the Taliban officials were also 
concerned about the rapid expansion of poppy cultivation and the trade in opiates and their 
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negative impact on the health of both Afghan society and economy. According to, 
Mawlawi Wakil Ahmad Mutawakkil, the foreign minister in the Taliban government, the 
regime had formulated a three phased strategy to deal with the drug problem. Firstly, “the 
trafficking of heroin was declared illegal” and “heroin laboratories were destroyed” in 
eastern and southern provicnes of the country. The next phase was to ban the source of 
heroin -- the cultivation of opium poppies. And the final phase of the strategy was to 
impose a total ban on the trade (buying and selling) of heroin, “a measure which was 
already carried out under a religious decree.”54  
It is work noting that, contrary to the popular understanding; Mullah Omar issued a 
Farman (administrative regulation/executive order) not a Fatwa
55
 (religious edict/ 
injunction). UNODC’s reports as well as a number of academic and journalistic sources 
have inappropriately called it a Fatwa.
56
 As opposed to the assertion made by various 
commentators, the Taliban’s decision to halt poppy cultivation was not based on “religious 
grounds” 57  and the group didn’t call poppy cultivation a “violation of Islam” 58  or 
something which is forbidden by Islam (haram).
59
  
In October 2000, a couple of months after the first decree, Mullah Omar issued his third 
edict related to the ban on poppies. This time, he gave detailed instructions to district 
governors/administrators (Wulaswals) and ordered them to immediately implement the ban 
by force. Meanwhile, he explained the logic and reasons behind his decision to ban poppies 
by saying that the measure was taken because opium’s “harms are far greater than its 
[financial] benefits.” 60 He also told them that “don’t seek any more information about its 
[religious] permission and prohibition. The ban has been ordered for the sake of 
expediency and its implementation is obligatory on all.”61 Mullah Omar’s decree banning 
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smoking by the Taliban members, especially those fighting the fronts, uses the same logic 
when it says that “smoking of cigarettes is absolutely banned” and then follows with the 
sentence that “no one will talk about its [religious] permission and prohibition.”62  
The relatively drought-resistant and high value poppy crop provided farmers with vital 
income. Given the poverty of farmers who had been enduring the fourth year of a 
calamitous drought, the implementation of the poppy ban was not only a big challenge; it 
was also a move which had severe consequences. However, the enforcement of the Taliban 
opium decrees was unique. First of all, the ban was announced on the radio well ahead of 
the start of the poppy cultivation season. In addition, all provincial and district governors 
as well as other relevant officials were ordered to inform the public about the Taliban 
government’s decision to ban poppies. The poppy ban was carried out through the chain of 
command. Mullah Omar’s decree was communicated to provincial governors and district 
administrators. As the main officials in their provicnes and districts, these administrators 
were made responsible for the implementation. The role of district administrators was the 
most crucial. They explained the ban to local mullahs/imams (prayer leaders in village 
mosques) and tribal elders and asked for their cooperation. Village mullas passed on the 
message to farmers in their mosques. Within a few days, the message reached every corner 
of the Taliban controlled territories. While informing farmers of the poppy ban, the Taliban 
officials told them to grow other crops such as wheat, maize, cotton, maize and onions. 
Potential violaters were threatened with imprisonment and fine or both.  
The Taliban generally gave their decisions a religious coating. Mullah Omar was referred 
to as Amir-ul-Momineen, the Leader of the Faithful, and his disobedience was considered a 
sin as well as a crime by many of them. Local and village mullahs, who were already 
supporters of the Taliban regime and are usually very influential in their own communities, 
also played a crucial role in convincing the people to obey the Amir (leader). The mulhlas 
frequently cited Islamic injunctions against drug addiction and encouraged people to 
abandon poppy cultivation.  
Seeing the Taliban’s seriousness, most farmers obeyed to save themselves from the wrath 
of the Taliban. A number of farmers also complied that year thinking the ban will be 
temporary. In the absence of government support and other economic activities, many 
farmers were already indebted and were experiencing a severe drought. Thereofre, when 
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the poppy plantation season arrived, some farmers couldn’t resist the temptation and took 
the risk to grow poppies. Many of them also though that the implementation wof the ban 
will be flexible and they would be able to get away with. Some of them planted poppies in 
their courtyards; some used camouflage techniques by trying to conceal poppy plants in the 
patches of other legal crops. In other cases, they planted poppies in very remote areas of 
rural Afghanistan. However, all these methods proved to be inadequate.
63
   
The Taliban counternarcotic squads and other officials even used helicopters to survey 
agricultural fields and made landings wherever they saw a poppy field. In addition, the 
Taliban’s vast network of informers also reported those farmers to the authorities who had 
violated the ban. Some of farmers caught for non compliance were punished in different 
ways. Their fields were generally ploughed and they were jailed until they paid the fines, 
apologised and gave assurances that they would not violate the ban in the future. Farmers 
were also forced to pay for the cost ploughing. The Taliban usually hired tractors and 
violators had to pay for the fuel and wages of the tractor drivers while eradicating poppy 
fields. Farmers were generally charged by the number of hours spent on eradication. In 
some cases, the faces of violators were blackened and marched through the bazaars with a 
string of poppies around their neck.
64
 
The Taliban poppy ban had a dramatic effect. According to the UN and US drug agencies, 
the ban meant an “almost total halt to opium growing in the 2001 season”.65 The Taliban 
ban on poppy cultivation is considered as “the largest, most successful interdiction of drugs 
in history”66 and was called “an unprecedented” and “rare triumph in the long and losing 
war on drugs.”67 The first American narcotics experts to go to Afghanistan under Taliban 
rule confirmed at the end of their eight day trip to poppy growing areas that poppy planting 
was ended in one season. The team of US drug officials “found nothing to contradict 
earlier United Nations reports” about the success of the ban.68 A United Nations official 
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called it “one of the most remarkable successes ever” in the UN’s drug fight.69 Bernard 
Frahi, head of the UN’s drug-control programme in Islamabad (Pakistan), said at the time 
that “opium poppy cultivation has effectively been eliminated in Taleban-controlled 
areas.”70  
Under the ban, there was simply no harvest in the Taliban-held Afghanistan. A 
comprehensive UNDCP ground survey confirmed that overall opium production in 2001 
fell by a massive 94%, back to the level of the early 1980s. The nationalwide opium output 
fell from more than 3,000 tons (70% of global illicit opium production) in 2000 to only 
185 mt., mainly because of continued cultivation and production in areas under the control 
of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance forces.
71
 According to Bearak, the Taliban managed 
to tackle the drug cultivation “without the usual multimillion-dollar aid packages that 
finance police raids, aerial surveillance and crop subsidies for farmers.”72  
By the time the Taliban imposed the ban on poppy cultivation (in 2000), the group had 
already emerged as a functional de facto state able to enforce law and order in around 90% 
of the Afghan territory. They made sure that their decisions were implemented down to the 
local level, even if they interfered with informal markets dynamics or social-economic 
needs of the segments of local population. The success of the poppy also demonstrated 
their ability to exercise functional governance in a very large part of the country.
73
 
Although the Taliban ban on poppy cultivation was very effective and successful, the 
reaction to the ban was largely sceptical. Many Western countries were questioning the 
Taliban’s motives behind the move and were waiting to see what the Taliban will do next. 
Would they lift the ban or continue the policy? The real motivation/s behind the Taliban’s 
poppy ban is still a mystery for most people. During my ethnographic research, the 
following five major suggestions and theories emerged as to what prompted the regime to 
prohibit poppy cultivation.  
A), it is suggested that the Taliban ban on poppy growing was a push for legitimacy and is 
seen as an attempt to gain international recognition. Although the Taliban were controlling 
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more than 90 percent of the Afghan territory, including the capital Kabul, the Taliban 
government was officially recognised by only three countries -- Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and 
the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The Taliban wanted the rest of international community 
as well as international organisation especially the UN to recognise their regime as the 
legitimate government of Afghanistan.  
B), the second view is that Taliban banned poppies in response to the international pressure 
the Taliban regime was under. Curbing opium production was one of the main demands of 
Western countries. The pressure was exerted by mainly those countries whose populations 
were consuming the end products of a seemingly endless supply of Afghan drugs. The 
regimes was under increasing international pressure to tackle not only the drug problem, 
but also address the issue of human rights, especially women rights, and prevent 
Afghanistan from becoming a sanctuary for international militants groups including the Al-
Qaeda network. By the time the Taliban announced the poppy ban, the regime was already 
under several international sanctions. Therefore, it is suggested that the 2000 poppy ban 
may have been intended to avert further international sanctions that could have negatively 
impacted the Taliban’s income from taxation of other imported goods that were smuggled 
to other regional countries, especially Pakistan.
74
  
C), the Taliban ban was limited to the cultivation of opium poppies while the trading and 
trafficking of opium continued as usual. They didn’t target the drug-lords some of whom 
were among the biggest financial supporters of the Taliban regime. Therefore, some 
Western officials suggested that the Taliban used the ban to drive up drug prices by 
deliberately curtailing the supply of opium.
75
 These officials also alleged that the Taliban 
had been stockpiling significant quantities of opium from the previous years. Due the 
poppy ban, the amount of exported opium decreased, and in the meantime, a ten-fold 
increase in prices of opium was noted.
76
 At the start of the poppy ban, a kilogram of opium 
was sold for around US$44 wholesale, but a year later, the price rose to US$400.
77
  
D), according to another theory, the Taliban expected foreign financial assistance after 
their ban on poppy growing. Although it was a unilateral act on the part of the Taliban, 
some officials in the regime expected that the country would be compensated for giving up 
                                                          
74
 Stepanova, Ekaterina, (2012). Illicit Drugs and Insurgency in Afghanistan. op.cit. 
75
 Draper, Robert, (2011). Opium Wars. op.cit.; See also Crews, Robert D., and Tarzi. Amin, (2008). The 
Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, p.254.   
76
 Goodhand, Jonathan, (2005). Frontiers and Wars: The Opium Economy in Afghanistan. op.cit. 
77
 Leinwand, Donna; Locy, Toni and Walt, Vivienne, (2001). US Expected to Target Afghanistan’s Opium. 
USA Today, 16 Oct. Available online at: <http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/sept11/2001/10/16/opium-
usatcov.htm> [Accessed 18 Apr 2014]. 
235 
 
the lucrative poppy crop in the same way as several Latin American countries were 
rewarded for their ban on drug production. However, the international community did not 
reward the Taliban regime for its ban on poppy cultivation. 
In addition, an unconventional theory that I call “mass deprivation and mass mobilisation” 
also emerged during my field work. Despite all the negative side-effects of opium 
production, the drug had become the main source of income for hundreds of thousands, if 
not millions, of Afghans. As the country had already been in the midst of a severe drought 
for several years, the poppy ban not only destroyed the livelihood of a big number of 
farmers, it also deprived numerous others who worked as day labourers in poppy fields. 
According to this theory, the Taliban wanted to deprive a big segment of the population of 
their livelihoods, especially in areas they controlled. The tactic would compel a large 
number of people to join the Taliban rank and file thus boosting the regime’s manpower it 
needed to expand their control and crush the remaining resistance they were still facing. As 
traditional licit crops were not enough to feed the families of many small farmers, the only 




The Taliban generally reject all the above suggestions and insist the ban was instituted for 
purely domestic reasons. Although the Taliban were under a number of international 
sanctions, they stressed that poppy cultivation was not banned for any quid pro quo. 
Rumours exited at the time that the Taliban expected an ease of sactions on the regime in 
exchange for the poppy ban. Aware of some these ideas, Mullah Omar himself explained 
his motivation for the ban in his decree issued in October 2000 saying that the measure was 
not taken by the regime as part of an effort to be recognised by the international 
community or to attract foreign aid. He added that: “we have banned it only and only for 
the welfare of the Muslim nation of Afghanistan.” 79  Mullah Omar asserted that the 
decision was made for domestic reasons because only “a few people reap the benefit but a 
lot of people have become indebted or addicted and the number of drug addicts is 
increasing year by year.”80 
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The Taliban government’s foreign minister, Mawlawi Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil, also 
argues that there were two main reasons for banning poppy cultivation – a), the rising 
number of drug addicts and b), the expansion of the drug trade and increasing reliance of 
the economy on drugs. According to Mawlawi Mutawakkil, “the drug trade was an 
obstacle for the development of other small businesses because due to the high levels of 
drugs profits, the narcotics industry was becoming an investment priority for many 
people.”81 Although Mutawakkil insists that the ban was imposed primarily for domestic 
reasons, he adds that “the potential political advantages and economic benefits -- including 
recognition of the Taliban regime and the flow of foreign humanitarian aid -- would have 
been the indirect and secondary consequences of the ban.” He concluded that if the Taliban 
had stayed in power, “they would have also banned the drug trade and trafficking in the 
next phase of their counter-narcotics policy.”82  
Although it seems that a number of factors including market forces, political conditions 
and socio-religious imperatives combined to motivate the Taliban to ban poppy cultivation, 
the move didn’t help the Taliban internationally and they were not rewarded for this action. 
Despite the poppy ban, the Taliban regime was not recognised by more countries, there 
was no foreign assistance forthcoming and sanctions were not removed. Instead, the 
regime wwas punished with additional international sanctions. On the other hand, the 
Taliban lost millions of dollars in taxes as well as the good will of a number of poppy 
farmers. 
In the absence of foreign assistance and lack of alternatives, the Taliban poppy ban had a 
very negative impact on the country’s economy as a whole. Opium not only brought more 
money than other traditional crops; it was also labour intensive and provided a reliable and 
relatively lucrative employment to a large number of people. Landowners usually hire 
people to turn the soil and collect the opium paste. An estimated 350 person days are 
required to cultivate one hectare of opium poppy in Afghanistan compared to 
approximately 41 person days per hectare for wheat and 135 person days per hectare for 
black cumin. In addition, harvesting of poppy alone requires as much as 200 person days 
per hectare.
83
 Thus the Taliban poppy ban denied jobs to hundreds of thousands of people.  
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The poppy ban came at a huge cost to poppy farmers as a number of them became poppy 
refugees. Many of them migrated to neighbouring countries of Pakistan and Iran in search 
of work or became internally displaced and moved to huge camps with the hope of 
receiving some food aid. The ban exacerbated the wider economic and social crisis and 
brought many parts of the country to economic ruin. It pushed poor farmers into greater 
indebtedness and the sale of livestock and land became a common strategy for meeting 
debt repayments and more immediate needs.
84
 The Taliban opium ban survived for just one 
year as the US-led coalition invaded Afghanistan in October 2001 after the 9/11 attacks on 
New York and Washington and toppled the Taliban regime. Many poor farmers were 
happy to see the fall of the Taliban regime thinking they will now be free to cultivate 
poppies.   
 
5.5 Reversal of the Taliban’s Poppy Ban  
Soon after the Taliban regime was overthrown in late 2001, impoverished Afghan farmers 
returned to growing the lucrative opium. Athough the ban on poppy cultivation was 
renewed by Hamid Karzai, the president of the post-Taliban Afghan government; it lacked 
the power and resources to enforce it. In addition, regional warlords and powerful drug 
traders also exploited the weakness of the new government and encouraged farmers 
through several incentives such as credit to grow poppies. On the other hand, corrupt 
government officials also turned a blind eye as they found the drug production as a good 
source of income mainly in the form of bribes from farmers and drug traffickers.     
Both poppy farmers and drug traders took advantage of the vacuum left by the regime 
change. By 2003 and 2004, the Taliban re-emerged as an insurgency and started their 
militant activities in different parts of the country, especially in southern and eastern 
provinces that border Pakistan. The Taliban insurgency got momentum in 2005 and 2006 
and by 2007 and 2008; the group posed a serious security challenge to the new Afghan 
government and the overall US-led NATO mission. The Taliban gradually got control of 
several areas of the country where they allowed people to cultivate poppies and produce 
and traffick drugs.  
The Taliban fighters went a step further and started protecting farmers’ poppy fields from 
eradication by NATO and Afghan forces and fought against the government’s eradication 
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squads. In some areas, especially Helmand and Kandahar provinces, some local Taliban 
commanders and foot soldiers even encouraged farmers to grow opium poppies with a 
promise that they will provide protection to their fields.
85
 Taliban members went to 
mosques in several villages telling farmers they were allowed to cultivate opium poppies 
and that they will not let the government and NATO destroy their livelihoods.
86
 By 
attacking government’s eradication teams on a regular basis, the Taliban made the 
destruction of poppy fields harder and costlier. Taliban also use landmines and booby traps 
to prevent eradication teams from entering poppy cultivation areas.
87
  This way, the 
Taliban get a lot of “political capital” and support from the local population, especially 
those whose livelihood are linked with the drugs economy. 
With the passage of time, eradication of poppy fields became riskier for the government’s 
counter-narcotics force. Over the past one decade, hundreds of Afghan security forces 
involved in poppy eradication have been killed and thousands of others have been injured 
in attacks by the Taliban insurgents and drug traders. The Afghan government’s figures 
show that during the 2012 poppy eradication campaign alone, 102 Afghan soldiers, police 
officers and civilians died while another 127 were injured in such attacks.
 88
 The number of 
security incidents and fatalities and injuries during the 2013 eradication campaign was 
even highier with a total of 143 people killed and 93 injured.
89
 However, the casualty 
figure in 2014 came down, as the eradication campaign was not as widespread as it had 
been over the previous two years. According to UNODC and Afghan government figures, 
during the 2014 eradication period, 13 lives were lost (8 police, 3 members of Afghan 
National Army and 2 farmers) and 26 persons were injured (13 Police, 2 Afghan Local 
Police, 8 members of Afghan National Army, one farmer, one tractor driver and one 
verifier).
90
 In some cases, poppy farmers also resort to violence to protect their fields from 
destruction arguing they cannot allow the government to take away their only means of 
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 In addition, many more Afghan security forces are killed and injured in fighting 
drug traffickers in remote areas of the country. 
Although the Taliban have not issued a public statement to clarify their position on poppy 
cultivation after the fall of their regime, they quietly incorporated the drugs in their overall 
strategy. The Taliban usually have three justifications or explanations for reversing their 
poppy ban. Firstly, the Taliban government was toppled; therefore, they were not in power 
anymore and not responsible for enforcing the poppy ban. Secondly, the ban was based on 
a Farman (executive order) of Mullah Muhammad Omar, the Taliban supreme leader, and 
was not a Fatwa (religious decree). Therefore, soon after the situation changed as a result 
of the fall of the regime, the executive order was repelled by another order which said that 
the poppy ban was not viable anymore. Thirdly, it is the need of the time to lift the poppy 
ban because the money received from the drug trade could be used to fight a “greater evil” 
-- the US-led “invaders and occupiers.”92  
 
5.6 Taliban’s Sources of Income  
Like insurgencies in other parts of the world, the Taliban in Afghanistan also need money 
to survive and sustain their violent campiagn. The group needs money to buy vehicles, 
especially motor cycles that they usually use for transportation inside the country. Inside 
Afghanistan, they don’t spend a lot of money on food as they mostly go to nearby villages 
where local people feed them either willingly, out of fear or simply for a possible future 
favour. A significant portion of their funds are spent on running sanctuaries and training 
camps. Although a number of seriously wounded Taliban fighters are treated by the ICRC 
(International Committee of the Red Cross), the group spends a lot of money on treating its 
wounded and sick. Some portion of their income goes into buying weapons especially 
explosives used in landmines and car bombs. They also buy the material used in individual 
suicide attacks such as explosive jackets. As the group has been facing a shortage of 
weapons for the past few years, it also buys grenades, rockets and other guns in the open 
market. In addition, they have set up a special commission which is looking after the 
families of those Taliban members killed in fighting or in the US or Afghan government’s 
custody. In addition, the group also bribes local Afghan security and judicial officials to 
secure the release of their jailed comrades. A significant amount of the Taliban funds are 
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also spent on propaganda and media activities which comes under the jurisdiction of the 
group’s Cultural Commission (Farhangi/Kalturi Kumisyun). They run a multi-lingual 
websites with audio, video and text as well as publish literature for general distribution. 




Although foreign assistance is invaluable to insurgents,
94
 they are normally dependent on 
civilian economy for food and logistics. Like other successful insurgencies, the Taliban 
realize they need both local and foreign financial sources in case one or more of them are 
evaporated. Therefore, from the very early stages of their insurgency, the group developed 
multiple sources of income. The group covers its costs through a variety of schemes and 
run a sophisticated financial network, both inside and outside the country.  
The Taliban’s annual income from 2011 onwards was estimated to be US$400 million95 
obtained from more than ten sources including ushr
96
 (10% Islamic tax on all agricultural 
produce including opium), zakat (2
1/2
% Islamic annual tax on money and other assets), 
money secured from domestic businesses including telecommunication companies/ mobile 
telephone operators, money obtained from reconstruction/development projects/NGOs, 
mining companies, money taken from private security firms involved in transportation of 
NATO supplies and other trucking companies, charity/donations inside the country, 
kidnapping (human and vehicles), extortion. Another major source of financing for the 
Taliban is protection payments from legitimate businesses operating in Taliban-controlled 
territory. In addition, they receive money from many foreign donors, mainly in Pakistan as 
well as in the Gulf countries where the Taliban collect donations from rich Arabs and 
Afghan businessmen in the name of Zakat and Khairaat (charity).
97
 It is worth noting that, 
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the ratio and percentage of income from each of the above sources have been different 
from time to time depend on several factors including the opportunities to exploit and the 
generousity of donors.  
Some regional and international militant groups also support them financially. Despite 
Islamabad denials, the Afghan government as well as some US officials say that elements 
within the Pakistani government also give financial support to the Afghan Taliban.
98
 In 
recent years, Iran has also been accused of supporting the Afghan insurgency.
99
 Money 
raised locally is mainly spent on local operations and the rest is channelled upwards to the 
Taliban’s Economic/Financial Commission (Iqtisaadi/Mali Kumisyun) which serves as 
finance ministry. However, most of the money is collected by the Financial Commission 
and then distributed among different organs and fronts. 
Foreign aid going into Afghanistan has been one of the richest sources of the Taliban 
funding. They raised millions of dollars annually from the money that have flowed into the 
country since 2001.
100
 Although the Taliban get a fraction of the billions of dollars donated 
for Afghanistan’s reconstruction, they maximise their income by taking a cut at various 
steps along the way. In 2012, the UN Security Council’s Taliban Sanctions Monitoring 
Team reported that the estimated Taliban income from contracts funded by the US and 
other overseas donors range from 10 to 20 percent of the total.
101
  
Nearly all major projects, especially in or near the Taliban controlled areas, pay them a 
healthy cut. This way, international donors, primarily the US, have been financing their 
own enemy. The Taliban usually negotiate a price with the contractors, mostly indirectly 
through a third person or sometimes call the contractor or the person incharge of the 
project directly on the telephone. The money paid to the Taliban depends on the nature of 
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contract and the amount of money involved; sometimes it is a fixed price and in other cases, 
a percentage is taken from the overall cost of the project which goes upto 20% in some 
cases. Contractors included the money they siphon off for the insurgents in their budget 
when they bid for a contract from the Afghan government or an international donor. 
According to a 2012 UN report, in just one province, Farah (western Afghanistan), the 
Taliban took up to 40 percent of the money coming in to pay for the government’s 
National Solidarity Programme, the community reconstruction projects.
102
 If a contractor 
refuses to pay the Taliban or the negotiations fail, there will be a cost to pay. The property 
or machinery related to that particular project is demaged or destroyed or camps where 
engineer/s and workers stay or the vehicles carrying them are attacked. In some cases, they 
are kidnapped and then released for a higher price or at the end of a protracted process. In 
many parts of the country, an understanding has developed between the Taliban, 
contractors and investors where they operate under unwritten proceedures.
103
  
In addition, the US/NATO troops supply convoys have been another major source of 
income for the Taliban for many years. The Taliban have successfully exploited the 
transportation market which expanded with the establishment of military bases and 
outposts. The arrival of more foreign troops to Afghanistan created more financial 
opportunities and resulted in a bigger income for the insurgents. The supply needs of 
international military scattered across the country have been mostly met by private security 
companies that protect convoys of trucks carrying American supplies to a network of 
military bases and offices. These contractors are forced to pay to protect American supply 
routes controlled by warlords, tribal militias and the Taliban. These funds add up to a huge 
amount of money for the Taliban who are paid for not attacking the trucks carrying 
US/NATO supplies. It is estimated that 10 to 20 percent of the Pentagon’s logistics 
contracts go to the insurgents.
104
 While testifying at a 2009 Hearing of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee on Afghanistan, the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton 
acknowledged that: “there’s a lot of evidence that, in addition to funding from the Gulf and 
the illegal narcotics trade, that siphoning off contractual money from the international 
community and the – in terms of just outright fraud and corruption, but also intimidation 
and extortion, is a major source of funding for the Taliban.” 105  A 2010 report by 
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congressional investigators entitled Warlord, Inc. found that the US military funds a 
massive protection racket in Afghanistan, indirectly pays tens of millions of dollars to 
warlords, corrupt public officials and the Taliban to ensure safe passage of its supply 
convoys to US bases.
106
    
In addition, the Taliban fighters regularly attack security posts, military convoys and other 
government/NATO installations. The weapons, vehicles and other valuables captured in 
such raids are considered as “spoils of war” and become the property of the fighters 
involved in the attack. The Taliban’s “Economic Commission” usually buys those weapons 
and other seized items for an estimated price. The equipment thus become the Taliban’s 
collective property and are then handed over to the “Military Commission” for distribution 
among different fronts and fighting groups.
107
  
The Taliban have also targeted gemstone and mining operations. Afghanistan is rich in 
gemstone deposits most of which is extracted illegally. It is difficult for the authorities to 
monitor and control these deposits as they are distributed throughout the country, notably 
the Panjshir Valley (emeralds), Jegdalek (rubies and sapphires), Nuristan (emeralds, rubies, 
aquamarine, tourmaline, kunzite, and spodumene), Helmand (flourite), Herat (aquamarine 
and tourmaline), and Badaskhan (sphene, peridot, aquamarine, ruby, spinel, lazurite and 
lapis lazuli). The World Bank estimates that the country’s gemstone industry could be 
worth up to US$300 million per year.
108
 Many insurgent commanders impose a “tax” on 
local Afghans or take a cut from marble and gemstone extraction as well as timber and 
antiquity smugglers. Illegal marble mining has been a very lucrative business for the 
Taliban in many provinces especially southern Helmand province. In its 2014 annual 
report, the UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team on the Taliban 
described the marble mining as the second major revenue source in Helmand. Identifying 
from 25 to 30 illegal mining operations in Helmand province alone, the UN report adds 
that “this Taliban revenue stream is significantly larger than $10 million a year.”109  
                                                                                                                                                                                
<http://www.understandingwar.org/reference/senate-armed-services-committee-hearing-afghanistan-
transcript> [Accessed 30 April 2013].  
106
 DeYoung, Karen, (2010). U.S. Indirectly Paying Afghan Warlords as Part of Security Contract. 
Washington Post, Tuesday, 22
nd
 June. Available online at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/06/21/AR2010062104628.html> [Accessed 05 June 2012].  
107
 Interviews with Taliban members/sympathisers (T1, T2 and T3). 2012 and 2013. 
108
 World Bank, (2012). Afghanistan Diagnostics Trade Integration Study. Report No. 70645-AF, November. 
Available online at: <http://www.enhancedif.org/en/system/files/uploads/afghanistan_dtis2012.pdf> 
[Accessed 18 April 2014].  
109
 Reuters, (2014). Taliban Changing From Religious Group to Criminal Enterprise – UN. 13 June. 
Available online at: <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/06/13/us-afghanistan-taliban-un-
idUKKBN0EO2K520140613> [Accessed 15 June 2014].  
244 
 
In areas of Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban, the insurgents also rely on donations 
which can be forced or voluntary motivated by religious or ideological convictions. The 
funds are generally extorted from businessmen and wealthy landowners in the name of 
Zakat (annual Islamic tax on one’s assets), Khairat (charity) or simply “assistance with the 
Mujahideen (Taliban fighters).” Major drug traders also make large ad hoc donations to the 
Taliban to obtain their favour and cooperation. Some local people in various areas under 
the Taliban’s influence complain this kind of “forced payment” and say that they fear they 
might be labelled as anti-Taliban or collaborators with the Afghan government or “foreign 
occupiers” for refusing or not paying the insurgents. Even in the government controlled 
areas, several landowners and businessmen are asked or encouraged to pay the Taliban. In 




However, drugs are said to be the biggest source of income for the Taliban, especially over 
the four years when their revenues from other sources reduced. The US and NATO 
officials have called illict drugs as “the insurgency’s chief source of revenue” which “buys 
the bomb makers and the bombs, the bullets and the trigger-pullers.”111 First of all, the 
Taliban’s drug income mechanism consists of several segments and stages. The Taliban 
officials charge poppy farmers a 10% religious tax called ushr usually at the farm gate and 
in kind. Secondly, Taliban foot soldiers augment their pay by working in the poppy fields, 
especially during harvest – an activity which brings them “sufficient funds for weapons 
and supplies.”112 Thirdly, the Taliban also receive money for protecting laboratories where 
opium is processed and converted into heroin. Fourthly, drug Traffickers and truckers pay 
them a transit tariff for the drugs smuggled out of the Taliban territory and sometimes for 
escorting the drugs convoy. Fifthly, big drug traders make regular payments to the Taliban 
leaders mostly in a bid to earn their favours and avoid any trouble. Sixthly, some local 
Taliban commanders have their own shares in the drug trade and get the money when 
drugs are delivered at the intended destinations.
113
  
                                                          
110
 Interviews with Afghan businessmen in Kabul (B1, B2 and B3), and villagers in Kandahar and Helmand 
provinces, (V5 and V6). Nov 2011 and Nov 2013.  
111
 Shanker, Thom, (2008). Obstacle in Bid to Curb Afghan Trade in Narcotics. New York Times, 23 Dec. 
Available online at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/23/world/asia/23poppy.html?_r=0> [Accessed 14 
April 2014].  
112
 Farrell, Theo and Giustozzi, Antonio, (2013). The Taliban at War: Inside the Helmand Insurgency, 2004–
2012. International Affairs 89, (4): 845–871. (Quote from p. 896). Available online at: 
<http://static1.squarespace.com/static/52908c90e4b023ca755eb442/t/53675c80e4b0e77173cc09af/13992828
16124/89_4_03_FarrellGiustozzi.pdf> [Accessed 14 March 2014].  
113




Seventhly, since 2013, the Taliban have been increasingly renting out the government land, 
especially in areas they control, to farmers and sharecroppers for the cultivation of opium 
poppies.
114 Local Taliban commanders or representatives of the Taliban’s Economic 
Comission have invested in some of these schemes in several districts of southern 
Helmand province, including Kajaki, Sangin and Musa Qala, where the Taliban have have 
hired farmers as sharecroppers. Such fields are usually irrigated through water pumped out 
of deep wells, ditches or river. The amount of renting the field (which is usually in kind in 
the form of opium) mostly depends on the access to water which is a very precious 
commodity in most of Afghanistan. Generally four main sources of irrigation are used such 
as rivers/streams, rain, underground water channels (called Karez) and deep wells (called 
Bawrai or Barmah depending on their depth and the way they are dug or drilled). Over the 
past few years, farmers, especially in drought stricken and water-scarce regions of southern 
Afghanistan have been increasingly relying on deep water wells that are dug or drilled. 
Some of such wells were drilled by NGOs and ISAF (International Security Assistance 
Force) contractors as part of Afghanistan’s reconstruction plan but are now used for poppy 
cultivation. Water is pumped up from these wells and ditches through generators run on 
fuel, electricity
115
 and solar panels. Like in other crops, rent farming is also common in 
poppy cultivation and both sides get their due share of the produce depending on the 
investment they make. The harvest is usually divided in half if the sharecropper provides 
inputs and work. If the landowner (in this case, the local Taliban commander or the 
representative of the Taliban’s Economic Commission) provides inputs, the Taliban 
receive 2/3 and the sharecropper gets 1/3 of the harvest. Local Taliban commanders have 
also rented the plots of those landowners who have left their homes and villages in the 
Taliban controlled areas because of their association with the government or opposition to 
the Taliban.
116
   
Although it is generally believed that the Taliban obtain most of their money from the drug 
trade, opinion has been divided on the actual amounts. According to the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the cumulative revenue from opiate farming and 
trade accruing to the Taliban insurgents in the 2005-2008 period was estimated at US$ 
350-650 million, or an annual average of US$ 90-160 million in Afghanistan alone.
117
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However, this estimate didn’t include insurgents’ potential revenues from other drug-
related activities (labs, imports of precursor chemicals need to convert opium into heroin) 
in Afghanistan and from the US$1 billion opiate trade in Pakistan. A 2008 report estimates 
that opium trade finances more than 40 percent of the Taliban’s insurgency.118 In 2009, the 
US military estimated that the Taliban collected $70 million annually from poppy farmers 
and narcotics traffickers.
119
 On the other hand, the UNODC estimated that in 2009, the 
Afghan Taliban’s income from the drug trade was around US$155 million, Afghan drug 
traffickers earned US$2.2 billion and the Afghan farmers received US$440 million.
120
 A 
New York Times report on 18 October 2009 quoted UN and Pentagon officials saying that 
the Taliban proceeds from the illicit drug trade alone ranged from $70 million to $400 
million a year.
121
 According to the UN Security Council’s Taliban Sanctions Monitoring 
Team, the Taliban income for the year 21 March 2011 to 20 March 2012 (the Afghan 
calendar year) was around $400 million of which an estimated $100 million to $155 
million annually came from the drug trade -- a sum that may represent more than a quarter 
of total Taliban funds.
122
 According to the 2012 Afghan government figures, “insurgents 
and warlords” received an estimated $200-400 million US dollars annually from drug 
trafficking.
123
Meanwhile, Zarar Ahmad Muqbel, Afghanistan’s minister for counter-
narcotics, calculated that the Taliban made at least $155 million from the poppy crop in 
2012.
124
 As the cultivation of poppies expanded and insecurity increased, the estimates of 
the Taliban drugs revenues went higher. In 2014, Afghan government officials expected 
the Taliban yield from that year’s poppy harvest to be upto $50 million only from Helmand, 
the biggest opium producing province.
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After insisting for years that drugs had been the main source of income for the Taliban, 
Western officials later shifted their focus to foreign donations. By 2009, US officials were 
“surprised to learn” that foreign donations, rather than drugs, had been the single largest 
source of cash for the Taliban. Richard Holbrooke, the US’s special representative for 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, said in June 2009 that it was “simply not true” that “the money 
all came from drugs in Afghanistan.”126 According to Holbrooke, private donors, including 
some from Persian Gulf countries, were increasingly believed to be a far more important 
source of money for the Taliban than the opium trade.
127
 The Middle East, especially the 
Gulf countries, has been a main foreign source of income for the Taliban for years. Taliban 
leaders usually send fund-raisers to a number of Arab countries to keep their coffers 
brimming with cash. In 2009, the CIA estimated that the Taliban leaders and their allies 
received $106 million in 2008 from donors outside Afghanistan.
128
 This view was 
supported by General Stanley McChrystal, the top commander of US and NATO forces in 
Afghanistan, in his 2008 report assessing the overall state of the Afghan war. He voiced 
scepticism that clamping down on the opium trade, even if possible, would crimp the 
Taliban’s overall finances unless other funding sources remained intact.129 Following these 
revelations, a new assessment emerged that the Taliban receive less than half of their 
revenues from the drug trade while other sources accounted for much of the rest.
130
    
In order to “bankrupt” the Taliban and their affiliated groups, the US and its allies have 
been engaged in a number of initiatives including the prosecution of individuals and 
organisations accused of providing material support to the insurgents and the freezing of 
assets of dozens of financiers and networks with alleged links to militancy. International 
organisations including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) -- an inter-governmental policy group tasked with 
finding regulatory fixes to money laundering and terrorist financing -- have also 
particpated in this crackdown. Meanwhile, the United Nations is at the forefront of efforts 
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aimed at impeding the ability of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban to fund their activities and 
sustain their infrastructure. As part of its “1267” list, the UN targeted Al-Qaeda and the 
Taliban financiers and subjected hundreds of individuals and entities to asset freezes and 
travel restrictions as part of the UN so-called “black-lists.”131 
 
5.7 Taliban Insurgency and the Opium Economy 
The Taliban’s revenue generation has been uneven and the extent of their income from 
different sources has changed overtime.
132
 In some provinces, such as Helmand, Nimroz 
and Kandahar, local fighting groups are not only financially self-sustaining, they also send 
extra money to the central budget, i.e. the Taliban’s “Economic Commission.” The funds 
are usually transferred to the Commission in cash or via “hawala”, an informal money 
transfer system which doesn’t involve moving any physical currency. According to the 
2014 annual report by the UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team on the 
Taliban, the group spends 20 percent of the money on fighting in Helmand, while 80 
percent is sent to the central leadership for redistribution to needier Taliban elsewhere.
133
 
The Taliban’s expenditure in a particular area also varies and depends on a number of 
factors such as the intensity of fighting, the number of their fighters and the freedom of 
movement. According to a 2013 UN report, the Taliban spent around US$40 million per 
year to finance their activities in the south-central Urozgan province while they were able 
to generate around $8 million a year through the drug trade and extortions from the 
province’s local economy.134 
Since around 2011, the Taliban’s reliance on drug money increased further due to two 
major developments -- the US/NATO troop withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Arab 
Spring. Donations for the Taliban from many Middle Eastern countries, especially the Gulf 
region, substantially decreased since the start of the “Arab Spring” in Tunisia in December 
2010. When people in several Arab countries took to the streets in a revolutionary wave of 
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uprisings to topple their autocratic regimes, many traditional rich Arab donors diverted 
their funds to support the causes closer to home such as the uprisings against Zine El 
Abidine Ben Ali in Tunis, Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, Muammar Al-Gaddafi in Libya, Ali 
Abdullah Saleh in Yemen, and Bashar Al-Assad in Syria.
135
   
The money the Taliban receive from contractors, mainly private security companies that 
protect convoys of trucks carrying supplies to US/NATO military bases has also decreased 
due to the gradual withdrawal of international forces in 2013 and 2014. The sharp 
decreases in the number of US military bases across the country meant there was less 
demand for the transportation of fuel, food and other items. The Taliban usually got 
“protection money” from this logistics operation and charged each truck at different stages 
of its journey to the final destination. Meanwhile, as the number of international forces 
decreased in Afghanistan, the Taliban’s insurgency expanded further and group opened 
new fronts which put more pressure on its budget. Although thousands of Taliban fighters 
have been killed since the US led invasion of Afghanistan, the Taliban insurgency 
remained resilient and attracted new volunteers. So, the shrinking of two major sources of 
income prompted the Taliban to exploit the drug trade further to meet their increasing 
needs.    
Although some Taliban commanders were already involved in drug trade both before the 
Taliban emerged and continued their business as usual during their rule (1996-2001), the 
group’s reliance on opium income has become deeper over over the past five.136 Many 
local Taliban commanders in opium-producing areas, particularly in southern Helmand and 
Kandahar provinces, are now linked to the drug trade in many ways and play and important 
role in both the upstream and downstream sides of the narcotics industry. Unlike the past 
when the Taliban were only going after the 10 percent usher tax and protection money, 
there are indications that they are now more involved than ever in almost all stages of the 
drug trade from encoouragment of poppy cultivation to farming and from protection to  
trade and trafficking.  
Many local commanders or their representatives encourage farmers to cultivate opium 
poppies, lend them seed money, buy the opium paste from them, refine it into exportable 
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opium and heroin and finally help in the transportation of drugs to other parts of the 
country, especially to Afghanistan’s shared borders with Iran and Pakistan. During my 
field research and interviews, it emerged that local Taliban commanders or representatives 
of the Taliban’s “Economic/Financial Commission” (Iqtisaadi/Mali Kumisyun), which 
serves as a finance ministry, usually keep a register of all the farmers and farms in opium 
producing regions. They visit the fields at several stages and finally get their share based 
on the size of the field and the total yield, mostly in kind. Farmers cannot hide or cheat as 
everything is recorded.
137
 This researcher also found that fighters involved in protecting 
the poppy fields from the government’s eradication campaigns get a percentage of opium 
or its monetary equivalent after the crop is obtained. In some areas, Taliban fighters 
usually supplement their pay by protecting poppy fields and working there during the 
harvest. Different areas in the two main opium producing provinces, Helmand and 
Kandahar, have been divided between different commanders. In some cases, they either 
have their own share in the drug trade or poppy fields are owned by members of their 
family or clan.   
The Taliban’s involvements in the drug trade and income from other “illegal sources” have 
raised concerns about “increasing criminality” in its rank and file. The question now arises 
what has been the impact of Taliban’s involvement in narcotics on their ideology and 
motivation? According to a 2014 United Nation’s report, the Taliban’s reliance on 
extortion and kidnappings, along with narcotics and illegal mining operations, is 
transforming it into a criminal enterprise hungry for profit. The annual report by the UN 
Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team on the Taliban adds that “these 
activities increasingly change the character of parts of the movement from a group based 
on religiously couched ideology to a coalition of increasingly criminalized networks, 
guided by the profit motive.”138 In February 2015, another UN Security Council report said 
that “their involvement in criminal activity, including narcotics trafficking, illicit mining, 
collusion with “transport mafias” and kidnapping for ransom, appears to be increasing.”139 
The report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team added that “at times, 
the Taliban have attempted to generate resources directly by acting as a criminal body. On 
other occasions, they have extracted revenue from, or in cooperation with, criminal 
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networks.”140 The report also identified a number of alleged Taliban traffickers who tap 
into the supply chain at every stage of the narcotics trade. In addition to the allegations that 
the Taliban are increasingly benefitting from criminal activities, some reports have 




However, this research found that most Taliban fighters are volunteers motivated by a 
cause or ideology. Majority of them don’t get regular salaries and are usually paid by their 
superiros to cover the cost of the day to day living. A number of fighters spend their own 
money while in the field and some even make their own financial contributions instead of 
taking money from the Taliban treasury. Although there are signs of criminality, such as 
kidnappings and extortion, within the Taliban insurgency, it is still mainly driven by 
ideology rather than money and control over resources. The Taliban remains a very 
hierarchical organisation with their finances controlled by the centre (mainly its 
“Economic Commission”) leaving little room for corruption. However, some of the 
group’s leaders have accumulated personal wealth and seems to be richer than what they 
had in the past. The reason is not always corruption and stealing of group’s funds. In 
addition, it doesn’t mean that the group’s general motivation has changed and is now 
driven by an economic agenda. The Taliban have deliberately left some room for 
accumulating personal wealth. The Taliban members including their leaders usually get 
two types of donations – a), for their own personal/family use and b), for the insurgency in 
general. Some of them, who reportedly live in Pakistan, own properties and fancy cars. It 
doesn’t mean that owning a nice car or a big house has become a main priority for most of 
the group’s members. Even the wells off Taliban leaders consider their newly acquired 
wealth as a by-product of their insurgency not the main purpose.
 142
  
Although it is also difficult to precisely determine the income and spenditure of the Taliban, 
the group’s annual revenues are estimated to be around US$400.143 Meanwhile, the cost of 
running the Taliban insurgency is much lower than the money spent by the Afghan and 
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US/NATO security forces. The Taliban insurgency is also cheaper as compared to other 
insurgencies such as FARC (Colombia), PKK (Turkey) and LTTE (Sri Lanka). The 
Taliban fighters don’t have a special uniform or boots and don’t spend money on other 
protocols and formalities. They have a simple life style and wear the local Afghan dress. In 
addition, they don’t live in purpose built barracks but live in villages among ordinary 
people. According to ISAF’s estimates, the cost to the Taliban of mounting attacks during 
2011 was between US$100-155.
144
 Meanwhile, a UN Security Council’s report estimated 
the annual Taliban income from the drug trade in 2011-2012 to be between US$100-155 
million.
145
 If these figures are accurate, it means that only the drugs income covers all the 
costs of war while the money the Taliban receive from other sources were spent on 
maintaining the overall insurgency or were a surplus.  
Despite the Taliban’s huge financial gains from the narcotics industry, the group is still a 
minor player compared to other major actors. The total value of the opium economy within 
Afghanistan in 2012 was US$2 billion while it was US$3 billion in 2013.
146
 This makes 
the Taliban’s income to lower than poppy farmers and drug traders. In addition, corrupt 
government officials earn much more in bribes and extortion than what the Taliban get 
from the drugs economy. According to the UN Security Council’s Taliban Sanctions 
Monitoring Team, the “Taliban share, while sizeable in absolute terms, is not particularly 
large in percentage terms. This suggests that the Taliban do not make great efforts to 
exploit this potential source of revenue.”147 
It is worth noting that despite their increasing reliance on the drugs industry, the Taliban 
have never acknowledged publically that the group has been involved in the drug trade that 
it receives millions of dollars annually from it. They have been careful about their public 
and international image and do not want to be portrayed as drug smugglers. A few days 
after a 2015 UN Security Council’s report, which said that the Taliban had been 
increasingly benefitting from criminal activites,
148
 the Taliban issued a statement calling it 
a document full of “baseless allegations.” They also rejected the notion that their members 
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had “links with the mafia circles” and stressed that their economic means are 
“legal/Islamic.”149  
The Taliban have the option of full involvement in the drug trade and controlling the whole 
opium industry. However, they understand the negativity associated with it and the damage 
it will do to their cause and reputation. According to Jean-Luc Lemahieu, head of the UN’s 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in Afghanistan, “not all in the Taliban are happy 
about the drug business, but undeniably too many of them are involved.”150 The Taliban’s 
involvement in the drug trade has been mostly facilitative; not determinative. Taliban’s 
original goals and grievances did not disappear with their deeper involvement in the drug 
economy. The group’s aim is not to accumulate wealth and get rich for the sake of it. In 
addition, so far, there are no indications that its main goals have been affected by its 
involvement in illict drug trade or it is now motivated by greed. As the Taliban control 
certain parts of the country, some people who were already involved in the drug trade have 
either joined the group or liaise with it to have the freedom of cultivating opium poppies 
and trafficking drugs. Therefore, the narcotics industry brought the Taliban and the drug 
traders closer as their interests are overlapping. Narcotics finance insurgents while their 
violence weakens government control and encourages poppy cultivation. Similarly, drug 
traders fund the Taliban because stronger Taliban means the ability to produce and traffick 
drugs with ease. It seems that, like many other insurgent groups elsewhere in the world, the 
Taliban have been adapting to new realities and are quick to exploit and replace the means 
and sources of income.  
 
5.8 Conclusion 
The drugs economy already existed in Afghanistan when the Taliban emerged in 1994. The 
group’s “love-and-hate” relationship with the narcotics trade predates the 2001 US-led 
invasion of Afghanistan which toppled its regime. The Taliban declared the use of drugs 
haram (forbidden) on religious grounds but allowed the opium trade and taxed its 
production and trafficking since the movement was launched in Afghanistan in 1994. 
When the Taliban banned the cultivation of opium poppies in 2000, the production in areas 
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under their control practically disappeared. However, after the Taliban were removed from 
power, the group quietly incorporated the drugs trade into its strategy.  
The drug economy has served as a quadruple-pronged tool for the group: a), the drug trade 
has been one of the major sources of funding for the group and helps it to buy weapons 
(guns, ammunitions, explosives) and pay for other expenditures including food, medicine, 
clothing and propaganda; b), the expansion of poppy cultivation in post-Taliban 
Afghanistan highlights inability of the Afghan government and its international allies to 
tackle the narcotics problem. This way, the Taliban exploit this weakness and highlight the 
fact that their ban on poppy growing was successful while the current government in Kabul 
lacks control over vast territories of the country; c), the Taliban also use the drug money to 
corrupt and weaken the Afghan government institutions and thus challenge the legitimacy 
of the government; d) some of their commanders see the drug trade as part of their overall 
insurgency against what they call “occupying powers” and consider it as a tool to weaken 
Western societies.  
Meanwhile, by protecting poppy fields from the government’s eradication efforts, the 
Taliban earn political capital and good will of all actors in the drugs economy, especially 
farmers. They portray themselves as the protectors of poor farmers whose livelihood are 
threatened and destroyed through the eradication and interdiction campaigns carried out by 
the Afghan government and its US/NATO allies. The Taliban also claim nationalist by 
protecting the livelihoods of poppy farmers and call their violent campaign a national 
cause and a resistance against “foreign occupation.”  
Like an enterprise, the Taliban have diversified. From the very early stages of their 
insurgency, the Taliban developed several sources of income. The group now has more 
than ten major sources of income including drugs, domestic and foreign donations, and 
reconstruction projects in Afghanistan, mainly private security companies that protect 
convoys of trucks carrying supplies to US/NATO military bases. However, the group’s 
revenue generation has been uneven and the extent of its income from different sources has 
changed overtime. The Taliban total annual revenues are said to be around US$400 and 
around a quarter (US$100-150) of it is said to be from the drugs industry. It is a lot of 
money as, compared to organised and professional armies, the insurgency is generally 
cheap and costs much less. In addition, the cost of the Taliban insurgency is relatively 
lower as its fighters don’t wear special uniforms and boots and live in villages among 




As the total value of the opium economy within Afghanistan in 2013 was US$3 billion, it 
shows that the Taliban are still receiving less money than other major actors in the drugs 
economy especially drug traffickers, corrupt government officials and farmers. According 
to a 2012 UN Security Council’s Taliban Sanctions Monitoring Team report, the Taliban 
share is not particularly large in percentage terms and if they wanted, they could have 
earned much more by exploiting this potential source of revenue. 
Since 2011, the Taliban’s reliance on the drug trade has increased. Foreign donations, 
mainly from the Middle East, have decreased due to the Arab Spring, when many oil rich 
donors from the Gulf region diverted funds to causes closer at home inlcluding Syria, 
Yemen, Libya and Egypt. Meanwhile, the money the Taliban used to receive for giving 
safe passage to US/NATO supply convoys inside Afghanistan has also reduced after the 
withdrawal of most foreign forces.  
In post-Taliban Afghanistan, the presence and quantity of poppy cultivation has become a 
measure of instability. The provinces that produce most opium are the most violent. The 
two southern provinces, Helmand and Kandahar which account for around 70 percent of 
the world’s opium supply, experience the highest levels of insurgent related activities. It 
seems that drug production and trade has become a joint venture for the Taliban and drug 
traders. The interests of both actors are overlapping here as both of them want to ensure 
that vast areas of Afghanistan remain outside the government control. Narcotics finance 
insurgents while their violence weakens government control and encourages poppy 
cultivation. Similarly, drug traders fund the Taliban because stronger Taliban creates the 
environment for the production and trade of narcotics.  
The Taliban’s involvement in the drug trade has been mostly facilitative; not determinative. 
Like many other successful insurgent groups elsewhere in the world, the Taliban have been 
adapting to new realities and are quick to exploit and replace their sources of income. 
Taliban’s original goals and grievances did not disappear with their deepening involvement 
in the drug economy. Given the weakness of Afghan state institutions, eliminating 
insurgents’ access to narco-profits will be very difficult, at least in the short term, but it 
would be disruptive and would substantially weaken the group. However, the elimination 
of drugs industry would not destroy result in the extinction of the Taliban insurgency so 





Drugs Economy: Crime, Conflict and State-(Un)Building 
 
While focusing on Afghanistan, this chapter explores the role illicit drugs play in the 
conflict and institution (un)building. Based on the first-hand information from the field and 
dozens of original interviews, the chapter argues that there is a mutually reinforcing 
relationship between opium economy, criminality and insurgency in Afghanistan. 
Narcotics finance insurgents while their violence weakens government control and 
encourages poppy cultivation. In addition, the narcotics industry has helped produce a new 
elite class in Afghanistan which is benefiting from the ongoing violence and has penetrated 
the state institutions mainly through patronage and corruption. This chapter reveals how 
corrupt officials and warlords/militia leaders often play both sides -- the insurgents and the 
counterinsurgents -- and infiltrate state institutions by colonising part of the civil and 
military administration. While appreciating the political economy dynamics of illict drugs 
in Afghanistan, the chapter gives a detailed account of the mechanism and extent to which 
drug production and trafficking inhibits institution-building and facilitates insurgency in 
Afghanistan.  
 
Conflicts and the subsequent social and political upheavals generally result in the creation 
of a new socio-economic and political order with political agents, usually leaders, engaging 
in strategies to attain power and influence and control resources. As the discipline of 
Political Anthropology suggests, self-service is an important part of politics where political 
agents use skills and power to ensure both political survival and social and economic well-
being.
1
 In his discussion on the bases of power in chiefdoms, Earle says, “a society’s 
economy and ideology stand in different ways as infrastructure and justification for 
developing political domination.” 2  Social and political power largely depends on the 
production, acquisition and distribution of economic resources. Besides human and 
material resources, ideology, symbols and information are considered the five critical 
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constituent resources of political power.
3
 Conflicts generally alter the usual rules of the 
game and create dominant leaders who seek obedience. Lewellen argues that in peacetime 
the very structure of kinship-based systems prevents any single person or elite group from 
assuming dominance.
4
 However, according to Kurtz, kinship plays an effective role and is 
used by political agents to form political alliances, unite potential enemies and acquire and 
control human and tangible resources.
5
 In conflict situations, such actors usually acquire 




Most political agents acquire resources through the goods that their community provides 
them and are generally notorious manipulators of their political economies.
7
 In 
Afghanistan, illict drugs have been a major source of income for a number of actors and 
interest group for the past few decades. Several actors including the Taliban insurgents, 
security officials especially the police and many warlords-cum government officials profit 
from it. In the context of Afghanistan, Giustozzi defines “Warlords” as “military leaders 
who emerge to play a de facto political role, despite their lack of full legitimacy.”8  
The conflict and the illicit drug trade resulted in the creation of a new elite class in the 
country. During the war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1980s, 
commanders used foreign money and aid to assert their authority to the detriment of 
traditional local elders which had a “devastating impact on the Afghan social fabric” 
whose infighting and rivalry led to the fragmentation of Afghanistan into numerous 
fiefdoms under the control of warlords who fought each other for power and influence.
9
 
The breakdown of central government power paved the way for the emergence of locally 
powerful figures and warlords “who wielded power and set up patronage networks through 
access to foreign aid, weapons, tax revenues, natural resources, and the illicit narcotics 
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trade.”10 Although they are the product of the conflict which started after the 1979 Soviet 
invasion and the subsequent factional war (1992-2001), warlords mostly function as 
political leaders and exploit criminal economy.
11
  
Warlords use the drug money to maintain and expand their political and ecpnomic power 
and try to infiltrate the state institutions by helping their partners and protégés get the 
government positions. Through using bribes and influence to appoint or transfer 
government officials, warlords corrupt government officials, especially in security and 
judicial institutions, whose job is to tackle the illict drug trade. Therefore, “warlodism” 
poses one of the biggest challenges to the Afghan state building as they and their acolytes 
hamper the establishment of an accountable, transparent and efficient Afghan state.
12
  
The local actors involved in Afghnaistan’s drug trade can be divided into two groups -- 
those who do it out of need (farmers, small traders) and those who are doing it out of greed 
(wealthy drug traders, corrupt officials, warlords). The greedy actors usually put pressure 
or offer incentives such as cash credits and leasing their lands to the needy ones to produce 
opium.
13
 “Warlords” and local miltia leaders are more innovative in exploiting the drug 
trade. Due to weak state institutions and a resilient insurgency, illicit drug trade has 
become a low-risk activity in a high-risk environment
14
 and a “persistent challenge to 
stability” in the country.15 According to Ghani and Lockhart, a state should be able to 
perform ten key functions including the monopoly on the legitimate use of force and 
administrative control.
16
 When the state is unable to perform its responsibilities effectively, 
people become disenfranchised and might resort to violence.
17
  
Governments in many parts of the world are struggling to break the nexus between drugs 
and conflict both of which create a suitable environment for institutional corruption. In 
some cases, the production and trade of narcotics sustain the conflict while in others; the 
counter-narcotics policies themselves have the opposite affect of fuelling the conflict. The 
Afghan government, established after the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, is struggling 
to build a functioning state able to monopolise the use of legitimate means of coercion and 
                                                          
10
 Jalali, Ali A. (2006). The Future of Afghanistan. Parameters, 36, (1), Spring, p.5. [Online]. Available at: 
<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/parameters/Articles/06spring/jalali.pdf> [Accessed 20 June 2014].  
11
 Hodes, Cyrus and Sedra, Mark, (2007). The Search for Security in Post-Taliban Afghanistan. IISS Adelphi 
Paper No. 391, London: Routledge, p.12. 
12
 Giustozzi, Antonio, (2004). ‘Good’ State vs. ‘Bad’ Warlords? op.cit.   
13
 Jalali, Ali A., (2006). The Future of Afghanistan. op.cit. p.12.   
14
 Jalali, Ali A. (2006). The Future of Afghanistan. op.cit.   
15
 Ghani, Ashraf and Lockhart, Clare, (2008). Fixing Failed States: A Framework of Rebuilding a Fractured 
World. New York: Oxford University Press, p.75. 
16
 ibid. pp. 124-166.  
17
 ibid. p. 163. 
259 
 
develop the capacity to respond to the people’s political, social, and economic needs. 
However, it has faced with numerous big challenges, especially the illict drugs economy 
and the insurgency, both of which are closely linked with the state (un)building in 
Afghanistan. Drugs provide the much needed cash to the insurgents and support their 
militant activities. Meanwhile, it has resulted in the creation of a criminal network which 
has infiltrated the state insitutions. Drug not only financ the parties involved in the conflict; 
it has also served as a corrupting agent of government officials. According to a 2005 World 
Bank report, the drugs economy is a major obstacle in establishing good governance, 
security and the rule of law in Afghanistan. The report adds that that “the security and 
political implications of Afghanistan’s opium economy present a grave danger to the 
country’s entire state building and reconstruction agenda.”18  
On the other hand, the illict drug trade has a negative impact on the social wellbeing of the 
people as it generally results in the rise in criminality and drug addiction. Although drug 
addiction is a relatively new problem in Afghanistan, the number of drugs users is rapidly 
increasingly. Many of the Afghan drug addicts began taking drugs in refugee camps in Iran 
and Pakistan and brought the problem with them after returning to their own country. 
There are an estimated 1.2 million drug users, including women and children; around five 
percent of the population, which is among the highest rates in the world. The use of opiates 
doubled from 2005 to 2009 putting Afghanistan on par with Russia and Iran.
19
 According 
to UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime), in 2013, local consumption 
accounted for about 5% (258 tons) of the estimated 5,500 tons of opium produced in the 
country that year. An approximately 11% of opiates, equivalent to 628 tons of opium 




There are various reasons behind increasing drug use in Afghanistan including peer 
pressure, availability of cheap narcotics, limited access to treatment/rehabilitation, 
economic harship, depression and other medical problems and direct involvement in drug 
production and trafficking. The drug use also led to domestic violence, crimes, 
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unemployment and poverty as the addicts generally face financial difficulties. The high 
rate of drug addiction also results in the loss of productivity in the workplace and, as a 
consequence, creates “a greater propensity for corruption.”21  
 
6.1 Main actors in Afghanistan’s Drug Economy 
The illict drug trade has become one of the most lucrative businesses in the contemporary 
world. It is mainly the profit that makes it attractive to a lot of people around the globe. A 
number of people, with profit motives in short span of time and with comparatively little 
efforts, are dragged into the drugs economy. Farmers cultivate poppies and other narcotic 
plants because they bring them more money as compared to many legal crops. On the other 
hand, drug traders and traffickers take the risk of being jailed and, in some cases, executed 
due the large amounts of money involved in it. In addition, government officials find it 
more profitable to flout laws than enforce them.  
The drug industry involves three main but specialized functions -- production, trafficking 
and consumption -- with each one generally requiring different actors ranging from poor 
farmers in the remotest areas of drug producing countries to traffickers and finally 
consumers in urban centres of the world’s richest countries. There are more than ten 
“primary actors” involved in Afghanistan’s drug economy: farmers/landowners; drug 
traders; rural labourers; refiners; government officials; warlords, commanders, and other 
power brokers/notables; Taliban and other insurgent groups; cross-border smugglers; 
cross-border (corrupt) officials; and drug consumers.  
A), Farmers, sharecroppers and landowners cultivate opium poppies mostly in areas where 
the government writ is weak. They get the least amount of money involved in the global 
drugs economy. B), Drug traders include both small and wholesalers. Small traders usually 
buy and sell varying volumes of opium at farm gate and villages and sell it in small 
general-purpose district bazaars. They also sell opium to large traders in the same province 
or to drug traders based in other provinces. They are mostly the ones who frequently run 
into trouble and are at the highest risks of being captured. C), Wholesalers or big drug 
traders trade larger quantities of opium and often organise the processing of opium. They 
also commission collectors and may be landowners with sharecroppers/tenants. In most 
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cases, they are also involved in transferring the products across borders. Although most 
large Afghan trafficking networks have responsibilities up to the border, after which 
internationally-oriented groups take over; some also have representation in neighbouring 
countries such as Iran and Pakistan.
22
 D), Rural labourers usually work in the seasonal 
cultivation of opium poppy and collection of opium paste, both of which are labour 
intensive activities. Most of the labourers are local villagers but in many cases, people 
from other provinces also go to poppy growing areas during the opium harvest season and 
earn a dissent living. E), Refiners process the opium into heroin or sometimes morphine 
generally on a commission payment basis. Some refiners are also involved in trading 
activities. In some cases, especially in the case of small farmers, the grower, trader and 
refiner is the same person. F), Corrupt government officials, especially in the security 
sector, are involved in the opium economy by receiving bribes and other payments at 
various stages of the opium chain including protection (of poppy fields and opium stores), 
transport/smuggling (of opiates), transactions or by simply turning a blind eye. Corrupt 
officials in the judiciary also get money for cooperating with the drig traders. G), Warlords 
and commanders, and other power brokers are involved in protecting and facilitating the 
drug cultivation and trade and benefit directly and indirectly from it. In a number of cases, 
they remote control the drug trade and receiving money from those involved in the drug 
trade by facilitating the transport and transactions of drugs as well as protection from law 
enforcement agencies. H), The Taliban insurgents usually protect poppy fields from 
eradication and drug trafficking convoys from interdiction. I), Cross-border smugglers 
include both individual traders and organised groups who have links with the regional and 
international drug mafia. When drugs cross the Afghan borders, more professional and 
organised drug cartels take over and smuggle them to high value markets including 
Western Europe. This group also include those who import precursor chemicals required 
for the processing of drugs especially the conversion of opium into heroin. J), Border 
officials in Afghanistan and neighbouring/regional countries receive bribes from drug 
traffickers in exchange for a safe passage of their cargo. Similarly, they allow the 
smuggling of precursor chemicals into Afghanistan. K), Drug consumers exist both inside 
Afghanistan and abroad. However, most of the drugs produced in Afghanistan are 
consumed in foreign countries.
23
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With opium being the country’s most valuable cash crop and the biggest contributor to its 
GDP for around two decades, drug production and trade play an important role in the 
political economy of Afghanistan. Although opium crop occupies around 3% of the arable 
land, the opium economy directly provides more than 400,000 full-time-equivalent jobs.
24
 
In impoverished countries such as Afghanistan, where around 70% of the population lives 
below the poverty line, the scope and economic importance of the drug economy goes 
beyond the involvement of the aforementioned actors and also involves what I call 
“secondary actors”. They include those who live off of imports purchased with drug profits, 
including durable consumer goods (such as mobile phone sets, television sets, motorcycles, 
cars, clothes, watches, etc.), fuel, travelling, fruit, and other amenities and “luxuries.” In 
addition, with the expansion of drug trade, local services such as teashops/restaurants and 
rest houses experienced a boost especially in areas through which drugs are trafficked. The 
involvement of government officials and influential figures in the drug trade has been an 
open secret in the country. The affects of the drug boom are more evident in real state, 
especially in the form of “poppy palaces” going up in Kabul and other provincial capitals.    
As illustrated in the figure below, primary actors can be divided into three categories. 
“Category A” consists of actors whose involvement in the drugs economy is due to need 
and includes farmers/sharecroppers, small landowners, labourers and refiners. “Category B” 
includes of those actors whose aim is to weaken the state control such as insurgents, drug 
traffickers and criminal groups. In “Category C”, the actors’ involvement is mainly due to 
greed and they include corrupt government officials, warlords/commanders and local 
powerbrokers. As illustrated in the following diagram (Figure 6.1), the roles and interests 
of the primary actors in the drug industry are generally overlapping. In addition, the nexus 
of corrupt security officials with the drug mafia is usually stronger in poppy producing 
areas as well as those regions from where drugs are trafficked. The survival and growth the 
drug network inside Afghanistan is upto large extent dependant on the nexus bewtween 
corrupt officials and the drug traders.  
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Figure 6.1 - Main actors in Afghanistan’s illicit drugs economy 
 
 
6.2 Drug Trade and the Patronage Pyramid 
The decades long conflict in Afghanistan has irreparably damaged the traditional structures 
in the society. Foreign aid as well as illict drugs played a major role in the transformation 
of the Afghan society and polity. In 1980s a number of individuals became commanders in 
the resistance against the occupying Soviet forces. Several of those Mujahideen 
commanders were involved in the drug trade which bought them the much needed 
weapons and food. The decline of the traditional leadership in Afghanistan resulted in the 
emergence of a new elite class mostly dependent on foreign aid and the drug trade. As Roy 
says, these “new notables”,25 established their power as redistributors of goods by creating 
“a network of clients, strengthened by matrimonial bonds.”26 A number of Mujahideen 
commanders in poppy producing areas not only allowed drug production but also 
sponsored the cultivation of poppies and the production of opium. The drug money 
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transformed these village commanders into powerful warlords and gradually gave them a 
degree of independence from their external sponsors and supriors.  
In early 1990’s, when Afghanistan experienced anarchy following the collapse of the 
Soviet backed communist regime in Kabul, powerful warlords used the drug money to 
maintain their power and tried to further increase their political and military influence. In 
many areas, local commanders/warlords taxed the drug production and trade and acted as 
independent entities.
27
 In post-Taliban Afghanistan (2001 onwards), power has been 
mostly coalescing around the same factions and individuals that established a power base 
during the war years and continue to have access to means of protection and predation. 
They also use elections to further entrench their power structures in the provinces as well 
as the centre and increase their capacity to generate money and patronage through the 
drugs economy. As the central government is weak, these power-brokers have a level of 
autonomy and leverage resulting in fluid political arrangements between central 
government and the peripheral elites. Although some warlords and power brokers have 
joined the government, they still benefit from the drug trade, have links with illegal armed 
groups and, in some case, maintain their own private militias.  
There is a deep interpenetration of formal politics with informal structures of networks and 
factions. In order to maintain internal political stability, the central government is forced to 
accommodate these factions and individuals who are organised along the patron–client 
lines.
28
 The Interior Ministry is described as the most corrupt of all the government 
institutions, with officials taking bribes for appointing police officers and protecting a wide 
range of wrongdoers, including drug traffickers.
29
  
Like the confusion of public and private interests that existed in early modern European 
states, these practices have blurred the line between the public and the private today. In 
renaissance Europe, public domain was not clearly distinguished from private interest. 
Thereofre venality and patronage was common and phenomena like nepotism, string-
pulling, and squeeze were either legitimate or their moral status was confused. According 
to Harding, “in pre-bureaucratic governments, officeholders often treated their offices as 
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business enterprises and sought to maximise their personal income from them.” 30  In 
addition, writing about the patronage system in England in early seventeenth century, 
Linda Levy Peck says that gratuities, frequently involuntary, were far more important than 
salaries for the office holders. She calls that period as the era of patrimonial bureaucracies 
where offices were staffed through kinship and clientage, bought and sold and treated as 
the holder’s private property.31  
Warlords-cum politicians sponsor the narcotics industry not only for their own financial 
benefits; they also get the political support of those involved in the drug trade. Such public 
support helps them to sustain their clout and influence in the government. Corrupt officials 
usually seek appointments in border districts and drug producing areas. The posts of police 
commanders and district governors in drug producing and along the drug trafficking routes 
are among the most attractive. As various interviewees told me during my field research, a 
number of people pay officials in the central government to secure posts with “high income 
opportunities.” The price of such appointments allegedly ranges from tens to hundreds of 
thousands of dollars.
32
 The patterns of corruption are not limited to Interior and Justice 
Ministries; there is an assemblage of actors and institutions continuously evolving and 
shifting across ministries and other formal institutions in order to adjust themselves with 
the changing environment. According to Byrd, the transformation of warlords into 
politicians has been accompanied by compromising of parts of some government agencies 
by drug industry interests. As a result, “security forces, most notably the police, are in part 
facilitating the activities of the drug industry rather than countering it.”33    
This chain goes from the districts to high ranking officials and politicians in Kabul. 
Officials get financial benefits from the drug trade in a number of ways. Fristly, farmers 
pay relevant authorities to protect their poppy fields from eradication both individually and 
collectively when a group of farmers collect money for officials as part of the arrangement 
that the eradication police would not visit their village to destroy poppy fields. In addition, 
farmers with who have “the right connections in the government” or pay “big bribes” want 
to ensure that even if the poppy eradication teams visit their villages and farms, they do, 
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the eradication is “cosmetic” and superficial with most of the farm remaining unscathed. 
Secondly, drug traders, who sell drugs in locally, pay security and civilian officials in the 
hope that their businesses would not be raided and drugs confiscated. Thirdly, drug 
smugglers pay security officials to avoid interdiction and get a safe passage at checkpoints. 
Fourthly, owners of heroin laboratories also pay officials to ensure their own safety and 
protect their opium processing laboratories from government raids. Fiftly, those arrested on 
charges of drug production and trafficking pay security and judicial officials to secure their 
release or get a lighter sentence. Sixthly, officials and government employees are also 
rewarded when they tipped off the drug traders before a raid or interdiction takes place. My 
interviews with poppy farmers, drug traders and tribal elders in Kandahar, Helmand and 
Nangarhar provinces in 2012 and 2013 revealed that there were a number of incidents 
when drug traders were given information in advance about raids on their businesses so 
they could have time to move some or all of their their drugs to another location and flee 
the area to avoid being captured.
34
 Drug traffickers are also informed if certain routes are 
not safe at a particular time due to heavy security or ongoing search operation. Sevethly, 
the confiscated drugs are given back to the owner in exchange of money.
35
 In some cases, 
drugs seized in raids are fully or partly sold back by the corrupt officials especially those 
involved in the raid. There are no fixed rates for these services.  
The amount of money farmers and drug traders and traffickers pay to corrupt government 
officials has changed with time and depends on a number of factors including the prices of 
drugs and the extent of risks involved in productin and trafficking of narcotics. The Afghan 
government doesn’t have the capacity to prevent poppy cultivation all over the country, 
especially in areas under the Taliban’s influence. Opium is traded freely in areas outside 
the control of the government forces. Even though security forces raid areas under the 
Taliban control to destroy drug factories and seize drugs, the drug traders quickly return 
and restore the old regime. However, trafficking is another matter. Drugs are mostly 
smuggled through the government controlled territories in the form of opium, heroin and 
marijuana. The drug shipments go through a number of government checkposts and 
usually face several patrols on their way to the border districts from where they are 
smuggled into the neighbouring countries. The involvement of government officials is 
greater at the trafficking stage of the drug trade.  
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In most cases, it is a “patron-client” relationship with drug traders/warlords providing 
famers access to land, credit while corrupt officials cooperate with drug traders and 
traffickers. The corruption in the judicialy and security institutions is mostly linked to 
patronage networks in which the illict drug trade plays a key role. In post-Taliban 
Afghanistan, the drug networks grew mainly under the political patronage with some social 
personalities, warlords and politicians providing support and protection to those involved 
in the drug trade. Patronage and criminal networks facilitate the drug trade, subvert the 
government and security institutions and, in some cases, provide money to the insurgents. 
According to John Sopko, the United States’ Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 
Reconstruction (SIGAR), “the patronage system and the failure to prosecute people guilty 
of gross fraud and abuse is undermining the Afghan economy and putting future 
development efforts at risk.” 36  In addition, a 2004 World Bank report says that 
“illegitimate regional powerbrokers” linked to illicit drugs have “captured” large parts of 
the country while opium production “funds interests strongly opposed to state-building” in 
Afghanistan. The drugs economy in general has induced a “vicious circle” of bad 
governance, insecurity and poverty.
37
 The following figure (Figure 6.2) illustrates the 
involvement of different actors in the drug trade and links them in what I call the 
“Patronage Pyramid.”    
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Figure 6.2: The Patronage Pyramid 
 
The patron-client relations in the drug trade create and cement structural corruption, a 
problem that has got worse in the post-Taliban Afghanistan. As in several other countries 
in the region, a number of people entered politics with the intention of accumulating more 
power and wealth rather than having a political agenda or vision. Nouveau riche and new 
elite have links with regional and national power brokers and are protected under their 
patronage. The presence of such politicians not only impacts the normal functionality and 
quality of political institutions, it also affects the over all political process in the country. 
Drugs money also play an important role in financing political parties and political and 
government leaders. Several individuals who have known links with the drug trade fund 
election campaigns of various politicians. The fuelling of the political system with drugs 
money has made the drug traders capable of infiltrating state institutions and destabilising 
government, at least at local level.  
 
Political Patronage 
Provincial Police Chiefs  & Border Security Officers 
(Payment for appointments & maintaining positions) 
Judicial Officials  
(payment for appointments  & maintianing positions) 
Big/Key Drug Traffickers  
(Payment for safe passage & voiding interdiction ) 
Mid Level Traders & Traffickers  
(Payment for safe passage & voiding interdiction) 
Disctrict Police cheifs  
(Payment for appointments & maintianing positions) 
Local/Small Drug Traders 
(Payment to avoid raids  & arrests) 
Farmers / Refiners / Labourers  
(Payment to avoid eradication & raids) 
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6.3 Drugs, Conflict and Governance Nexus 
The involvement of corrupt officials and other power brokers in the drugs economy takes 
several forms. Direct involvement means that the individual owns land and either he 
himself, his family members or relatives cultivate poppies or leas/rent his land to farmers 
for poppy cultivation. The other form of direct involvement is the trading and/or trafficking 
of drugs in which case, the individual might not be involved in the cultivation of poppies. 
Indirect involvement means that the individual has a share in somebody else’s drugs 
business or benefit financially from it. It can take many shapes ranging from a percentage 
or lump sum payment for making sure that poppy fields are not eradicated and drugs pass 
safely through government security checkposts. It also involves the use of one’s influence 
to get a safepassage for drugs, protect poppy fields and drug factories and secure the 
release of those charged with drugs offences.  
In a number of areas, corrupt police commanders turned a blind eye towards poppy fields 
and ignore implementing the government’s policy of eradicating. The eradication of poppy 
fields is manual and generally includes the using of sticks or sickles, blade and uprooting 
of plants by hand and tractor and animal plough. Relatives and family members of officials 
and other influential figures have been generally exempt from eradication in many parts of 
the country. In some cases, a “mock eradication” takes place in which only some parts of 
the field are eradicated just to show that the authorities have fulfilled their obligation.
38
  
In addition, a number of officials and power brokers who speak publically against illict 
drugs have been accused themselves of being involved in the drug trade. The tactic of 
condemning the drug trade in public while benefitting from it privately has been used by 
many former warlords and militia commanders who are part of the government.
39
 These 
politicians have been accused of helping officials in their appointments in exchange of a 
continuous flow of money. In some areas, police commanders and district officials have 
even a share in the local drug trafficking. Several border police units have been notorious 
for this type of involvement in the drugs economy.
40
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A number of high ranking officials privately admit that a long chain of the personnel in law 
enforcement agencies benefit from the drug trade including district police chiefs as well as 
officials in the capital Kabul. In many cases, politicians and power-brokers have a “remote 
control” involvement in drug trade by working through individuals lower down the chain. 
In 2005, Afghanistan’s interior minister, Ali Ahmad Jalali, said that the ministry had a list 
of 100 influential individuals who were being watched for evidence about their 
involvement in the drug trade. The unpublished list included top officials in the security 
institutions, provincial governors and even cabinet ministers. According to Jalali, 
sometimes high ranking officials use their cars for drug trafficking or rent them for a fee as 
they are not searched at security checkposts. Even if the drugs are found in these vehicles, 
the officials deny any knowledge of the activity and usually blame drivers or bodyguards 
for the wrongdoings. However, the same officials then use their influence to secure the 
release of their men.
41
  
In 2006, Abdul Rashid, the Deputy Chief Justice of Supreme Court, admitted that the 
names of powerful players involved in the drug trade were being excluded when legal 
cases are prepared by prosecutors. Accroding to him, “the main and dangerous people” 
involved in narcotics trade live freely while “we have punished cleaners or drivers.”42 The 
same year, the then security chief at Kabul airport accused high ranking Afghan officials of 
colluding with the drug smugglers. He publically complained that they order him to release 
“heroin smugglers caught red-handed” and added that “the smugglers had their own people 
within the government.” 43  In 2007, Afghanistan’s first Vice President, Ahmad Zia 
Massoud, said that corruption in the Afghan government institutions was increasing due to 
the drugs industry. While linking foreign and local drug mafia, he added that failure in the 
fight against illict drugs is largely due to the involvement of senior government officials in 
drug trade.
44
 The same year, the spokesman of Afghanistan’s Counternarcotics Ministry 
acknowledged that corruption was hampering the fight against drugs and added that 
international mafia had established links with officials in the Afghan government 
institutions.
45
 In November 2007, the country’s Counter-Narcotics Appeal Court 
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announced over the previous two years, six-hundred cases linked to illict drugs have been 
brought to and processed by the court. However, there were no high ranking officials and 




Afghan judicial officials admit that despite having evidence, it is hard for them to arrest or 
prosecute a number of known drug traders. Such reluctance is usually justified as for the 
sake of stability and avoiding trouble and negeative reaction from these influential figures. 
In 2010, Afghanistan’s Justice Minister, Habiullah Ghaleb, said that the government knew 
that a number of officials and power brokers were involved or benefitting from the drug 
trade but couldn’t take action against them “because they can cause instability”. 47  In 
addition, in some cases, security officials do not destroy poppy fields for the fear of losing 
political capital and support of the population. According to two different police 
commanders in Kandahar and Helmand provinces, growing poppies was the only 
livelihood for many farmers and destroying their fields would push them towards the 
Taliban. As one of the commanders said that “our priority is peace and stability and if we 
eradicate their fields, these people will turn against us.”48  
While on one hand, some degree of corruption is tolerated for the sake of stability, on the 
other hand, it is corruption itself which is preventing the formation of functioning and 
accountable state institutions. Corruption in state machinery has been detrimental to the 
overall strategy of state-building. In many ways, the drugs trade ties together the Taliban 
insurgents, drug traffickers and corrupt officials. There are reports about corrupt officials 
turning a blind to the activities of Taliban-linked drug traders. Many of my interviewees 
said that a number of officials are in cohort with the drug traders who have links with the 
insurgency or make payments to the insurgents.
49
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As seen in many drug producing countries and regions, bad governance and weak state 
institutions create favourable conditions for the cultivation and trade of illict drugs. Funds 
generated from the drug trade are usually used in two ways -- to buy influence in the state 
institutions and to undermine the state capacity. This leads to the weakening of government 
institutions and results in the fragility and even failing of the state. State failure occurs 
when its institutions are unable to fulfil its core functions including securing its territory 
and providing services to its population. Over all, the illict drug trade is causing at least 
three major problems; it enhances corruption, distorts legal economy and undermines 
state’s legitimacy. 
 
6.4 Drugs and Corruption  
Depending on its context, corruption is defined differently. Joseph Nye’s public office 
centred definition is often cited in public policy and cademic circles which says that 
“corruption is behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of 
private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or 
violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence.” 50 In his 
classic definition, Nye describes such behaviour as “bribery (use of a reward to pervert the 
judgment of a person in a position of trust); nepotism (bestowal of patronage by reason of a 
scriptive relationship rather than merit); and misappropriation (illegal appropriation of 
public resources for private-regarding uses).”51    
On the other hand, Friedrich focuses more on public interest in his description of 
corruption and calls corruption a “deviant behaviour associated with a particular 
motivation, namely that of private gain at public expense.” 52 These private gains may be 
monetary or may take other forms such as “a rapid promotion, an order, decorations, and 
the like of, and the gain may not be personal, but benefit a family or group.” According to 
Friedrich, the patterns of corruption exist when a power holder takes actions to favour 
reward providers in a way that constitutes a breach of law or of standard of high moral 
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 In addition, Van Klaveren says in his market centred conception that 
corruptionit is the abuse of authority by a corrupt civil servant who “regards his public 
office as a business, the income of which he will…seek to maximise. The office then 
becomes a -- maximising unit.”54  
The contemporary discussion on corruption is more focused on the individual behaviour of 
the office holder. As Jain says, the behaviour of politicians and bureaucrats is important 
“because political values, institutions, and parties play an important role in defining the 
values of the society and in defining the norms that individuals in positions of power have 
to follow, as well as in designing the control systems that determine the limits of the 
behaviour of the political elite.”55 As Dobel says, corruption destroys the fabric of a society, 
results in the loss of a capacity for loyalty and self-interest becomes the normal motive for 
most actions. Dobel adds that: “societal or state corruption involves the moral incapacity of 
citizens to make disinterested moral commitments to actions, symbols and institutions 
which benefit the common welfare.”56 In addition, laws which can be manipulated at will 
by the wealthy and powerful lose their spontaneous acceptance by the common people.
57
 
Therefore, institutionalised corruption not only upsets the markets, it also does corrosive 
damage to governance, disrupts the democratic process and damages the legitimacy of the 
political system.  
Corruption, in its different forms, exists in almost all countries. In every society, certain 
people look for opportunities to exploit the system and take advantage of the weakness in 
laws. However, corruption seems to be more common in developing countries where 
accumulation and allocation of public resources involve changes in property rights and 
institutions or the creation of new ones. In his study of patron-client networks and the 
economic effects of corruption in Asia, Khan argues that, given the importance of such 
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allocations and, in the meantime, the absence of legitimate practices and strict rules, there 
are huge incentives to dispute, contest and attempt to change them often with bribing.
58
  
The corruption in Afghanistan mostly mirrors Klaveren market centered conception 
mentioned above. Meanwhile, the following typology of forms of corruption in three West 
African countries (Benin, Niger and Senegal) by two French anthropologists, Giorgio 
Blundo and Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan, fits well in the case of Afghanistan. The seven 
basic forms of corruption they identified are: (1) commission for illicit services, (2) 
unwarranted payment for public services which is usually free or inflating the cost of a 
routine service; such as issuance of ID cards, Passports, licences and other officials 
certificates and documents(3) gratuities, (4) string pullings, (5) levies and tolls, (6) side-
lining, and (7) misappropriation.
59
 
In many drug producing countries, the narcotics trade is usually linked with both state 
corruption and mainstream politics. The interaction of drugs and politics is closer in areas 
where drugs are produced or trafficked from. As the drug industry has been a significant 
part of Afghanistan’s political economy for the past several decades, it has resulted in an 
unlevelled playing field in politics. The drug money is used in election campaigns by 
certain candidates who want to become members of provincial and national assemblies and 
thus get influence as well as immunity from prosecution.  
For government officials, a job in state institutions that deal with drugs has the potential to 
bring more kickbacks and bribes. Such jobs are often sold to the highest bidder or the 
person who has good connections and influential patrons. Therefore, an employee who has 
spent a hefty sum to secure his employment will have to earn sufficient to pay this off 
before his investment becomes profitable. Generally, drug money weakens formal state 
institutions and erodes their capacities at many levels. Illict drugs have become a short cut 
for many people to accumulate money and power.  
Illict drugs provide multiple opportunities and incentives for institutional corruption. 
Firstly, illicit drug trade usually corrupts the state system through bribes and incentives and 
fully or partially captures government institutions through the appointment of actors linked 
with the drug trade. In addition, unlike many other resources such as oil and timber, which 
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takes more time and effort to be looted, illegal drugs are less obstructable and easily 
marketable. The insurgents use the drug funds not only to buy weapons; they also utilize 
the narcotics money to corrupt government officials. For warlords and politicians, drugs 
bring money they use for acquiring influence in state institutions while corrupt government 
employees use the drug related bribes to enrich themselves and buy promotions and 
appointments. Drug traders usually rely on their “links” and “supporters” in the 
government
60
 who come to their help when they are in trouble. 
The drug traffickers target state institutions in order to create an environment where drugs 
economy can continue and flourish. Weak state institutions pave the way for more violence 
and drug trade. According to Lee, “both drugs and terrorism organizations thrive in 
countries that lack strong central governments and whose law enforcement officials are 
ineffective and highly susceptible to corruption….These organisations operate freely after 
establishing partnership with corrupt officials to facilitate their criminal enterprise.”61   
According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), in 2011, “half of 
Afghan citizens paid a bribe while requesting a public service.”62 Meanwhile “almost a 
quarter of Afghan National Police (24 percent) were offered a bribe or received the offer in 
order to prevent imprisonment or speed up the release of a prisoner” while “another 21 
percent were offered a bribe to not report drug trafficking or the smuggling of other 
items.”63 In addition, actions such as tampering with criminal evidence and “turning a 
blind eye to” drug trafficking are other reasons for police to be offered bribes which 
according to UNODC’s report are “acts that can have a shattering impact on overall 
integrity of law enforcement activities in the country.”64 The report concludes that “drug 
traffickers are seen to be the biggest influence on police work at the local level and 
criminal group leaders the third biggest, after tribal leaders.”65 
In April 2014, General John Allen, former commamnder of US/NATO forces in 
Afghanistan, called corruption as “the existential threat to the long-term viability of 
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modern Afghanistan” and more serious than the Taliban insurgency. In his testimony to a 
Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee, General Allen proclaimed that “the ideological 
insurgency, the criminal patronage networks, and the drug enterprise have formed an 
unholy alliance, which relies for its success on the criminal capture” of the Afghan 
government.
66
 According to Karl Eikenberry, former US ambassador to Afghanistan 
(2009-2011), seventy percent of drug trafficking probably involves the Afghan security 
forces.
67
 In addition, a US State Department report says that drug-related corruption is “a 
problem, being particularly pervasive at provincial and district government levels. 
Corruption behaviours range from facilitating drug activities to benefiting from revenue 
streams that the drug trade produces.”68  
It is not only the Afghan officials and politicians who have links with the drug trade, state 
government and political actors in regional countries from where illict drugs are transited 
also benefit financially from it. Most of the drugs produced in Afghanistan are smuggled 
into Iran, Pakistan and central Asian countries where some of it is consumed domestically 
while the rest is transited further. Opium is smuggled from Afghanistan through two main 
corridors -- the Balkan route and Northern route -- linking Afghanistan to the huge regional 
and international markets including Russian Federation and Western Europe. The Balkan 
route traverses Iran (partly via Pakistan), Turkey, Greece and Bulgaria across South-East 
Europe to the Western European market, with an annual market value of some US$20 
billion. The northern route runs mainly through Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan (or Uzbekistan 
or Turkmenistan) to Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation. The size of that market is 
estimated to total US$13 billion per year.
69
 Approximately 35% of heroin produced in 
Afghanistan arrives in Iran for domestic consumption and westward transit on the Balkan 
route while approximately 40% transits through Pakistan towards destinations in Europe, 
Africa, the Gulf States, China, and North America (Canada, primarily). Another 25% 
moves through Central Asia, most of which flows through Tajikistan and onward to Russia 
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and Europe on the Northern route.
70
 In all major relay points for drugs flowing out of 
Afghanistan, officials are involved or benefit from the narcotics trafficking and the mafia 
has managed to infiltrate parts of the governments.  
Funds generated from the illegal drug trade are used to undermine state capacities and 
make government institutions fragile. The process of weakening the state or preventing the 
building robust institutions is usually done in two ways; co-option and attacks/threats. 
Drug money is used to weaken formal institutions either by undermining them through 
corruption or partly capturing them by those involved in the drug trade. In several cases, 
the traffickers and their agents are corrupt government officials themselves who forge 
alliances with drug smugglers and even with insurgent groups to keep the flow of money 
open. Eventually, the relationship between drug mafia and corrupt officials becomes so 
close that evolves into an alternative governance structure which is part official and part 
un-official but anti-state and criminal. Such governance structure can be observed in some 
parts of drug producing and transiting countries. These structures influence the functions of 
the rest of the government and impact the democratisation process by monopolizing power 
and eliminating opponents and alternative sources of authority.   
The state-building process in the Afghanistan is comparatively more complicated and 
challenging for mainly two reasons. Firstly, institutions had to be built from scratch after 
years of wars and destruction, and secondly, the actors that are determined to weaken the 
state or prevent state building (including the drug mafia and Taliban insurgents) are strong 
and active.  The “drug cartels have long established links with members of the government 
and security forces”71 and the expansion of drug production resulted in wealthy traffickers 
and drug-lords gaining more influence over the economy and state institutions.  
Therefore, both market and non-market (parochial) corruption is found in the country’s 
polity. “Market” corruption signifies competition and involves an impersonal process in 
which influences is accorded and rents are allocated competitively to the actors who can 
“pay” the highest bribe, regardless of who they are. In Market corruption, the price is set 
by the market and consumers can go to another supplier of corrupt service. On the other 
hand, “parochial” (nonmarket) corruption is a situation where only ties of kinship, 
                                                          
70
 Rosen, Liana and Katzman, Kenneth, (2014).  Afghanistan: Drug Trafficking and the 2014 Transition. 
Congressional Research Service Report (R43540). 9
th
 May. p. 3. Available online at: 
<http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43540.pdf> [Accessed 27 September 2014].  
71
 Green, Matthew (2012). U.S. Lists Afghan Insurgent as Taliban’s First Heroin “Kingpin”. Reuters, 15 
November. Available online at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/15/afghanistan-kingpin-
idUSL3E8MF65820121115> [Accessed 15 Sep 2014].  
278 
 
affection, caste, and other traditional obligations (such as nepotism) determine access to 
the favours of power holders.
72
  
Over the past five years (2009-2014), the Berlin-based institute, Transparency International, 
which ranks countries and territories based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived 
to be, has been putting Afghanistan among the bottom five in its annual corruption 
perception index. In 2012 and 2013, it put Afghanistan, North Korea and Somalia in the 
last place in its corruption perception index.
73
 Afghan officials acknowledge that 
corruption is a reality in their country, in the services sector, and add they are committed to 
tackling it. However, they point to what they call “the big corruption” which, according to 




6.5 Drugs Economy vs. Legal Economy 
As Kopp says, the existence of criminal organisations and illegal economy has detrimental 
consequences on the conduct of other economic activities and creates distortions by 
penetrating legal economies.
75
 Illegal drugs economy affects the legal economy in a 
number of ways and largely supports anti-state actors. It also side-lines legal economic 
activities and, since it is not taxed, results in the reduction of government revenues, 
limiting its ability to deliver services to the public. Although the drug trade is the source of 
a substantial amount of money and helps to stabilise the economy, especially at times of 
financial crisis, it generally distorts legal economy. 
Illegal narcotics represent a big share of the Afghan economy and results in indirect 
benefits. By providing funds for foreign exchange and driving up rural wages, the drug 
money helps in keeping the economy and currency, the Afghani, stable. However, the 
return flows of drug money are also generating “Dutch Disease” which is defined “a 
reduction in a country’s export performance as a result of an appreciation of the exchange 
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rate after a natural resource such as oil has been discovered.”76 Labour in opium harvesting 
and opium trading earns high returns as compared to other licit crops and, therefore, 
shifting to other, licit activities is discouraged. As opium production has become 
entrenched in some areas and has been a major economic activity for more than two 
decades, the opium economy affects asset prices (most notably the price and 
rental/sharecropping rates for agricultural land) and non-opium business activities.
77
 In 
addition to foreign aid, the drug money accounts for much real-estate speculation as well 
as a significant portion of other business activities in Afghanistan. This gives the illegal 
economy a comparative advantage and hampers the development of legal economy. As in 
Afghanistan, drugs also caused the stagnation of the GDP growth rate and resulted in the 
“Dutch Disease” in Colombia in 1980s and 1990s when millions of hectares of land was 
bought by those suspected of being involved in the drug trade.
78
  
According to UNODC, the farm-gate value of opium production in Afghanistan in 2014 
was US$ 0.85 billion (US$ 853 million), or the equivalent of roughly 4% of Afghanistan’s 
estimated GDP.
79
 In 2013, the farm-gate value of opium production was US$ 0.95 billion, 
again the equivalent of roughly 4% of the country’s estimated GDP. However, together 
with profits made by drug traffickers, the total value of the opium economy within 
Afghanistan was significantly higher. In 2013, the gross export value of opium and 
heroin/morphine exports was US$3 billion (as compared to US$2 billion in 2012) while 
the net export value of Afghan opiate exports was US$2.9 billion. A comparison of these 
gross and net values with the 2013 GDP of Afghanistan (US$ 21.04 billion) shows that the 




6.6 Illicit Drugs and State’s Legitimacy 
The creation of a legitimate and capable political authority is a major challenge in most 
post-conflict societies. Illegal drugs economy undermines the legitimacy and authority of 
the state at different levels. If law enforcement agencies and security institutions adopt a 
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repressive approach towards drug production and target poppy farmers, the state then risks 
losing public support and can become de-legitimised in the eyes of some of its citizens. On 
the other hand, the government’s reputation and legitimacy is also damaged if it is 
perceived to be infiltrated by the drug mafia or connected with illegal drug trade. The 
official corruption and judicial impunity are seen some of the greatest challenges to the 
legitimacy of the Afghan government. The 2013 study commissioned by the top 
US/NATO Commander in Afghanisan found that: “Corruption directly threatens the 
viability and legitimacy of the Afghan state. Corruption alienates key elements of the 
population, discredits the government and security forces, undermines international 
support, subverts state functions and rule of law, robs the state of revenue, and creates 
barriers to economic growth.”81 In 2014, another US official, John Sopko, the Special 
Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), proclaimed that “corruption is 
really the big issue” which “robs the Afghan people of the resources they need and makes 
them lose faith in their government.”82 
The Taliban insurgents are successfully exploiting the problems of corruption in the 
Afghan government as well its policy of eradicating poppy fields. Ban on poppy 
cultivation and the eradication of poppy fields have deprived many poor farmers of their 
livelihoods and resulted in their alienation. As part of their strategy to mobilise support, the 
Taliban protect poppy fields from the government’s eradication police teams. As officials 
are the face of a government, the perception of a widespread corruption in state instituions 
has become a powerful tool which is often used to question its legetimacy. The presence of 
crooked officials on key posts features heavily in the Taliban propaganda. The insurgent 
group’s statements usually refer to widespread corruption in the government and call it 
“fasid” (corrupt).83 In addition, the presence of officials linked to criminal activities also 
has a negative impact on the overall reputation of the government. It “indirectly assists the 
insurgency”, leads to “further alienation of the public from formal political institutions” 
and erodes popular support for the government.
84
 In addition, the Afghan government and 
its international allies are often criticised for their inaction against the big actors in the 
narcotics industry as well as those officials and politicians who benefit from the drug trade. 
During my field research, a number of farmers and villagers frequently complained that the 
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security forces were arresting only poor poppy farmers and small drug traders while the big 
“drug-lords” lived with impunity.85 
Afghan authorities acknowledge the side affects of its poppy eradication campaign and 
accept the fact that some poppy farmers whose fields were destroyed joined the Taliban or 
resort to violence.
86
 In addition, organised crime also poses a security threat to government 
employees and target “uncooperative officials.” Drug mafia usually earmark those officials 
who are not willing to co-opt and/or create hurdles in their path. Security and civilian 
officials, including judges and prosecutors, have been regularly attacked by the drug mafia. 
On 4
th
 September 2008, the chief judge of the Central Narcotics Tribunal appeals court, 
Alim Hanif, 65, was shot dead while on his way to work. He was known for his tough 
stance on drug trafficking and his assassination was seen as a warning to those in the 
judiciary who try to stamp out Afghanistan’s drugs trade. 87  In addition, hundreds of 
Afghan policemen and soldiers involved in the eradication of poppy fields and interdiction 
have been killed or injured over the past decade. According to official figures, during the 
2010-11 poppy eradication and interdiction operations, 22 members of Counter Narcotics 
Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) were killed.
88
 The government figures for 2012 show that 
during the  poppy eradication campaign alone, more than one hundred Afghan soldiers, 
police officers and civilians lost their lives and many more were injured in attacks aimed at 
preventing poppy eradication that year.
89 
Border posts and other security checkpoints are 
also regularly attacked by armed groups associated with drug traffickers. The killing of 
government officials generally weakens the state institution and has a demoralising affect 
on the workforce in general.
90
  
In addition, the Taliban have been benefiting from the drug trade at many levels including 
taxing the crop and heroin laboratories as well as protecting poppy fields and safeguarding 
trafficking convoys. Some Taliban members are said to have been directly involved in the 
drug trade. In November 2011, the US government added a top Taliban commander to its 
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list of suspected drug trafficking “Kingpins”91 in the first such designation of a leader of 
the Afghan insurgency.
92
 The US Treasury accused Mullah Naim Barich -- the Taliban’s 
“shadow governor” of the largest opium producing province, Helmand -- of being 
“involved in many levels of the heroin and opium trade, including leading meetings with 
drug traffickers, controlling opium production, and owning his own drug loads.” 93 
According to US officials, Mullah Barich had directed his followers “that all measures 
should be taken to protect the poppy harvest which includes planting improvised explosive 
devices against Coalition forces and corrupting Afghanistan government officials by 
enticing them to take bribes.”94 Moreover, the US has put on its sanctions list dozens of 
other Afghan and Pakistani individuals and businesses and accused them of being involved 
in the narcotics industry and financing the Taliban through their drug money.
95
 Official 
British documents also point to the Taliban’s “direct connection to the manufacture and 
processing of opium that helps to fund and fuel the Taliban insurgency.”96 The 2011 report 
by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons adds that “narcotics 
trafficking and terrorist funding and attacks are all inter-connected.”97 The links between 
the insurgents and drug traders vary from outright membership of insurgent groups to ties 
of tribal loyalty and alliances of convenience based on transit and protection fees.
98
  
Drug trafficking in Afghanistan is also closely linked with the rise and expansion of 
criminal networks that, in addition to the drug trafficking, are involved in arms and human 
trafficking as well as burglary and kidnapping. The organised crime, “a form of 
accumulation based on corruption and the use or threat of physical violence”, in has 
transnational linkages into Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries and beyond.99 According 
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to UNODC, “criminal groups are the main organisers and beneficiaries of the opium trade” 
and are “contributing substantially to corruption and undermining state capacity” in 
Afghanistan.
100
 The UNODC report adds that organised crime “is heavily intertwined with 
the state and the insurgency, participating in or buying protection from both sides of the 
conflict.” Members of criminal networks undermine the effectiveness of the government, 
generate revenue for the insurgency, supply it with weapons and partner with it in violent 
resistance to government encroachment.
101
 The narcotics trade is not only worsening the 
security situation in Afghanistan, it is also linked with warlordism and the issues of bad 
governance and corruption in the government.
102
 The processes of illegal drugs 
contributing to the erosion of state capacities and strengthening insurgent and criminal 
groups work in a circle and impact eachother. The following diagram (Figure 6.3) 





Figure 6.3: The Drugs-Insurgency-Governance Cycle 
The international community’s drugs policy has usually oscillated between tolerating 
drugs-linked corruption for the sake of stability and taking targeted but limited action 
against those involved in it. However, power brokers linked to the drug trade realised that 
the best way to benefit from the drugs economy was join politics or the government. A 
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number of people suspected of being involved in the drug trade took up positions in the 
government or became members of provincial councils and national parliament in an effort 
to protect their businesses and get immunity from prosecution. While some drug traders 
joined the Afghan government, others infiltrated the government institutions in different 
ways including appointing relatives or associates on important government positions 
especially in the security institutions. The other means they use is to simply pay bribes to 
officials for their cooperation.  
The US-led international coalition allied itself with a number of power brokers including 
warlords who were suspected of having links with the drug trade. The US worked through 
them instead of being obsessed with their “criminal” practices and the means of their 
income. As Gretchen says, the US had “a wealth of evidence that some of these individuals 
are enriching themselves through the opium trade”, it found them “helpful in the effort to 
capture Al-Qaeda fugitives.”103 For several eyars after the fall of the Taliban, “the United 
States condoned opiates production both in areas traditionally controlled by the United 
Front (Badakhshan) and in areas held by various local commanders whose support was 
deemed strategically necessary to fight the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.”104  
The international community’s dependence on such controversial but “useful” interlocutors, 
and using them for intelligence, logistics and direct counterterrorism operations further 
deteriorated governance and the public’s trust on formal institutions. Their illegal activities 
were generally ignored as they facilitated anti-Taliban operations and helped the ISAF 
(International Security Assistance Force) get things done. According to Felbab-Brown, the 
international community, led by the United States, allowed “pernicious power brokers and 
corruption” and “systematically underemphasized good governance” by subordinating it to 
short-term battlefield priorities.
105
 As Byrd says in his description of “the vicious circle of 
the drug industry”, when opium production rebounded in the first two years following the 
fall of the Taliban regime, local warlords exploited the situation in order to maximise their 
wealth and power:  
“[P]ayments from the opium economy strengthened warlords, who in turn undermined the 
state, while drug-related corruption also undermined the state directly. In return for 
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payments, warlord militias helped provide the enabling environment (often including 
armed protection) for the opium economy to operate. The weak government was unable to 
provide genuine security or rule of law, and this created a good environment in which the 
opium economy could continue to thrive. Thus the dynamic tendencies at work would 
perpetuate a large opium economy and a weak, ineffective state.”106 
The US authorities acknowledge the damage caused by their alliance with such 
“controversial” figures. A 2009 US Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s report 
acknowledges that “regional and local warlords and militia commanders” were on the US’s 
“payroll” and adds that “despite alliance with the opium trade, many of these warlords later 
traded on their stature as US allies to take senior positions in the new Afghan Government, 
laying the ground work for the corrupt nexus between drugs and authority that pervades the 
power structure today.” The report concludes that this contributed to the “escalation of 
opium production” in Afghanistan and had a negative impact on governance.107   
In addition, the study commissioned in 2013 by General Joseph Dunford, Commander of 
US Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A), also linked corruption in Afghanistan to the US’s 
dealing with the warlords. The report laid out some key findings and said that “the US’ 
initial support of warlords, reliance on logistics contracting, and the deluge of military and 
aid spending which overwhelmed the absorptive capacity of the Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) created an environment that fostered corruption.”108  
Warlords and militia leaders, majority of whom are still loosely affiliated with one of the 
ex-Mujahideen parties, exploit the weakness of the central government which does not 
exercise effective control over most of the country’s territory. A number of them also 
enjoy a degree of influence within the government structures and with international 
coalition countries. Many of them have entered the political process and are members of 
national parliament and provincial councils. Some of them have been appointed to key 
government posts, such as police chiefs and civilian administraotrs. Despite years of costly 
counter-narcotics campaign, many warlords still have connections to drug trafficking 
networks and benefit directly and indirectly from the drug trade.
109
   
In addition, several district and provincial governors and police commanders as well 
members of parliament and warlords are widely reported to be profitting from the drug 
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 In August 2013, the Deputy Minister of Counternarcotics, Baz Mohammad 
Ahmadi, admitted that senior government figures, including police officers, had 
connections with drug traders. A few days later, the Afghan authorities announced the 
arrest of a high ranking security official, the police chief for south-western Nimroz 
province bordering Iran, on the charge of collaborating with drug traffickers.
111
 He was the 
highest ranking government official arrested on drug charges in Afghanistan. However, he 
was cleared of the drug charges and instead convicted of obstruction of justice.  
The involvement of government officials in the drug trade has undermined the rule of law 
and the public’s faith in many state institutions. In addition, drug trafficking is linked to 
arms smuggling, especially in northern Afghanistan where narcotics are exchanged for 
weapons. A number of Afghan drug smugglers pay for guns and ammunitions with drugs 
and the sell weapons to private or Taliban-linked dealers. Drug mafias in Tajikistan and 
Russia are reportedly the main players in this type of barterring.
112
   
As part of their strategy to bankrupt the Taliban, Afghan and US/NATO forces started 
targeting drug traders and poppy farmers. However, this strategy had only a limited 
success. One on hand, it made the alliance between the Taliban and drug traders stronger 
as they had a shared interest in the continuation of the drug trade. They used eachother’s 
“resources” and expertise to weaken the government’s control and maximise their profits. 
On the other hand, eradication of poppy fields alienated many Afghans living in rural areas 
and also strengthened the Taliban physically as it drove farmers and other economic 
refugees into the insurgents’ hands. In addition, the eradication strategy undermined the 
motivation of local population, especially farmers, to provide intelligence on the Taliban to 
the government; instead, they provided intelligence about the movement and location of 
Afghan and international forces as well as eradication teams to the Taliban.  
Although the link between official corruption and drug trade is a well-established fact, the 
existence of drugs economy and corruption doesn’t always result in chaos and conflict. The 
effects of drugs and corruption on peacebuilding processes are generally ambivalent and 
context-specific. As Synder, in his political economy of extraction framework, argues that 
lootable resources such as drugs are associated with divergent effects on political stability. 
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If rulers could construct institutions of joint extraction of lootable resources, then these 
resources can contribute to the stability by providing the income with which to govern. For 
example, the joint extraction by the Burmese military in 1990s transformed opium from a 
source of conflict into a source of order. In contrast, the breakdown or absence of such 
regimes increases the risk of civil war by making it easier for rebels to get income.
113
  
As it is difficult for rulers, rebels and other private actors to establish monopoly control on 
illict drugs economy, joint extraction of illict drugs benefits all parties including the rulers. 
Rulers can use a range of sticks (no extraction, drug eradication, legal inducements, 
interdiction etc.) and carrots (protection, non-enforcement of the law, amnesty etc.) in 
order to get private actors to co-operate and share their wealth as part of joint 
extractions.
114
 On the other hand, private actors also find it useful to enter a joint extraction 
with the rulers in order to minimise risks. In such cases, violence is generally avoided and 
discouraged because it is bad for business.  
Joint extraction takes place in several parts of Afghanistan. Security officials and district 
administrators usually receive payments from drug producers, processors and traffickers 
for allowing them to carry on their activities. It is often reported that security officials have 
allowed the drug traffickers to ship their cargo after receiving a payment from the 
smugglers. In other cases, officials have received money for not raiding opium storage 
facilities as well as heroin making laboratories despite having the capability and resources. 
In addition, farmers also save their poppy farms from eradication by paying corrupt 
officials. In some cases, only a “mock” eradication campaign takes place where only parts 
of the field are eradicated.
115
  
Historically, illegality and shadow economy has generally grown during the early phases 
of state-building process. For example, in Burma, peace proved more profitable than war 
because the returns on opium increased dramatically after the ceasefire agreements 
between the military and insurgents.
116
 The construction of institutions of joint extraction 
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However, comparative evidence exposes an important limitation of the existing research on 
the impact of joint extraction on peace and stability in conflict zones. Regimes of joint 
extraction work better in a “greed” driven and criminal environment. Joint extraction of 
resources by the two opposite sides is not the norm when the conflict is motivated by 
ideology and nationalism. In the context of Afghanistan, the construction of a general joint 
extraction regime is difficult for mainly two reasons. Firstly, the Afghan insurgency is still 
largely driven by ideology, at least at local level; and, secondly, the international 
community, which is a main actor in the counter-narcotics campaign in Afghanistan, 
prevents the institutions of joint extraction. Governments in countries dependent on foreign 
aid such as Afghanistan are usually reluctant to enter a joint extraction regime of illegal 
resources due to international pressure. In several countries including Colombia, the 
externally-induced prohibition against joint extraction causes violence and disorder as it 
puts governments into a confrontation with drug cartels.
118
 
Nevertheless, a limited joint extraction regime only exists between some officials and drug 
traders in Afghanistan. The scope and size of the institutions of joint extraction vary from 
area to area. The government is unable to function normally or coerce private actors to 
share their drug money in areas of the country controlled by the Taliban. Here, the Taliban 
want to monopolize the extraction of resources including the drug-related rents. The 
insurgent group is usually not interested in constructing a joint extraction regime with a 
government it aims to dismantle. However, the Taliban refrain from fighting during the 
poppy harvesting season to allow farmers collect their opium paste. There is usually a lull 
in fighting during that period of the year and the conflict usually intensifies as soon as the 
opium harvesting is over.  
In Afghanistan, joint extraction of drugs generally happen at a secondary level; usually 
between drug smugglers, warlords and corrupt officials. Over the past few years, most of 
the drugs are produced in southern provinces while the north of the country has mainly 
served a drug trafficking/transit route to Central Asian countries and all the way to Europe. 
Government officials use carrots (such as protection, non-enforcement of the law, safe 
passage and non-eradication) and sticks (including arrest, raid, eradication, interdiction and 
prosecution) to get drug traders share their drugs income. On the other hand, private actors 
can use negative and positive inducements to get cooperation of the rulers. In the absence 
of a mutual understanding, private actors avoid or refuse to share their income with 
officials and, in extreme scenarios, attack government officials for preventing them from 
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doing business. In drug producing and trafficking areas, corrupt government officials have 
adopted a policy of limited interference and even maintain a protection racket. This 
arrangement has resulted in some degree of stability in some parts of the country.  
The relationship between state-building and illicit drug trade is both ambiguous and 
complex. In the context of Afghanistan, the drugs economy is a major hurdle for building 
viable state institutions. The drug trade supports a criminal network of drug smugglers and 
corrupt officials and funds the insurgency. Given the large scale opium production, some 
writers have argued that “poppy has been deeply entwined in the socio-economic and 
political fabric of the whole country.”119  
Ashraf Ghani, speaking as Afghanistan’s finance minister in 2003, was among the first 
who warned of Afghanistan becoming a “narco-mafia state” and called for an “infusion of 
urgency” into everyone’s commitment.120 In February 2004, while commenting on the 
expansion of drug trade in Afghanistan, Antonio Mario Costa, head of the UN office on 
drugs and crime (UNODC), stated that he didn’t “think we can call it a narco-state now” 
but warned that the country was at risk of becoming a narco-state because corruption was 
aggravating the drugs problem.
121
 In September 2004, the Bush administration’s special 
envoy and ambassador to Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, repeated this assertion by 
acknowledging that “there is a potential for drugs overwhelming the institutions [in 
Afghanistan] -- a sort of narco-state.” 122  Later on, several commentators dubbed 
Afghanistan as a “narco-state”123 while Dormandy, in his book on opium characterised the 
country as “a 21st century narco-state.”124 It was the assertion by Hillary Clinton, US’s 
Secretary of State, which caused more controversy. In January 2009, while commenting on 
the level of penetration of the Afghan government by the drugs economy during her 
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confirmation testimony, she said that “Afghanistan has turned into a narco-state.” 125 
However, it was disputed by the Afghan officials. The Afghan Foreign Minister, Rangin 
Dadfar Spanta, objected to use of the term “narco-state” to describe Afghanistan and 
argued that Clinton’s characterization was “absolutely wrong.” 126   
The term “narco-state” is used from time to time mainly by politicians and the media in the 
context of drug producing coutnries. However, such characterization is problematic. There 
is no clear and agreed definition of a narco-state and there is no consensus on the criteria 
for a narco-state? Is it about the amount of drugs production, level of infiltration of the 
state institutions by drug mafia, or the level of drugs related corruption and the 
involvement of officials in drugs? Why are only the drugs producing countries labelled as 
“narco-states” and not the ones where drugs are consumed, processed and/or trafficked? As 
Chouvy says, states are not defined and categorised according to their economic resources. 
He adds that drug producing countries such as Afghanistan “are far from fitting any 
definition of rentier states” where only between 1 and 5 percent of arable land is used for 
poppy cultivation.
127
 In addition, Goodhand argues that there is little evidence that the state 
in Afghanistan is subordinate to drugs interest.   
Although drug money represents a significant source of rent for military and political 
entrepreneurs, other (licit and illicit) income streams, including large inflows of foreign aid, 
play a role in buying votes, positions and favours. Also, because of the overall growth of 
the licit economy since 2002, the relative size of the drug economy has declined. Finally, 
political decision-making involves a complex mix of factors in which financial, political 
and social resources are brought into play. Tribal, ethnic, political and religious allegiances 
can -- and frequently do -- trump economic self-interest. Thus, although drugs are a factor 
in political decision-making, the ‘narco-state’ discourse exaggerates their role by raising 
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There is a strong link between the drug trade, weak state institutions and armed conflicts. 
Due to its illegallity, the narcotics industry undermines governance and corrupts the state 
and society. One one hand, bad governance and weak state institutions create favourable 
conditions for the production and trade of drugs. On the other hand, illicit drugs finance 
crimes and insurgencies who aim to weaken and corrupt the state institutions. Thus the 
opium industry has a duel role of fuelling the insurgency and organised crime as well as a 
large portion of the much-resented government corruption.  
In Afghanistan, opium production is closely linked with the problems of insecurity, bad-
governance, corruption and warlordism. The illicit drug market has not only distorted the 
country’s legal economy; it also plays a major role in corrupting its nascent political 
system. Funds generated from the drug trade are usually used to buy influence in the 
government and to undermine state capacities, moves that result in the fragility and even 
failing of state institutions. State failure occurs when its institutions are unable to fulfil its 
core functions including securing its territory and providing services to its population. 
Drugs money weakens formal state institutions, erodes their capacities at different levels 
and results in three main governance problems; it corrupts the system, distorts the legal 
economy and undermines the legitimacy and authority of the state at different levels. 
Afghanistan has been the world’s biggest opium producer since 1990s. Opium poppies are 
not only a main source of income for many poor farmers, they also bring huge sums of 
money for warlords, drug traffickers as well as the insurgents. The processes of illegal drug 
trade contributing to the erosion of state capacities and strengthening insurgent and 
criminal groups work in a circle. The nexus between drugs, insurgency and state building 
is generally stronger in weak states. In most cases, the roles of main actors including drug 
traffickers, insurgents, and corrupt officials are overlapping.  
The breakdown of central government power due to invasions and wars led to the 
emergence of local leaders and warlords who have benefitted from the drug trade and 
wield power by setting up patronage networks. The overall drug network in Afghanistan is 
largely dependent on a nexus between the main actors and the patronage network. In 
addition, the drug trade supports a criminal network of smugglers and corrupt officials. 
The Taliban have been encouraging farmers to cultivate opium poppies in areas of the 
country under their influence and thus earn both political and financial capital. The Taliban 
defy the government in an effort to win the hearts and minds of the population and provide 
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protection to drug traffickers who pay a percentage of their revenues to the Taliban to 
cement an alliance of convenience. The country’s opium economy provides the insurgents 
an estimated US$100-400 million in funding each year.  
Although the drug trade represent a big share of the Afghan economy and, as a source of a 
substantial amount of money, helps in financial stabilise, it distorts and hampers legal 
economy and have a negative impact on the conduct of other legal economic activities. In 
addition, illict drugs demages the social wellbeing of the people and result in high 
addiction rates. Although Afghanistan didn’t have a major addiction problem, more than a 
million people, including women and juveniles, are now said to be addicted to a variety of 






Counter-narcotics and Opium Alternatives 
 
This chapter focuses on the impact impact of counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan and 
suggests several policy options. Since 2002, the United States and its allies have spent 
around US$10 billion to tackle the drug production, trade and trafficking in Afghanistan. 
The chapter examines the counter-narcotics policies applied so far and discusses that 
reason for their failure. The chapter also describes the role of relevant institutions in 
tackling the narcotics problem and argues that the narcotics industry in Afghanistan is a 
multi-dimensional and multi-national problem and, therefore, needs a multi-faceted and 
coordinated strategic framework. The chapter concludes with a discussion about 
alternatives to opium production and analyses a number of possible policy options to tackle 
the drug problem in Afghanistan.   
 
The new Afghan government innaugorated after the fall of the Taliban regime in 
December 2001 renewed the poppy ban. The issuance of a decree on 17
th
 January 2002 
banning poppy cultivation, heroin production, drug trafficking and drug use was one of the 
first acts of the leader of the Afghan interim Authority, Hamid Karzai. As the Afghan 
government institutions were weak or non-existent, different countries involved in the US-
led mission volunteered to take the lead role for various sectors in war torn country. In 
January 2002, at the G-8 meeting, donor countries including Germany, France, Italy, UK 
and the US, took on responsibilities for the reform and reconstruction of different sectors. 
The United Kingdom volunteered to be the lead country in tackling the narcotics industry 
in Afghanistan. This part of the UK’s Afghanistan policy was mostly driven by its own 
domestic concerns as most of the drugs consumed in the UK had been trafficked from 
Afghanistan. Speaking in the 2001 Labour Party Conference, just three weeks after the 
9/11 attacks, the then British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, stressed that the US-led invasion 
of Afghanistan would also destroy the country’s illicit drug trade. He told his supporters: 
“The arms the Taliban are buying today are paid for by the lives of young British people 
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buying their drugs on British streets. This is another part of the regime we should 
destroy.”1  
The international community was heading the counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan 
while the Afghan government’s role was secondary and much smaller in terms of both 
policy and resources. The UK remained the lead nation until the Afghan government took 
control, at least on paper, under the 2006 version of the National Drugs Control Strategy 
(NDCS). However, the UK and the US were still the most influential actors in both 
formulating and implementing the counter-narcotics strategy. In the first decade after the 
fall of the Taliban, a number of policy responses have been applied including bans and 
eradication, containment, building Afghan institutions and security forces, drafting and 
implementing Afghanistan’s National Counter-narcotics Strategy, public awareness 
campaigns aimed at discouraging drug production and addiction, judicial reforms, 
developing alternative livelihood programs and interdiction.  
The US administration initially considered counter-narcotics as a distraction from its main 
mission of fighting against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda and ignored poppy cultivation and 
drug shipments. In addition, the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 shifted more resources from 
Afghanistan to the new theatre of war. The US officials increasingly saw counter-narcotics 
as a “drain on resources”2 and viewed it as a “mission creep.”3 The Pentagon under the 
defense secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, resisted efforts to draw the US military into 
supporting counter-narcotics campaign. Senior commanders at the Pentagon were 
concerned that preventing drug trafficking would only antagonize regional warlords and 
local power brokers who had links with the drug trade but whose support they needed. 
Meanwhile, they were also worried that it might turn more of the populace against the US 
troops and drive poppy farmers into the arms of the insurgents.
4
  
For a few years, the international community didn’t have a clear and coherent counter-
narcotics mission in Afghanistan. According to Jean-Luc Lemahieu, head of the UN office 
on drugs and crime (UNODC) in Afghanistan, counter-narcotics didn’t have the right place 
in the international community’s security agenda in the country. The US-led foreign forces 
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even blocked counter-narcotics efforts and believed that it “went against their aim of 
winning hearts and minds.”5   
 
7.1 Eradication, “a Quick Fix” 
The Afghan government continued its fight against the drug industry. Despite concerns 
about the negative impact of eradication, it became a major pillar of counter-narcotics 
strategy in the country. However, the Afghan government lacked the resources and 
manpower to eliminate the drug trade altogather as it was almost fully dependant on 
international aid and assistance. Meanwhile, the US government was divided on the best 
strategy to counter the drugs. The State Department and Pentagon repeatedly clashed over 
drug policy in Afghanistan, with Pentagon leaders refusing to destroy poppy fields, bomb 
drug laboratories or disrupt opium shipments or capture major traffickers.
6
 
After realising the seriousness of the drug problem in Afghanistan the US recognised that 
the Taliban insurgency was being revived with the help of drug money. Some US officials 
intensified lobbying for a more robust counter-narcotics campaign in Afghanistan. While 
Pentagon was still reluctant to get involved in the “war on drugs”, the State Department 
developed its own counter-narcotics strategy for Afghanistan in 2004 which was focused 
on five pillars: Poppy elimination and eradication, interdiction and law enforcement, 
justice reform and prosecution, public information, and alternative crop development. 
Although the US’s policy to tackle the drug problem in Afghanistan had many pillars, its 
main focus was on eradication of poppy fields which was seen at the time as “a silver 
bullet” and “the centrepiece” of the strategy.7 As the production of opium continuously 
increased, the US felt the need for a more forceful eradication and directly funded 
eradication programs in the country. In 2004, the US issued contracts to an American 
security company, DynCorp International, which was also involved in US backed drug 
eradication programs and aerial spraying in Colombia, to lead the poppy eradication 
campaign in Afghanistan and train and supervise Afghan counter-narcotics teams.
8
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On the other hand, several countries engaged in Afghanistan’s reconstruction, including 
the United Kingdom, were reluctant to wage a full blown war against the drug industry in 
Afghanistan. Soon after the British troops were deployed in southern Helmand in 2006, a 
radio message broadcast across the province assured local farmers that the Internationa 
Security Assisstacen Force (ISAF) would not interfere with poppy fields and that growing 
poppy was understandable and acceptable.  
Respected people of Helmand! The soldiers of ISAF and the Afghan national army do not 
destroy poppy fields…They know that many people of Afghanistan have no choice but to 
grow poppy. ISAF and the Afghan national army do not want to stop people from earning 
their livelihoods.  
The message, drafted by British officers and carried on two local radio stations in 
Afghanistan’s largest poppy producing province, angered the Afghan officials who 
reprimanded British diplomats and demanded an explanation. The British officials soon 
removed the radio message and issued an apology.
9
 The mix messages people were 
receiving created more confusion and gave birth to a number of conspiracies. On one hand, 
poppy fileds were eradicated and people were told not to grow poppies while on the other, 
poppy cultivation was encouraged or ignored. A number of people including farmers, 
journalists and tribal elders in different parts of Afghanistan said that the US and UK were 
not serious in fighting drugs and, on the contrary, wanted more poppy production in 
Afghanistan.  
However, the US approach became tougher towards the end of the Bush administration 
(2000-2008) when it focused more on counter-narcotics. In August 2007, the Bush 
Administration issued a revised strategy in the light of increasing poppy production and 
introduced financial and development rewards to poppy-free provinces of Afghanistan. 
More resources were also devoted to support interdiction and eradication activities.
10
 
Between 2002 and 2014, the US allocated about US$1 billion for the eradication poppy 
fileds in Afghanistan; the bulk of which was spent on an independent eradication force 
operating from 2004 to 2009. The US government contractor DynCorp International 
operated a Poppy Eradication Force (PEF) from 2004-2009. According to the report by the 
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US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), nearly $700 
million was expended on the PEF and its supporting Special Air Wing between 2004 and 




Eradication of poppy fields not only failed but also ignited violent strikes and social 
protests by farmers whose livelihoods were destroyed. Faced with the failure of its 
eradication efforts and alarmed by the expansion of opium poppy cultivation, the US called 
for an aerial spraying of poppy fields and put pressure on President Hamid Karzai of 
Afghanistan to accept the new proposal. However, President Karzai consistently opposed 
the idea arguing that spraying chemicals would negatively impact people, cattle and legal 
crops. Nevertheless, in 2004, there were reports from eastern Nangarhar province that 
unidentified airplanes sprayed poppy fields with toxic chemicals which resulted in the 
poppy seedlings turning yellow and crop dying. Although President Karzai called in the 
British and American ambassadors, who represented the two main donor countries 




The US also pushed for a ground based spraying which, a proposal again rejected by 
President Karzai on the grounds that it will damage the environment. In 2007, as poppy 
cultivation reached a record-high – 193,000 hectares (477,000 acres) -- the US sent a 
strong message by appointing William B. Wood, as its new ambassador to Afghanistan. 
Bill Wood, a former US ambassador to Colombia, was a vocal proponent of aerial spraying 
of poppy fields and was known in the press as “Chemical Bill.” He went to Afghanistan to 
implement a strategy of aerial spraying of the kind he had undertaken in Colombia under 
the US funded “Plan Colombia.” The US planned aerial fumigation in Afghanistan for the 
Spring of 2008. However, President Karzai again resisted the idea who, along with some 
European countries, was also worried that chemical spraying might push farmers further 
into poverty, and into the arms of the Taliban.
13
 President Karzai also asserted that aerial 
chemical spraying would damage other licit crops, pollute water and could further 
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destabilise rural areas where the support for Afghan government and its international allies 
was much needed.  
In a major policy reversal in mid-2009, the new US administration under President Obama 
ceased all direct support for and involvement in poppy eradication campaigns and focused 
on supply reduction efforts. The new US policy centred on an Afghan-run initiative called 
the Governor-Led Eradication (GLE) program which was administered by the Ministry of 
Counter-Narcotics (MCN) of Afghanistan. Since 2010, under the Governor Led 
Eradication (GLE) program, the Afghan Ministry of Counter-Narcotics (MCN) reimburses 
provincial governors for expenses incurred for eradicating poppy fields. Pursuant to MCN 
strategic guidance, GLE became the only permissible eradication program in Afghanistan. 
Under the ministry’s guidelines, eradication efforts may only be conducted using manual 
or mechanical and ground-based methods and governors are prohibited from providing 
farmers with any financial compensation for destroyed farmland.
14
  
Crop eradication has been promoted an an effective way to reduce the overall opium 
production, sale and consumption. It is also argued that it deters planting in future seasons 
by changing the risk-benefit calculation to farmers. However, in less secure areas, farmers 
usually see eradication as a random act that can be managed through patronage and 
bribery.
15
 It is reported from a number of “contested districts” and areas under the 
Taliban’s influence, that corrupt security anc civilian officials receive bribes before a 
promise of non-eradication. In some cases, local officials deliberately avoid eradicating 
poppy fields fearing that farmers might turn against the government.
16
 
Although, counter-narcotics is one of the most important elements of the Afghan 
government’s development and security strategy, the past decade has shown that there is 
no correlation between poppy crop eradication and the level of poppy cultivation or opium 
production. Although the US proposed aerial fumigation (which was rejected by the 
Afghan government), the eradication of poppy crop is done manually or mechanically from 
the ground. Tens of thousands of hectares of poppy fields are eradicated each year but that 
usually makes a small fraction of what is planted. On the other hand, poppy cultivation 
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simply moved around and the overall cultivation of poppies continued to increase. In 
addition, eradication of poppy fields mostly takes place in government controlled and 
relatively secure areas of the country where the risks of being attacked is lower and access 
is easier. It is only in such areas that farmers are usually reluctant to plant poppies. In 
addition, this strategy has displaced drug production into the Taliban-controlled areas and 
turned many poppy farmers into Taliban supporters. As economist Jeffrey Clemens argues, 
opium suppression efforts enriched the insurgents by significantly increasing the drug-




7.2 Interdiction and the “Capture or Kill” Mission 
Soon after taking charge in 2009, the Obama Administration concluded that the Western 
counter-narcotics policies in Afghanistan were filing and adapted a more aggressive course 
of action. The new US government viewed the war on drugs as an integral part of the 
overall US-led mission in Afghanistan. In March 2009, the US envoy for Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke, publically acknowledged that the US efforts to eradicate 
opium poppy crops in Afghanistan had been “wasteful and ineffective.”18 He declared that 
eradication of poppy fields had failed to make an impact on the Taliban insurgents’ ability 
to raise money from the drugs trade. Holbrooke added that the US$800 million a year the 
US was spending on counter-narcotics, especially on eradicating poppy cultivation, would 




The new US administration thus turned towards a counterinsurgency strategy that hinged 
on winning hearts and minds of Afghan population. It also stated that previous counter-
narcotics policies, which included funding for a centrally directed Poppy Eradication Force 
(PEF), were alienating those rural Afghans who depended on opium for their families’ 
subsistence, had the perverse effect of bolstering the insurgency and undermined security 
and stability goals. It was a clear shift from eradication to interdiction and agricultural 
development assistance that aims to provide farmers with alternative livelihoods. The US 
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troops on the ground once again “made peace with poppies”20 and left the eradication of 
poppy fields to the Afghan government.   
The 2009 decision to deemphasize opium poppy eradication and to go after the drug 
runners and drug traders was a major shift in US’s counter-narcotics drive in Afghanistan. 
The US government put 50 Afghans suspected to be drug traffickers with Taliban links on 
a Pentagon list of people to be “captured or killed.” That meant they had been given the 
same target status as insurgent leaders and could be captured or killed at any time. The new 
strategy, which focused for the first time on breaking the link between the narcotics trade 
and the Taliban, coincided with the US military expansion in Afghanistan. The strategy 
reflected a new, interagency approach in which the military, intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies from the participating countries worked together to identify those 
individuals linked with drugs and insurgency. In 2009, one of the two US military generals 
serving in Afghanistan told the US Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee that “we have a 
list of 367 ‘kill or capture’ targets, including 50 nexus targets who link drugs and the 
insurgency.”21 The Taliban insurgency was largely seen as a self-financed insurgency and 
the aim of the new US strategy was to disrupt the financial network behind the insurgency 
and break the links between drug traffickers and the insurgents. Under this policy, a several 
of Afghans suspected of being involved in the drug trade and with Taliban links were 
killed in raids conducted by US/NATO forces.   
Meanwhile, the US government put dozens of Afghan individuals, groups and businesses 
suspected of being involved in the drug trade on its sanctions list under the “Foreign 
Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act” commonly known as the “Kingpin Act.” 22  The 
“Kingpin Act” list bans US citizens from doing business with the person/s whose name is 
on the list and freezes any assets s/he may hold under the US jurisdiction.
23
 In addition, the 
US has arrested and extradited a number of Afghans and Pakistanis suspected of drug 
production and trafficking. 
Haji Bashir Noorzai, a former anti-soviet Mujahideen commander from Kandahar, who 
later became a confidante of the Taliban Supre Leader, Mullah Omar, was one of those 
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suspected of having links with the narcotics trade. Although he agreed to cooperate with 
the Americans after the fall of the Taliban regime in late 2001, the “ally” soon became a 
“drug suspect.” In June 2004, he was added to the US government’s drug kingpin list; the 
first Afghan on the list. In 2005, he was secretly indicted and lured to New York where he 
was arrested after nearly two weeks of talks with law enforcement and counterterrorism 
officials in a Manhatten hotel. The US authorities announced his capture in New York in 
April 2005 and introduced him as a drug lord and a big catch -- the Asian counterpart of 
the Colombian cocaine legend, Pablo Escobar.
24
 The US officials accused him of providing 
“explosives, weaponry, and personnel to the Taliban in exchange for protection for his 
organisation’s opium poppy crops, heroin laboratories, drug transportation routes, and 
members and associates.”25 Haji Bashir denied his involvement in drug trafficking and 
pleaded not guilty to charges that he smuggled heroin into the US. However, the judge in 






 October 2005, the US authorities announced the extradition of an Afghan national, 
Baz Mohammad, “the first extradition in history from Afghanistan to the United States.”27 
The US government’s Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) called him a “drug lord” 
and “a Taliban-linked narco-terrorist” and charged him with “conspiring to import more 
than $25 million worth of heroin from Afghanistan into the United States and other 
countries.” The indictment said that his organisation was “closely aligned with the Taliban 
and other Islamic-extremist groups in Afghanistan” and provided financial support to the 
insurgents who, in return, protected “its opium crops, heroin laboratories, drug-
transportation routes, and members and associates.” Before his extradition to the US, Baz 
Mohammad had been arrested in January 2005 in Afghanistan in a joint US-Afghan 
operation codenamed “Marble Palace” and was put on the “Kingpin list” in June 2005.28 
Two years later, on 5
th
 October 2007, a US court in New York sentenced him to more than 
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15 years in prison for “heading a drug trafficking ring” in Afghanistan and Pakistan and 
using his illicit profits to support the Taliban.
29
   
Over the following years, several other suspected drug traders were arrested in Afghanistan 
and extradited to the US. In November 2007, Khan Mohammad, from Afghanistan’s 
eastern Nangarhar province, was taken to the US and became the first person to be 
convicted under a narco-terrorism provision of the USA Patriot Act that went into effect in 
March 2006 and increased the penalty for a defendant found to be involved with terrorism 
and distributing illegal drugs. A federal jury found him guilty of drug trafficking and 
funding “terrorist activity by trafficking in illegal drugs”30 and, on 22nd December 2008, 
was handed the maximum sentence of life imprisonment.
31
 
In 2008, Haji Juma Khan, an ethnic Baloch, who was described by the US federal 
prosecutors as perhaps the biggest and most dangerous drug lord in Afghanistan, was 
arrested in Indonesia and transported to New York to face charges under a new American 
narco-terrorism law. According to US authorities, he led an international opium and heroin 
trafficking group and operated laboratories/factories that produced refined heroin. Haji 
Juma Khan was also accused of helping the Taliban with a steady stream of money and 
weapons. According to the New York Times, before he was captured, the CIA and the 
US’s Drug Enforcement Administration relied on him as a valued source for years in return 
for what he hoped would be protected status as an American asset.
32
 US prosecutors 
accused him of moving upto US$1 billion worth of opium a year paying protection to the 
Taliban and bribes to officials in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran.
33
 In 2012, another Afghan 
national, Haji Bagcho, accused of having links with the Taliban was sentenced to life in 
prison for “narco-terrorism” and conspiring to distribute heroin in the United States. The 
US authorities called Haji Bagcho, who has been arrested in Afghanistan and extradited to 
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the US in May 2009, as “one of the world’s most prolific drug traffickers who helped fund 
the Taliban.”34 
In addition, the US government put a number of individuals and businesses on its sanctions 
list who it says are “indirectly linked” to the drug trade and insurgency. In February 2014, 
the US government designated an Afghan national pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics 
Kingpin Designation Act (Kingpin Act) for being “involved in moving money for the 
Taliban and other narcotics traffickers using his hawala, a value transfer system”, and “for 
his significant role in international narcotics trafficking.”35 Meanwhile, the Afghan security 
forces also captured a number of suspected drug traffickers from different parts of the 
country. In June 2013, the Afghan Minister of Counter-Narcotics, Zarar Ahmad Muqbel 
Osmani, announced that the Afghan authorities had arrested seven of the top 10 traffickers, 
including individuals having significant political and financial power, and called it “a 
major breakthrough of the Afghan government.”36  
Although such arrests inside Afghanistan disrupted the drug trade to some extent, the 
impact of interdiction may be limited for at least these three reasons. (A), Afghanistan’s 
judicial system is still incapable of bringing high-level drug traffickers to justice. (B), Most 
major drug traffickers have either fled the country or conduct their business through 
proxies, labourers. (C), Many big drug traffickers don’t live and operate on permanent 
basis in Afghanistan. According to Afghan security officials, the biggest narco-traffickers 
live abroad, mostly in Pakistan, from where they remote control their drug trade.
37
 
Similalry, the Obama administration’s strategy of “killing or capturing” drug traffickers 
created problems for the narco-industry, the effects were mostly temporary. Moreover, in 
many parts of the country, the strategy drew the so called drug-lords closer to the Taliban 
as their reliance on the Taliban for protection increased. A number of them simply moved 
to neighbouring Pakistan.  
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The previous US strategy which focused mainly on the eradication of poppy fields also had 
a limited success as it failed to provide viable and sustainable alternative livelihood options. 
In addition, the strategy drove a number of poppy farmers and landowners into the arms of 
the Taliban and started cooperating with the insurgents in exchanging for protecting their 
poppy fields from the government’s eradication police. 
Meanwhile, despite eradication of tens of thousands of hetres of poppy fields each year, 
drug production and poppy cultivation has increased year over year since the fall of the 
Taliban regime. Like the 2000 US funded campaign to destroy coca fields in Colombia, 
commonly known as “Plan Colombia”, largely failed to achieve its goals,38 the US strategy 
to destroy the drug industry and reduce the overall production of opium in Afghanistan has 
not been succesful. Although poppy cultivation reduced in some parts of Afghanistan, it 
increased in other areas. In many drug producing countries, counter-narcotics campaigns 
often resulted in a “balloon effect” -- the concept that describes opium cultivators to simply 
relocate just like squeezing the balloon on one end makes it bulge at the other. In 
Afghanistan too, several provinces, where poppy cultivation took place for a few years, 
were later declared “poppy free.” However, some of them went back to poppy cultivation 




7.3 Alternative Development and Substitute Crops 
Alternative development has been an important part of counter-narcotics strategy in 
Afghanistan which is intended to help farmers switch from poppy cultivation to licit 
livelihood options and keep them away from a reliance on opium production as a source of 
income. This has included a number of initiatives aimed at increasing farmers’ 
employment opportunities while decreasing their expenditures and risk (e.g., by providing 
licit seeds such as wheat, fertiliser and farming technology) and in the meantime, 
improving and reconstructing the agricultural infrastructure. As part of the alternative 
livelihood policy, the Good Performers Initiative (GPI) was designed to reward provinces 
that successfully reduced or eliminated poppy cultivation with funding for developmental 
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projects. However, the scheme was not properly implemented and secondly, the money 
allocated didn’t match the needs of the people. In addition, allocations of funds didn’t 
result in robust rural development but were in some cases were diverted for personal profit 
or amounted to one isolated project here and there.
40
 For many farmers, especially those 
living in remote areas, alternative livelihoods and cash-for-work programs never 
materialised. Alternative development has been very slow and still hasn’t reached large 
areas of the country. Many parts of rural Afghanistan haven’t seen its benefits due to 
limited resources or insecurity that has halted many developmental projects. Electricity, 
roads and access to market are far from sufficient to convince poppy farmers switch to licit 
crops. Although poppy cultivation reduced in some parts of the country, such initiatives 
have not resulted in the overall poppy cultivation in the country. 
The US also supported alternative crops as part of its counter-narcotics strategy in 
Afghanistan and planned to bring in teams from the US Department of Agriculture to help 
identity what crops to grow.
41
 Farmers were told to cultivate crops such as saffron, roses, 
alfalfa, basil, cotton and pomegranates as substitute to poppies. Farmers were told this 
would bring them more than opium. In addition, crops with short growing seasons such as 
onion, tomatoes, and cucumbers were also promoted. Meanwhile, growing vegetables in 
rotation and, in the meantime, planting fruit trees for the long term on the same plot of land 
was also seen as an alternative to poppy. Onions got more attention than other vegetables 
as an alternative to poppies for several of reasons. Firstly, it is considered a high-value 




As opium farmers generally get offers for credit, seeds and fertilisers, the Afghan 
government and its international backers offered similar incentives to steer farmers toward 
alternative legitimate crops. The slogans of “Poppies for Peace”, “Poppies for 
Pomegranates” and “Poppy for Medicine” have been used over the past decade as part of 
possible strategies aimed at tackling the drug problem in Afghanistan. Many promises 
were made to farmers who switched to legal crops but they found later the money they 
received from legal crops was not comparable with opium prices.  
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In addition, cultivating several crops is more labour intensive and in the absence of cold 
storage facilities and a very limited access to foreign market, a significant amount of 
vegetables and fruits are wasted and rotten every year. Many famers sell their vegetables in 
Pakistan on cheap prices where they are kept in cold storage. The same are exported back 
to Afghanistan in the winter and are sold on higher prices.
43
 Afghanistan’s export base is 
already very narrow, with official exports -- mostly dried nuts and fruits, derivatives of 
legal agricultural production, and carpets -- amounting to only 5.5 percent of GDP in 
2012/13. Even factoring illicit exports such as opium and other drugs, Afghanistan 
underperforms in exports. As a 2014 World Bank report says, countries at similar income 
level tend to have an export-to-GDP ratio closer to 30 percent.
44
  
Lack of storage facilities for fruits and vegetables, absence of easy access to domestic 
markets and minimal export of licit agricultural products are some of the main factors 
which make opium the most profitable crop in Afghanistan. Poppy-growing households are 
usually farther away from markets. Although opium fuels conflict and undermines 
governance by providing income to insurgents and other criminal groups, it has been 
Afghanistan’s single most important cash crop having significant implications for income 
and consumption of many rural and poor households. The average cash income of poppy-




Wheat accounts for approximately 60 percent of agricultural output in Afghanistan and is 
one of the most important crops, next to opium. Around one-third of wheat production is 
rain-fed, which makes agriculture output highly volatile and dependent on rainfall.
46
 In 
addition, the comparison of the per-hectare income from wheat and poppies, the two crops 
planted during the same season in Afghanistan, indicates why poppies aremore attractive. 
In 2003, farmers earned 27 times more gross income per hectare of opium than per hectare 
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The only other plant that can compete with opium in terms of prices is Saffron which sells 
high on the international markets. However, the saffron market is dominated by other 
countries especially Iran, Afghanistan’ eastern neighbour. Although many poppy farmers 
have switched saffron all over the country, it is still not a perfect substitute for opium as 
many farmers complain they struggle to market saffron on competitive prices. A very small 
amount of saffron is used inside Afghanistan As a farmer from northern Balkh province 
said, “I could only sell a few grams of his saffron to a local traditional medicinal 
practitioner while the rest is stored in my bedroom.”49 Therefore, the absence of foreign 
markets for Afghan saffron might decrease its appeal leaving poppy as the most lucrative 
crop.  
 
7.4 Poppy for Medicine: Legalising Opium Production  
As the policies aimed tackling the opium problem in Afghanistan failed to achieve their 
goals, some started looking for a panacea and advocated using Afghan opium for 
medicines such as morphine and codeine, which are highly-demanded painkillers globally. 
In 2005, the Senlis Council, an international drug policy think tank, proposed the “Poppy 
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for Medicine” program and the creation of a licensing system in Afghanistan which would 
allow the cultivation of opium for the production of essential pain killers. The Senlis 
Council argued that in order to break the vicious circle of the drugs economy, opium trade 
needed to be brought into a legal system controlled by the state. It added that the strategy 
of destroying poppy crop was destroying people’s livelihoods and encouraging them to 
support the Taliban. The Senlis Council proposed a village-based licence scheme and a 
“community co-policing”, intended to prevent individuals selling opium to drug traffickers 
and to make sure that the opium is delivered to the factory to be converted to morphine.
50
  
Legal production of opium is permitted under the UN Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs and other international drug treaties. Legal poppy cultivation is undertaken for 
pharmaceutical use by at least nineteen countries in the world (Australia, Austria, China, 
the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, India, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, South Korea, Spain, Macedonia, Turkey, and the United 
Kingdom). Only four of them (China, India, Japan and South Korea) produce opium while 
the others harvest poppies (“poppy straw”), and produce concentrate of poppy straw (CPS) 
in the context of a modern mechanised agriculture. Two countries, Turkey and India, 
produce most of the world’s legal opium. India is the only legal exporter of opium and 
benefits from a preferential access to markets in the US
51
 which is the world’s biggest 
importer of opium. 
Opium licensing has been used in India to curb illegal opium production for several 
decades where tens of thousands of farmers, most of them in the states of Madhya Pradesh, 
Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan, are permitted to grow opium under the supervision of Central 
Narcotics Bureau, a branch of the Indian Finance Ministry. India exports hundreds of 
tonnes of opium annually mainly to US, UK and Japan.
52
 Similarly, Turkey, which has a 
long history of illicit opium production and remained a major source of narcotics smuggled 
to Europe and US for decades, overturned the poppy ban in 1974 and allowed licensed 
growing for medical uses.
53
 Therefore, some experts and politicians thought that liscensing 
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the opium production would also work in Afghanistan. Aslan, for example, argued that the 
licensing scheme and regulating poppy cultivation might turn Afghanistan, one the poorest 
countries in the world, into “the Saudi Arabia of morphine” and that it could create 
stability and economic development, as well as sap support for the Taliban.
54
  
However, the Senlis Council’s proposals were condemned by the US, UK and the Afghan 
government. The US has been at the forefront for opposing the legalisation of opium 
production in Afghanistan. The idea of a liscensing scheme was rejected first and foremost 
on the grounds that the political conditions and regulatory framework required for the 
implementation of such a plan were missing in Afghanistan. It was argued that the 
legalisation of opium would speed up the transformation of Afghanistan into a narco-
economy and would legitimise the position of the drug-lords.
55
  
The British government, which led the counter-narcotics campaign in Afghanistan for 
many years, also insists that legalisation is not an option. The US and UK position has 
been that the law and order needed to have a licit poppy cultivation doesn’t exist in 
Afghanistan and that violations will be common. They also argue that the Afghan opium 
industry will be impossible to monitor because of insecurity, corruption and harsh 
landscape. They are also concerned that such a scheme will put the Afghan government in 
competition with the drug traders and that there might be a competition between farmers to 
supply both licit and illicit opium. Even if the scheme was approved, the country will need 
clean facilities to produce medical grade opiates.
56
 Some have suggested that even if 
Afghanistan were allowed to join the ranks of licensed producers of opiates for medical use, 
the country’s tiny farm sizes, highly labour-intensive technology and poor infrastructure 
mean that costs would be about 10 times higher than those of Australia, a major exporter.
57
 
                                                          
54
 Aslan, Reza, (2008). How Opium Can Save Afghanistan. Daily Beast, 19 Dec. Available online at: 
<http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2008/12/19/how-opium-can-save-afghanistan.html#> [Accessed 01 
Nov 2014]. See also Ham, Peter van and Kamminga, Jorrit, (2006). Poppies for Peace: Reforming 
Afghanistan’s Opium Industry. The Washington Quarterly, 30, (1): 69-81.   
55
 Grare, Frédéric, (2008). Anatomy of a Fallacy: The Senlis Council and Narcotics in Afghanistan. The 
Centre for International Governance Innovation, Working Paper #34. Available online at: 
<HTTP://WWW.CIGIONLINE.ORG/SITES/DEFAULT/FILES/WORKING_PAPER_34_WEB.PDF> 
[Accessed 01 Nov 2014]. See also Chouvy, Pierre-Arnaud, (2008). Licensing Afghanistan’s Opium. op.cit.; 
Mansfield, David, (2001). An Analysis of Licit Opium Poppy Cultivation in India and Turkey. Available at: 
<http://www.davidmansfield.org/all.php>[Accessed 01 Nov 2014]; Felbab-Brown, Vanda, (2007). Opium 
Licensing in Afghanistan: Its Desirability and Feasibility. Brookings Institute Policy Paper No. 1, August 
2007. Available online at: 
<http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2007/8/afghanistan%20felbab%20brown/felbab
%20brown200708.pdf> [Accessed 01 Nov 2014]. 
56
 US Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, (2009). Afghanistan’s Narco War. op.cit.  pp. 25-26.  
57
 Byrd, William A. and Mansfield, David, (2014). Licensing Afghan Opium for Medicinal Use: Why It 
Won’t Work. Washington DC.: United States Institute of Peace. Available online at: 
<http://www.usip.org/publications/licensing-afghan-opium-medicinal-use> [Accessed 02 Nov 2014].  
310 
 
Nonetheless, the notion of legalising/licensing opium production in Afghanistan got 
support from a wide range of circles. In 2007, The British Medical Association (BMA) 
proposed a radical solution to the Afghan poppy problem by harnessing the Afghan opium-
poppy crop to alleviate a shortage of painkillers in Britain’s National Health Service 
(NHS). Dr Vivienne Nathanson, the BMA’s head of science and ethics said: “If we 
actually were harvesting this drug from Afghanistan rather than destroying it, we’d be 
benefiting the population of Afghanistan as well as helping patients and not putting people 
at risk.”58 Responding to the proposal, Mark Malloch-Brown, the then British minister of 
state for Africa, Asia, and the UN, acknowledged that “the UK has repeatedly considered 
legal poppy cultivation” but argued against such a move by saying that “unless the Afghan 
government can control the size of the crop, legal opium will supplement and not substitute 
illegal opium production.”59 
In June 2014, Sir William Patey, the former UK ambassador to Afghanistan (2010-2012), 
became one of the highest-profile figures in Britain to back legalising and regulating of 
opium in Afghanistan. After acknowledging the failure of British-led efforts to eradicate 
poppy crops in Afghanistan over the past 10 years, Patey said: “If we cannot deal 
effectively with supply, then the only alternative would seem to me to try to limit the 
demand for illicit drugs by making a licit supply of them available from a legally regulated 
market.”60 However, Karl Eikenberry, the former US ambassador to Afghanistan (2009-
2011) while reacting to his British counterpart’s comments warned against such a move 
and equated the opium legalisation in Afghanistan with “more havoc on the streets of 
Moscow, London and the US.”61 
The notion of legalising/licensing opium poppy cultivation remains problematic and 
controversial. Neither the Afghan government nor its main international backers, especially 
the US and the UK, are willing to give it a try. The US administration is also concerned 
that such a scheme would contradict America’s avowed “war on drugs.” In addition, 
finding a market for legal Afghan opium will be another problem. Two major exporters of 
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legal opiates, India and Turkey, both recognised by the United Nations as traditional 
supplier countries, continue to cultivate opiates on smaller farms with some leakages into 
the illegal market. India’s raw opium extraction makes leakages into the illicit market 
easier, making it the fourth-largest global producer of illegal opiates.
62
 The huge quantities 
of Afghan opium in the legal markets would have a negative impact on prices in the 
industry. Countries that cultivate opium poppies legally, especially India and Turkey, are 
defending their market share and don’t want another major producer to take their place.  
 
7.5 Counter-narcotics: Institutions and Policies  
Afghanistan has been part of a multilateral drug control framework, described as the 
Global Drug Prohibition Regime (GDPR), aimed at preventing the non-scientific and non-
medical production, supply and use of drugs. The country is a party to the 1988 UN Drug 
Convention, the 1971 UN Convention, and the 1961 UN Single Convention on 
Psychotropic Substances. The Afghan government does not have a formal extradition or 
legal assistance arrangements with the United States but Afghan counter-narcotics 
legislation allows the extradition of Afghan drug offenders under the 1988 UN Drug 
Convention. Over the past decade, the US Department of Justice extradited several 
Afghans believed to be major drug traffickers.
63
   
The first government institution to tackle the drug problem in post-Taliban Afghanistan 
was the Counter Narcotics Directorate (CND). Established in October 2002 under the 
National Security Council, the CND became fully operational in January 2003. In early 
2005, it was replaced with the Ministry of Counter-Narcotics (MCN) which has been the 
lead government agency for developing counter-narcotics policy, coordinating activities 
with other governmental bodies and international agencies as well as implementing various 
drug interdiction and reduction programs. It also takes the governmental lead for gathering 
and analysing data in the production, trafficking and consumption. The Ministry is guided 
by the following Mission Statement:  
Based on the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the Counter Narcotics 
and Intoxicants Law of Afghanistan and the designation of counter narcotics as a 
crosscutting issue in the Afghanistan National Development Strategy; the Ministry of 
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Counter Narcotics will: lead counter narcotics policy and program formulation; 
coordinate the counter narcotics budget with the Ministry of Finance; coordinate relevant 
counter narcotics efforts with the line ministries and organisations; and monitor and 
report on the implementation of the National Drug Control Strategy. The MCN will 
work with other partners to create a secure environment for a healthy society with a 
strong licit economy, through evidence-based policy-setting, effective coordination and 
full accountability to the people of Afghanistan and their government.
64
  
Afghanistan’s Ministry of Counter Narcotics has eight pillars of activity under the National 
Drugs Control Strategy (NDCS) including: Institution Building, Law Enforcement, 
International and Regional Cooperation, Eradication, Public Awareness, Alternative 
Livelihoods, Criminal Justice and Demand Reduction. The MCN does not have 
implementing authorities or agencies and relies on other ‘Line’ Ministries for the 
application of its programmes including the ministries of Agriculture; Irrigation and 
Livestock; Rural Rehabilitation and Development; Public Health; Education; Hajj and 
Religious Affairs and the ‘Ministry of Labour. However, the MCN’s key ‘line’ ministries 
are the Ministry of Interior Affairs (MoI) and the Ministry of Defense (MoD) upon which 
it relies for enforcement support. In terms of policy formulation, the MCN also retains a 
close relationship with international non-governmental organisations (I-NGOs), the United 
Nations’ Offices and the US and British Embassies -- the two principle national level 
actors working on counter-narcotics.  
In May 2005, the Afghan government established the Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF) 
which investigates, prosecutes and tries major narcotics and drugs-related corruption cases. 
CJTF includes a Central Narcotics Tribunal, investigators from the Counter Narcotics 
Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), prosecutors from the Attorney General’s office, and Judges 
from the Supreme Court. They jointly investigate and prosecute trials of serious drug-
related offences all over the country.
65
 The international community, especially the US and 
UK, have supported the development of Afghan capacity to investigate and prosecute 
narcotics and narcotics-related corruption cases through the training and mentoring of 
specialised investigators, prosecutors and judges. In addition, they have provided support 
to facilitate linkages between Kabul-based investigations and provincial justice centres. 
The Counter Narcotics Justice Centre (CNJC), opened in Kabul in 2009, includes a 
forensics laboratory, narcotics-specific primary and appellate narcotics courts (Counter 
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Narcotics Tribunal (CNT), and a detention centre. The investigators, prosecutors, and 
judges, who are co-located at the CNJC, encompass the Criminal Justice Task Force 
(CJTF).
66
 The Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), a specialist unit of the 
Afghan National Police (ANP) under the Ministry of Interior (MoI), has officers in all 34 
provinces of the country to enforce drug laws by means of investigations and operations 
including interdiction and crop eradication.  
Among the international bodies involved in Afghanistan’s drug sector, are a number of 
governmental and non-governmental agencies that have played an important role in 
countering narcotics in the country. Although the UK took the lead for counter-narcotics in 
Afghanistan for the first few years after the fall of Taliban, the US remained at the 
forefront of a multifaceted effort and poured in numerous resources. The Department of 
State’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) is the 
central US body on counter-narcotics effort in Afghanistan. The US’s Drugs Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) reopened its country office in Kabul in 2003 and, through working 
closely with the Counter-narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), has been at the forefront 
of interdiction. Meanwhile, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) has 
financed numerous developmental projects in poppy cultivating areas of the country.  The 
UN’s engagement is much older than that of the US and UK and has been involved with 
drug policy and programs in Afghanistan for decades. The United Nations Offices on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC), which defines itself as “a global leader in the fight against 




In order to enhance international and regional cooperation on counternarcotics issues, a 
range of initiatives have been created. In 2011, the Central Asia Counternarcotics Initiative 
(CACI) was launched by the US’s State Department which is aimed at providing 
specialised training, mentoring, and equipment to enhance regional law enforcement 
capacity and promote cooperation among counternarcotics units among Central Asian 
countries. In addition, Pentagon plans to establish a Regional Narcotics and Analysis and 
Illicit Trafficking Task Force (RNAIT-TF). There are several other international and 
regional arrangements and organisations including: United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC) and its Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre; 
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International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) and its Project Cohesion on precursor 
chemical control, which Afghanistan joined in August 2013; Paris Pact Initiative, which 
launched its fourth phase to combat Afghan opium and heroin trafficking in June 2013; the 
Colombo Plan, an Asia-Pacific regional collective, which has conducted work on Afghan 




In his report to the US Congress in October 2014, John Sopko, the Special Inspector 
General in charge of assessing American reconstruction programs in Afghanistan, said that 
the US alone spent approximately $7.8 billion on counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan 
in the first twelve years (2002- June 2014) since the fall of the Taliban. The money was 
mostly spent on the development of Afghan government counter-narcotics capacity, 
operational support to Afghan counter-narcotics forces, encouragement of alternative 
livelihoods for Afghan farmers, financial incentives to Afghan authorities to enforce 
counter-narcotics laws, and counter-narcotics operations conducted by US authorities in 
coordination with their Afghan counterparts.
69
 However, he acknowledged that the 
program to combat Afghanistan’s opium production failed as “production and cultivation 
are up, interdiction and eradication are down, financial support to the insurgency is up, and 
addiction and abuse are at unprecedented levels in Afghanistan.”70 
 
7.6 The Way Forward 
The narcotics industry constitutes a large portion of Afghanistan’s GDP and has played a 
major role in the country’s political economy since 1990s. As the biggest contributor to the 
Afghan GDP, the opium economy in general has had a positive and stabilising effect on the 
GDP growth, currency and the balance of payments. The drug industry has resulted in 
significant increases in rural wages and serves as an important source of credit for poor 
rural households. Although opium crop has occupied only 3% of land under cultivation, it 
is Afghanistan’s most valuable cash crop, and opiates (opium, morphine, and heroin) are 
its largest exports, with an estimated value of US$3 billion at border prices. In 2014, the 
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opium economy directly provided up to 411,000 full-time-equivalent jobs -- more than the 
entire Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).
71
  
Although much of the drug profits are made outside Afghanistan, the money spent inside 
the country has created a lot of economic opportunities. Opium supports hundreds of 
thousands of additional secondary-effect jobs in the licit economy. In total, the opium 
industry has created around a million direct and indirect jobs. As I observed during my 
ethnographic research in different parts of Afghanistan, the impact of the drug industry is 
very tangible on the construction boom and has fuelled consumption of domestic products 
(such as carpets, furniture, fruits) and high-value goods imported from abroad (such as cars, 
watches, gold rings, fridges, air-conditioners, television sets, mobile telephone sets, and 
solar panels). The drug producing regions as well as those areas which lay on the drug 
smuggling routes have seen visible signs of inward investment. The drug money is 
regularly recycled into legal businesses resulting in overall development. In addition, the 




In many ways, the lines between licit and illicit markets in Afghanistan are blurred as 
many actors are involved in both formal and illicit economic activities at the same time. As 
Lister and Pain says, “[e]ven if traders have not themselves been involved in the illicit 
economy, they require good relationships with those who are because this latter group 
controls the supply routes and transport systems.”73  
At the moment, there are very few incentives for tackling the drugs economy. Wages are 
generally low in Afghanistan and opium remains the most lucrative crop. Meanwhile, 
poppy farmers do not have real alternatives that would bring them the same amount of 
money as opium. Several licit crops have been promoted as alternative to opium poppies 
but none of them could compete with drugs in prices. Corrupt officials do not want to be 
deprived of the easy money they receive from poppy farmers and drug traders. The 
warlords-cum politicians are not willing to give up a lucrative source of income. The 
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Taliban insurgent are not yet ready to divest themselves from of the drug industry which 
brings them tens of millions of dollar annually.  
There is a need for a three-pronged strategy involving the Afghan government, regional 
countries and the rest of the international community. Domestically, building government 
capacity, tackling corruption and curbing warlords’ powers would prove effective in 
controlling the opium economy. In addition, raising national income level in general would 
encourage many opium producers to switch to legal economy. Historically, Afghanistan 
has been an agrarian economy and even today around 70% of Afghans rely on agriculture. 
No amount of aid and investment can contain opium production unless the agricultural 
sector, which was severely and continuously damaged in wars and invasions, is galvanised. 
Building storage facilities and processing and packaging plants inside the country would be 
a good first incentive for many poppy farmers to swtich to legal crops.  
At the moment, opium is the only Afghan commodity which a market abroad. The solution 
to Afghanistan’s poppy problem lies in access to international markets. As long as Afghan 
farmers don’t have access to regional and international markets, no licit crop can become a 
real alternative for opium poppies. Millions of tons of fruits and vegetables are wasted or 
rotten every year due to limited or no access to regional and international markets. Linking 
Afghan farmers with foreign supermarkets such as Sainsbury’s, Walmart and Tesco is the 
cheapest and easiest way of discouraging opium production. If the West scraped tariffs on 
Afghan agricultural products and regional countries allowed the transit and entry of 
Afghan fruits and vegetables to their markets, the drug production will not make any sense 
for majority of poppy farmers.  
Drug trade is a multi-dimensional and multi-national problem; therefore, tackling it needs a 
multi-faceted strategic framework and an integrated and multi-national response. There has 
been a lot of blaming but very little coordination among countries involved in the 
production, transiting and consumption of drugs. Regional cooperation is fraught by high 
levels of corruption, low or mixed enforcement capacities, and political sensitivities in a 
number of countries surrounding Afghanistan. There are  serious shortcomings in 
controlling borders from Afghanistan all the way to Western Europe. While drugs are 
smuggled out of Afghanistan, chemicals used to convert opium into heroin are smuggled 
into the country from abroad. The UN estimates that some 475 metric tons of 
commercially produced chemical, acetic anhydride, is illegally imported into Afghanistan 
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each year for use in some 300 to 500 clandestine laboratories.
74
 Therefore, Afghanistan 
alone cannot tackle the drug problem as it involves not only poppy farmers in the field, but 
also heroin laboratories and traders with regional networks and ready access to the 
international banking sector.
75
 Drugs consuming countries are also responsible to reduce 
demand, crack down on drug mafia in their own jurisdictions and control borders. It is a 
shared responsibility of all those countries where drugs are consumed, processed, 
smuggled/trafficked and produced. It is a regional and international problem and requires a 
multi-national and coordinated solution.  
Domestically, the Afghan government lacks the capacity and resources to put an end to the 
drugs industry by force. Eradicating poppy fields, destroying drug processing laboratories 
and interdicting drug trafficking need a force of tends of thosuands and costs hundreds of 
millions annually. The Taliban government managed to enforce the ban on poppy 
cultivation in 2000 with a total success. As most of the opium is produced in areas under 
the influence of the Taliban, therefore, the cooperation of the insurgents is needed in 
dealing with the problem. Given their record of enforcing the ban and proximity to the 
drug producing areas, the Taliban are in a much better position to prevent drug production, 
processing and trafficking. As the Afghan government has been talking to the Taliban and 
has invited them to join the political process, tackling the drug problem can be made part 
of the deal with the insurgents.  
Ending the drug problem is generally a gradual and long term process and requires both 
consistency and creativity. Given the destruction Afghanistan has experienced over the 
past four decades, the country would depend on international community for assistance and 
cooperation in responding to the drug problem for many years to come. The issue of drug 
production in the country is likely to remain an acute problem in the near future and the 
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Tackling Afghanistan’s drug problem has been one of the main objectives of the US-led 
campaign in the country. Since 2002, the US and its international allies have spent around 
US$10 billion to halt the production and trade of drugs in Afghanistan. However, policies 
applied so far have not resulted in the intended outcome and the production and cultivation 
of drugs has expanded. The counter-narcotics strategy has evolved involving several 
elements including alternative livelihood initiatives, crop eradication and interdiction.     
In the first five years of the US-led intervention in Afghanistan, the US military was not 
involved in poppy eradication and considered fighting the drugs as a distraction “from 
fighting terrorists.” However, in 2007, the Bush administration concluded that poppy and 
insurgency were inseparable and joined the Afghan government in the destruction of poppy 
fields while offering farmers help with alternative crops. The backlash to poppy 
eradication was violent and poppy-growing regions became more unstable and many 
farmers and drug traders sought protection from the Taliban. In 2009, in a major policy 
reversal, the Obama administration stopped the eradication of poppy and focused mainly 
on interdiction by killing and capturing major drug traffickers. Meanwhile, the Afghan 
government continued the implementation of its eradication strategy.  
The narcotics industry constitutes a large portion of Afghanistan’s GDP and plays a major 
role in the political economy of the country. Although opium crop has occupied only 3% of 
arable land, it is Afghanistan’s most valuable cash crop with an estimated value of US$3 
billion at border prices. In 2014, the opium economy directly provided four hundred 
thousand full-time-equivalent jobs -- more than the entire Afghan National Security Forces 
(ANSF) and resulted in significant increases in rural wages.  
Drug production is a multi-dimensional and multi-national problem involving local, 
regional and international actors and processes such as production, trafficking and 
consumption. Therefore, the Afghan government cannot tackle it on its on. Therefore is a 
need for a multi-national and multi-faceted strategic framework embedded in a long-term 
development and institution-building agenda. Building the Afghan economy, giving 
farmers access to international markets and building the government’s capacity to tackle 
corruption and curb warlords’ influence will prove effective in controlling some of the 
domestic drivers of the drugs industry. There is no quick fix. To deal with the drug 
problem, the Afghan government will depend on international community’s assistance and 






Conflict and violence has been part of human society throughout the history. Scholars from 
the ancient times to the present have presented a number of perspectives and theories on 
the causes of violent behaviour. Aristotle, while assessing the causes of social conflict in 
his own society over 2000 years ago, noted that the Athenian conflict was the result of the 
unequal nature of society, frustration at the rulers’ incompetence and the desire for 
acquiring wealth and privilege. As understanding of human society and psychology 
increased, the role of several other elements was also examined as part of conflict studies 
and the social sciences in general.   
Comparatively, more attention was paid to the study and understanding of conflictive 
behaviour in the 20
th
 century. In particular, the field of conflict studies expanded vastly 
after the Second World War (1939-1945). Depending on their scholarly background and 
academic approaches, social scientists have tried to understand the motivation and causes 
of conflict and suggested different ways to tackle the problem. Some scholars call violence 
as innate and part of human nature while others argue that it is a socially acquired 
phenomenon. On the other hand, the relative deprivation theory is based on the concept of 
grievances and says that violence is the result of deprivation and inequality. It argues that 
frustration of economic and/or political needs causes collective action. Conversely, the 
greed-model stresses the importance of resources and material gains, both as an instigator 
and an objective, and argues that material gain and remuneration drive social mobilisation. 
In recent decades, the greed model has become more popular attracting the attention of 
many scholars as well as policy makers.  
Although these models and frameworks have played an important role to understand 
different aspects of conflict, they mostly focus on individual elements while overlook other 
important factors. These approaches either downplay or overplay the role of certain actors 
and factors in both initiating and prolonging the conflict. Empirical and historical evidence 
show that these approaches (discussed in detail in Chapter One) do not always correspond 
to the dynamics of conflicts in all types of societies. Although there appears to be a link 
and continuity between different approaches adopted to analyse and understand conflictive 
behaviour, there is no one size fit all explanation or solution. Different conflicts have 
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divergent dynamics and no single cause can give an account of all types of conflicts. 
Conflict is as complicated and contingent as the human psyche and society. That is why, 
the occurrence of a conflict, its intensity and duration depend on the convergence of a 
number of different factors and conditions rather than one single cause.  
In an increasingly globalising world, conflicts are becoming more and more complex 
involving multiple actors at local, regional and international level and consisting of a 
combination of causes and motivations. Therefore, I have suggested the “Hybrid 
Framework” of conflict which takes into account a variety of causes and overlapping 
motivations as well as the complex web of actors and factors at different levels and stages. 
The “Hybrid Framework” is an integrated and comprehensive approach to understand and 
analyse conflict by bringing all factors (including ideology, proxy, nationalism, criminality) 
and actors (including local and transnational) together. These actors and factors not only 
play an instrumental role in causing a conflict, they also transform the polity and society 
and result in the sustainment and prolongation of conflict. Hybrid Framework can be 
applied to almost any conflict, especially contemporary conflicts, which generally have 
multiple drivers.  
The conflict in Afghanistan, like many other cases elsewhere in the world, demonstrates 
the multiplicity of state and non-state actors and the overlapping nature of their 
motivations. As demonstrated in the thesis, the Afghan conflict is neither just a 
terrorist/extremist problem, nor a confrontation between different ethnic groups. The 
conflict in the country is the outcome of a combination of more than a dozen factors 
including strategic, proxy, nationalist, economic, religious, identity and criminal. The April 
1978 Communist coup and the 1979 Soviet invasion the following year turned Afghanistan 
into a theatre of war where different local and foreign actors started a competition for 
influence and dominance. Although the resistance against the Soviet occupation in the 
1980s was a war of independence for Afghans in general, many foreign state actors used it 
as an opportunity to settle historic scores with each other and extend their influence to a 
strategically important part of the world. The two super powers, the US and the USSR, 
each leading the Capitalist and Communist blocs respectively, chose Afghanistan as a 
battlefield to conduct a bloody proxy war. Over time, the conflict in the country became 
more complicated attracting a variety of new local, regional and international actors who 
had overlapping interests and motivations.  
The conflict in Afghanistan was created by international factors in the first place i.e. the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the resistance to it. The Afghans who were fighting the 
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Soviet occupation were mainly motivated by nationalism and ideology. On the other hand, 
Western powers and their allies were mainly driven by the desire to defeat the communism 
USSR and, therefore, supported the Afghan Mujahideen. With the passage of time, a 
variety of transnational factors changed the internal dynamics of the Afghan conflict 
contributing to its complexity and perpetuity. Following the withdrawal of the Soviet 
forces, the factions involved in the internal war in the 1990s were again supported by 
various regional powers. Pakistan was one of the main supporters of the Taliban 
government in Afghanistan. Even after the fall of the Taliban regime as a result of the US 
led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, Pakistan “continued supporting the Taliban insurgents” 
to gain influence at the expense of its arch rival, India.
1
 Meanwhile, the Taliban’s main 
goals include the withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan, recapturing of the 
government in Kabul and the enforcement of their interpretation of Islamic in the country. 
The interests and motivations of these two actors seem to be overlapping here. For the 
Afghan Taliban, it is mainly an issue of religion (creed), nationalism (identity) and 
grievances. However, Pakistan’s policy is rooted in the desire to increase influence in 
Afghanistan and instal a “friendly” regime in Kabul. On the other hand, India and Iran 
supported the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance during the 1990s factional war as part of a 
regional competition to dominate Afghanistan. Internationally, Afghanistan became a 
major theatre of the US led “War on Terrorism” where a number of regional and 
international militants had established bases since 1980s.  
Afghanistan has thus become the centre of several proxy wars including Pakistan-India 
rivalry, Iran-Saudi confrontation, Pakistan-Iran competition and US-Russia discord.In 
addition, the country has also become a battlefield for several international and regional 
militant groups such as Al-Qaeda, ISIS/ISIL and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 
(IMU) – groups that are mainly driven by ideology and fight against the Afghan 
government and its foreign allies. Meanwhile, criminals groups such as drug mafia/cartels 
and illegal armed groups that are motivated by greed also benefit from chaos and 
instability and exploit the weakness of state institutions. As the interests and motivations of 
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most of these actors overlap, there is a degree of cooperation and collaboration. These 
conflicts now determine the course of events in Afghanistan. Although the Afghan actors 
on different sides of the conlict play an important role in prolonging the conflict, they are 
not fully incharge of the situation. While local actors have their own motivations, the 
slogans they raise are mainly aimed at justifying their causes and rationalising the policies 
and decisions of their external patrons.  
Conflicts generally transform political and economic realities and are closely linked with 
the expansion of illegal economic activities including illicit drug production and the 
looting of natural resources. The initiation of many intra-state conflicts, including the 
Afghan conflict, is not linked to the production and trade of illicit drugs; it was the war that 
paved the way for the drugs economy to flourish. As observed in nearly all drug producing 
countries, some sort of instability including coup d’etat, revolution, tribal tensions, violent 
ethnic and/or religious protests, invasion and/or guerrilla warfare preceded the 
entrenchment of narcotics. The conflict in Afghanistan, which was primarily caused by 
foreign interferences and interventions, resulted in the collapse of the state and, in turn, 
created a suitable environment for the production of drugs and expansion of other criminal 
activities. The inititation of many intra-state conflicts, including the conflict in Afghanistan, 
is not linked to the production or trade of illict drugs; it was the war that paved the way for 
the drugs economy to flourish. However, the drugs economy generaly makes a conflict 
more intractable and harder to resolve due to vested interest of relevant actors.   
In order to understand the geopolitics of opium in Afghanistan, it is important to locate the 
country in the geographical context of south-west Asia. The meteoric rise in opium poppy 
cultivation in Afghanistan since the 1979 Soviet invasion is neither an isolated event nor 
can it be solely attributed to one single factor. A number of internal factors supported the 
trend of opium production in the country such as:  (a) more income from opium crops than 
legitimate crops, (b) rural poverty, (c) destruction of agricultural infrastructure due to war 
and (d) weakness or absence of state institutions, especially in remote country side, to 
enforce law. The opium economy firmly established in Afghanistan in the last two decades 
of the 20
th
 century and flourished in conditions of war and anarchy. Opium production in 
Afghanistan grew at an average rate of 15% per annum over the 1980-2000 period, almost 
twice as fast as the global opium production growth rate of 8%. While Afghanistan 
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produced about 19% of world opium in 1980, this proportion grew to 52% by 1995, the 
year prior to the Taliban takeover of Kabul, and rose to 79% by 1999.
2
  
Illicit drugs have been associated with a number of conflicts in different parts of the world. 
The illegality and high demand make narcotics a valuable commodity for both the 
insurgents and criminals. Drugs play a significant role in financing a number of insurgent 
groups and warring factions in several countries including Burma, Colombia and 
Afghanistan. With the passage of time, the drug trade permeated various levels of state and 
society undermining legal economy and health of the society in general. Although drug 
trade is a local factor, it affects many other regional and international actors and connects 
them in many levels. Illicit drug trade is usually associated with four major developments; 
a), it strengthens the insurgents, b), inhibits state-building by weakening and corrupting 
institutions, c), increases criminality and addiction, and d), distorts the legal economy. 
The nexus between drugs, insurgency and state building works in a circle and the link is 
generally stronger in weak states. In most cases, the role of main actors including drug 
traffickers, insurgents and corrupt officials is overlapping. As explained through the 
“Patronage Pyramid”, the drug trade is largely dependent on a nexus between the main 
actors and the patronage network. The patron-client relationship in the drugs economy 
creates and cements structural corruption. Drug trade breeds corruption at every level from 
eradication of poppy fields to processing and trafficking and provides multiple 
opportunities and incentives for government officials in the local civilian administration, 
security forces and judiciary to receive bribes. In most drug producing and drug transit 
countries, narcotics trade is the most common reason of corruption in the government 
institutions.  
Drugs became more attractive for both the insurgents and criminal groups after the end of 
Cold War. With the demise of the bipolar confrontation, fighting a communist or non-
communist regime no longer translated into financial support from a superpower or its 
allies. The loss of state support resulted in many rebel groups resorting to the illict drugs to 
finance their activities. The relationship between illicit drugs and insurgent groups stands 
out for a number of reasons. First, compared to many other resources, drugs are immensely 
profitable, especially in the processed form. Second, they are renewable as the same plant 
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can be cultivated year after year, bringing continuous profits. Third, drugs are illegal and it 
makes them more demanding, especially in consuming countries. Fourth, illegal drug trade 
is a more enduring source of income than other activities such as kidnapping and bank 
robberies. Fifth, drugs can be taxed in several stages – farming, trafficking and processing. 
Sixth, unlike minerals, oil, gas and timber, drugs are “lootable” and easy to appropriate by 
individuals and small groups of people. Seventh, drugs are comparatively easy to hide and 
smuggle in a variety of ways. Eighth, as the demand for drugs is high, they are sold at 
farmgate and farmers don’t have to take them to far away markets. Ninth, opium/coca 
farmers usually get advance credit from traffickers before their yield. Tenth, unlike most 
other agricultural products, drugs can be easily stored for years and can be sold at anytime 
by farmers and traders. Eleventh, drugs can be cultivated in almost all kinds of climates 
and weather conditions. In addition, compared to many other traditional legal crops, drugs, 
especially opium poppies, need less water and less time.   
Insurgent by their nature are usually very entrepreneurial and exploit whatever is available 
in the environment they operate in. They are involved in a number of fund-raising 
activities including the smuggling of drugs, ancient artefacts, cigarettes and timber as well 
as extraction of oil, gold and diamonds. Natural resources generally play an important, if 
not the vital, role in almost all conflicts. Certain natural resources including drugs can be 
easily exploited, looted and sold for big profits. It is in such cases where the issues of greed 
and need and the roles of criminal groups, so called conflict entrepreneurs and war 
profiteers become relevant. Illicit drug trade has been described as the main source of 
income as well as a major motivation for insurgent groups. However, this study’s findings 
indicate that drugs are not the main cause and motivation of all conflict even in drug 
producing countries. Evidence shows that greed alone does not always cause conflicts; 
however, it generally plays an important role in the perpetuity of a conflict. Rather than 
generated by drug production, armed conflicts qualitatively and quantitatively transform 
the existing drugs economy by strengthening the capacity of insurgent groups, attracting 
organised crime and conflict entrapreneurs while weakening the state institutions.  
Many insurgencies including Colombia’s Marxist rebel group, FARC (Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia); Turkey’s Kurdish separatist group, PKK (Partya Kerkeren 
Kurdistan); and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka; are/were not 
initiated for economic benefits and were/are not wholly driven by financial gains. Evidence 
shows that their interaction with drugs came much later. The drugs economy already 
existed and was autonomous before the emergence of these groups. The origins of these 
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three insurgencies were based on grievances and were launched with a clear political 
vision and ideology. However, as this study found, the involvement of these groups in the 
drug trade didn’t have a major impact on their overall motivation or organisational 
structure. Although it is possible that certain elements within the insurgencies might have 
had an economic agenda, the general goals of the groups remain the same. Despite 
profound changes in global geo-politics and the emergence of new sources of funding, the 
primary demands and major goals of these groups have been consistent and their support 
still stems from an ideological framing of grievances. Their original agenda and political 
objectives have not been fully hijacked by greed despite the illegal nature of narcotics trade 
and the huge sums of money involved in it.  
In Afghanistan too, the main insurgent groups are primarily motivated by creed and not by 
greed. Although the Taliban banned opium production a year before the removal of their 
regime by the US led coalition, the insurgent group reversed its poppy ban and once again 
started benefiting from the drugs economy. The Taliban’s relationship with the narcotics 
trade predates the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. This study found that the 
Taliban’s involvement in the drugs economy is much deeper and more complicated than is 
usually understood. The Taliban have developed a sophisticated and well organised 
mechanism to extract money at different stages of the drug trade chain including the 
cultivation of poppies and production, processing and trafficking of opiates.  
The Afghan Taliban group charge poppy farmers a 10% religious tax called ushr usually at 
the farm-gate and in kind. In addition, the Taliban fighters and foot soldiers augment their 
pay by working in the poppy fields during harvest. The Taliban also receive money for 
protecting laboratories where opium is converted into heroin. Moreover, drug traffickers 
and truckers pay them a transit tariff for the drugs smuggled out of the Taliban controlled 
territory or areas under their influence. Big drug traffickers make regular payments to the 
Taliban mostly to earn their favours. Some local Taliban commanders have a share in the 
drug trade and get the money when the drugs reach their intended destinations. Over the 
past two years, the Taliban have been renting out some of the government land in areas 
they control to poppy farmers and, in several districts of Helmand province, local Taliban 
commanders have hired local villagers as sharecroppers. Like other crops, rent farming is 
also common in poppy cultivation and both sides get their due share of the produce 
depending on the amount of investment they make. Some local Taliban commanders have 
also rented the plots of those landowners who have left their villages because of their 
association with the government or animosity towards the Taliban. 
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The drug trade has become a quadruple-pronged tool for the Taliban. Firstly, the group 
receives tens of millions of dollars annually from the drugs economy and comprises a 
major source of its income. Secondly, the expansion of the poppy cultivation after the fall 
of the Taliban regime has a propaganda value for the group. They take pride in their 
successful ban on poppy cultivation and highlight the weakness of the government in 
Kabul and its international allies and their inability to tackle the problem. Thirdly, the 
Taliban (and drug traders) also use the drug money to corrupt Afghan officials, weaken 
government institutions and challenge its legitimacy. Fourthly, some Taliban commanders 
see the drug trade as part of their overall insurgency against the “occupying” US/NATO 
forces and some even consider narcotics as a tool to weaken Western societies. Meanwhile, 
by protecting poppy fields from the government’s eradication campaign, the Taliban earn 
political capital and good will of all the actors involved in the drugs economy. They 
portray themselves as the protectors of poor farmers whose livelihood are being threatened 
and destroyed by the Afghan government and its US/NATO allies.  
In addition to drugs, the Taliban have a number of other sources of funding. Since the 
launch of their insurgency in 2003-04, the Taliban have diversified like a successful 
business enterprise and, with the passage of time, developed multiple income streams. 
During my field work, I discovered more than ten major sources of income for the Taliban 
including donations, drugs, US/NATO supply convoys and construction companies and 
NGOs. Moreover, the group has increased its involvement in the extraction of mines and 
minerals and receive tens of millions of dollars annually by taxing the industry and 
allocating contracts in areas it controls. Like several other successful insurgencies, the 
Taliban have relied on both local and foreign financial sources.  
The Afghan Taliban’s total annual revenues have been estimated to be around US$400 and 
around a quarter (US$100-150) of it is said to be from the drugs industry. However, some 
estimates put the Taliban’s drug revenues much higher than that. The total annual value of 
the opium economy within Afghanistan has been between US$3-4 billion. It shows that the 
Taliban receive less money than other major actors in the drugs economy especially drug 
traffickers and corrupt government officials. According to a 2012 UN report, the Taliban 
share is not particularly large in percentage terms and that they could have earned much 
more by exploiting this potential source of revenue.
3
 My field work and interviews 
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indicated that the Taliban think that taking full control of the drugs industry would damage 
their reputation. It is for that reason that the group has not publically acknowledged its 
involvement in the drug trade. As compared to organised and professional armies, 
insurgencies generally cost much less. Meanwhile, the cost of the Taliban insurgency in 
Afghanistan is lower than other major insurgencies as its fighters live in villages among 
ordinary people and don’t wear special uniforms and boots.  
Since 2011, the Taliban’s reliance on the drug trade has gradually increased. Foreign 
donations, mainly from the Gulf countries, have decreased due to the Arab Spring as 
wealthy donors switched the flow of their money to militant groups fighting in the Middle 
East. Meanwhile, the huge amount of money the Taliban received for years from private 
security companies escorting US/NATO supply convoys inside Afghanistan has also 
reduced after the withdrawal of most foreign forces from the country. The Taliban, like 
other successful insurgent groups, have been adapting to new realities and are quick to 
exploit and replace the means and sources of income.  
So far, the Taliban’s involvement in the drug trade has been mostly facilitative; not 
determinative. The Taliban’s original goals and grievances have not disappeared with their 
deepening involvement in the drugs economy. There are no indications that the group’s 
main goals have been affected by its involvement in the illict drug trade or that it is now 
collectively motivated by greed. As the Taliban control some parts of Afghanistan, drug 
traders living or operating in these areas either join the group or liaise with it in order to 
have the freedom of conduction their business. As a result, the narcotics industry brought 
the Taliban and the drug traders closer due the overlapping nature of their interests. 
Narcotics finance insurgents while their violence weakens government control and 
encourages poppy cultivation. Although eliminating Taliban’s access to narco-profits will 
be very difficult, it would prove disruptive and would deprive the insurgent group of a 
major source of income. However, the destruction of the drug industry in Afghanistan 
would not ruin the insurgency financially so long as other funding sources and motivating 
factors remain intact.  
The narcotics industry constitutes a large portion of Afghanistan’s GDP and has played a 
major role in the country’s political economy since 1990s. The drug trade has had a 
positive and stabilising effect on the GDP growth, currency and the balance of payments 
and resulted in significant increases in rural wages. Afghanistan is a mountainous country 
and only around 12% of its land is arable while farming remains the primary means of 
existence for around 70 percent of Afghans. Although opium crop has occupied only 2-
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4% of land under cultivation, it is Afghanistan’s most valuable cash crop. Opiates (opium 
and heroin) are its largest exports, with an estimated value of US$3 billion annually at 
border prices. In 2014, the opium economy directly provided up to 411,000 full-time-
equivalent jobs -- more than the entire Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).
4
 
Moreover, the opium economy supports hundreds of thousands of additional secondary-
effect jobs in the licit economy thus creating nearly a million direct and indirect jobs in 
total. Meanwhile, the drug trade has created a true “national market”, involving multi-
ethnic networks and strong intra-regional integration.
5
  
Afghans earn relatively little from the illegal drug trade as the greatest proportion of profit 
is accrued by foreigners. Big profits are made in drug consuming wealthy societies, 
especially Europe. There is a huge demand and an open market for Afghan drugs in several 
countries. On the other hand, a small quantity of Afghan fruits and vegetables are exported. 
Although several crops have been promoted as alternatives to opium poppies, none of them 
could compete with opium in prices. Finding markets for other agricultural products is the 
most effective way of tackling the drug problem in Afghanistan. As long as farmers don’t 
have access to regional and international markets, most licit crops cannot become real 
alternatives for opium. Linking poor Afghan farmers with foreign supermarkets is one of 
the cheapest ways of discouraging opium production. If rich countries scraped tariffs on 
Afghan agricultural products and regional countries allowed the transit and entry of 
Afghan fruits and vegetables to their markets, drugs will lose its attraction and many 
opium producers will switch to legal economy. In addition, raising national income level 
will also discourage those poppy farmers who produce opium because it brings them more 
money than licit crops.  
Between 2002 and 2015, the international community, in particular the United States, has 
spent around US$10 billion
6
 to tackle the drug production, trade and trafficking in 
Afghanistan. However, the illicit opium production not only persists, it increased with 
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th
 October. op.cit. p.3.  
5
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online at: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13533310802058984> [Accessed 7 Aug 2014].  
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th
 October. Virginia. Available online at: 
<http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2014-10-30qr.pdf> [Accessed 02 Nov 2014]; See also, New York 
Times, (2014). Editorial: Afghanistan’s Unending Addiction. 27 Oct. Available online at: 




more hectares of land being used to cultivate opium poppies. At the moment, there are very 
few incentives for tackling the drugs economy in Afghanistan. Corrupt government 
officials do not want the flow of drug money they receive in bribes to stop. Warlords-cum 
politicians are not willing to lose a valuable source of income from the drug trade. On the 
other hand, the Taliban are not interested to give up one of their biggest sources of 
revenues. Meanwhile, poppy farmers do not yet have real alternatives as other crops cannot 
compete with opium in prices and market. Therefore, building government capacity, 
eliminating corruption and curbing warlords’ powers will prove effective in controlling a 
thriving opium economy. Domenstically, the resolution of the drug problem requires 
mainly a political and economic rather than a military solution. As most of the drug 
production takes place in areas controlled by the Taliban, the insurgents are in a better 
position to tackle the problem. Therefore, it is suggested that resolving the drug problem 
should be made part of the peace talks and political settlement with the Taliban who have 
shown in the past a willingness to crack down on the opium trade. 
The four main stages of the drug trade – production, processing, trafficking and 
consumption – work in a cycle in which actors in regional countries and other parts of the 
world are involved. The expansion of drug trade further impinges on regional security 
especially when it becomes a two-way traffic. In most cases, precursor chemicals required 
for converting raw opium into more potent drugs are smuggled to drug producing countries 
from abroad. In other cases, raw material is exported from the drug producing countries for 
conversion in drug laboratories in neighbouring/regional countries. As long as the demand 
in the drug consuming countries remains high and trafficking of narcotics through the 
borders of several transit countries is easy; criminal groups and international drug mafia 
will keep exploiting the situation. In addition, political unrest and weak state institutions in 
Afghanistan and its immediate neighbours provide a conducive environment for drug 
dealers and corrupt officials. 
Tackling the Afghan drug problem in Afghanistan is a gradual and long term process and 
requires both consistency and creativity. The ongoing conflict, poverty and poor 
agricultural infrastructure means that the Afghan government will be depending on 
international community for assistance and cooperation for many more years to come. The 
illict drug trade is a regional and an international problem and needs a comprehensive and 
coordinated approach. Therefore, the Afghan government, regional countries and the rest 
of the international community need to work together to make Afghanistan free of drugs. 
Finally, as seen in many countries, once the drug cultivation becomes popular in a conflict 
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stricken country, it largely outlasts the war and becomes part of a circle, contributing to the 
perpetuation of war and anarchy. Therefore, time as well as a multi-national and 
coordinated approach is needed for war-torn countries to achieve transition from war 
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II. Primary Sources (Interviews, Conferences etc.) 
 
II (A). Personal Interviews 
During the course of this study, the author had interactions and discussions with hundreds of people about the 
topic. Several of them were formally and informally interviewed. Given the sensitivity of the topic, and as 
requested by the University Ethics Sub- Committee, anonymity and confidentiality was offered to all 
participants. Every participant was assured about the confidentiality of the interviews and prior approval was 
also taken from each individual for recording. Therefore, names and titles of some of the informants and 
interviewees have only been included, where this has been agreed beforehand. Those interviewees who 
wanted to remain anonymous (due to the sensitivity of the topic and the potential risks they might face) have 
been mentioned with their profession such as farmer, smuggler/drug trader and journalist with the names of 
the province of Afghanistan they reside in. They have been given codes such as “B1, B2 and B3…” for 
businessmen; “D1, D2 and D3…” for Afghan diaspora members/labourers in Gulf countries mainly in UAE 
and Qatar; “G1, G2, G3…” for government officials; “F1, F2, F3…” for farmers; “J1, J2, J3…” for local 
journalists; “P1, P2, P3...” for politicians; “S1, S2, S3…” for smugglers/drug traders; “T1, T2, T3…” for 
Taliban members/supporters; and “V1, V2, V3…” for local villagers including tribal elders.  
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Afghanistan), Kabul, Feb 2013. 
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Government Official 3 (G3). Nangarhar province. Nov 2013. 
Government Official 4 (G4). Nangarhar province. Nov 2013. 
Government Official 5 (G5). Kandahar province. Nov 2011. 
Government Official 6 (G6). Badakshan province. Nov 2011. 
Government Official 7 (G7). Kabul. Oct 2014. 
Experts/Analysts 
Sedney, David, (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia (2009-
2013); London, 14 May 2014. 
Felbab-Brown, Vanda, (Senior Fellow Foreign Policy, The Brookings Institution, Washington DC.); London, 
01 Aug 2013. 
Londoño, Daniel Mejía, (Director of the Research Center on Drugs and Security, University of the Andes, 
Colombia); London, 01 June 2012. 
Uribe, Alejandro Gaviria, (Dean of the School of Economics at the University of the Andes from 2006 to his 
appointment as Minister in 2012); London, 01 June 2012. 
Jalali, Ali Ahmad, (Interior Minister of Afghanistan (Jan. 2003-Sept. 2005); currently serving as a 
Distinguished Professor at the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESA) of National 




Dastgiri, Haji Agha Lalai, (Tribal elder and member of Kandahar Provincial Council). Oct 2014. 
Rahmat, Haji, (Tribal elder in Helmand province). Nov 2013. 
Ismail, Haji Muhammad, (Tribal elder in Helmand province). Nov 2013. 
Villager 1 (V1). Kunar province. Nov 2013. 
Villaher 2 (V2). Nangarhar Province. Nov 2013. 
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Afghan Labourer/Diapora member based in UAE (D1). 2014. 
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Businessman in Kabul (B2). Kabul, Nov 2013. 
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Durrani, Mamoon (Journalist in Kandahar province). Nov 2013. 
366 
 
Hejran, Abdul Wadood (Journalist in Helmand province). Nov 2012. 
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Shafi, Aziz Ahmad (Journalist in Helmand province). Oct 2014. 
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Sri Lanka/LTTE 
Tamil diaspora member sympathetic to the LTTE cause (Tamil 1), London, Feb 2013. 
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Tamil Journalist from Sri Lanka (Tamil 3). London, March 2013.  
Sinhala journalist based in London on Tamil-Sinhalese tensions (Tamil 4). London, March 2013.  
 
 
II (B). Conferences and Seminars: 
 
During the research period, I attended a number of speeches, seminars, conferences and workshops, which 
informed the research. 
● The End of America’s Long War and the Future of Post-Election Afghanistan. Karl Eikenberry, former US 
ambassador to Afghanistan (May 2009 until July 2011), currently serving as a Fellow in International 
Security at Stanford University. Discussion at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), London, 
25 June 2014. 
● Prospect roundtable meeting on Afghanistan.  Richard Stagg, UK Ambassador to Afghanistan, as the guest 
speaker. Discussion at the Prospect Magazine, London, 20
th
 May 2013. 
● Anti-drug policies in Colombia: Successes, failures and lost opportunities. Event organised by the 
Embassy of Colombia at Canning House, London, with guest speakers Daniel Mejía Londoño and Alejandro 
Gaviria Uribe (University of the Andes, Colombia), 29 May 2012.  
● Colloquium on counter-narcotics policy in Afghanistan: transition and beyond. off-the-record event of 
which I was the author was a participant. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), London, 28 May 
2012. 
● Making Sense of Afghanistan: Competing narratives and their impact on future policy. Round Table at 
Chatham House, London, 28 April 2014. 
● Drugs, Insecurity and Failed States: The problems of prohibition. Nigel Inkster and Virginia Comolli as 
speakers at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), London.  23 April 2012. 
● Ideology versus Profit: Drugs and Insurgencies in Afghanistan and Colombia. My public talk at the 
Mershon Center for International Security Studies, the Ohio State University, Columbus, USA. 2 April 2012.  
● Funding the Insurgencies: The impact of illicit drugs on the structure, political goals and ideologies of 
insurgent groups. My talk at the Department of Politics and International Relations (DPIR), University of 
Westminster, DPIR conference, London, 12 Nov 2014. 
● The Afghan Mission: Achievements of the US-led intervention and the Prospects of Peace and Prosperity 
in Afghanistan. The Mershon Center for International Security Studies, the Ohio State University, Columbus, 
USA, 23 January 2014. 
● Mission accomplished? Weak police as the allies retreat from Afghanistan. My talk at the Front Line Club, 
London, 25 Feb 2013. 
● Where has war left the people of Afghanistan? 10th Anniversary of the US-led invasion. My talk at the 
Front Line Club, London. 5 October 2011. 
● The Challenge of Change in Afghanistan. Guest speaker Muhammad Daud Yaar, Afghan Ambassador to 





      
Appendix I: 
 
Taliban’s Drugs Decrees 
 
 
During the Taliban rule in Afghanistan (1996-2001), the Taliban’s Supreme Leader, 
Mullah Muhammad Omar, issued several Farmans (decrees/executive orders) banning and 
regulating the production and trade of opium and other drugs in the country. Following is 
the English translation of Mullah Omar’s “opium decrees” as well as material illustrating 
Taliban’s attitude towards opium before and after their regime was toppled by the US-led 
intervention starting on 7
th
 October 2001. This section also includes the English translation 
of Mullah Omar’s decree in which he banned the smoking of cigarettes for his followers 
and government employees.      
 
 
1. Text of the Taliban government’s decree banning the cultivation of cannabis. 
Dated 13 Muharram 1420 (29 April 1999) and published in the Official Gazette 
# 788 on 5 Jumad-al-Akhir 1420 Islamic Lunar Year (15 September 1999), p. 
90. (Translated from Pashto and Dari by the author.) 
 
 
Decree of the Office of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan regarding the ban on the 
cultivation of marijuana/cannabis. 
 
Serial No: (2) 




(1). The cultivation of marijuana/cannabis is absolutely banned throughout the country. 
 





Provincial governors are required to take necessary measures in their concerned provinces 










Servant of Islam 
 
Amir-ul-Mumineen Mullah Muhammad Omar ‘Mujahid’ 
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2. Text of the Taliban government’s decree ordering all of its employees and 
fighters not to smoke cigarettes. Published in the Official Gazette # 788 on 5 
Jumad-al-Akhir 1420 Islamic Lunar Year (15 September 1999), p. 8. The 
decree itself doesn’t have a serial number or the exact date of issuance. (Translated 





Message of the Office of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan Regarding ban on the 
smoking of cigarettes.  
 
 
To all respected officials and mujahideen of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan! 
 
Assalam-u-alaikum wa rahmat-Ullah-e wa barakaatuh. 
 
 
All respected officials are informed that smoking cigarettes is absolutely banned from now 
on. There will be no discussion about its religious permissibility or impermissibility.  
 
Every official should monitor and track his subordinates. This is a serious order, aversion 






Servant of Islam 
 

























3. Scanned image of Mullah Omar’s 2000 decree (Farman) banning opium 











Image 1: Scanned image of Mullah Omar’s 2000 decree (Farman) banning poppy cultivation as published in 





















3 (b). Text of Mullah Omar’s Farman (decree) banning opium poppy cultivation. 
Dated 21 Jumad-Al-Awwal 1421 of Islamic Lunar Hijri Year (21 August 2000) and 
published in the Official Gazette # 795 on 12 Shawal 1421 Islamic Lunar Year (7 
January 2001), p. 308. (Translated from Pashto and Dari by the author.) 
 
 
Decree of the Office of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan Regarding the Ban on the 
Cultivation of Opium Poppies  
 
 
Serial No: (22) 





(1). Opium poppy cultivation is absolutely prohibited throughout the country.  
 
(2). Those people who cultivate poppies and violate the order above will be given a severe 




Relevant employees of the Emirate [The Taliban Government] are responsible to take 











Servant of Islam 
 


















4. Text of the Taliban government’s decree ordering district governors to 
implement the poppy ban. Dated 14 Rajab 1421 of Islamic Lunar year (11 
October 2000) and published in the Official Gazette # 795 on 12 Shawal 1421 
Islamic Lunar Year (7 January 2001), p, 310-312. (Translated from Pashto and Dari by 
the author.) 
 
Message of the Amir-ul-Mumineen Regarding the Cultivation Opium Poppies  
 
Serial No: (95) 
Date: 14/7/1421 [11 October 2000] 
 
To the respected district governors in the provinces! 
 
Assalam-u-alaikum wa rahmat-Ullah-e wa barakaatuh! 
 
Although the ban on the cultivation of opium poppies has been announced many times on 
the radio and all the people are aware about it, but now, as it is the poppy cultivation 
season, you should start action in your relevant area immediately. You yourselves should 
go to every area and village, collect information, and, if someone had violated the ban, 
[and] had cultivated poppies; detain him until he has eradicated his poppies. If he didn’t 
eradicate his poppies despite his detention, then you should eradicate them through a 
tractor or other methods. Take the cost [of eradication] from him. This activity should 
continue until the end of the poppy cultivation season. We are monitoring the progress [of 
this task] and are collecting information. If any poppy field remained intact in any district 
or province, the responsibility will be on the official of that area. Then he doesn’t have the 
right to complain. 
 
To implement the above order, collect the people in different areas [and] hold gatherings. 
Also convey to them this message from us that we have not banned the poppy cultivation 
for our [Taliban regime’s] recognition or on the asking or help of the foreigners. We have 
not been given any help [aid] and, even if we ask [for it], they will not help. We have 
banned it [cultivation of poppies] only and only with the intention of the welfare of the 
Muslim nation of Afghanistan. Only a few people bear its benefit [but] many people have 
become indebted or addicted [to drugs]. The number of its [opiates] addicts increases year 
over year. If all of youngsters become addicted, then you will regret. 
 
You see [it for yourself], those provinces that do not cultivate poppies, have poor people 
but they do not have that many indebted and addicted people as there are in the poppy 
cultivating provinces. If you look carefully, its harms are far greater than benefits. Don’t 
seek any more information about its [religious] permission and prohibition. The ban has 
been ordered for the sake of expediency and its implementation is obligatory on all. 
Opposition is not allowed. No one should defy. 
 
Nor can one guaranteed the food/provisions himself neither can we [for him]. This 
[provisions/sustenance] is provided only and only by God. Opium is not the only means of 
[provisions/livelihood], there other means too. We ask the Lord Almighty to provide 
provisions/sustenance from another means.         
     
Wassalam 
 
Servant of Islam 
 
Amir-ul-Mumineen Mullah Muhammad Omar ‘Mujahid’ 
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5. Text of the Taliban government’s decree asking ulama (religious scholars) to 
convey the message of poppy ban to people. Dated 14 Rajab 1421 of Islamic 
Lunar year (11 October 2000) and published in the Official Gazette # 795 on 12 
Shawal 1421 Islamic Lunar Year (7 January 2001), p, 309. (Translated from Pashto 





Decree of the Office of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan Regarding the Ban on the 




Serial No: (48) 
Date: 14/7/1421 [11 October 2000] 
 
 
To the provincial and district councils of honourable ulama (religious scholars)! 
 
Assalam-u-alaikum wa rahmat-Ullah-e wa barakaatuh. 
 
Regarding the order issued by the Office of the Emirate about the ban on the cultivation of 
opium poppies, we have issued a message and instructions to district 
governors/administrators (Wulaswal) and told them that the implementation and pursuance 
of the order was their responsibility. We are also sending [you] a few pages/copies of that 
message to communicate and disseminate it to the people through the honourable ulama, 
because you will be more effective in this task than others. 




Servant of Islam 
 


























Image 2: A sign board in Pashto and English from the narcotics control department of Afghanistan’s eastern 
Nangarhar province at the time when the Taliban were in government (1996-2001). (Source: BBC Website: 
[Online] : <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/2361453.stm>) 
 
The text reads: 
 
“The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan not only considers illegal things forbidden but 
launches effective struggles against illicit drugs as these drugs are great threat to 








Image 3: Night Letter Attributed to the Taliban Warns Against Eradication  
 
The letter written in Pashto language warns people not to eradicate their poppy fields and threatens them with 
punishment otherwise. The letter is on the official letter pad of the Taliban’s governor for Helmand province. 
It was obtained by a villager in Helmand province.  (Note: The Taliban have not confirmed the authenticity 
























Image 6: Author in a ceremony where the seized drugs were burnt in the remote North-East Badakhshan 


























Image 9: Author with drug addicts in a drug rehabilitation centre in the remote North-East Badakhshan 
province (Afghanistan). (Source: Author’s photo) 
